Dissenting Opinion, per JoNes, J. The utilization of these words excludes the power to regulate. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The charter of the city government plainly incorporated a power not conferred by the provisions of the constitutional section above quoted. The power attempted to be exercised by the city of Cleveland in the instant case is one of the police powers of the state, and remains therein, unless it has been unquestionably delegated by the state. We have already said that there are no clear or express terms found in our constitution conferring this sovereign function upon the city. The police power emanates from the welfare clause of the state and federal constitutions, and is based upon the principle that private property and corporations exercising public franchises or special privileges must submit their use to the control of the state for the common good. There is no question but that this is an exercise of the police power. Indeed, counsel for the city in their oral argument admitted it. It has been so recognized by every court which has had the subject under consideration. Yeatman v. Towers et al., 126 Md., 513; City of Benwood et al. v. Public Service Comm., 75 W. Va., 127; State, ex rel. Webster, v. Superior Court, 67 Wash., 37; Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist et al., 26 Idaho, 222; Seattle Electric Co. v. City of Seattle, 78 Wash., 203; Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co. v. Reynolds et al., 244 U. S., 574; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S., 113; Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U. S., 265, and Lima Tel. & Teleg. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, ante, 110. Dissenting Opinion, per JONES, J. Recurring again to the home-rule constitution conferring police power upon charter cities, we find that provision limited by the following language: Section 3, Article XVIII. "Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws." In the present case, assuming that the charter city had the right to adopt this police regulation, the legislature, meanwhile, in conformity with its constitutional grant, had provided by general law for the creation of the public utilities commission and clothed it with supreme powers which are in direct conflict with the alleged power of rate regulation found in the city charter. In speaking of a police regulation adopted by the city of Fremont under authority of the quoted section, this court said in the case of City of Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St., 468, 470: "This statute is a police regulation, and, under the section of the constitution above referred to, the municipality has the right to adopt and enforce within its limits police regulations in regard to the same subject-matter, not in conflict with this statute." The foregoing cases disclose that under constitutional provisions similar to our own other jurisdictions have subordinated the police power of rate fixing to the control of the various commissions established by legislative action. Section 11, Article XI, of the Constitution of the state of Washington, provides that any city Dissenting Opinion, per JONES, J. "may make and enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws." This is substantially the language of the Ohio amendment. In construing the quoted provision of the Washington constitution the supreme court of that state held that the right of the city to exercise the police power over a particular subject-matter ceases when the state acts by establishing commission control. In that case there was an attempt by the city of Seattle to regulate the operation of the street railroads, which by the terms of the general law had been made common carriers, subject to commission control. The case of State, ex rel. Webster, v. Superior Court for King Co., 67 Wash., 37, was peculiarly similar to the instant case. That, was a telephone company case. The procedure in that case covers this like a blanket. The telephone company was operating its telephone system in the city of Seattle. In June, 1910, complaint of a patron of the company was made to the public service commission of that state, and hearing was had, and an order was made directing the company to inaugurate a new schedule of rates higher than those fixed in the franchise theretofore granted by the city. As in this case, the city of Seattle attempted to enjoin the company from collecting the rates fixed by the commission. Thereupon the relator invoked the original jurisdiction of the supreme court of Washington in prohibition, asking that "a writ be made to run against the superior court, prohibiting it from further proceeding in defiance Dissenting Opinion, per JONES, J. of the order of the public service commission." The court held that, under the provision of the Washington constitution quoted, there remained the reservation of general legislative power in the state, and that "a franchise granted by a city to a telephone company under authority of a special city charter is subject to such reservation, and may be controlled or modified by subsequent acts of the legislature," and awarded a writ of prohibition against the superior court. To the same effect is the decision of the supreme court of that state in State, ex rel. Great N. Ry. Co., v. Railroad Commission, 52 Wash., 33. * * The provision of Section 16, Article IX of the Missouri Constitution, adopted in 1875, is as follows: "Any city * may form a charter for its own government, consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws of this State," etc. In State, ex rel. Gardner, v. M. & K. Telephone Co., supra, the supreme court of Missouri held that the police power of rate making was not a purely municipal power, and that under the provisions of the constitution a city "may form a charter for its own government;" but the power of price regulation for telephone service within the city was not conferred upon the city by that constitutional provision. By the provisions of the constitution of Oregon the voters of a municipality are authorized to enact and amend their charters "subject to the Constitution and criminal laws of the State of Oregon." That state had created a public board known as the public service commission of Oregon, with Dissenting Opinion, per JONES, J. power to make or substitute such rate or rates as should be just and reasonable. The supreme court of the state held that the constitutional grant did not empower the cities of Oregon "to provide for the fixing of rates of public utilities granted franchises within their limits, which cannot be changed by a commission created by general law." Cases construing the provisions of the California constitution would not be helpful in determining this case for the reason that the freeholders' charters of that state granting police power emanate from the legislature. While Section 8, Article XI of the California Constitution, provides that any city "may frame a charter for its own government, consistent with and subject to the constitution," the constitution expressly provides that such charter shall be submitted to the legislature, and if approved by a majority of each house, shall become the organic law of the city. They therefore obtain, in respect to matters pertaining to police regulation, their grant of power directly from the sovereign authority. This explains the language in Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S., 265, where it is held: "Only the legislature of a State, or a municipality specifically authorized thereto by the legislature, can surrender by contract a governmental power such as fixing rates." The supreme court of Oregon in the case of Woodburn v. Public Service Commission, supra, held that enabling provisions of the Oregon constitution, empowering cities to enact charters "subject to the Constitution and criminal laws of the |