as some of the epigoni have done it. What we must learn to insist on is that in the long run, or in the large, ethical ideas and economic ends must coincide; that they cannot, at any rate, be diametrically opposed to each other, else how can they be made out to be sciences of the same cosmos? If industry is absolutely competitive, this and nothing more, it is a rude and crude state of war. The relentless, the extravagant assertion of the rights of competition, a much misunderstood term,' gave the initial impetus and impulse for the separation of business from ethics, a point of departure from which contemporary economics has begun a return journey, a point of departure from which there must be more complete recovery if nations shall endure.

Among the many hopeful signs of the continued development of economic science in the immediate future is the growing respect for, and the present very general and concrete employment of, scientific method in economics in lieu of eighteenth-century doctrinaire methods. This is evidenced by the esteem and confidence which American economists have been winning in positions of public trust and specifically in the public administration of both our federal and our commonwealth public service. This has been true especially since 1898, the year of our war with Spain; and who can doubt that the results of the present war will also continue to impress nations of our time with further need of more expert professional public service. But let the economist beware of trusting too far or too exclusively to books, to mere books, lest his learning become merely the learning of the parrot or the mandarin.

Another hopeful sign of the further development of economic science in the immediate future lies in the growing recognition of the interdependence of all the social sciences upon one another. The several social sciences are less and less disposed to shut each other off from one another as if they could be assigned to respective water-tight compartments. The developing science of sociology is contributing directly to this wider view of a larger social science. The lesson of rising by each other's aid as suggested by Keller in 1 See Hadley, Economics. What the older English classical economists did wish to rule out of their economic philosophy was the meddling interference from uninformed religious opinion, not the carefully reasoned opinions of a canonist economist. Cf. sec. 13 of Modern Economics.

his Societal Evolution, as the physical sciences do, bids fair to be taken. Is this example not already followed in more and more channels and directions? A happy index of this combination of effort is today found in the field of social politics,' which is haply sought to be advanced by the efforts of each of the departments into which the several social sciences are at present wont to be grouped, namely, anthropology, sociology, economics, politics, history, and social ethics.

3. Sociology as foundation and continuation, structure and superstructure, of social science.

a) Genetic Ethics and Economics: These sciences may be grouped together as two fundamental social sciences. Ethics may be regarded as the more spiritual and the less material of the two, while economics is the more material and concrete, in the sense that economics begins in even closer touch with life and matter. Ethics begins with human thought and reflections on human conduct, manners, and ways of thinking of human acts and relationships. Economics emerges with thought-processes and acts which center about the house hither and whither, converge the food quest in consumption and production, in discovery, preparation, or conservation.

Ethics in its genesis may be viewed as fundamental sociology. But ethics in this sense should be considered, not as an intuitional, but as an evolutionary or historical, science. The initial norm and therefore the initial unit of inquiry in social science is eos, "custom." When the Greeks began to make their inquiry it should be remembered and fully borne in mind that they were no longer a primitive folk, although they were then yet pristine. After Aristotle, perhaps we should say long after, intuitional ethics began, although we find traces of the same earlier even than Aristotle. Intuitional ethics and the intuitional philosophy which sanctioned and postulated an intuitional sense or faculty was a full-fledged product of the eighteenth century of Europe.

When William Graham Sumner late in the nineteenth century determined for his part to abandon the inherited certitudes and

1 Cf. C. E. Merriam, "Outlook for Social Politics in the United States," American Journal of Sociology, VII (1912).

a priori assumptions of the older philosophy, he began to look for an answer to his questions in search for the proper title for his first book in sociology. As the world now knows, he went back in spirit to Aristotle and happily selected the word Folkways; the whole student world now knows, or should know, that Sumner selected the word mores, a Latin word having a little wider significance, as equivalent for the Greek Oos.

About the word mores the facts of Sumner's social studies mainly centered, and from these facts collected and reported in Folkways, Sumner and his students began a reconstruction of social science. At the same time, and both before and since, a legion of other students has been occupied with the same or a similar inquiry, with the result that a practical and historical ethics is gradually supplanting a decadent and waning intuitional ethics. Ethics and religion are too often identified with the faith of the medicine man instead of being identified as they should be with the faith and vision of the theistic philosopher.

The standards of conduct as worked out by any given society constitute its mores. The economist who aspires to rank as a master of current economic literature must acquaint himself, not only with the masterful contribution of William Graham Sumner's Folkways, but also with that notable continuation of Sumner's work which is embodied in Societal Evolution: A Study of the Evolutionary Basis of the Science of Society, by Albert Galloway Keller (New York, 1915), and with the recently published volume on Applied Sociology, by Henry Pratt Fairchild (New York, 1917), together with other recent contributions in the same field. Such fundamental phases of social psychology as Sumner has demonstrably expounded in his Folkways and which Keller and Fairchild continue to re-enforce and expound can no longer be left out of account by the economist who hopes to deal efficiently with the problems of international economy, and will continue to be involved in the international or world-state economy of the future.

The mores of any given group of society tend to "become," says Keller, quoting Sumner, "in part uniform, universal in a group, imperative, and invariable," growing, as time goes on, "more and more arbitrary, positive, and imperative." They are thought of

as the code of a superior group, and this involves their comparison with the codes of other groups, to the disadvantage of the latter. "This group egotism which, among other things," continues Keller, "causes so many tribes to denominate themselves 'Men,' as distinguished from the rest of the world, who do not measure up to that exalted title, is called ethnocentrism. The reason why the rest fall short of "us" is because of their ways far more than for any other, for example, any physical peculiarity. Ethnocentrism is thus a specifically human sentiment. It enters to strengthen the local code of mores as the distinguishing character of the group, and to promote intolerance and hostility as respects the ways of others. "Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn. Opprobious epithets are derived from the differences. Pig-eater, cow-eater, uncircumcised, jabberers, are epithets of contempt and abominations." A galaxy of such terms could be gathered in our own society and time, as, e.g., bog-trotter, dago, sheeny, griner, hunkie, bohunk, guinea, wapp. These and other terms have been invented to mark the exponents of uncongenial mores, racial, national, or sectional. Thus "ethnocentrism leads a people to exaggerate and intensify everything in their own folkways which is peculiar and which differentiates them from others. It therefore strengthens the mores."

It is to be noted that the differences which catch the eye and are thus held up to contempt are often entirely inessential. Diversity in language is prominent among these; ignorant people take the attitude, so graphically portrayed in Huckleberry Finn, that a human being should talk in the way human beings were meant to talk, i.e., as "we" do. Again, it is what the other people eat that arouses our contempt and even ire. Greek and American Indian alike despised the "Raweaters" ("Eskimantsic"); and the British sailor hastened to smite the snail-eating Johnny Crapaud. Such judgments, often totally irrational, as to the undesirability of others' mores, have contributed not a little, with the proper opportunities, to the attempt to eradicate both mores and men.

The economist, moreover, cannot close his eyes to such a sociological proposition as this: "There are such things as harmful mores."3

Keller, Societal Evolution, p. 58.
Keller, op. cit., pp. 58-60.

3 Cf. Sumner, Folkways, secs. 28, 29, 65.

I

It has been affirmed of the classical English writers on political economy that these contain no name of the first rank in literature, and J. S. Mackenzie in his Social Philosophy comments with great directness and clearness on the shortcomings of economists, whether considered as scientists or as philosophers. The influence of J. S. Mill, Cairnes, Alfred Marshall, and other English economists has recently aided in working out an altogether wider and more universal view of economic discussion and investigation. Economists will undoubtedly continue to suffer from some of the past strictures which were deservedly passed upon them and will continue to be passed upon them, except as they will cultivate the wider aspects of their science. Economists cannot too well heed the remark of Schäffle, "Without good psychology there can be no good biology," and Mackenzie's added remark, "Without good biology there can be no good economics."

In our day science cannot be shut off by itself and set apart into a separate, water-tight compartment, and the more we try to set up the complete distinction between science and philosophy and between ancient and modern thought the more clearly we seem to be learning their interrelations and interdependence.

Are Plato, Aristotle, and Aristophanes or Sophocles modern or ancient? They are to me as modern as Hinky Dink or BathHouse John. The memory of the latter will not survive. This attitude of mind, this habit of thought, the evolutionary hypothesis, develops. Social science, which embraces economic science, can afford to take lessons from natural science the more cheerfully and self-complacently because evolutionary science ought to pay back its debt to economic science. Spencer substantially said, I learned from Malthus.4

' Cf. J. S. Mackenzie, Social Philosophy, pp. 53-70. On p. 57 Mackenzie observes, "Of course the reference here is chiefly to English economists."

2 Discussion of scope and logical method of economics, cf. sec. 46 of chap. vi of manuscript volume on Economic History: Rise of Modern Economics.

3 Schäffle, Bau and Leben des socialen Körpers, III, 285.

For his exact words see Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, Part II, p. 440, where Spencer says of division of labor: "This division of labour first dwelt on by political economists as a social phenomenon, and thereupon recognized by biologists as a phenomenon of living bodies, which they called 'physiological division of labour,' is that which in the society as in the animal, makes it a living whole."