governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71A.2 In brief, Rule 71A requires the filing in federal district court of a "complaint in condemnation," identifying the property and the interest therein that the United States wishes to take, followed by a trial-before a jury, judge, or specially appointed commission-of the question of how much compensation is due the owner of the land. The practical effect of final judgment on the issue of just compensation is to give the Government an option to buy the property at the adjudicated price. Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271, 284 (1939). If the Government wishes to exercise that option, it tenders payment to the private owner, whereupon title and right to possession vest in the United States. If the Government decides not to exercise its option, it can move for dismissal of the condemnation action. Ibid.; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 71A(i)(3).

3

A more expeditious procedure is prescribed by 40 U. S. C. § 258a. That statute empowers the Government, "at any time before judgment" in a condemnation suit, to file "a declaration of taking signed by the authority empowered by law to acquire the lands [in question], declaring that said lands are thereby taken for the use of the United States." The Government is obliged, at the time of the filing, to deposit in the court, "to the use of the persons entitled thereto," an

2 Suits under § 257 originally were required to "conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, forms and proceedings existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State" in which the suits were instituted. Act of Aug. 1, 1888, ch. 728, § 2, 25 Stat. 357. The adoption in 1951 of Rule 71A capped an effort to establish a uniform set of procedures governing all federal condemnation actions. See Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 71A, Original Report, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 644.

3 Section 258a was enacted in 1931, for the principal purpose of enabling the United States, when it wished, peremptorily to appropriate property on which public buildings were to be constructed, making it possible for the Government to begin improving the land, thereby stimulating employment during the Great Depression. See H. R. Rep. No. 2086, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1930).

amount of money equal to the estimated value of the land." Title and right to possession thereupon vest immediately in the United States. In subsequent judicial proceedings, the exact value of the land (on the date the declaration of taking was filed) is determined, and the owner is awarded the difference (if any) between the adjudicated value of the land and the amount already received by the owner, plus interest on that difference.

Finally, Congress occasionally exercises the power of eminent domain directly. For example, when Congress thinks that a tract of land that it wishes to preserve inviolate is threatened with imminent alteration, it sometimes enacts a statute appropriating the property immediately by "legislative taking" and setting up a special procedure for ascertaining, after the appropriation, the compensation due to the owners.5

In addition to these three statutory methods, the United States is capable of acquiring privately owned land summarily, by physically entering into possession and ousting the owner. E. g., United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 747-749 (1947). In such a case, the owner has a right to bring an "inverse condemnation" suit to recover the value of the land on the date of the intrusion by the Government. United States v. Dow, 357 U. S. 17, 21-22 (1958).6

The Government's selection amongst and implementation of these various methods of acquiring property is governed,

"The owner is entitled to prompt distribution of the deposited funds. 40 U. S. C. § 258a; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 71A(j).

5

See, e. g., 16 U. S. C. § 79c(b) (vesting in the United States "all right, title, and interest" in the land encompassed by the Redwood National Park as of the date of the enactment of the statute).

"Such a suit is "inverse" because it is brought by the affected owner, not by the condemnor. United States v. Clarke, 445 U. S. 253, 257 (1980). The owner's right to bring such a suit derives from "the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to condemnation. . . .'" Ibid. (quoting 6 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain § 25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972)).

Opinion of the Court

467 U. S. to some extent, by the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U. S. C. § 4601 et seq. That statute enjoins federal agencies, inter alia, to attempt to acquire property by negotiation rather than condemnation, and whenever possible not to take land by physical appropriation. §§ 4651(1), (4), (8). In addition, the statute requires a court with jurisdiction over a condemnation action that is dismissed or abandoned by the Government to award the landowner an amount that will reimburse him for "his reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses" incurred in contesting the suit. §4654(a). The statute does not, however, regulate decisions by the Government whether to employ the "straight-condemnation" procedure prescribed in § 257 or the "declaration of taking" procedure embodied in § 258a.

B

7

Petitioner, a manufacturer of forest products, owns substantial tracts of timberland in Texas. This case arises out of a protracted effort by the United States to appropriate 2,175.86 acres of that land.

In the mid-1960's, several studies were made of the desirability of establishing a national park or preserve to protect an area of relatively untrammeled wilderness in eastern Texas. One of those studies, conducted in 1967 by the National Park Service, recommended the creation of a 35,500acre Big Thicket National Park. The Texas Forestry Association, of which petitioner is a member, endorsed that proposal and declared a voluntary moratorium on logging in the designated area. Since 1967, petitioner has observed that moratorium and has not cut any trees on its property lying within the area demarked by the Park Service.

"We have held that the last-mentioned provision for the reimbursement of costs is a matter of legislative grace, not constitutional entitlement. United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U. S. 202, 204 (1979) (per curiam). Testimony at trial by one of petitioner's officers suggested that, regardless of the existence of the moratorium, petitioner would not have cut

8

After seven years of desultory consideration of the matter, Congress rejected the Park Service proposal and enacted legislation creating a much larger Big Thicket National Preserve. Act of Oct. 11, 1974, Pub. L. 93-439, 88 Stat. 1254, 16 U. S. C. § 698 et seq. The statute directed the Secretary of the Interior to acquire the land within the boundaries of the Preserve. 16 U. S. C. § 698(c). The Senate Report made clear that, though the Secretary had the authority to acquire individual tracts by declaration of taking, pursuant to 40 U. S. C. § 258a, such a peremptory procedure should be employed only when necessary to protect a parcel from destruction. S. Rep. No. 93–875, p. 5 (1974). was understood that, in the absence of such an emergency, the Secretary would purchase the land using the straightcondemnation method prescribed in 40 U. S. C. §257.9

It

The Government initially attempted to acquire the acreage owned by petitioner through a negotiated purchase. On August 21, 1978, after those negotiations had broken down, the United States filed a complaint in condemnation in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Shortly thereafter, the Government filed a notice of lis pendens, notifying the public of the institution of the condemnation proceeding. The District Court referred the matter to a special commission to ascertain the compensation due petitioner.

Trial before the commission began on March 6, 1979. On that day, the parties stipulated that "today is the date of taking." After hearing competing testimony pertaining to the fair market value of petitioner's land, the commission

any trees on that land, which it had held as a "reserve logging area" since the 1950's. Brief for United States 8, citing 1 Tr. 52. For the purpose of our decision, we place no weight on that testimony; we assume that petitioner voluntarily forwent an opportunity to make profitable use of its land. "The House bill had contained a provision appropriating the land by a legislative taking. H. R. 11546, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., §2 (1973). The Senate rejected this method on the ground that it was unnecessary to protect the land and would be unduly expensive. S. Rep. No. 93-875, pp. 5-6 (1974). The House acceded to the Senate's position.

entered a report recommending compensation in the amount of $2,331,202.

Both parties filed objections to the report in the District Court. On August 13, 1981, after holding a hearing to consider those objections, the District Court entered judgment awarding petitioner compensation in the amount recommended by the commission, plus interest at a rate of six percent for the period from August 21, 1978 (the date the complaint had been filed), to the date the Government deposited the adjudicated value of the land with the court. United States v. 2,175.86 Acres of Land, 520 F. Supp. 75, 81 (1981). The court justified its award of interest on the ground that the institution of condemnation proceedings had "effectively denied [petitioner] economically viable use and enjoyment of its property" and therefore had constituted a taking. Id., at 80.10 On March 26, 1982, the United States deposited the total amount of the judgment in the registry of the District Court. On the same date, the Government acquired title to the land.

Both parties appealed. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit unanimously ruled that the commission's report failed to meet the standards enunciated in United States v. Merz, 376 U. S. 192 (1964), and remanded the case for further findings regarding the value of petitioner's land. United States v. 2,175.86 Acres of Land, 696 F. 2d 351, 358 (1983). More importantly for present purposes, the Court of Appeals, by a vote of two to one, reversed the District Court's award of interest to petitioner. Reasoning that "the mere commencement of straight condemnation proceedings, where the government does not enter into possession . does not constitute a taking," id., at 355, the court held that,

10 The District Court did not expressly rule upon petitioner's contention that the stipulation entered into by the parties on the opening day of trial established the date of the taking. But, by awarding interest as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the court implicitly rejected petitioner's submission on that issue.