Now the question of the inequalities among them in level of desire or of values presents itself. If there is too great a discrepancy between the levels of people's desires they cannot engage in voluntary team work or socially organized effort of a voluntary character. However, the discrepancies in levels of desires or values among the people of a society do not present a problem so difficult of solution as to prevent or disrupt the major forms of organized activity.

Those whose desires come within the very lowest level, consisting mainly of cravings for sensual pleasures, will gradually have the gratification of these lower forms of desire denied them by the large majority whose feelings are of a higher order. But we know from the observation of the working of the social order that when such groups are denied what they want, that is, the gratification of the desire for the very lowest forms of sensual experience, they will not attempt by withdrawing or by other means to disrupt the organized effort of society. They soon learn to adapt themselves to a somewhat higher plane of desire and satisfaction.

If those whose desires come within the highest level were to impose their standards upon those lower in the scale the latter would, if they could, refuse to do team work with them and would disrupt the social order. If there then existed organized activity participated in by both of these groups it would have to be involuntary on the part of one, if that one could not rise to the higher plane of desires. If their desires were ungratified and they were unable to displace them with others by means of rising to the higher levels of desires, life would be empty, unsatisfactory; so why should they voluntarily join their efforts in team work directed toward the production of fruits in the sharing of which they could not participate because these fruits were beyond their appreciation and enjoyment? Such an enforced will would lead to discontent, unrest, and instability in the social order.

Fortunately for organized forms of human endeavor the minor differences in levels of desire that develop within a society can exist side by side and be gratified without seriously tending to disintegrate and hinder the growth of efficient forms of the social team work that takes place in most of the major institutions of the social order. These differences, however, do seriously interfere

with the team work of social intercourse. They disintegrate friendships and families and make small groups for purposes of congenial social intercourse difficult to form and maintain.

When one group in society advances beyond the others in ethical or democratic values and ideals, and appropriate ideas are conceived in the form of proposed additions to the ethical code or a proposed extension of the suffrage, the result will be unrest, an unrest that will persist until this group has its will, even if it is necessary to gain it by violent forms of force. Then the less advanced group, having another will enforced upon it, becomes the discontented group, but this condition will not be permanent and will not disrupt the social order, for all the people are capable of feeling such values, even if they do resist them during the period of transition. The rising generation will be brought up in them, will accept them, and will finally become so habituated to them that such values and ideas will become customary with them. Thus after a time the newer order will be according to their will. Any group that will not with time rise to the level of the desires and values that are imposed upon it becomes an involuntary part of the social order and will always be a danger to the stability of that order.

The great social-service machines of society are the instruments through which the productive energies of the people are gathered and translated into organized or socialized forms of productive effort and activity. But it does not necessarily follow that where the effort and activity of the people of a society are organized, that such socialized activity is motivated by socialized wills. The organized effort in our society is directed for the most part by unsocialized separatistic motives.

The organization of the effort of the people in the societies ever tends to outrun the organization of the wills behind that effort. The socialization of outward overt activity tends to outrun the socialization of inward thought and feeling, for organized effort, because of its superior efficiency, is vital to a large community. So great is this superiority in efficiency that one hundred millions of people with organized effort are able to live where only one hundred thousand could survive with a relatively unorganized

effort. Who gain the major shares in the benefits of such organized endeavor and are thereby enabled to gratify their less important needs is not so vital to the community as the possibility of at least a subsistence level of existence for the others. Thus more of the thought and energy of man has been centered upon the organization of overt activity for purposes of production than upon the organization of the wills of the people for the purpose of directing such organized activity; that is, of directing it in the production of general social services and the distribution of such services in socially just ways.

People following their impulses, unable to socialize their wills, submitted to the rise of small, tyrannical ruling classes, even though these ruling classes took the tyrant's share of the benefits, because such classes under the circumstances made themselves the instruments to force the forms of organized activity requisite to at least a subsistence level of existence. The more desirable and coveted fruits of the organized activity thus established were looked upon as spoils and were fought for by rival powerful classes who used the masses as ammunition in this warfare. Nearly all the struggles the written records of which fill the pages of the history of mankind have been over the spoils of the concerted effort of man in his social orders. Finally the masses, gaining under this régime of control only a mere precarious existence, and that at a sacrifice of freedom and liberty, entered upon the struggle for a larger share in the control over their efforts.

The question arises: Do such changes in control follow some social ideal, or do the changes reflect disturbances in balance of power which permit now one class in society then another to have its will? Is this particular evolution in the social order a mere struggle of will against will in which now one group, through powerful strategic advantages, such as the army, the church, education, communication, prestige due to grandeur of background, superstitions, and group delusions about class stratification and social position, dominates and has its way? Then when its grip upon these engines of might loosens, do others rise to power in society and assert their will? And so is the shifting of control a mere reflection of shifting advantages in the struggle for control over the

social order, like the shifting winds and waves of the sea? Or is this evolution not a mere aimless change but a change in a certain direction, real social growth, growth toward a social ideal? Is it a struggle to establish a distribution and a participation in control according to a social rubric, a principle which rests upon a social value? The movement has probably developed far enough to permit an interpretation of it, to see its direction and what goal lies ahead.

The reaction of the people against the undemocratic ruling classes and the attempt to gain a share in the control over their efforts by means of the overthrow of these classes which controlled their organized activities absorbed their attention so completely that they lost sight of the value of concerted activity. As an easement toward the solution of the problem of control they tried to minimize the amount of socialized or concerted activity employed in the newer social order. The individual was to control or direct his own activities himself in as wide a sphere as possible and share with others on a seemingly one-to-one basis the control over the necessary minimum of team work or joint activity. "That government is best which governs least" seemed to phrase their feeling. This simply meant that that condition of society is best in which there is least socialized activity, not because team work is an evil in itself, but because that condition minimizes the difficulty of securing freedom and liberty. Freedom and liberty suddenly gained by a long-oppressed people seemed so precious that they would not risk the possibility of having it jeopardized by the difficulty of working out a socialized control over socialized effort. They would rather sacrifice the efficiency of concerted effort. From this individualistic point of view the one-to-one rule of suffrage seemed to preserve liberty and freedom. It was one individual set over against another individual. The price of such liberty was eternal friction. Each was to have a sphere of separatist activity and keep everyone else out. else out. Each was to assert himself, be self-reliant and independent, struggling in a fight in which there was a more nearly equal chance of winning because the overwhelming handicaps that formerly prevailed in the unequal struggle for self-assertion and control had been removed.

There is an idea prevalent that the wills of people are just so many units of force. Then by means of some device of voting these units may be registered as to direction, and a majority or plurality of those tending in some direction will serve to give direction to the organized activity of society. Such a will is not a pan-will, a social will, for all do not participate in it. The efforts of the minority in the community are directed, not by their wills, but by the wills of others. To that extent they do not have freedom and liberty. The group in a society that says, "We have the votes; what are you going to do about it?" is using might, is just as undemocratic as the group that says, "We have the men, the money, and the hips; what are you going to do about it?" The majority can enforce their will because they fall heir to the engines of power and the machinery of control built up in the social order.

The social device, however, does broaden participation in control and changes the form of the struggle between wills to have their own way. The powerful classes have to resort to new sources of power and set up a new sort of militarism, so to speak. They employ an army of sophists and political strategists, manipulators and corruptionists, as an engine to afford them leverage in the newer sort of struggle. The device of voting, however, does much more than modify the form of the struggle for control over the organized effort of society, for it does tend, in addition, to develop sincere discussion, acquaintance with one another's feelings and ideas, and, greatest and best of all, a mutual consideration for these feelings. Social ideals become involved, and the will in the process of operating this social device tends to become socialized.

Unified activity requires a unified control-a single direction, not a conflicting, crisscross chaos of aims. This unity of purpose and activity may be secured in several ways: by means of a powerful class, or by means of a unity of wills-a joint or pan-will. A concert of wills may be employed to direct a concert of activity; the socialized wills of the people may serve to direct the socialized activity of the people.

Let it be clear that there is or may be an organization of the wills of the people, a real participation in control, and not a mere struggle of wills. It is a mere contest of wills that results when we