Opinion, per MATTHIAS, J. independently of it." It would be quite contrary to the long-established and frequently-applied rule in this state to permit a public officer or agent, by the adoption of methods or a course of action forbidden by law, to validate the same by his unauthorized action, no matter how long continued. The contention that the provisions of Section 2702, Revised Statutes, familiarly known as the Burns law, have application to the contract entered into by the trustees of waterworks is fully met by the decision of this court in the case of Kerr v. City of Bellefontaine, 59 Ohio St., 446. In that case the court had under consideration provisions relative to the powers and duties of trustees of gas works, quite similar to the statutes under consideration here conferring powers upon and prescribing the duties of waterworks trustees. The condition in the contracts under consideration here, that "when the rentals along said line shall equal annually, 10 per cent. of the cost of construction thereof, this board shall, if in funds applicable thereto, repay said The Frisbie Company," etc., makes the following language used by the court in the case of Kerr v. Bellefontaine quite pertinent here: "Not only was this requirement of the statute designed to place a restriction upon the increase of municipal indebtedness but its terms are inapplicable to a contract of this character. The requirement is that the certificate must show that the money required for the contract is in the treasury to the credit of the fund and not appropriated for any other purpose. The fund from which the plaintiff is entitled to satisfaction of his Opinion, per MATTHIAS, J. demand is not raised by taxation. It is derived from the operation of the gas works and made subject to the order of the board whose authority is so limited that they can make valid contracts only for appliances and supplies for the gas works to which the fund is devoted. The fund can be appropriated to no other purpose, and the trustees can contract for no other purpose." Nor do we regard Section 1693, Revised Statutes, providing that "No contract, agreement or obligation shall be entered into except by ordinance of council," etc., as having application to the matters under consideration, for the reason that by Section 2415, Revised Statutes, the trustees of waterworks are specifically authorized to make contracts essential for the efficient management and construction of waterworks, and it is provided by Section 1693, Revised Statutes, that the section. shall not be construed "to impair the power to contract wherever elsewhere given in this title." Sections 2415 and 1693, Revised Statutes, are in the same title. The powers of the board of waterworks trustees of the Village of East Cleveland, at the time the contracts here sued upon were made, were conferred, and their duties prescribed, by the provisions of Sections 2407 and 2435, Revised Statutes of 1900, being Bates' Third Edition. We must therefore look to those provisions for the authority possessed by the trustees, and from a consideration thereof ascertain whether it has been exceeded or any of the express restrictions thereof disregarded. Opinion, per MATTHIAS, J. Section 2415, Revised Statutes, conferring general authority upon trustees of waterworks to make contracts is as follows: "The trustees or board shall be authorized to make contracts for the building of machinery, waterworks, buildings, reservoirs, and the enlargement and repair thereof, and the manufacture and laying down of pipe, and the furnishing and supplying with connections all necessary fire hydrants for fire department purposes, and keeping the same in repair, and for all other necessary purposes to the full and efficient management and construction of water-works." The power thus conferred is limited and restricted by the provisions of Section 2419, Revised Statutes. That section is as follows: "The trustees or board, before entering into any contract for work to be done, the estimated cost of which exceeds five hundred dollars, shall cause at least two weeks' notice to be given, in one or more daily newspapers of general circulation in the corporation, that proposals will be received by the trustees, for the performing of the work specified in such notice; and the trustees shall contract with the lowest bidder, if in their opinion he can be depended on to do the work with ability, promptness, and fidelity; and if such be not the case, the trustees may award the contract to the next lowest bidder, or decline to contract, and advertise again." It is well settled in this state that where the statute prescribes the mode by which the power therein conferred upon a municipal body shall be exercised, the mode specified is likewise the measure of the power granted, and that a contract made Opinion, per MATTHIAS, J. otherwise than as expressly prescribed and limited by statute is not binding or obligatory as a contract. (City of Lancaster v. Miller, 58 Ohio St., 558.) Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal., 96, 81 Am. Dec., 96, is a leading case upon this subject, the opinion being by Chief Justice Field. Concededly the provisions of Section 2419, Revised Statutes, were not followed, and it is claimed that they have no application to the contracts in question in this case. Each of the contracts sued upon contemplates the expenditure of a sum of money far in excess of $500, and, therefore, should have been let by competitive bidding after advertisement, unless for some reason exempt from the provisions of Section 2419, Revised Statutes. Provisions of similar import and effect have been construed by this court in several cases, and in every instance the court has held such provisions mandatory, that a compliance therewith was a condition precedent to the power to enter into a valid contract providing for the improvement, that no implied liability arises against the municipality by the approval or acceptance of such improvement by its officers, and that the municipality is not estopped by the acts of its officers to rely upon the provisions of statutes relating to their powers in defense to actions upon contracts made in disregard thereof. City of Lancaster v. Miller, supra; McCloud & Geigle v. City of Columbus, 54 Ohio St., 439; Buchanan Bridge Co. v. Campbell et al., 60 Ohio St., 406; City of Wellston v. Morgan, 65 Opinion, per MATTHIAS, J. Ohio St., 219, and McCormick v. City of Niles, 81 Ohio St., 246. The decision in the case of City of Lancaster v. Miller, supra, is particularly in point, and is controlling as to the matter now under consideration. It was there held that a contract entered into by a municipal corporation, by which, in its own behalf, it was to pay for the construction of a sewer in one of its streets, the cost of which exceeds $500, imposed no valid obligation upon the corporation, unless it had advertised for bids according to the requirements of Section 2303, Revised Statutes. The syllabus in the case of McCloud & Geigle v. City of Columbus, supra, is as follows: "Where a municipal corporation, acting under Chapter 4, division 7, of Title XII, Revised Statutes, improves a public street, the provisions of section 2303, prescribing the mode and time of advertising for bids, are mandatory, the compliance with which is a condition precedent to the power of the municipality to enter into a valid agreement in respect thereof." But it is urged that even these clearly mandatory provisions of the statute can have no application in the present case for the reason that the trustees did no work and purchased no material, all the work done and material furnished having been paid for by The Frisbie Company. This is begging the entire question. Under the provisions of the contract entered into The Frisbie Company was to pay the entire expense of the proposed improvement. That company did the work and furnished the material and now seeks to recover the cost and expense thereof under the terms of its contract. The |