As a result of this policy, the Selected Reserve has moved towards timely responsiveness and combat capacility. Application of this policy has improved equipping, funding, facilities, construction, programing and some training areas. I recognize and appreciate the great amount of effort that has been made to develop the Guard and Reserve. Progress has been made. However, cross readiness measurements (which should be improved) indicate that we have not yet reached a level consistent with the objective response times. It is clear that we should move as much post-mobilization administration as possible to the pre-mobilization period and streamiine all remaining post-mobilization administrative and training activities. We must assure that the readiness gaias in the Selected Reserves are maintained and that we move vigorously ahead to reach requized readiness and deployment response times in areas still deficient. I want each Service Secretary to approach afirmatively the goals of producing Selected Reserve units which will meet readiness standards required for wartime contingencies. Each Secretary will provide the manning, equipping, training, facilities, construction and maintenance necessary to assure that the Selected Reserve units meet deployment times and readiness required by contingency plans. You will have my support and personal interest in overcoming any obstacles in these areas. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is charged by statute and by Defense policy and Directives with the responsibility for all matters concerning Reserve Affairs. It is my desire that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, as a matter of priority, take such actions as are necessary to bring the Selected Reserve to readiness goals. In this respect, the Services, the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Defense Program Analysis and Evaluation and other Defense Agencies will provide support on a priority basis. Particular emphasis will be placed on assistance in manning, equip ping and training. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) will continue to function in accord with current statutes and directives. To emphasize and to strengthen Selected Reserve management, I suggest a civilian Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs in the office of each of the Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. This Deputy should be supported by an adequate staff and be assigned responsibilities and functions similar to those assigned the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. At the military level, the Navy has been given specific guidelines The Chiefs of the National Guard and Reserve components will In addition to the foregoing emphasis on Reserve Force policy and management, I am asking my Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, with your support, to manage a study covering the issues of availability, force mix, limitations and potential of Guard and Reserve Forces. In summary, strong management with achievement of readiness дени NGAUS Force Structure Study Group Report The National Guard Association of the United States is deeply concerned about Army National Guard force reductions programmed over the next 5 years. The programmed force appears to continue the reliance on a large standing Army rather than the historical precedence of greater emphasis on a militia. This force fails to adequately recognize the cost effectiveness and dual benefits of the National Guard in providing national defense and state and local support during emergencies, disaster relief and support of counter narcotics efforts. These reductions raise many questions. Foremost among them are: .. What is the prime factor in deciding if force structure should be in the active or Guard and Missions should be assigned to the Guard and Reserve unless there are "sound and .. Are the programmed force reductions the most effective way to reduce conventional There is a significant cost savings associated with National Guard organizations. Cost .. What effect will large force structure reductions in the National Guard have on the broad In many communities the Guard is the only visible tie to national defense. The benefit of • Is the drastic reduction in the Total Army well considered in view of the volatile political DoD leaders have stated in testimony before Congress that the programmed Army force Should force structure changes be implemented prior to a full review of the lessons learned in the Southwest Asia contingency in the context of a rapidly changing strategic environment? Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the first "real world" test of the Total Force Policy. Most aspects of the mobilization, deployment and subsequent performance exceeded expectations. An assessment must be made that goes beyond a single contingency. That assessment must include consideration of the wide array of threats in a larger strategic environment. The Policy worked well and only needs fine-tuning to meet the demands of the future. .. How did the Army's readiness reporting system impact on the recent call up of the Lack of confidence by the Army in it's readiness reporting system was clearly detrimental Answers to these questions should be weighed before the most stable part of the conventional defense forces, the National Guard, is drastically reduced. Without a full and analytical review of world events during the past year we may unnecessarily cut military capability. Reduction of National Guard structure should be delayed while this nation determines how best to meet the evolving threat. Investment of tax dollars in the Total Army has created a quality force. This is certainly evident in the National Guard. The Total Force Policy and the resulting increase of support to the National Guard has borne fruit. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm has provided visible proof. Artillery brigades, engineers, military police, transportation, maintenance and other service support units, mobilized quickly and with little or no post mobilization training deployed to the theater and performed their mission. Of special significance was the performance of the Army Guard's combat units. The two field artillery brigades called and deployed to Southwest Asia met Army expectations and integrated into maneuver operations. These units participated in combat with some of the most complex equipment in the Army arsenal. The Roundout brigades proved that Guard combat units could be validated combat-ready in the prescribed period of time, even when faced with serious challenges, to include lack of modern equipment for integration of information management systems and new combat equipment training. We believe the readiness reporting system must be fixed before drastic reductions to the National Guard are implemented. Defining readiness is difficult because many factors must be considered. Measurement of Total Army readiness must include operational, logistical and administrative factors. Substitution of major systems that cannot perform the primary function in combat should be eliminated. Information management systems, especially in the Roundout units, must match the Active Army systems. Consistent readiness measurement standards must be established throughout the Total Army. It is also incumbent, while assessing improvements to the readiness evaluation process, to ensure that the readiness reports of Roundout units are a part of the parent units' readiness report. Until there is a comprehensive, coherent and standardized system for evaluating “unit combat readiness," combat units will continue to be rated subjectively and not objectively. A readiness reporting system must be developed that is credible and validates capability before mobilization so that all participants have confidence in the rating. As integral as the National Guard has become in the Total Force, we recognize that there are currently limitations in place that might preclude using the Guard in contingency missions. Presidential call-up authority should be reviewed and legislative relief sought to extend that authority to 180 days with an additional 180 day extension. Legislative relief should also be sought to automatically mobilize Roundout units if the parent unit is called. Removal of these two impediments would help overcome political reluctance to use the Guard because of time limitations. Other improvements to the mobilization process are required. Our present mobilization planning is based on full mobilization and not partial call-ups for contingency missions. We also learned that mobilization stations were not fully prepared to deal with receiving, processing and deploying Guard and Reserve units. It is even mc. difficult to structure a force to meet emerging threats in a multi-polar environment than it was to meet a Soviet Central European threat. The type of future combat environment our forces might have to be inserted into is uncertain. Recent history has seen American forces involved in a jungle environment and a desert environment while training was primarily directed to a European scenario. Host nation support is also uncertain, not just because of the varied port capabilities across the world but also because of the level of local political support for American forces. This spectrum of challenges focuses very closely on lift capability and on what will actually be available to move American forces. If lift is not available to transpor a unit within 60 days, and the mission can be performed by the Guard, then that unit should be in the Guard. Assessment of the threat and development of a corresponding strategy determines force structure. Force structure development is also limited by dollars available to field that force. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm proved that the Total Force Policy was a success and a prudent investment. It also proved that the Guard, given the resources, can mobilize and deploy in a short period of time. Changes in the strategic environment and budget constraints have created pressures to reduce defense expenditures. Unfortunately as we have gone from a bipolar to a multipolar world the future has become more uncertain. Although the Soviet near term threat appears to be reduced, internal disruptions cause concern as to what the Soviet military might do. To reduce our capability prematurely to levels that may be too low increases immediate and future risks. The Total Force Policy must be continued and reinforced. As final decisions are made on future force structure, four prescripts must be considered: • Lessons learned must be incorporated to improve the integration of administration, • The readiness reporting system must be improved to instill confidence in the validity of the • If lift is not available to transport a unit within 60 days, then that unit should usually be in If a unit is required in the structure but is not required for immediate deployment, then cost effectiveness would normally dictate that it be in the Guard. Our position is that this nation must retain and maintain maximum force structure at minimum cost. Traditionally our nation has relied on the National Guard to accomplish that goal. It is better to maintain as much structure as possible in the National Guard, and have it if required, than to drastically reduce the Total Army and have insufficient structure. Senator GLENN. Thank you, General. General Weber, do you have an additional statement? General WEBER. Mr. Chairman, I have no prepared remarks in support of the National Guard Association position, but I look forward to responding to questions. Senator GLENN. Thank you very much. General Hultman. STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. EVAN L. HULTMAN, USA (RETIRED), EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES General HULTMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, Senator Nunn. I would like to begin where General Ensslin just left off, because I think that is really the thrust of your basic questions that you have been asking all morning and clearly were set forth in the five basic elements, Senator Nunn, of your analysis and your study this past year. The Total Force Policy works. If there is one thing we all agree on here at this table today, and I think basically you gentlemen, is that the Total Force Policy is proven. And there were a lot of doubters. And for good reasons there were a lot of doubters. But the Total Force Policy worked, which then brings us to the question, where do we go from here in light of the budget constraints that again all of us must recognize and live with. So when you put those two together, Senator Glenn, as you asked time and time again this morning, and as General Ensslin referred to awhile ago, it just seems that, Senator Nunn, your third point, your third thesis, is correct and sound because of those two premises, that we do have to rely in the future with fewer dollars on more Reserves and on only Reserves that will meet the mission. And we all agree there, that will first meet the mission. Because if the Active is the entity, Senator Glenn, as you put it in a number of ways this morning, that is needed for all those reasons, then it should be Active. No question. But if that Reserve unit, whatever kind it is from any service, can meet that capability, as we have proven at least in many instances in the operation that just came about, then it just seems that simple logic says that we ought to put and keep the capability in. If you do away with the combat unit, whatever service it may be, you do not need the combat support and the combat service support and the tail that goes with it. But it does not mean that automatically when you take out X amount of combat units of whatever capability it is out of the Active that automatically it ought to then be done away with in terms of the tail that follows or in the process. We are actually going to put more of the combat support and service support into the Active side of the equation under the plans that are being formed now. Now, to the degree that somebody can make a credible case for that under the first major premises, I think we would all agree in this room and at this table, Guard, Reserve, and Active. But until that case has been made in those specific instances, then we should not be about bringing down Reserve forces that, once you bring them down, as everyone in this room likewise knows, you have one hell of a time to bringing them back up. You can bring back an Active force in a relatively short period of time or at least comparatively in a much, much, much shorter period of time than you can a Reserve unit for the obvious reasons and the obvious equations. As we look then at the 1992-1993 DOD budget request and project it on out to the years that are the follow on, we say that we |