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The American commissioners awarded $24,592.50 for the first expulsion, but the umpire disallowed the claim on the ground that Santangelo was not at that time a citizen of the United States, though he had made a declaration of intention to beHe was, however, naturalized in 1829, and for the second expulsion, for which the American commissioners awarded $54,588, the umpire allowed $50,000.

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Case of Santangelo, commission under the convention between the United States and Mexico, of April 11, 1839.

"Several memorials have been presented Commission under the to the board by citizens of the United States Act of March 3, 1849. who were residing in Mexico at the commencement of the late war with that country, setting forth, severally, claims to indemnity for losses sustained by the memorialists in consequence of having been expelled at short notice, by order of the public authorities of Mexico, from the places of their residence and business in violation, as is alleged, of the twenty-sixth article of the treaty of April 5, 1831. "By the law of nations, whenever a war breaks out between two countries, the persons and property of one of them found within the dominions of the other are liable to detention and capture.

"When hostilities have commenced, the first objects that naturally present themselves for detention and capture are the persons and property of the enemy found within the territory on the breaking out of the war. According to strict authority a state has a right to deal as an enemy with persons and property so found within its power, and to confiscate the property and detain the persons as prisoners of war.' (Kent's Com. vol. 1, pp. 55–56, citing Grotius, B. 3, C. 9, S. 4.)

"This absolute right, however, has not been very rigorously insisted upon, especially in modern times, although the United States, during the late war with Great Britain, by the decision of the Supreme Court maintained the sterner and ancient rule of national law upon this subject to its full extent. (8 Cranch, 110, Brown vs. U. States, 1 Kent, 59.) But, however absolute the right may be, all writers on public law agree that it may be modified and regulated by treaty; and it is said that most of the treaties of the present day make provision for such contingencies. (1 Kent, 55-56.) And although, as a general principle, the breaking out of war puts an end to all treaties be

tween the belligerents, yet it is not universally so. Kent, vol. 1, p. 175, says:

"As a general rule the obligations of treaties are dissipated by hostility, and they are extinguished and gone forever unless revived by a subsequent treaty. But if a treaty contains any stipulations which contemplate a state of future war, and make provision for such an exigency, they preserve their force and obligation when a rupture takes place. All those duties of which the exercise is not suspended necessarily by the war subsist in their full force. The obligation of keeping faith is so far from ceasing in time of war that its efficacy becomes increased from the increased necessity for it.' Where treaties contemplate a permanent arrangement of national rights, or which by their terms are meant to provide for an intervening war, it would be against every principle of just interpretation to hold them extinguished by the event of war.' (Ib. p. 177.)

"The twenty-sixth article of the treaty of April 5, 1831, between the United States and Mexico is in these words:

"ART. 26. For the greater security of the intercourse between the citizens of the United States of America and the United Mexican States, it is agreed, now for then, that if there should be at any time hereafter an interruption of the friendly relations which now exist, or a war unhappily break out between the two contracting parties, there shall be allowed the term of six months to merchants residing on the coast and one year to those residing in the interior of the States and Territories of each other respectively to arrange their business, dispose of their effects, or transport them wheresoever they may please, giving them a safe conduct to protect them to the port they may designate. Those citizens who may be established in the States and Territories aforesaid, exercising any other occupation or trade, shall be permitted to remain in the uninterrupted enjoy ment of their liberty and property so long as they conduct themselves peaceably and do not commit any offense against the laws; and their goods and effects, of whatever class and condition they may be, shall not be subject to any embargo or sequestration whatever, nor to any charge nor tax other than may be established upon similar goods and effects belonging to citizens of the State in which they reside respectively; nor shall the debts between individuals, nor moneys in the public funds, or in public or private banks, nor shares in companies, be confiscated, embargoed, or detained."

"This article of the treaty secured to citizens of the United States doing business as merchants and residing on the coast the right to remain six months, and to those in the interior

one year, at their places of business for the purpose of arranging their affairs and disposing of their effects, or of transporting them from the country. It did not give the right for any other purpose; nor did it give the right of removal of the person or his property to other places in the territory for the purpose of extending trading operations or commencing new branches of business. The purpose is explicitly stated. In some of the memorials before the board it is alleged that by reason of the expulsion of the claimant from the place of his residence on the coast, Vera Cruz, Tampico, or Matamoras, he was prevented from sending his merchandise into the interior before those places were taken possession of by the American arms, as other foreign merchants did, and that upon the opening of those ports to importations of goods from the United States, without payment of duties, prices considerably declined, whereby the claimants sustained heavy losses upon their stocks of goods Although the language of the article of the treaty above quoted is not entirely explicit, the obvious construction of it, in the opinion of the board, only guaranteed to the merchant the right to remain at his place of business and to dispose of his effects there in the same manner he had been accustomed to do. The decline of prices consequent upon the occupation of the ports by the American forces is not attributable to any cause for which Mexico is responsible. In the opinion of the board the expulsion of citizens of the United States from their places of residence and business in Mexico, during the existence of the late war, before the expiration of the period limited in the treaty, by the public authorities of Mexico, was in violation of their rights secured by treaty, and constitutes a valid claim on the part of any persons so expelled against that republic for all losses and damages which shall be proved to result from such expulsion.

Schatzell, Strother,

"By an order of the supreme government Cases of Breeze, Chase, of Mexico, dated 12th of May 1846, and proFox, Gisner, Miller, mulgated at Tampico in the early part of the and the Zezeneaus. following month, all citizens of the United States residing in any port which should be visited by a vessel of war of the United States were, within the period of eight days, to be sent into the interior, twenty leagues from the coast, unless they should prefer to embark within that period, and all consuls and vice-consuls of the United

States were immediately to cease their functions. The port of Tampico having been entered by the United States vessel of war St. Mary's in the month of June, this decree was enforced against the citizens of the United States residing there.

"The claim of Franklin Chase, then consul of that port, has already been decided to be valid, he having been compelled to embark in consequence of the order above recited. Sidney Udall, a citizen of the United States, a carpenter and builder by trade, then residing in Tampico, was also required to leave within the prescribed time, and was sent into the interior and did not return to the city until after it was taken possession of by the American troops. He has presented a memorial to the board claiming indemnity for the damages sustained by him consequent upon such expulsion.

"The board is of opinion that this claim is valid and allows the same accordingly, the amount to be awarded subject to the future action of the board.

"In the month of April 1846, in consequence of the occupation of the left bank of the Rio Grande by the American troops under General Taylor, an order was issued by General Ampudia, then commanding the Mexican troops on the opposite bank, requiring all citizens of the United States residing in Matamoras, and by another order those residing in Reynosa, to remove, or to be sent, into the interior within the period of twenty-four hours from the promulgation of such orders, and in consequence thereof Mr. John P. Schatzell, then consul of the United States at Matamoras, and several other citizens of the United States, merchants and mechanics, were compelled to leave their business and retire into the interior. General Ampudia's order required them to go to Victoria. They left Matamoras on the 12th of April, but went only about fifteen miles from the city, where they remained several days. In the mean time General Arista had superseded General Ampudia in the command of the Mexican army, and an appeal was made to him to revoke the order of expulsion issued by the latter, and a protest was made against it as being in contravention of the treaty of 1831. General Arista declined to revoke the order, but so far modified it as to permit the parties to go to Tampico and embark there, if they chose to do so, instead of going to Victoria. Mr. Schatzell and three or four others availed themselves of the permission and went to Tampico. Henry Breeze,

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one of the claimants, was permitted, upon his application, to return to Matamoras after an absence of about twenty days. It does not appear that he had been to a greater distance from the city of Matamoras than Moquito, a place fifteen miles off. But his memorial nevertheless sets forth that in consequence of such expulsion he was compelled to abandon his affairs, and travel through a hostile country infested with robbers and disease at the great risk of life and fortune.' Henry Gisner, an American citizen residing at Matamoras, a combmaker by trade, also sets forth in his memorial that he was expelled by virtue of said order, and had to abandon his affairs and had to travel through a hostile country infested with robbers and disease, at the great risk of life and fortune;' and indeed all the memorials contain the same allegation. Among the papers furnished to the board by the State Department is a statement made by Gisner upon oath, that owing to his inability he did not leave the city under the order of General Ampudia, and was in consequence arrested by the Mexican authorities and imprisoned several days, when he was removed to a rancho about one league distant, where he was kept at labor for some days longer, having been detained in the whole, about thirty days. Several others, it also appears from the papers before the board, remained at ranchos, or stock farms, at a short distance from the city, and yet they all recite that they were compelled to travel through a country infested with robbers and disease. These manifest and palpable exaggerations of the grounds of claims are calculated to impair very seriously the testimony adduced in support of the amount of losses set forth by the memorialist respectively. Soon after the army of the United States had taken possession of Matamoras these memorialists returned to that place and resumed their various pursuits, from which they had been debarred about sixty days, at most, some of them for a shorter period.

"In the opinion of the board, the claims of John P. Schatzell, George S. Miller, Henry Breeze, Joachim Fox, French Strother, Adloph Zuzeneau, Pierre Zuzeneau, administrator of Emilie Zuzeneau, deceased, and Henry Gisner, set forth in their several memorials to this board, are valid claims against the Republic of Mexico and the same are allowed accordingly, the amount to be awarded to the said parties respectively to be subject to the future action of the board.

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