in this case, the date of the taking should be deemed the date on which the compensation award was paid." Consequently, no interest was due on that award.12

We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Circuits regarding the date on which the taking, in a "straightcondemnation" proceeding, should be deemed to occur and the constitutional obligation of the United States to pay interest on the adjudicated value of the property.' 464 U. S. 913 (1983). We now affirm.

II

13

The United States has the authority to take private property for public use by eminent domain, Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 371 (1876), but is obliged by the Fifth Amendment to provide "just compensation" to the owner thereof.

"The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the parties' stipulation regarding the "date of taking" was not controlling, see n. 10, supra. After reviewing the record, the Court of Appeals determined that the stipulation pertained only to the date as of which the land was to be valued, not the date on which the Government was deemed to have appropriated the land. 696 F. 2d, at 356. We see no reason to question that determination.

12 Judge Jolly dissented on this issue, arguing that the owner of unimproved land subject to condemnation proceedings under 40 U. S. C. § 257 is entitled to interest on the award at least for the period beginning with entry of judgment by the district court, because during that period the owner is "shackled from making economically viable use of his property." 696 F. 2d, at 358-359.

13 In two cases, panels of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have rejected the position taken by the Fifth Circuit in this case, holding that, when the United States condemns unimproved property using the method prescribed in 40 U. S. C. § 257, it must award interest to the owner for some period prior to the date the award is paid and title passes. United States v. 15.65 Acres of Land, 689 F. 2d 1329 (1982), cert. denied sub nom. Marin Ridgeland Co. v. United States, 460 U. S. 1041 (1983); United States v. 156.81 Acres of Land, 671 F. 2d 336, cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1086 (1982). Similar confusion exists in the District Courts. See, e. g., United States v. 59.29 Acres of Land, 495 F. Supp. 212 (ED Tex. 1980) (date of taking is date of announcement of the award by the commission).

"Just compensation," we have held, means in most cases the fair market value of the property on the date it is appropriated. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U. S. 506, 511-513 (1979).14 "Under this standard, the owner is entitled to receive 'what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller' at the time of the taking." Id., at 511 (quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 374 (1943)). 15

If the Government pays the owner before or at the time the property is taken, no interest is due on the award. See Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S., at 284. Such a mode of compensation is not constitutionally mandated; the Fifth Amendment does not forbid the Government to take land and pay for it later. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 400-403 (1895). But if disbursement of the award is delayed, the owner is entitled to interest thereon sufficient to ensure that he is placed in as good a position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if the payment had coincided with the appropriation.

14 Other measures of "just compensation" are employed only "when market value [is] too difficult to find, or when its application would result in manifest injustice to owner or public. . . ." United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U. S. 121, 123 (1950).

15 We have acknowledged that, in some cases, this standard fails fully to indemnify the owner for his loss. Particularly when property has some special value to its owner because of its adaptability to his particular use, the fair-market-value measure does not make the owner whole. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U. S. 506, 511-512 (1979). We are willing to tolerate such occasional inequity because of the difficulty of assessing the value an individual places upon a particular piece of property and because of the need for a clear, easily administrable rule governing the measure of "just compensation." Ibid.

None of the discussion in this opinion is intended to modify either the manner in which the fair-market-value standard is interpreted and applied or the test for determining when the fair-market-value standard must be supplanted by other formulae, see n. 14, supra. In particular, we express no view on the question of how the value of land condemned under 40 U. S. C. § 257 should be assessed when activities of the Government during the pendency of the condemnation proceedings have so altered the condition of the property as to reduce the price it could fetch on the open market on the date of the taking.

Phelps v. United States, 274 U. S. 341, 344 (1927); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 306 (1923).16

From the foregoing it should be apparent that identification of the time a taking of a tract of land occurs is crucial to determination of the amount of compensation to which the owner is constitutionally entitled. The Government contends that, in straight-condemnation proceedings like that at issue here, the date of taking must be deemed the date the United States tenders payment to the owner of the land. The Government's position is amply supported by prior decisions by this Court and by indications of congressional intent derivable from the structure of the pertinent statutory scheme and the governing procedural rule.

In Danforth v. United States, supra, we were called upon to determine the date on which the Government, in an exercise of its eminent domain power under the Flood Control Act of 1928, ch. 569, 45 Stat. 534, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 702a et seq., appropriated the petitioner's property. We held that, “[u]nless a taking has occurred previously in actuality or by a statutory provision . . ., we are of the view that the taking in a condemnation suit under this statute takes place upon the payment of the money award by the condemnor." 308 U. S., at 284.17 In response to the contention

16 The last-mentioned principle underlies the provision in 40 U. S. C. § 258a for the payment of interest on any difference between the estimated value of land appropriated through a declaration of taking and its subsequently adjudicated actual value as of that date. See supra, at 5. The principle also underlies several decisions by Courts of Appeals, holding that the six percent rate of interest prescribed by § 258a is not a ceiling on the amount that can and must be paid by the Government. See, e. g., United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 704 F. 2d 800, 812, and n. 18 (CA5 1983) (en banc). The United States has acquiesced in those decisions. Brief for United States 14, n. 13.

17 Petitioner's contention that our decision in Danforth pertained only to takings effected pursuant to the Flood Control Act is unpersuasive. Though the Flood Control Act contained a provision (analogous to 40 U. S. C. § 258a) empowering the United States to appropriate land expeditiously by filing a special petition and depositing an estimated award,

Opinion of the Court

467 U. S.

that such a procedure was unfair, we observed, "[t]he owner is protected by the rule that title does not pass until compensation has been ascertained and paid . Id., at 284-285 (quoting Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 581, 587 (1923)).

That all straight-condemnation proceedings under §257 should operate in the fashion described in Danforth is strongly suggested by the structure of Rule 71A, which now governs the administration of the statute. Rule 71A(i) permits the United States to dismiss a condemnation suit at any time before "compensation has been determined and paid," unless the Government previously has “acquired the title or a lesser interest . . . or taken possession." 18 The Government's capacity to withdraw from the proceeding in this fashion would be difficult to explain if a taking were effectuated prior to tendering of payment.

Finally, Congress' understanding that a taking does not occur until the termination of condemnation proceedings brought under § 257 is reflected in its adoption of § 258a for the purpose of affording the Government the option of peremptorily appropriating land prior to final judgment, thereby permitting immediate occupancy and improvement of the property.19 Such an option would have been superfluous if, as

ch. 569, § 4, 45 Stat. 536 (incorporating by reference § 5 of the River and Harbor Act of 1918, ch. 155, 40 Stat. 911), when the Government appropriated the land at issue in Danforth, it apparently did not invoke its special statutory authority but instead took the property in the usual fashion as authorized by 40 U. S. C. § 257. The holding of the case is thus on point. 18 After commencement of the valuation hearing, the Government may dismiss the suit only pursuant to a stipulation with the owner, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 71A(i)(2), or with the approval of the district court, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 71A(i)(3). The Rule does not suggest that a court order dismissing a suit has the effect of nullifying a taking that has already occurred. Indeed, to the contrary, the Rule forbids the district court to dismiss an action (without awarding just compensation) if the Government has acquired any "interest" in the property. Ibid.

19 See n. 3, supra.

petitioner contends, a taking occurred upon the filing of the complaint in a § 257 suit.20

Petitioner's principal objection to the position advocated by the Government is that such a reading of § 257 and Rule 71A is precluded by the Fifth Amendment. Petitioner contends that, at least when the subject of a straight-condemnation proceeding is unimproved land, the owner is effectively deprived of all of the significant interests associated with ownership long before the Government tenders payment. The filing of a complaint in condemnation and a notice of lis pendens, petitioner contends, has the effect of preventing the owner of unimproved land thereafter from making any profitable use of it, or of selling it to another private party. At the same time, the owner remains liable for property taxes.21 Such a thoroughgoing abrogation of the owner's rights, petitioner submits, surely constitutes a taking as soon as the abrogation is effective, regardless of when the land is officially appropriated under the terms of the statute.

If petitioner's depiction of the impairment of its beneficial interests during the pendency of the condemnation suit were

"It must be admitted that the adoption of § 258a does not compel the conclusion that Congress in 1931 understood that the taking in a § 257 suit did not occur until the date payment was tendered by the condemnor, because § 258a by its terms only empowers the Government to file a declaration of taking prior to "judgment." The language of § 258a is thus consistent with a congressional understanding that the taking occurred upon entry of final judgment in a straight-condemnation action. However, the fact that Congress did not empower the Government to file a declaration of taking anytime prior to the tender of payment does not undercut our construction of $257, because the Government has no need of special authority to appropriate land after judgment and before payment in a straight-condemnation suit; after entry of judgment, the Government can acquire the land merely by paying the owner the adjudicated value of the property.

"Cf. United States v. 15.65 Acres of Land, 689 F. 2d, at 1334 (arguing that the initiation of a condemnation action leaves "[t]he owner of unimproved land . . . with the liabilities which follow title but none of the benefits, save the right ultimately to be paid for the taking").