closed and open groups." The group based on ethnic (unity or kinship is replaced by one based on civil unity, from which point civilization begins. Civilization may, therefore, be defined as "modally and characteristically a substitution of the open for the closed group in politics, religion, trade, and education."

In his analysis of the origin of society Professor Giddings now arrives at the phenomena of sovereignty, which is another method of considering the co-operation of an entire social population. Sovereignty is not an indivisible unit; it is rather a composition of forces. This is seen by a description of the four distinct modes of sovereignty presented by different stages of social evolution. First comes personal sovereignty, the power of the strong personality to command obedience; secondly, class sovereignty, the power of the mentally and morally superior to inspire obedience or through the control of wealth to exact it; thirdly, mass sovereignty, the power of the majority to compel obedience; and, lastly, general sovereignty, the power of an enlightened, deliberative community to evoke obedience through a rational appeal to intelligence and conscience.2

When the supreme will of society is organized for requiring and directing obedience, government comes into existence, and, like sovereignty, is determined by prevailing conditions of the social mind. In times of chaos and insecurity the forceful personality sets up an absolute government. Where there is much spontaneous co-operation and more like-mindedness than difference and antagonism, with a fair resistance to arbitrary power, government takes the power of limited minority rule. Where revolutionary conditions, political or industrial, exist, absolute majority rule tends to be found present as a product of the revolt. Finally in a community that is on the whole homogeneous, and is composed of individuals approximately equal in ability and in condition, limited majority rule is the form of government.3 In the latter form constitutional limitations are stated to insure the rightful balance between the coercion through which government as a form of social control 1 Quoted from unpublished lectures.

I

Descriptive and Historical Sociology, p. 359.

3 Cf. Descriptive and Historical Sociology, pp. 372-73.

operates and the liberty associated with that full development of personality which is the function of social organization.'

But liberty, says Professor Giddings, is not guaranteed by a written constitution; it is determined by the composition of sovereignty, which is the real constitution. Here enters in his more recently stated doctrine of procedure. By this term is meant the bond by which the most democratic form of sovereignty is held together, that is, the agreement to abide by the decision of the majority. The conditions implied in this form of organization of majority rule are twofold. (1) The majority may not and does not override certain rights agreed on by the majority and most of the minority, and thereby guaranteed to all the minority. These rights must be set forth in a constitution, which is necessary for minorities and for democracies generally. The defense and the safeguard of liberty, however, does not lie in this constitution but in the maintenance of the condition, and more especially of a second. (2) Minorities must have freedom of speech, of the press, of meeting, and of orderly and peaceful agitation, to the end that they may be able to turn their minority into a majority. The repression of minorities throws society back on to lower planes of organization, where patriotism and various forms of lordship are the chief characteristics.

Leaving this as a totally inadequate presentation of the account Professor Giddings has given of the laws of the genesis and evolution of human society, let us now attempt to summarize his analysis of the social organization. In a community there are two forms of organization; one called the social composition, combining those who dwell together in one specified place, the other combining those who are desirous of carrying on special forms of activity or of maintaining particular interests. Each of the latter groupings may be called a constituent society. Each group in the social composition may be called a component society. The earlier tribal forms of component societies were brought together by genetic aggregation, while the later civil component societies are the product, in addition, of congregation. Tribal societies insist on kinship as the bond Cf. Principles of Sociology, p. 421.

2 Carroll D. Wright, Memorial Lecture.

of association; civil societies have broken that bond of ethnic unity. The path of development toward a civil organization of society, where kinship is of less value, has lain in the transition from the loosely knit, even segregative, metronymic group to the more compact and more powerful patronymic group, in the establishment of a barbaric and pastoral feudalism, and in the effect of migration and settlement in producing a varied demotic composition in which the bond of kinship is no longer adequate. In the change from the metronymic to the patronymic organization, wife purchase was an important factor, also the domestication of animals, the value of sons as herdsmen and heirs to property, and the position the patriarch acquired through his lordship and the custom of ancestor worship. With the establishment of male descent and ancestor worship, clan headships and tribal chieftainships tended to become hereditary in certain families. Barbaric feudalism arose as the chief became wealthy in cattle and land, which he received as rewards from his tribe. It became his duty to protect the borders of his land, and for this purpose he used the broken and ruined men, the landless and the clanless from other clans, and bound them to him as feudal dependents in a bond of uncritical and unquestioning obedience. The development of this form of organization and a synchronous development of agriculture led to civil society based on neighborhood and common interests.

In civil society, constituent societies wherein membership is not an incident of birth became possible. Constituent societies grow out of, and are differentiated from, component societies through a specialization of function; they are voluntarily formed purposive associations. Their chief characteristics are co-ordination, mutual aid, and division of labor. The chief of these purposive organizations in civil society is the state, through which the social mind operates to the co-ordination and domination of the whole community and its minor purposive associations. Its functions are coextensive with human interests, for its primary purpose is to perfect social integration. In so doing it is carried into economic activities and cultural functions. Yet equally vital to social organization are the various private and voluntary associations which arise, duplicating in many cases the functions of the state. "The

state, so far from being the only political organization, could not exist in a free or republican form, were there not voluntary and private political associations." It follows, therefore, since the compulsory state and the voluntary association are both vital and essential, that "whatever belittles the state or destroys belief in its power to perform any kind of social service, whatever impairs the popular habit of achieving ends by private initiative and voluntary organization, endangers society and prevents the full realization of its ends."2

Turning now to the second problem which Professor Giddings enunciates as facing the sociologist, that of social constraint, we find him defining his point of view thus:

We make the initial assumption that the institutions of human society and all the events of history, including the migrations of men from place to place, the great enthusiasms, the intellectual awakenings, the wars and the revolutions, may be regarded as responses to varying stimuli, and that they are governed by certain laws of combination or by certain facts of resemblance or of difference among the minds responding.3

That is, social constraint and the conformity of behavior and character to type are functions of the operation of the social mind. This social mind is no abstraction, nor, on the other hand, a mere summation of individual minds. It is an integration of them, born of their interaction. "The social mind is the phenomenon of many individual minds in interaction, so playing upon one another that they simultaneously feel the same sensation or emotion, arrive at one judgment and perhaps act in concert."4 It is to be explained in terms of response to stimulation, of consciousness of kind, and of concerted volition. From like response spring the phenomena of agreement and co-operation; from differences of response in kind, degree, and completeness come the innumerable phenomena of unlike interest, antagonism, conflict, rivalry, and competition." The process of interstimulation is carried on by suggestion, impression, example, and imitation, with conflict as a coefficient, and as

I Inductive Sociology, p. 217.

3 "Theory of Social Causation,"

tion, 1903, p. 144.

4

Principles of Sociology, p. 134.

s Inductive Sociology, p. 68.

Descriptive and Historical Sociology, p. 515. Publications of the American Economic Associa

"Descriptive and Historical Sociology, p. 128.

a further determinant, forms of expansive association, such as travel, commerce, diplomacy, and war. With the accumulation through the advance of socialization of innumerable conditions, events, relations, acts, ideas, beliefs, plans, and ideals, there are created large classes of secondary stimuli which play a larger part in modern social life in the formation of the social mind than the primary stimuli. "The very arrangements under which we live, the groupings of human beings, their ideas and purposes, their aims, their ideals, their laws and institutions are ever-present, everpotent causes of continuing collective action." These secondary stimuli are divisible into four classes: the ideo-motor, which directly incite the motor system; the ideo-emotional, which awaken chiefly emotional reactions; the dogmatic-emotional, appealing to emotion and belief; and the critically intellectual, appealing to the higher intellectual processes. Corresponding to these stimuli are classifications of like-mindedness into instinctive, sympathetic, dogmatic, and deliberate like-mindedness, according as the individuals are swayed by feeling, belief, or reason, respectively. A correlation can be established between these psychic traits and the extent of the forms of like-mindedness. This correlation is expressed in the law: "More individuals agree in feeling than agree in belief. More agree in belief than concur in reasoned opinion. Sympathetic like-mindedness is more extensive than dogmatic like-mindedness, and dogmatic likemindedness more extensive than deliberate like-mindedness."

This movement of the social mind may also be viewed from the standpoint of the modes of activity of the individual, the types of character that shape it, and the motives and ideals that are indorsed. The modes of activity of the individual are fourfold. There is first, appreciation, the seizing of the facts of experience and their organization into knowledge, preference, and values. Next comes utilization, the turning to use of the objects of the external world. Then the conscious individual adapts himself to his situation, to the opportunities and activities possible to him, the process of characterization. Finally conscious individuals adapt themselves to one another in the process of socialization. Parallel with the complex T. S. C., quoted in Descriptive and Historical Sociology, p. 176.

Descriptive and Historical Sociology, p. 127.