ABANDONMENT OF RAILROAD LINES. See Interstate Commerce
Act.
ABSTENTION. See Jurisdiction, 1.
ACCESS OF PUBLIC TO PRETRIAL SUPPRESSION HEARINGS.
See Constitutional Law, X.
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION OF DISABILITY BENEFIT
CLAIMS. See Social Security Act.
ADVERTISING ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES. See Federal Communi-
cations Commission.
AGRICULTURAL FAIR PRACTICES ACT OF 1967.
Farmers' associations-Pre-emption of state law.-Act's provisions per-
mitting individual farmers and other producers of agricultural commodities
to join voluntarily in cooperative associations, and prohibiting such associa-
tions from interfering with such individuals' rights, pre-empts Michigan
Act insofar as it provides for accreditation of producers' associations to
serve as exclusive bargaining agent for all producers of a particular com-
modity, to collect service fees from nonmember producers, and to force
them to sell their products under terms established by association. Michi-
gan Canners & Freezers Assn. v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining
Bd., p. 461.
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AGREEMENT ACT OF 1937.
Milk market orders-Judicial review-Consumers' standing to sue.—
Individual consumers of fluid dairy products have no standing to obtain
judicial review of Secretary of Agriculture's milk market orders, issued
under Act, setting minimum prices that handlers (those who process dairy
products) must pay to dairy farmers for "reconstituted milk." Block v.
Community Nutrition Institute, p. 340.
AIRPLANE ACCIDENTS. See Federal Tort Claims Act.
AIR POLLUTION. See Clean Air Act.
ALASKA. See Constitutional Law, I, 2.
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES ADVERTISING. See Federal Communi-
See Constitutional Law, V; Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952; National Labor Relations Act.
ANTITRUST ACTS. See also Motor Carrier Act of 1980.
Conspiracies-Parent corporation and subsidiary.—A parent corpora-
tion and its wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring with each
other for purposes of § 1 of Sherman Act. Copperweld Corp. v. Independ-
ence Tube Corp., p. 752.
APPORTIONMENT OF WATERS BETWEEN STATES. See Water
Rights.
ARIZONA. See Constitutional Law, II, 2.
ARMED FORCES. See Garnishment.
See Constitutional Law, VIII.
ATTORNEYS' PROMOTIONS IN PARTNERSHIP FIRMS. See Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 2.
BACKPAY AWARDS. See National Labor Relations Act.
See Constitutional Law, IX.
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION'S SALES OF HYDRO-
ELECTRIC POWER. See Pacific Northwest Electric Power Plan-
ning and Conservation Act.
BONNEVILLE PROJECT ACT OF 1937. See Pacific Northwest Elec-
tric Power Planning and Conservation Act.
BREATH-ANALYSIS TESTS. See Constitutional Law, III, 1.
"BUBBLE CONCEPT" AS TO AIR-POLLUTION CONTROL. See
Clean Air Act.
BURDEN OF PROOF. See Water Rights.
CABLE TELEVISION ADVERTISING OF ALCOHOLIC BEVER-
AGES. See Federal Communications Commission.
CALIFORNIA. See Postal Service.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. See Constitutional Law, II, 2.
CERTIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT BY FEDERAL AVIATION
AGENCY. See Federal Tort Claims Act.
Improvident grant of writ-Validity of state statute.-Writ of certiorari
was dismissed as improvidently granted since case did not provide an ap-
propriate vehicle for determining constitutionality of a New York statute
prohibiting loitering in a public place for purpose of engaging in, or solicit-
ing another to engage in, deviate sexual behavior. New York v. Uplinger,
p. 246.
ORGANIZATIONS' FUNDRAISING EXPENSES.
See Constitutional Law, VI, 1.
CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT FOR NOTARIES PUBLIC. See
Constitutional Law, V.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866.
Employment discrimination-Suit for individual discrimination-Ef-
fect of earlier class action.-Petitioner bank employees were not precluded
from maintaining an action against bank, alleging that each petitioner had
been denied a promotion because of race in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1981,
by fact that they were members of class represented in an earlier class
action where it was held that bank had not engaged in a pattern or practice
of racial discrimination. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,
p. 867.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871.
Conspiracy between public defenders and state officials-Public defend-
ers' immunity.-Where respondent, whose state-court conviction was
affirmed on appeal, filed an action in Federal District Court under 42
U. S. C. § 1983 seeking to recover damages from petitioner public defend-
ers who had represented him in state proceedings, allegations that peti-
tioners had conspired with various state officials to secure respondent's
conviction were sufficient to assert conduct "under color of" state law for
purposes of § 1983; petitioners were not immune from § 1983 liability for
such alleged intentional misconduct. Tower v. Glover, p. 914.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.
1. Employment discrimination-Consent decree-Enforcement or mod-
ification. Where a consent decree was entered in a class action by
black members of Memphis Fire Department alleging racial discrimina-
tion in hiring and promotions in violation of Act's Title VII, and, when a
subsequent reduction of city employees was required, District Court pre-
liminarily enjoined Department from following its seniority system, result-
ing in layoffs of white employees with more seniority than retained black
employees, such injunction could not be justified either as an effort to
enforce or to modify consent decree; litigation was not moot even though all
employees affected by layoffs had been restored to duty or offered back
their old positions. Firefighters v. Stotts, p. 561.
2. Sex discrimination-Law firm partnership-Failure to advance fe-
male associate to partnership.-In petitioner's action against respondent
law firm alleging that (1) when she accepted employment with respondent
as an associate she relied on representation that associates would be con-
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964-Continued.
sidered for partnership "on a fair and equal basis," (2) such promise created
a binding employment contract, and (3) respondent discriminated on the
basis of sex when it failed to invite her to become a partner, complaint
stated a claim under Title VII of Act. Hishon v. King & Spalding, p. 69.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968. See Jurisdiction, 2.
CLASS-ACTION JUDGMENT AS AFFECTING SUBSEQUENT INDI-
VIDUAL SUITS BY CLASS MEMBERS. See Civil Rights Act
of 1866.
CLAYTON ACT. See Antitrust Acts.
"Stationary source" of air pollution-Plantwide definition.-Where,
pursuant to Act, Environmental Protection Agency promulgated regula-
tions authorizing States to adopt a plantwide definition of statutory term
"stationary source" of air pollution under which a plant may install or mod-
ify equipment without meeting permit conditions if total plant emissions
are not increased, EPA's plantwide definition was a permissible construc-
tion of statute. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., p. 837.
CLOSING PRETRIAL SUPPRESSION HEARINGS TO PUBLIC.
See Constitutional Law, X.
COLORADO. See Water Rights.
COLOR OF STATE LAW. See Civil Rights Act of 1871.
COMMERCE CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, I.
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934. See Federal Communications
Commission.
COMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ACT. See
Estoppel.
CONDEMNATION ACTIONS. See Constitutional Law, IV; Interstate
Commerce Act; Jurisdiction, 1.
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE. See Securities and Exchange Com-
mission.
CONSENT DECREES. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1.
CONSPIRACY. See Antitrust Acts; Civil Rights Act of 1871.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See also Certiorari; Criminal Law; Federal
Communications Commission; Jurisdiction; National Labor Rela-
tions Act; Securities and Exchange Commission.
1. State wholesale gross receipts tax-Validity.—A West Virginia stat-
ute imposing a gross receipts tax on wholesale businesses but exempting
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.
local manufacturers, who are subject to a higher manufacturing tax, uncon-
stitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce. Armco Inc. v.
Hardesty, p. 638.
2. Timber taken from state lands-Processing in State prior to export.-
Court of Appeals erred in holding that Alaska's requirement that timber
taken from state lands be processed within State prior to export was au-
thorized by Congress' endorsement of a similar requirement as to timber
taken from federal lands in Alaska, and thus did not violate Commerce
Clause. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, p. 82.
II. Double Jeopardy.
1. Guilty pleas to lesser included offenses-Trial on greater charges.—
Where, as a result of a killing and a theft of property, respondent was
indicted on counts of murder, involuntary manslaughter, aggravated rob-
bery, and grand theft, and state trial court, over State's objection, ac-
cepted guilty pleas to lesser included offenses of involuntary manslaughter
and grand theft, court erred in dismissing murder and aggravated robbery
charges (to which respondent pleaded not guilty) on ground that Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibited State from continuing prosecution on those
charges. Ohio v. Johnson, p. 493.
2. Murder conviction-Life sentence-Death penalty on resentencing.-
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited Arizona from sentencing respondent
to death where (1) jury convicted him of first-degree murder and armed
robbery and trial judge, after sentencing hearing, found no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances and, as required by state law, sentenced respond-
ent on murder conviction to life imprisonment without possibility of parole
for 25 years, (2) Arizona Supreme Court held that trial judge erred in
interpreting statutory aggravating circumstance of killing for "pecuniary
gain" as applying only to contract killings, and (3) after a new sentencing
hearing on remand, trial court sentenced respondent to death. Arizona
v. Rumsey, p. 203.
1. Breath-analysis tests-Preservation of breath samples.-Due process
does not require that law enforcement agencies preserve breath samples in
order to introduce breath-analysis test results at trial; thus, Constitution.
was not violated by State's failure to preserve samples of breath of re-
spondents, who were charged with drunken driving and who sought to sup-
press test results on ground that they could have used samples to impeach
results. California v. Trombetta, p. 479.
2. Multiemployer pension plans-Employer's withdrawal liability.—
Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment was not violated by application,
during 5-month period prior to enactment of Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980, of Act's provisions requiring an employer with-
drawing from a multiemployer pension plan to pay plan employer's pro-
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