in ways favorable to us, and to positioning us favorably to respond to emerging threats.

Second, the new strategy requires the ability to respond to continuing threats of regional crises on short notice. Highly ready and rapidly deployable air and ground forces, as well as a robust naval capability are key elements of protecting ourselves and our far-flung interests from unexpected or sudden challenges. We must be ready to deploy both heavy and light forces of significant size at great distances. Our ability to insert forces quickly-particularly heavy ground forces-into distant theaters can be greatly enhanced through prepositioning equipment either on land (POMCUS) or afloat (MPS), as well as increased investment in lift. Forward presence and crisis response capabilities for regional security concerns play critical roles in sizing our Active and Reserve forces.

Third, we must keep an eye to the future and plan to reconstitute additional U.S. conventional forces if necessary to respond to a global threat, such as a decision by the Soviets to return to a strategy of global confrontation. Longer warning and reduced likelihood of a renewed global threat enables us to reduce our forces in being able to meet the regional threats which are now our focus. But we must be prepared to build, in the President's words, "wholly new forces" should the need to counter a global threat reemerge. The forces we might build for new threats might differ from the units we had eliminated. In addition, some Army and Navy units will be maintained in a cadre-type or innovative-reserve status. The new strategy thus prudently refocuses resources both on the more likely near-term threats and on high priority investments in future defenses.

Successful reconstitution will require that we retain those elements of our defense that would take longer to reconstitute than the available warning of a renewed global threat. Such critical long-lead items include, particularly, our technological edge, our industrial base, major equipment, and the quality of our military leaders and technical personnel.

Finally, on the strategic side-where we have not seen a major change in the nature of the threat we must maintain a robust strategic deterrent and enhance prospects for defensive forces to respond to limited threats of nuclear weapons.

Our program of reductions and our budget have thus been based on certain assumptions about the future strategic environment. If trends prove less favorable along the way than we first projected, we may not be able to reduce forces as fast or as far as we have planned. I would emphasize that in sizing these reductions, we have not simply apportioned cuts from current levels based on budget reductions; rather we have assessed anew the overall force requirements of the dramatically changed threat we now project.

CONCLUSION

As the President stated on August 2, the easing of superpower competition gives us the opportunity to reduce our force levels within prudent levels of risk. Yet, as the August 2 invasion of Kuwait demonstrated, events will be no more predictable and specific threats no easier to foresee in this new era. We will need to be poised to shape distant events and, if necessary, respond to sudden and distant regional contingencies that threaten our interests, as we did in Desert Shield. We will have to peer into longer warning periods to discern strategic changes in the Soviet Union or other potential global threats, and we will have to maintain the ability to reconstitute needed forces. We will face continued technological challenges and the need to modernize our strategic capabilities. The poet quoted by Secretary Acheson at the outset of his autobiography observes, "If I had been present at the creation of the universe I would have had some hints for its better ordering." As we confront the challenge of ordering the universe of post-Cold War international affairs, we will be guided by this new defense strategy, and ultimately strengthened by those elements of our democratic society that make us inventive, determined, and an enduring source of hope to others.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much. General Fedorochko.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM FEDOROCHKO, JR., DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR FORCE STRUCTURE AND RESOURCE, THE JOINT STAFF

General FEDOROCHKO. Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a detailed written statement. I would ask that it be included in the record. Senator GLENN. It is included.

General FEDOROCHKO. And with your permission, I would like to summarize some key points from that statement. I believe there is also a hand-out of charts which you might care to refer to as I go through the things.

The first chart in there, sir, underneath the cover, basically lays out the challenge before the Department with regard to what we had to do for the future, and that was to develop a plan for the 1990s that defined the minimum force structure and supporting capabilities needed to achieve our national objectives and strategy, given the projected world environment and domestic fiscal constraints.

This force had to be credible to friends and foes, tailored to our regional interests and potential threats and consist of well-trained, well-equipped combat ready units manned by quality people.

Our vision for the 1990s, which we have called the base force, shown on chart 2 provides for four conceptual military force packages and four supporting capabilities. These force packages and capabilities define our requirements. They do not represent command arrangements.

The first package is strategic nuclear forces. The highlights of that are shown on chart 3. Despite the positive improvements that have occurred, the Soviet Union is still the only country on Earth able to destroy the United States. There is no evidence that this will change any time soon.

Our strategic deterrent force must therefore remain viable. The strategic offensive force we are proposing will be smaller than previously planned. We will have 18 Trident II SSBNs with a mix of C-4 and D-5 missiles; and a bomber leg consisting of B-52, B-1 and B-2 bombers.

We will reduce the current ICBM force by retiring Minuteman II and to protect future options, we will continue research and development on both the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison and the Small ICBM while deferring their deployment.

We also remain committed to the development of strategic defenses. The SDI program, although restructured, remains consistent with the Phase I objectives established by the Joint Chiefs.

The second package is our Atlantic forces. These forces which include elements from all services, will span the area from our East Coast to the Persian Gulf and form the backbone of our conventional deterrence posture. They will also be the bedrock of our reconstitution capability should we receive warning of a Soviet return to a posture of direct military confrontation with the West. The configuration of our forward presence forces in Europe is being negotiated with our European allies. The forces remaining, approximately less than half of today's, will be operationally relevant and available for use in other areas should the need arise as it did during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

In this regard, we see the need for a heavy corps of two active Army divisions plus supporting elements remaining in Europe in addition to some POMCUS assets. Much of the Army's CONUSbased reinforcements forces, three to four Active, six Reserve component and two cadre divisions will be configured for employment in this region.

The Air Force will keep about three fighter wings based in Europe backed up by both Active and Reserve forces in CONUS. Two to three carrier battle groups will maintain forward presence throughout this area, and a permanent, but rotational, Marine amphibious ready group will also be kept in the Mediterranean.

The bottom line then is that we plan to reduce Europe-oriented, Active and Reserve component units and to cadre two Army heavy divisions. Mr. Chairman, we believe this is consistent with the reduced threat, emerging world events, and our revised strategy.