gion their former place of prominence and importance in the discussions of economics and politics.

It is self-evident and a universally accepted principle of a scientific pedagogy that we should aim to implant in our education of the child those simple arts and sciences which mankind mastered first. What we are in danger of forgetting is that specialized study must begin after generalized study has been prosecuted to a liberal extent, and that graduate study, in our parlance, should follow, and not precede or be contemporaneous with, undergraduate study. Not every man has the necessary saturation point for successful graduate study. We may with more semblance of accuracy argue that first steps in education can be taken by all. They belong to primary and secondary education. What we are in danger of forgetting in a self-complacent democracy is the natural stratification of social classes and the real differences between the thinking and informed classes and those who have no claims to distinction and leadership or to special skill as technically trained. For those who aspire to rise to recognition as entitled to rank in the category of the learned in social science or learned in social sciences, a broad and longer career of preparation must be vouchsafed; as Plato might add, they must be well born in the sense of a scientific eugenics.'

b) The Significance and Uses of Applied Sociology and Pure Sociology:

Pure sociology studies man in his relation to his human environment for no other purpose than to discover the principles which lie back of human association, to discern the forces by which the social organization is built up, developed, and held together, to deduce all possible laws and generalizations as to the nature of social activities. Pure sociology has its eye neither on the future nor the present, but on the past. It would be content to stop its investigations a hundred years ago, provided that by that time all the essential facts could have been ascertained. Because the forces of society are most easily observed and isolated where they are reduced to their simplest terms, i.e., in the most primitive forms of society, pure sociology devotes much of its time to the study of human groups low down in the scale of culture, the barbaric and savage races of the present, and the prehistoric societies of the past, so far as evidence exists for studying them.

1 Cf. Fairchild, Applied Sociology, pp. 293–94.

Applied sociology, on the other hand, seeks to serve wider ends than the accumulation of knowledge. It is concerned less with the ascertainment of truths than with the utilization of truths to serve human ends. Applied sociology turns its face, not to the past, but to the present and future, and since the present is but a point of time, preponderantly to the future; it is not so much concerned with finding out why society is as it is, as with determining how society can be made different from what it is better than it is.

It is evident, however, that applied sociology is immediately dependent on pure sociology. Without the theoretic branch, the practical branch not only would be helpless-it could not exist. It is from pure sociology that applied sociology gets all its knowledge of the fundamental facts, the basic principles and laws which it is to utilize in accomplishing its conscious purposes. In one sense pure sociology is the handmaiden of applied sociology, but in an even wider sense it is the parent, the creator, the sustainer of applied sociology. Applied sociology needs continually to hark back to the teachings of the theoretic branch. Without the parent's guiding hand it is inevitably doomed to wander blindly and to grope ineffectually. A large part of the failures and miscarriages chargeable to the so-called "practical" sociologists is attributable to a faulty equipment of knowledge of pure sociology, or to a neglect to use the knowledge possessed.

Applied sociology then has to do with the task of examining the human relationships of modern civilized societies with the avowed purpose of evaluating them, of distinguishing helpful tendencies and forces from those which are pernicious, and of devising means to perpetuate that which is good, to eliminate that which is bad, and to reshape the social organization the better to serve human welfare. Just as the applied sciences in the material field seek to control and direct the forces of nature for conscious ends, so applied sociology seeks to manipulate social forces to accomplish human desires. Both are absolutely dependent on the forces which exist; neither can escape from the domination of these forces, nor go a step farther than the forces make possible. But both can control and direct the forces so that they operate as dynamic agents for human welfare rather than as unconstrained and vagrant powers of evil.

The goal aimed at by applied sociology in this manipulation of social forces is concisely indicated by the term utility, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number. To increase the sum total of human welfare, to make life more worth living to the largest possible number of the constituent individuals of society, to make society itself a more efficient agent of human happiness— these are the functions of applied sociology.1

The larger social science will aim to conserve the Aristotelian objective and empirically social viewpoint in the study and in the construction of the social sciences and so keep in close touch with the spirit and method of the physical and biological sciences, and

will strive not to lose sight of the substantial unity, continuity, and continuous interrelations of all the sciences.

2. The newer psychology and the realignment of ethics with economics.-The psychology which lies back of the view of applied sociology just stated is the newer psychology which has been recently expounded, for example, by a group of psychologists in a series of essays collectively published under the title Creative Intelligence.1

Through this conception of sociology, re-enforced by the modern social interpretation of psychology, modern economists will again be able to yoke together the teachings of a rational ethics and sound business practice. That honesty and integrity in business is in the long run the best business policy, that it is the only safe and lasting basis of success in business in the long run, is the teaching of economic history. How the neglect of this maxim avenges itself by the decay of business resting on deceit is indicated in many ways. For example, it was demonstrated by the failure of a false trade money which imperial traders from the Roman Empire attempted to impose and no doubt temporarily did impose early in the Christian Era on unsuspecting Hindus, as shown by the Roman denarii which have been found in the Punjaub, of the pretended coinage of Augustus, but debased and plated to pass at full value. The uselessness of this kind of deceit must be proved by long-time and not by short-time periods, that is, by social values and not by individual values. The intelligent and farseeing state and the large-minded and generous-minded individual, thoughtful of the future, both are alike guided by long-time, that is, social, values. On the other hand ignorant states and selfish, self-centered individuals are guided by short-time values, on which profits can be realized or are hoped for being realized before discovery of defects or other fraud. During the first century of the Empire a considerable trade with India had developed through Egypt, but with wars and deceit it was lost after the lapse of time on account of the use of unreliable methods in trade. This sort of reasoning may be sneeringly dubbed ethics or moralizing, but in order that economic practice or the economic mores of any given community may be proved sound they must commend themselves, not only to the I By John Dewey and others, 1917.

isolated community, but also to the general mores of any advanced and enlightened community, else we cannot conclude that there is or can be any standard which we can safely or correctly designate as the standard of civilization. A war confessedly often introduces a temporary reign of unreason and terror. But even in periods of peace between states we must be hesitating, liberal, and largeminded, or magnanimous, as a classic Greek might say, if we wish to pose as able to declare what are or what ought to be the ethical standards of a civilized man.

Perhaps it would be safe to observe that among the select and honorable clergy of every church and in the learned professions of all states, whether of church, state, or general community, law, medicine, engineering, and other skilled professions have in recent decades shown decided evidence of the new propaganda for social justice and social amelioration. The value of race psychology, local usages, and business methods and practices into which the would-be seeker for new trade must be willing and expert in adapting himself also deserve his assiduous and efficient heed and study.2 But even these are vain and useless in the long run if they are made to rest on mere pretense and chicanery, and not on real mutual service. Altruism can never be profitably eliminated wholly from human intercourse of man with man, nor even of animal with animal. Grounded in this newer and profounder contemporary psychology and this more broadly and more deeply based sociology, contemporary twentieth-century economists now generally accept the contention of the historical school of the midnineteenth century and the protests of literature from writers like Carlyle, Ruskin, and Morris that the induction from facts by the old English economists, including Mill and most of his immediate contemporaries, was not sufficiently wide, or rather that induction from facts was not sufficiently practiced. Their reasoning was

1 Edward Alsworth Ross.

2

W. B. Sheppard, "Our South American Trade," Political Science Quarterly, XXIV (1909).

3 That brilliant Irishman, John E. Cairnes, in his study of the Slave Power (1862), showed the latent capacity of British economists of that period in historical exposition. John Richard Green's Short History of the English People belongs to the same decade and likewise holds high rank as an essay in the economic interpretation of history.

excessively deductive. Adam Smith had begun with a few undeniable maxims of the advantage of liberty of labor and the division of labor. Ricardo and his followers developed all these with great severity under the guidance of the principle of freedom-of competitive freedom. Soon the older economists had made a faith of competitive industry. The idea of competitive market value was habitually made the central and well-nigh wholly exclusive point of their theory, the major premise and the minor premises of all their syllogisms. The next step was to eliminate from value, and in consequence from wealth, the idea of well-being. In this crass garb industry stood forth as a state of war and as nothing more. Re-enforced by their laissez faire, laissez passer, the older economists by the aid of the epigoni of the first reform epoch won for our science the sobriquet of the "Dismal Science." From the hopeless aspects of the laissez faire maxim the classical economists presently recovered by developing carefully reasoned and well-selected maxims of exceptions.

But from the unfortunate and scientifically unfounded separation of economics from ethics the English-speaking world, above all the United States of America, has not yet recovered. If the proclamation of the separation had been accompanied by a contemporaneous or coexistent declaration that the separation must be insisted on because, forsooth, we do not know what is meant by ethics because ethics is a philosophical or religious concept and not the basis of a positive science, the decree of separation would have been less mischievous. But unfortunately the decree of separation has been seized upon as a basis for that fearful maxim of much of our business and politics that "business is business," or that "politics is politics," either of which being interpreted means, "Do the other man and see to it that you do him first."

In economic conduct we must insist upon honesty and integrity; if these are not ethical the economist can perhaps discuss his subject without the aid of, or even without reckoning with, ethical ideas. But unless this can be established we must draw upon the aid of ethical ideals for the determination and guidance of economic conduct. Not one of the masters of economic science has dismissed ethical motives and ends from his consideration as curtly