uniform, but then what is called a suicide occurs, and there is an estrangement.

Now, I know that probably a lot of folks are uncomfortable. They do not know what to say to someone whose family has just experienced what is called a suicide, and so the natural human nature is, you shy away, but boy, that is the time I think you really need to you are comrades. We need to make sure that that network remains intact, whether you are an admiral, a private, or anybody else.

General TAYLOR. Sir, I would add to that that whether it is a suicide, a homicide, or any death, accidental or otherwise, that same kinship exists between the military services and the family. Senator KEMPTHORNE. That is right.

General TAYLOR. That needs to be reinforced.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Again, but I think with suicide there is an additional awkwardness sometimes.

General TAYLOR. Absolutely.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. The sensitivity from families, you have lost somebody, but now you are told that it was a suicide. I mean, that is a different feeling as well.

All right. Senator Frahm.

Senator FRAHM. No questions, thank you.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Now, Ms. Hill, let me ask you, when do you anticipate that you will be finished with all of the 1185(b) reinvestigations?

Ms. HILL. Senator, as soon as possible, certainly. I am reluctant to give you a specific date because I can tell you that some of the cases that are remaining are very difficult ones, and we have done a lot of work on them so far. There are some that we are about ready to get finished. We have got, I think, eight in the draft report stage, which means they are almost finished, but then we have got some we are just starting.

I do not want to mislead any families by telling them that it is going to be done by a date certain and then not be able to live up to that deadline, but I can tell you we are trying to get them done as quickly as possible.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Ms. Hill, will you issue a comprehensive report with analysis of trends and shortcomings in investigative procedures, systemic corrections which should be made, and including lessons learned after you finish reinvestigating these 1185(b) cases?

Ms. HILL. Senator, we had not really contemplated that, frankly. We have been so busy trying to get the individual cases done, and I do not see that in the statute. That is something we certainly could think about, but obviously if the committees wanted us to give them some feedback as to what we found in total, I mean, we would certainly be willing to do that.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. I cannot resist stating that even though you did not see it in the statute, that does not seem to bother the IG's office.

Ms. HILL. That is true. There are things that were done that are not in statute such as not meeting the 1185(a) deadline.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. That is the old days. Now, on to the new.

Now, let me ask any member of this panel, is there something that I have not asked, that Senator Frahm has not asked, that Senator Robb has not asked that you wish had been asked, or any information or point you would like to make before we conclude this hearing. Again, the record is open for 1 week, so you might wish to provide additional information from an issue that was raised and, too, the committee will retain its right that we may have additional questions that we would submit to you in writing and ask that you respond in writing.

So is there anything else that needs to be said? General Doherty. General DOHERTY. No, sir, and again, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Thank you very much. General Taylor. General TAYLOR. No, sir. Thank you again for the opportunity. Senator KEMPTHORNE. Thank you. Mr. Nedrow.

Mr. NEDROW. At the risk of not leaving well enough alone, Senator, thank you very much for the opportunity, but I would just point out that these cases are difficult for the families, but they are difficult for our investigators, too.

Part of the function of our psychologists is to debrief our own people once they have gone through some of these cases and some of these crime scenes and some of the process, and I appreciate the opportunity you have given us to help get that out on the record also.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Yes, as Mr. Rush had pointed out, some of these were done in an exemplary fashion and, too, we are talking 3,084 cases. The vast majority I think to the extent you can there has been closure, but we know there are deficiencies, and that is what we are going to address so that these families, at least in this context, will know that something good has come from all of their efforts, and their loved ones have somehow helped future families so that to the extent possible the pain will not be as deep.

Senator Frahm, thank you very much.

Senator FRAHM. You did not ask Ms. Hill if she had any additional comments.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. I am sorry.

Ms. HILL. Senator, I think I would join in what you have just said. I think even though there may be disagreements as to individual cases, the fact that the families have brought this to the forefront obviously is making everybody much more sensitive to the fact that we are dealing with people in very traumatic situations, and we need to try to work with them and help them be given as much information as they can. I think that is a positive thing.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. With that, this 5-hour hearing is now concluded.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

[The following information was received for the record:]

Ms. HILL. The death of Second Lieutenant Cavanaugh took place in April 1982. The guidelines cited by Senator Kennedy were not in effect until July 1983.

In criminal cases involving military service members that occur off a military installation, the State has primary jurisdiction. Second Lieutenant Cavanaugh's death did not occur on a military installation and the State of Arizona properly assumed jurisdiction to investigate. By law, the Air Force Office of Special Investigation

(AFOSI) did not have the authority to conduct a criminal investigation unless the local authorities chose to cede their jurisdiction, which in this case they did not. The AFOSI did respond to requests from the Mesa Police Department (MPD) for assistance when asked.

Senator KENNEDY. Who were the members of AFOSI responsible for monitoring the Cavanaugh case, and how long after the AFOSI was notified of Lt. Cavanaugh's death did AFOSI contact representatives from the Mesa County Police Department and begin monitoring the Mesa Police Department's handling of the case?

Ms. HILL. The agents assigned to the AFOSI Detachment 1817, Williams AFB, AZ monitored and provided liaison with the Mesa Police Department (MPD) during their investigation of the Cavanaugh case. AFOSI Headquarters, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC, was kept informed of the case by the AFOSI agents in AZ. The AFOSI at Williams AFB was notified on 11 April 1982. Personnel from Williams AFB contacted the MPD at Lt. Cavanaugh's residence at approximately 12:15 p.m. on that day.

Senator KENNEDY. Please provide copies of all communication between the AFOSI team assigned to monitor the Cavanaugh case and the Mesa Police Department, including memoranda and notes taken by AFOSI investigators.

Ms. HILL. No notes or communication between AFOSI and MPD could be located. The case is 14 years old.

Senator KENNEDY. Were the AFOSI investigators assigned to the Cavanaugh case aware that the Mesa Police Department did not interview Lt. Cavanaugh's roommate and neighbors who were the last persons to see Lt. Cavanaugh alive?

Ms. HILL. There is no mention in the Mesa Police Department (MPD) report of neighbors being interviewed. There is nothing to indicate that they were or were not screened for information on the day the body was discovered. It was established that the last time anyone heard from Lt. Cavanaugh was when he called his office at 8:00 a.m. on April 9, 1982 and told his secretary he was having car trouble. Lt. Cavanaugh's roommate, Randy Tollefson, discovered the body, was at the scene, and was interviewed. Lt. Cavanaugh's other roommate, Lt. D. Glenn Annis was TDY in England at the time of the death.

Senator KENNEDY. Were the AFOSI investigators assigned to the Cavanaugh case aware that the Mesa Police Department did not recover or analyze the bullet fired from the weapon that killed Lt. Cavanaugh?

Ms. HILL. The fact that the spent bullet was searched for but not recovered was in the MPD report that was provided to AFOSI.

Senator KENNEDY. Were the AFOSI investigators assigned to the Cavanaugh case aware that the Maricopa Medical Examiner who signed the death certificate never conducted an autopsy or a complete postmortem on Lt. Cavanaugh?

Ms. HILL. The AFOSI knew the Maricopa County Medical Examiner made the decision to conduct an external examination of the body on April 12, 1982. The AFOSI received the completed MPD report on May 4, 1982 and closed the file. In a position paper dated October 6, 1983, Major Owens, AFOSI stated "An autopsy on DECEASED might have added further factual information; however, the civilian authorities determined that the circumstances surrounding the death did not warrant such additional investigative effort."

Senator KENNEDY. Were the AFOSI investigators assigned to the Cavanaugh case aware that the Mesa Police Department never conducted powder burn residue tests on Lt. Cavanaugh's hands, body, or clothing to determine if he fired the death weapon?

Ms. HILL. A staff summary dated October 12, 1993 prepared by Major Owens states "Local authorities had jurisdiction over the matter and feel that their investigation was adequate for determining cause of death. AFOSI believes that further investigative effort will not result in conclusions other than those already reached." Senator KENNEDY. (a) If the AFOSI investigators were aware of any of the circumstances described in the preceding question, did they encourage the Mesa Police Department to pursue these leads? (b) Since the leads never were pursued by the Mesa Police Department, did the AFOSI approach the Mesa Police Department about conducting a joint AFOSI-Mesa Police Department investigation or pursuing the leads itself, possibilities provided for in the Air Force guidelines concerning offbase death investigations? (c) If AFOSI did not approach the Mesa Police Department about initiating a joint investigation and did not pursue the leads itself, why not?

Ms. HILL. Since the death occurred off base, the local authorities had jurisdiction, made decisions they felt were appropriate, and the AFOSI agreed that the local investigation was adequate in determining the cause and manner of death.

Senator KENNEDY. If the AFOSI investigators were not aware of any of the circumstances described in the second question, please explain why they were not, con

sidering the Air Force's guidelines requiring that "close, continuous liaison and working relationships" with local authorities be maintained throughout investigations of deaths occurring outside of military installations.

Ms. HILL. See response to previous question.

Senator KENNEDY. Were the AFOSI investigators aware of Lt. Cavanaugh's suspicions of illegal drug activity at Williams AFB and his intention to disclose this during the AF Inspector General inspection scheduled at the time of his death?

Ms. HILL. One witness claimed that 2d Lt. Cavanaugh told him that he was aware of illegal drug activity at Williams AFB and that he intended to disclose this during the AF Inspector General inspection. This allegation could not be corroborated or substantiated. There was no indication that 2d Lt. Cavanaugh was involved in any overt or covert drug activity with AFOSI or any other agency. His duties as drug and alcohol counselor did not involve him in any activity that could be tied to his death.

[The Committee requested and received the following statements concerning the Service Suicide Prevention Programs for the record:] PREPARED STAtement SUBMITTED BY LT. GEN. THEODORE G. STROUP, JR., USA, DEPUTY CHIEF of Staff for PERSONNEL, United States ARMY

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the men and women of the United States Army, I thank you for the opportunity to submit my record testimony to the subcommittee. Soldiers and their families are the Army's most important asset. As an institution, the Army has a moral and ethical obligation to care and provide for them. It is an obligation we take seriously and exercise great care in fulfilling. Suicide prevention must be the business of every leader, supervisor, soldier, and civilian employee in the Army.

During the late 1970's and early 1980's, the Army experienced an increase in the number of its soldiers committing suicide. This increase coincided with an increase in the American public at large. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, working with the Offices of the Surgeon General and Chief of Chaplains, developed an extensive Suicide Prevention Program and began fielding it in 1985. Since that time, modifications have occurred as experiences from the field dictated and lessons were learned. However, the primary thrust of the program has remained unchanged, which is to emphasize moral leadership, based upon three principles: 1) Most suicides are preventable. 2) Leadership is key. 3) Leaders need training to become sensitive to indicators of depression and danger signals, as well as the referral process available to help troubled soldiers and family members discover alternatives to suicide.

THE ARMY SUICIDE PREVENTION PROGRAM

The Army requires the establishment of a coordinated suicide prevention program at every installation or community and separate activity. To assist commanders and leaders, the Army developed and issued three references that provide useful information, procedures and guidelines:

(1) Army Regulation, 600–63, Army Health Promotion, Chapter 5, Suicide Prevention and Psychological Autopsy-This chapter sets guidelines for establishing the Army Suicide Prevention Program (ASPP). This reference addresses active duty soldiers, family members, and civilians.

(2) Department of the Army Pamphlet, 600-24, Suicide Prevention and Psychological Autopsy-This pamphlet establishes the functions of the Suicide Prevention Task Force (SPTF), explains the procedures for suicide risk identification, and for conducting a psychological autopsy. The primary purpose is to reconstruct and understand the circumstances, lifestyle, and state of mind of a suicide victim at the time of death.

(3) Department of the Army Pamphlet, 600-70, United States Army, Guide to the Prevention of Suicide and Self-Destructive Behavior-This pamphlet explains the problem of suicide, causes, facts versus myths, signs and symptoms and intervention strategies.

The overall responsibility for providing guidance and monitoring the suicide prevention mission at each installation rests with the installation commander. One of the commander's key tools for suicide prevention is the establishment of an organized Suicide Prevention Task Force (SPTF). The SPTF is normally chaired by the Director of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA). Other members may include the Installation or Division Chaplain, mental health officer, provost marshal, division surgeon, public affairs officer, civilian personnel officer, and representative

commanders. The task force meets periodically or at the discretion of the task force presiding officer.

The Suicide Prevention Task Force coordinates suicide prevention activities of the command, interested agencies and persons. It develops awareness training and appropriate forums for training. The SPTF recommends command policy guidance regarding training and operational issues to assure soldiers and their leaders have sufficient opportunity for quality family life. The TF is aware of local suicide publicity and develops public awareness articles for publication. Coordination with civilian support agencies is necessary to provide an effective community liaison. In the event of a suicide, the task force reviews the results of the psychological autopsy for possible causes and trends and makes preventive recommendations to the commander. Commanders and leaders at all levels must be sensitive to the potential for suicides and ensure their subordinates take prompt action to refer soldiers for appropriate assistance when early warning signs become evident. To assist commanders and leaders in identifying at-risk individuals and their behaviors, the following information has been compiled from psychological autopsies.

SUICIDE PROFILES AND RATES

While suicides occur in all ages, races, and gender, the typical soldier committing suicide is a young white male with a rank of staff sergeant or below. If the suicide victim is an officer, he is typically a lieutenant or captain. On examination, soldiers who commit suicide have poor relationships with significant others. They find the situation to be hopeless and feel helpless to do anything to change their circumstances. This combination of hopelessness and helplessness is the critical motivation that results in suicide. Most often, the suicide occurs immediately following an argument with a wife or girlfriend. Often, alcohol is consumed just prior to the event. Frequently it turns out the soldier was experiencing severe financial difficulties and this was affecting his relationship with his wife or girlfriend. Firearms comprise the most common method soldiers use in taking their own lives.

The Army's suicide rate is less than what we find in society's equivalent at-risk age population (20-34 years old). The suicide rate for this at-risk age population, nationwide, is in the range of 22-25 per 100,000. The Army's annual suicide rate will probably be in the range of 13–15 per 100,000 for calendar year 1996. The current point projection, based on data collected through August, is 13.5 per 100,000. By comparison, the Army rate for calendar year 1995 was 14.2 per 100,000; in 1994 it was 14.5 per 100,000. The chart below graphically depicts our overall downward trend since 1993.