DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1992 AND 1993

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 5, 1991

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, DC.

TOTAL FORCE POLICY REPORT, AND MANPOWER AND FORCE STRUCTURE PLANS

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in room SD-628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Glenn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Glenn, Nunn, Dixon, Thurmond, and Smith.

Committee staff member present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff direc

tor.

Professional staff members present: David S. Lyles and Frederick F.Y. Pang.

Minority staff members present: George K. Johnson, Jr., and George W. Lauffer, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Barbara L. Braucht and Debra A. Rice.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN GLENN, CHAIRMAN Senator GLENN. The hearing will come to order. The Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel meets today to receive testimony on the Total Force Policy Report to the Congress, and to receive testimony on the four military packages that the Defense Department has formulated as the basis for the force structure and manpower levels in the future years defense program.

Last year, we put the military services on a glide slope that would reduce active duty manpower by about 25 percent by fiscal year 1995, 100,000 per year or about 500,000 over 5 years.

We did this with the expectation that these reductions would result from a draw-down in active force structure of about 25 percent over that same period. Quite frankly, we did this without much input from the Department of Defense, because when we received the fiscal year 1991 defense budget request early last year, it seemed to us to be pretty much out of phase with what we viewed as reality, to be quite frank about it.

The request proposed a reduction in active duty manpower of about 40,000 for fiscal year 1991, but gave no long-term projection of where active duty manpower would settle over the next 5 years. More broadly, the budget gave us no long-term vision of a military strategy that we could have confidence in. So in effect, we had a budget request last year, that as Chairman Nunn properly characterized it as having a threat blank, a strategy blank, a dollar blank, a force structure blank and a program blank.

Now at the same time we were faced with having to cope with proposals on this side of the river to substantially reduce defense spending by making deep cuts in force structure and manpower.

These proposals, like the defense budget, also lacked any longterm supporting military strategy. So in order to act responsibly in this environment, the Armed Services Committee had to develop its own sense of the threat, develop the outlines of a credible military strategy to counter the threat and then develop a fiscal year 1991 defense budget that would set in motion the long-term course for the military services.

The committee's actions in this regard are spelled out in the first 36 pages of last year's committee report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991. With regard to that military strategy supporting its actions, the committee outlined five key elements.

First, nuclear deterrence, we should continue to look to nuclear deterrence as the critical underpinning of military strategy for the foreseeable future and it should be achievable at significantly lower levels of weaponry and with a much higher degree of stability.

Second, a reinforcement strategy, we should look to a reduction in our forward deployed forces, consistent with changes in the threat, much greater emphasis should be placed on reinforcement with combat forces to support our allies.

Third, use of our Reserve forces, we should look to greater utilization of our Reserve forces to handle missions being withdrawn from the Active components, assuming a reduced operational tempo, and take advantage of lower costs where it is possible to do that.

Fourth, flexible readiness, we should look to the adjustment of the readiness levels of various forces, Active and Reserve, based on an order of forced employment that takes into account increased warning times.

And fifth, a resource strategy, we should look to a resource strategy that makes more efficient use of procurement dollars, based on concepts such as flying before buying and as I think the Chairman said, thinking smarter, not richer.

So that in a nutshell is sort of the conceptual basis for what we did last year. With regard to the matter of the Active Reserve force mix of our forces in the future and that goes right to the heart of our Total Force Policy, I must say we were very disappointed last year in the "share the pain" approach taken in the 1991 budget request. By "share the pain" I mean just straight percentage cuts.

In the absence of a force structure basis for the proposed reductions in the Reserve and National Guard and consistent with one of the five key elements of military strategy that the committee de

veloped, greater utilization of the Reserves, we froze Reserve and National Guard force structure.

Now I reluctantly supported this 1 year freeze in the full expectation that we would receive a Total Force Policy report this year that would lay force structure options for the Active Reserve mix of each of our military services in the future.

There has not been a real bottom to top review of the Active Reserve mix in any of the services since the Total Force Policy went into effect in 1973. I, along with others such as our Chairman, Sam Nunn, our ranking minority member, Senator Warner and ranking minority member on this subcommittee, Senator McCain, have been pressing for several years for such a study.

I pushed it in this subcommittee and in fact, it started out in this subcommittee, but at that time we got no results. So we finally mandated such a study in the Fiscal Year 1990 Defense Authorization Act and the Department of Defense had over a year to do its work.

We will be getting into the substance of the report with our witnesses later, but I think that how well the report makes a case for the planned, Active Reserve mix of the services will be crucial to the action that we take this year.

We will also hear from defense witnesses on what some have termed the Department's base force plan, which as I understand it, embodies the four force packages that constitute the basis for the future force structure of the military services.

The four force packages include: (1) a strategic nuclear forces package; (2) an Atlantic forces package; (3) a Pacific forces package; and (4) a contingency forces package.

I will be interested in seeing how our military services fit into each one of these four packages in terms of force structure and also, what the Active and Reserve mix will be in each of these.

With regard to the Reserve and National Guard, manpower levels in the Fiscal Years 1992-1993 Defense Authorization Request, it is unclear how much of the reductions are a direct result of either the Total Force Policy review or the basic force plan as opposed to being strictly dollar driven.

So it is in this context that we will be conducting this hearing today. As I have repeatedly stressed, the bottom line of the actions we take must be based on the effect of such actions on one thing and that is, combat efficiency and I mention that I think at practically every hearing we have, because our bottom line driving force is combat efficiency.

And everything we do, whether it is organizational or what fits in what pigeon hole, if it contributes to combat efficiency, that is what we are interested in and this bottom line is even more crucial as we draw down our standing forces.

So that is what we are after and that is what will be the focus of this hearing.

At this point we usually turn to Senator McCain for any remarks he has but he is involved in another hearing right now. I understand he will be along very shortly if he can make it.

Senator McCain has been ranking minority member on this subcommittee and has played a very major role in the formulation of the requirement for the total force study requirement that was

written into law in 1989, and we do have a common interest in having, as I said, the most combat efficient force mix that we can have as we draw down over the next few years.

So I want to publicly thank Senator McCain for his work in this very important area.

I will turn to Senator Dixon, if he has any opening statement this morning.

Senator DIXON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like your consent to place a statement in the record and may I briefly make this comment.

Senator GLENN. It will be in the record.

Senator DIXON. I understand that the Secretary of Defense, along with the Army, has proposed a plan to decrease the strength of the National Guard and Army Reserves by 32 percent nationally.

Now, Mr. Chairman, regrettably, it has been suggested, a suggestion I cannot believe, that the Illinois Army National Guard could potentially lose 58 percent of its force, and I simply want to make the record very clear that I will strongly oppose cuts that deep.

A 58 percent reduction in the Illinois Army National Guard and major cuts in the 85th Reserve Training Division are far too much compared to what most other States may lose and this is especially important, Mr. Chairman, to keep in mind because every Illinois National Guard unit mobilized for Desert Storm met all readiness and timeliness criteria.

And so, Mr. Chairman, I have expressed to you and to the distinguished Chairman of the committee, and the ranking member and a great many others my concerns about this. I am willing to support cuts, but not cuts that dramatic, and I think that will be one of the issues we will want to discuss in the committee.

I thank the Chair.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, I wish to extend a special welcome to this distinguished panel. I am interested in hearing from them about the Army's Total Force Plan and how it affects the Army National Guard and Reserves, while preserving and protecting our future national security objectives.

I understand the Secretary of Defense, along with the Army, has proposed a plan to decrease the strength of the National Guard and Army Reserves by 32 percent nationally. Regrettably, it has been suggested-a suggestion I cannot believe-that the Illinois Army National Guard could potentially lose 58 percent of its forces. I strongly oppose cuts this deep.

I realize these proposed cuts are part of an effort to reduce militia in response to this Nation's budgetary constraints. While reduction of our deficit is indisputably a critical priority, these cuts ironically come at a time when the Army National Guard and Reserves, our most cost effective fighting forces, deserve to be praised for their superb performance in Operation Desert Storm.

A 58 percent reduction of the Illinois Army National Guard and major cuts in the 85th Reserve Training Division are far too much compared to what most other States may lose. This is especially important to keep in mind, because every Illinois National Guard unit mobilized for Desert Storm met all readiness and timeliness criteria. Additionally, little regard has been given to the impact such a reduction would place on workers, municipalities, commerce and industry in Illinois. I must object to losing sight of the big picture as we all struggle to pare our Armed Forces. Pare we must. Demolish we must not. Balance is the key. Thank you, Mr. Chair

man.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. I want to introduce our witnesses today. On our first panel, we have the Honorable Christopher

Jehn, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management and Personnel; the Honorable Stephen Duncan, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Reserve Affairs; Mr. I. Lewis Libby, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Strategy and Resources; Brig. Gen. William Fedorochko, Deputy Director for Force Structure and Resource, the Joint Staff.

The others appearing as back-up military witnesses are Brig. Gen. Tom Montgomery, Deputy Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, U.S. Army; Brig. Gen. Robert Rosenkranz, Army Director of Force Programs Integration; Rear Adm. Edward Baker, Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy; Maj. Gen. Don Gardner, USMC, Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Programs Division, Marine Corps; Maj. Gen. Richard Hawley, Air Force Director of Operations.

So gentlemen, with that, we will lead off with Chris Jehn this morning. I understand you all do have lengthier statements that have been submitted and we have been through those.

If we could have your summaries of those this morning we will start now with Mr. Jehn.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER JEHN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL

Mr. JEHN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am so very pleased to be here today to discuss with you our 1992 budget and our Total Force Policy.

Mr. Duncan and I appeared before this committee about 14 months ago to discuss our Total Force Policy and since then, there has been a lot of activity. Three very obviously important events have occurred since then, most notably and most obvious to the public, of course, we fought a serious, major war in the Persian Gulf.

We have also, as you noted, conducted a major review on the Department's Total Force Policy, the first one to be conducted since the policy's inception in 1973. But probably the most important event, for the long-term defense posture of the Department was the President and the Secretary of Defense articulating a new defense strategy, the first one in many, many years.

Now all three of these events confirmed the wisdom of our Total Force Policy, and so our budget that we have submitted to you for fiscal year 1992 reflects that while reducing and restructuring the Department, we have continued strong reliance on Reserves and other components of the total force.

Our 1992 budget and the associated defense plan represent a careful, thorough, and we think creative response to the new strategic environment and the fiscal realities currently facing us.

And that, I think, in turn reflects the insistence of the President and the Secretary, that we think through the implications of these new realities, not just cut the military in a rout or reflexive fashion.

Many people worked long and hard to meet those expectations and among those, I am proud to say were the participants in our Total Force Policy study. As you know, Mr. Duncan and I were