thank you very much for the support, particularly the support this committee has offered, for the last number of years.

I do not think this operation would have been possible 10 to 12 years ago. And I think the progress we have made in the last 10 years, much of it due to the efforts of you and your colleagues on this committee, is noteworthy.

Many lessons will be drawn from the events of the last 6 or 8 months, but two are especially important as far as I am concerned, in the role I have to play in the Defense Department. The first is, of course, the wisdom, to me, of adopting an all-volunteer force. We are convinced, and we were convinced before the war and we are even more convinced now that the war has successfully ended, that volunteerism is in fact the only sensible way to produce a military force for the United States.

And I think the second lesson I draw from all of this is the wisdom of the adoption, at more or less the same time that we adopted an all-volunteer force, of a total force policy. And the first thing about that, I would say, is the total force policy worked as well as our policies related to the all-volunteer force.

A lot of attention has been given, and most people begin to think about the total force, only in terms of reserve components and active components. But I think it is also important to note that the civilian employees in the Department of Defense made essential and important contributions to the Persian Gulf War, as did contractors and host nation support, the other three elements of the total force. So I would say that the policy has been vindicated, and I think its wisdom has been amply confirmed by the events of the last 8 months.

For that reason, the 1992-1993 budget that we have submitted to you for your consideration strongly supports both an all-volunteer force and our total force. And despite these constants, though, I want to turn to the second point I made, and that is that this budget reflects a new strategy. There are some constants running through it, but there are some important changes as well. And I want to emphasize those right now.

We no longer face, to the extent that we did 5 years ago, the threat of global war with the Soviet Union and its allies, and the attendant threat of a short-warning invasion of Europe. Instead, we believe we need to prepare for major regional contingencies, not unlike the one we have just successfully dealt with.

So based on these new realities, we have developed and proposed a new force structure, a department of smaller size, and we continue our efforts to further streamline the Department's infrastructure and improve its management. But despite all of that, we will continue to emphasize, and do emphasize in the budget we sent over here, the importance of readiness and combat capability of the force, and continued support for our people in the form of support for pay and other elements of compensation.

For example, the budget proposes a 4.2 percent pay raise in 1992, and 4.7 percent pay raise in 1993. You will also find strong support for a dependent school system, child care, family support centers, and other elements of our network of support for service members' quality of life. These were all important also in our support to members and their families during the Persian Gulf war.

So I solicit your support and the support of your committee for these important items, and I look forward to talking further with you about the budget and our proposed new program. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jehn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. CHRISTOPHER JEHN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to testify before you today on the manpower program of the Department of Defense. I am especially proud to represent the Department at a time when the overwhelming success of Operation Desert Storm has demonstrated the high quality and dedication of the men and women serving in our Armed Forces.

As the Secretary of Defense said in his annual report, "As this report is prepared, the Defense Department is engaged in two formidable tasks: one in response to an immediate crisis and one in response to longer-term changes in the strategic environment." While all elements of our total force have been immersed in the combat operations in the Persian Gulf, we have been formulating a strategy to reduce and reshape American military forces for the post-Cold War era.

The changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have led us to reassess our national military strategy of the past four decades. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, and the anticipated implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, if ratified, mean that a long period of visible Soviet preparations would probably precede a Europe-centered global war. This allows a new focus for U.S. security strategy and permits us to reduce force levels without jeopardizing our safety or that of our allies. Changing world dynamics also permit a decrease in U.S. forward presence, particularly in Europe.

We can now reshape and substantially reduce our military forces. However, the forces that remain must provide (1) an appropriate rotation base for forward presence, (2) versatile and ready conventional forces for crisis response and regional conflict, (3) a capability for reconstituting larger forces for global war, and (4) offensive and defensive nuclear strategic deterrence for the Nation and its allies. In the future, we will give priority to preserving a mix of forces that best meets these requirements.

Desert Storm, of course, complicated our planning for this new strategy. We are also keeping a close eye on developments in the Soviet Union and need to keep our options open if our assumptions about a decreasing threat change. We hope you will support us in maintaining the flexibility a complicated world situation will require during the coming year.

My statement today describes our current manpower request and programs and outlines the effects Operation Desert Storm has had on both.

FISCAL YEARS 1992-1993 MANPOWER REQUEST: RESHAPING AND REDUCING THE FORCE The following table shows the President's budget request for active military, Selected Reserve, and civilian manpower for fiscal years 1992 and 1993, programmed fiscal year 1991 numbers, and actual numbers from fiscal year 1990.

1SELRES called to active duty under Title 10, U.S.C., section 673b in support of Operation Desert Shield as of September 30, 1990.

Our fiscal years 1992-1993 military manpower request begins transition from a Cold War posture, primarily oriented on the Soviet Union, to a more versatile posture shaped to meet the requirements of the 1990s and beyond. By fiscal year 1996 both active duty and reserve military end strength will be about 20 percent lower than in fiscal year 1990.

Our objectives while we make this reduction are to maintain a balance between mission and readiness requirements and personnel considerations, while remaining sensitive to fiscal constraints and the impact our decisions today will have on the future force. We plan to reduce the number of recruits to the level we need to sustain our new force level. Much of our strength reduction will be achieved by reducing the number of people we recruit. However, too large a reduction in new personnel would result in long-term readiness risks and stagnation for those in our career force, so we will have to be careful in making these reductions. We will use existing strength management policies, whenever possible, to reduce our personnel inventories to the level required to sustain our new force level. For enlisted personnel, tighter reenlistment and high year of tenure policies will reduce the inventory while improving quality. For officers, continuation boards, promotion policies, and selective early retirements will produce similar results. We want to protect our military members who are near retirement; whenever possible, qualified members who have completed 15 or more years of service will be protected until retirement. Finally, we will rely on reduction-in-force policies as a last resort.

We are committed to making sure that, at the end of the transition period, a satisfactory balance exists between the grades and skills of those serving and the grades and skills required to man the force structure effectively. To ensure this result, needed changes in officer management authorities were provided in the fiscal year 1991 Defense Authorization Act, and we appreciate the help this subcommittee gave us in this area. Statutory restrictions that inhibited effective reductions in the size of the officer work force were eliminated; and, as a result, we now have more

flexibility in the area of voluntary and involuntary retirement or discharge of commissioned officers.

The request for active military end strength for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 reflects a total reduction of 249,200 from fiscal year 1990 actual end strength levels. This significant reduction will be achieved by a number of force structure cuts and implementation of approved base closures and realignments and a myriad of Defense Management Review initiatives.

The requirements of Desert Storm, however, have made it impossible for us to meet our authorized fiscal year 1991 end strengths. The primary reason for this is the implementation of Stop Loss authorities allowed by title 10, United States Code. In August, the President authorized the Secretary of Defense to implement the Stop Loss program. This program allows the services to retain all members who are participating in, are in direct support of, or possess critical skills associated with Operation Desert Storm. To date, all services have implemented some level of Stop Loss. In late March, the Department peaked, with 29,900 members having been affected by this program. The legislative relief provided in the Persian Gulf Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 will give us the necessary management flexibility to get back on track with our planned reductions by mid-1992, without resorting to the severe involuntary personnel management actions that would have otherwise been required. I thank this subcommittee for helping to provide that much-needed legislative relief.

Our civilian estimates for fiscal years 1992 and 1993 reflect reductions resulting from a smaller military force structure and management improvements. During fiscal year 1990 total civilian employment in military functions declined by 44,000, and we anticipate another 97,000 reduction from the fiscal year 1990 level by the end of fiscal year 1993. In order to prepare for these reductions and to avoid potential involuntary separations, we have restricted the hiring of new employees since January 1990. On March 29, 1991, the Deputy Secretary established policy for the remainder of fiscal year 1991. The DOD components can now hire two employees from outside the Department for every five employees who leave. Only a few employment categories are exempt from this overall hiring limit-medical, safety, and security positions; college recruiting, summer hires, and work study programs; and employees necessary to support the National Drug Control Strategy, implementation of the Defense Management Report, and Persian Gulf activities. There is no limitation on internal placement of current DOD employees or on nonappropriated fund employees converting to appropriated fund status.

The fiscal year 1991 Defense Authorization Act requires us to submit a civilian employment master plan for industrially funded activities and to notify Congress each time we deviate from the master plan. In addition, we must identify and justify planned involuntary separations or furloughs at those activities. We, of course, plan to use strategies other than furloughs or involuntary separations whenever possible to achieve a smaller, more flexible work force and want to work with you to ensure that we satisfy the intent of Congress without such extensive reporting. We also request your support for flexibility in workload execution-including freedom from legislated employment ceilings and floors—and for avoidance of non-programmatic reductions to the work force. Finally, while we are fully committed to achieving appropriate reductions in the costs of foreign national civilian employment at overseas military installations, such reductions-particularly those that involve country to country negotiations-will take time. We ask that you not impose any arbitrary reductions in the funds available for foreign national compensation.

As we plan for reductions in our manpower levels, we realize that some of our decisions may have a profound effect at the community level. To assist affected communities, the Department has conducted an Economic Adjustment Program since 1961. The fiscal year 1991 Defense Authorization Act strengthened this program and continued the authorization for grant assistance to communities unable to fund completely the planning activities required to adjust to the sometimes abrupt impacts caused by Defense program changes. In some communities, the Desert Storm deployments have caused severe business losses. Our Office of Economic Adjustment has been helping those communities set up task forces to tackle this problem. We have also underwritten detailed economic surveys and analyses to help the communities develop targeted responses to the cutbacks.

Before leaving the subject of our manpower request, I would like to note that it reflects our efforts, to improve the performance of our personnel and reduce cost. These efforts include development of quality and productivity self-assessment guides, work force motivation techniques such as gain sharing and recognition through group and individual awards, productivity enhancing capital investments, awareness through education and training, and various statistical and analytical

processes. As the Department reshapes its forces, these quality and productivity initiatives will be tailored to support organizational change, application of new technology, and a smaller, more flexible work force.

FORCE MANAGEMENT: THE TOTAL FORCE

I closed my overview statement last year by saying that we would be spending a great deal of time in 1990 answering these questions: What should we expect our military forces to be able to do, and how shall we use the elements of the Total Force to do it? I was right, but in ways I could not foresee.

When I originally made this prediction, I was thinking primarily of the work we were doing in conjunction with the Total Force Policy study. I will not revisit the findings of that study in this statement but will say that our work on it has helped us reevaluate old assumptions and consider new ideas for enhancing Active and Reserve component integration in a fiscally constrained environment. However, the most graphic lessons for Total Force Policy have been provided by Operation Desert Storm, where all the components of the total force have made significant contributions.

Reservists and National Guardsmen have been essential to the success of Desert Storm. As we said in the Total Force Policy Report, "the prompt integration of Active, National Guard, and Reserve forces into a formidable 'Desert Shield' is eloquent testimony to the capability of the Reserve forces generally, to the often unique skills and experience they bring to the Total Force, and to the progress that has been made in recent years in implementing the Total Force Policy." The President's authority to call upon the Nation's Reserve forces-under sections 673 and 673b of title 10 of the United States Code-has worked well in filling our manpower needs in a crisis, as has the recall of selected retirees. Desert Storm has demonstrated the importance of having active duty and Reserve forces that are able to deploy rapidly and stay deployed for a considerable period. In the future, any composition of our force that detracts from readiness and deployability should be eliminated from the equation.

Civilians, too, provided critical support to Desert Storm. Civilian technicians and engineers have performed maintenance on aircraft, missiles, radars, tanks, and helicopters at regional locations, just as they do in the United States.

Host nation support, another component of the Total Force, has also been essential to sustaining a U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf. The facilities and supplies made available to U.S. forces by the Saudi government have reduced costs associated with the operation.

The lessons we finally learn from the Persian Gulf crisis and how we relate them to shaping the military forces of the future remain to be seen. However, I can say with no hesitation that Desert Storm has demonstrated that the Total Force Policy is not merely a philosophy but a method of operation that works.

PERSONNEL: RECRUITING, RETAINING, TRAINING

Like everything else, however, the Total Force Policy will work only if we have the right numbers of people with the right aptitudes and training to make it work. This will be especially true of a smaller force. The next section of my statement will describe how we try to reach this goal and how Desert Storm has affected our efforts.

Recruitment/Advertising

For the last several years, the military services have successfully recruited the high-quality people demanded by the increasing complexity of modern national security strategies and the high-technology weaponry and support systems deployed to execute them. This was also true for fiscal year 1990. Since fiscal year 1982, recruits have been of higher quality than the average eligible youth population. In fiscal year 1990, 95 percent of all recruits were high school graduates (versus 75 percent of the youth population), and 97 percent scored average or above on the enlistment test (versus 69 percent of the youth population).

Since the deployment of American troops to the Persian Gulf, we have carefully monitored recruiting trends to determine if enlistments have been significantly affected. This is difficult since the effects of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm are intertwined with the effects of the impending force drawdown and associated budget cuts, and the impact of the economy on recruiting. Nevertheless, for the first 5 months of fiscal year 1991, all services met or exceeded their accession requirements, as shown in Table 2.