Pub. L. 280 to require that all subsequent assertions of jurisdiction be preceded by tribal consent. The court also rejected petitioner's argument that to prohibit a suit such as petitioner's would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and deny petitioner equal access to the courts in violation of the North Dakota Constitution. Held:

1. No federal law or policy required the North Dakota courts to forgo in this case the jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion, supra. Pp. 147-151.

(a) The exercise of state-court jurisdiction in this case would not interfere with the right of tribal Indians to govern themselves under their own laws. As a general matter, tribal self-government is not impeded when a State allows an Indian to seek relief against a non-Indian concerning a claim arising in Indian country. The exercise of state jurisdiction is particularly compatible with tribal autonomy when, as here, the suit is brought by the tribe itself and the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the claim at the time the suit was instituted. Pp. 147-149.

(b) Nor would the exercise of state jurisdiction here be inconsistent with the federal and tribal interests reflected in North Dakota's Enabling Act or in Pub. L. 280. The legislative record suggests only that the Enabling Act's phrase "absolute [congressional] jurisdiction and control" was meant to foreclose state regulation and taxation of Indians and their lands, not that Indians were to be prohibited from entering state courts to pursue judicial remedies against non-Indians. Public Law 280 does not either require North Dakota to disclaim the basic jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion or authorize it to do so. Nothing in Pub. L. 280's language or legislative history indicates that it was meant to divest States of pre-existing and otherwise lawfully assumed jurisdiction. Pp. 149-151.

2. Where it is uncertain whether the North Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of Chapter 27-19 rested on a misconception of federal law, its judgment will be vacated, and the case will be remanded to that court for reconsideration of the state-law question. Pp. 151-158.

(a) The court's incorrect assumption that Pub. L. 280 and the Civil Rights Act of 1968 either authorized North Dakota to disclaim jurisdiction or affirmatively forbade the exercise of jurisdiction absent tribal consent appears to have been the sole basis relied upon by the court to avoid holding the jurisdictional disclaimer unconstitutional as applied in this case. Pp. 154-155.

(b) The manner in which the court rejected the availability of "residuary jurisdiction" leaves open the possibility that, despite the court's references to state law, it regarded federal law as an affirmative

bar to the exercise of jurisdiction here and interpreted state law to avoid a perceived conflict. Pp. 155-157.

(c) The conclusion that the North Dakota Supreme Court's statelaw decision may have rested on federal law is buttressed by prudential considerations. If that court is not given an opportunity to reconsider its conclusions with the proper understanding of federal law, this Court, contrary to the fundamental rule that it will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them, will be required to decide whether North Dakota has denied petitioner equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 157-158.

321 N. W. 2d 510, vacated and remanded.

BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined, post, p. 159.

Raymond Cross argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was John O. Holm.

Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Habicht, and Edwin S. Kneedler. Hugh McCutcheon argued the cause for respondents and filed a brief for respondent Wold Engineering, P. C.*

JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. This litigation presents issues of state-court civil jurisdiction over a claim asserted by an Indian tribe. The case, as it comes to us, is somewhat unusual in a central respect: the Tribe seeks, rather than contests, state-court jurisdiction, and the non-Indian party is in opposition. Cf. Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959).

Chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code (1974) is entitled "Indian Civil Jurisdiction." Section 27-19-01 of that

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe et al. by Reid Peyton Chambers; and for the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians by Kim Jerome Gottschalk and Richard B. Collins.

Code provides that the jurisdiction of North Dakota courts shall extend "over all civil causes of action which arise on an Indian reservation upon acceptance by Indian citizens." In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota interpreted Chapter 27-19 to disclaim state-court jurisdiction over a claim (against a non-Indian) by an Indian Tribe that had not accepted jurisdiction under the statute. The court determined that the North Dakota Legislature had disclaimed jurisdiction pursuant to the principal federal statute governing state jurisdiction over Indian country, namely, the Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 1360, commonly known as Pub. L. 280. The court further concluded that the jurisdictional disclaimer, inasmuch as it was authorized by Pub. L. 280, did not run afoul of the North Dakota or Federal Constitutions. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of Chapter 27-19 and its accompanying constitutional analysis appear to us to rest on a possible misunderstanding of Pub. L. 280, we vacate the court's judgment and remand the case to allow reconsideration of the jurisdictional questions in the light of what we feel is the proper meaning of the federal statute.

I

A. Petitioner Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation is a federally recognized Indian Tribe with its reservation in northwestern North Dakota. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 23, 26 Stat. 1032. See City of New Town v. United States, 454 F. 2d 121 (CA8 1972). In 1974, petitioner employed respondent Wold Engineering, P. C. (hereafter respondent), a North Dakota corporation, to design and build the Four Bears Water System Project, a water-supply system located wholly within the reservation. The project was completed in 1977 but it did not perform to petitioner's satisfaction.

In 1980, petitioner sued respondent in a North Dakota state court for negligence and breach of contract. At the time the suit was filed, petitioner's tribal court did not have

jurisdiction over a claim by an Indian against a non-Indian in the absence of an agreement by the parties. Tribal Code, ch. II, § 1(a). The subject matter of petitioner's complaint, however, clearly fell within the scope of the state trial court's general jurisdiction. See N. D. Const., Art. VI, §8; N. D. Cent. Code § 27-05-06 (1974 and Supp. 1983). After counterclaiming for petitioner's alleged failure to complete its payments on the water-supply system, respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's complaint on the ground that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over any claim arising in Indian country.

B. At this point, in order to place respondent's jurisdictional argument in perspective, it is desirable to review the somewhat erratic course of federal and state law governing North Dakota's jurisdiction over the State's Indian reservations. Long before North Dakota became a State, this Court had recognized the general principle that Indian territories were beyond the legislative and judicial jurisdiction of state governments. Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832); see generally Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S., at 218-222. That principle was reflected in the federal statute that granted statehood to North Dakota. Like many other other States in the Midwest and West, North Dakota was required to "disclaim all right and title. . . to all lands lying within [the State] owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes" as a condition for admission to the Union. Enabling Act of Feb. 22, 1889, §4, cl. 2, 25 Stat. 677. The Act further provided that all such Indian land shall "remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and . . . shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United

2

'Following the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in this case, petitioner's Tribal Business Council amended the Tribal Code to grant the tribal court subject-matter jurisdiction over all civil causes of action arising within the boundaries of the Fort Berthold Reservation.

2 See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 268, and n. 72 (1982 ed.).

States." Ibid. North Dakota's original Constitution contained, in identical terms, the required jurisdictional disclaimers. See N. D. Const., Art. XVI, § 203, cl. 2 (1889).

3

Federal restrictions on North Dakota's jurisdiction over Indian country, however, were substantially eliminated in 1953 with the enactment of the aforementioned Pub. L. 280. See generally Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 471–474 (1979). Sections 2 and 4 of Pub. L. 280 gave five States full jurisdiction, with a stated minor exception as to each of two States, over civil and criminal actions involving Indians and arising in Indian country. 67 Stat. 588-589, codified, as amended, at 18 U. S. C. § 1162 and 28 U. S. C. § 1360, respectively. Sections 6 and 7 gave all other States the option of assuming similar jurisdiction. Section 6 authorized States whose constitutions and statutes contained federally imposed jurisdictional restraints, like North Dakota's, to amend their laws to assume jurisdiction. 67 Stat. 590, codified, as amended, at 25 U. S. C. § 1324. Section 7 provided similar federal consent to any other State not having civil and criminal jurisdiction, but required such States to assume jurisdiction through "affirmative legislative action." 67 Stat. 590. As originally enacted, Pub. L. 280 did not require States to obtain the consent of affected Indian tribes before assuming jurisdiction over them. Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 amended Pub. L. 280, however, to require that all subsequent assertions of jurisdiction be preceded by tribal consent. Pub. L. 90-284, §§ 401, 402, 406, 82 Stat. 78-80, codified at 25 U. S. C. §§ 1321, 1322, 1326.

Even before North Dakota moved to amend its Constitution and assume full jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280, the North Dakota Supreme Court had taken an expansive view of the scope of state-court jurisdiction over Indians in Indian

Before that, however, Congress had vested North Dakota with certain criminal jurisdiction over the Devils Lake Reservation. Act of May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 60 Stat. 229.