but we will back on track as you suggest by the end of fiscal year 1992. In this post-Desert Storm period, we find that what we believed all along has been confirmed by the build-up and by the performance by our units on the battlefield. We are now certain, as Mr. Jehn said, that the policies and programs that will lead to a smaller army must be intelligent, effective, and fair as the one that served us so well over the past decade in building the great army we have.

Reshaping the Army must begin with strong emphasis on our continued commitment to recruiting and retaining high quality men and women. Desert Storm has again proven the value of quality. High-tech weapons, sophisticated tactics, and individual initiatives all demonstrated in the operation, argue compellingly for quality.

Our draw-down will also be characterized by the same fairness which characterize our present force. But we face a difficult period. We must remember that everyone in the Army today has met the quality standard as a volunteer. As well, the smaller Army of the future will be essentially the best of the best. Recruiting and reenlistment standards will need to reflect that fact. To maintain these standards requires resources, and for those, we will need your and the committee's help.

Our soldiers and their families, both essential to our overall readiness, now face a period of change and some uncertainty. We owe them the same loyalty and competence they have demonstrated to the Nation. The people we must ask to leave are quality men and women, and they must be treated accordingly. Our continued success with high-quality personnel, training, and readiness will depend in the future, as it does now, on our attention and care for soldiers and their families. We will not lose sight of this fact as we proceed with the draw-down.

Our success over the next few years is dependent, as well, on the continued support of your committee and the Congress. We will ask for additional flexibility so that we may decrease the size of the Army, maintain readiness, and retain a high-quality level force the Nation has come to expect. We need, for instance, the Warrant Officer Management Act to achieve the reshaping flexibility that you have given us with the commissioned officer corps. At West Point we need a final fiscal year 1995 student body end strength and the flexibility to manage towards that number over the next 4 years. We will also need continued support for our recruiting and family programs, both so vital to our overall goal of readiness. Quality begins with recruiting and is sustained through sound reenlistment programs. As we transition to a smaller force, we will offer services and benefits to those we must ask to leave, to our alumni. This includes enlisted and officer Reserve components and the outstanding civilians that have supported the Army for so many years. We will need your support and assistance as we transition these veterans and their families to the civilian world and in many cases, we expect, to the Reserve components.

The Army truly appreciates the support of this committee, and I personally look forward to working together with you during my tenure as DCSPER in the years ahead.

[The prepared statement of General Reno follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. WILLIAM H. RENO, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL, U.S. ARMY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee;

It is indeed a pleasure to appear before this committee and discuss those programs that are so critical to sustaining and shaping your great Army.

The people of this country have an Army of which they can be justifiably proud. At its peak, the Army had over 300,000 men and women deployed in Southwest Asia. The performance of our soldiers in liberating Kuwait and defeating the Iraqi army was outstanding. This was a total Army effort with Active, U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard units, Individual Ready Reservists and civilians serving together to achieve this great victory. Our plans, our training and your support over the last 10 years made this possible. Each man and woman in uniform thanks this committee for its support.

THE THREE VECTORS: DESERT STORM, READINESS, RESHAPING

Since August 2 of last year, the Army has moved along three vectors simultaneously. We have supported and fought in Desert Storm. We have maintained readiness world wide throughout the Southwest Asia crisis. And we have continued to plan and prepare for the difficult and dramatic reshaping that confronts us. No one vector is separate and distinct from another; they are related.

My statement today reflects that relationship. While Desert Storm is not completed, its success sets the stage for new focus on reshaping and continued readiness. The personnel policies and programs that will lead to a smaller Army must be as intelligent, effective and fair as the ones which served us so well over the past decade.

IMPACTS OF DESERT STORM

Requirements of Operation Desert Storm demanded some extraordinary personnel measures in supporting the campaign. We interrupted planned force reductions and increased our strength temporarily. Today the strength of the Active component is about 741,000 along with 7,891 TTAD Reserve component soldiers and recalled retirees which add to the authorized Active component end strength. We also activated over 140,000 other Reserve component soldiers to support Operation Desert Storm. One important part of our personnel manning strategy was implementation of STOP LOSS. In this program, soldiers scheduled to end their active or reserve service were extended indefinitely. STOP LOSS was and is important to us for two reasons. First, it permitted us to stabilize the force world wide. Even as our attention was focused on Southwest Asia, we had to maintain Army readiness around the world. STOP LOSS, combined with indefinitely extending foreign service tours maintained the strength and cohesion of Army units world wide. This stability ensured readiness and allowed us to turn our attention to supporting the force in Saudi Arabia. Second, STOP LOSS allowed us to keep trained, experienced soldiers on active duty, minimizing the number of reservists we were required to call-up.

We did not totally suspend separations. We continued to separate those who reach mandatory retirement, those with extreme hardships and those whose conduct is unacceptable. I can tell you that the number of hardship requests has been very small. Now that the situation in Southwest Asia is stabilized and relevant political decisions made, we are phasing out STOP LOSS expeditiously, releasing affected soldiers as quickly as possible. We will phase these separations to ensure we do not forfeit the readiness we have worked so hard to achieve. We expect to release all soldiers who were held by STOP LOSS by July 7. However, we intend to be sensitive to the needs of the soldiers and their families. Any soldier needing more time to make an orderly transition may extend their service through September 1991.

In addition to STOP LOSS, we also suspended our involuntary loss programs for fiscal year 1991. We felt it both incongruous and insensitive to notify a soldier in the desert, in harm's way, that he or she was being involuntarily separated. This suspension affects both enlisted and officer programs such as: Qualitative Management Program (QMP), Selective Early Retirement Boards (SERB) and Reduction in Force (RIF).

Given the increased Active component end strength at this point in the fiscal year, we will not be able to attain the congressionally mandated end strength of 702,000 by the end of fiscal year 1991. We will exceed Active component end strength as well as congressional limits on senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) strength, officer end strength and DOPMA grade ceilings. We estimate that we will exceed the active component end strength by about 8,000. The Persian Gulf Conflict

Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 authorizes us the necessary flexibility to manage the force in fiscal year 1991. We will be back on track in fiscal year 1992.

It is important for the committee to understand that as we exercise the authority to exceed these limits, the Army is not acting in a cavalier manner. Our officer and enlisted accession programs are programmed against the fiscal year 1995 end strength target of 520,000 rather than our current strength or our programmed fiscal year 1991 end strength of 702,000. The senior NCO and officer promotion plans are based on the fiscal year 1991 programmed end strength of 702,000. We are not using the increased end strength of Operation Desert Storm to over access or over promote.

RESERVE COMPONENT MOBILIZATION

Operation Desert Shield/Storm marked the first use of Presidential Call Up Authority under Title 10 USC 673b, and the most significant use of Partial Mobilization authority since the Korean War. The initial call up of Reserve units occurred on August 23, 1990, only 21 days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As the crisis in the Middle East developed, the need and subsequent authorization for additional Reserve component personnel increased, culminating in the partial mobilization authority of 220,000 under which we have been operating.

The Army activated 1,041 Reserve component units with 68 percent of them (703) actually deployed to Southwest Asia. These units provided combat forces as well as combat support and combat service support services, such as transportation, water, petroleum, linguist and military police functions. Forty-one (41) backfilled VII Corps units in Europe and 297 were integrated into the CONUS sustaining base. These Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units consisted of 124,901 soldiers. Reserve component units have contributed significantly to the success of Operation Desert Storm. As shown in figure 1, 25 percent of the personnel who served in Southwest Asia were members of the Reserve components.

From the beginning of Operation Desert Storm, over 22,000 retirees, Reserve component unit members, Individual Ready Reservists and civilians have written or called to offer their services to the Army. Volunteers were matched by grade, specialty, and training readiness and ordered to a temporary tour of active duty. These volunteers accounted for approximately one-third of the 21,845 individuals ordered to active duty, and all volunteers who matched requirements were called in order to minimize the number of IRR soldiers called to active duty involuntarily. Importantly, Commanders throughout the Army attested to the high state of preparedness and motivation embodied in each IRR soldier. They have also done a great job.

Of particular note is the large number (1,167) of retirees who were quick to volunteer and assume duties in CONUS, Europe, and Southwest Asia. This group of knowledgeable and experienced veterans was invaluable as they took the place of active component doctors, nurses, pilots and technicians who were then available for deployment to Southwest Asia.

Equally impressive was the response to the Army's involuntary call-up of the Individual Ready Reserve. Of the 20,920 soldiers ordered to active duty by Western Union Mailgram from the Army Reserve Personnel Center in St. Louis, only 223 are not accounted for and only 4 were declared Absent Without Leave.

Approximately 2,738 of the IRR soldiers called to active duty were accessed, trained, equipped and deployed to Southwest Asia; another 4,488 deployed to Europe, and 2,818 were assigned to units within the United States. When offensive operations terminated, there were 3,619 still in training. We began releasing these soldiers from active duty on 4 March, with due recognition for their services. Orders for those who had not reported were canceled. To ensure accuracy of data used for future planning, each soldiers' status was determined, and he or she was advised that had the operation continued, he or she would not have been released from active duty.

Because of this partial mobilization, we did not fully use the Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS), which is the Army's management information system for mobilizing replacements and filler personnel. The limited number of personnel required for Desert Storm and the lack of train-up time mandated that only those most qualified and experienced soldiers be involuntarily called to active duty. For this reason, we concentrated on calling soldiers who had been released from the active Army or reserve unit duty within the past 12 months. While these soldiers were technically deployable, they were each given a thorough training evaluation and received refresher training at mobilization stations and TRADOC schools. Each was certified as being trained to standard prior to deployment to Southwest Asia or elsewhere within the Army.

Operation Desert Storm also provided another "first" for the Army-execution of the CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) concept. This, too, was a highly successful and important phase of the operation. The activation of CONUS Replacement Centers at Fort Benning, Fort Knox, and Fort Jackson, each staffed with approximately 80 personnel from the U.S. Army Reserve, provided the Army maximum command and control of individual replacements. We not only processed military replacements but also processed civilians deploying to the theater. This was done to ensure standards were met in survival skills, particularly chemical warfare. The CRC's allowed us to focus logistical support to ensure every soldier and civilian was equipped and processed properly and to make efficient use of air transportation to the theater. Some of the tasks accomplished in these CRCs were: issue and zero

rifles, issue and fit protective masks, complete pre-deployment inoculations, and training in chemical warfare.

Even before the beginning of the ground phase of Desert Storm, the Army began preparing to bring our soldiers home. The personnel management plan we have developed is based on three fundamental principles. First, we will and must sustain the readiness of the Army as we redeploy, demobilize, reconstitute and reshape the Army. The second is to ensure we attend to the needs of individual soldiers and their families. To this end, we planned adequate decompression time, continuing family support, welcoming ceremonies, and reintegration into the Reserve component structure. Our third major concern is to ensure our actions support shaping of the Army of the 1990's and the many force structure and stationing changes planned to implement DOD and congressional guidance.

CIVILIAN SUPPORT TO DESERT STORM

More than 1,500 civilians in over 100 specialties served on temporary duty supporting Desert Storm in Southwest Asia. Those civilians performed jobs soldiers were not expected to do. For example, a soldier is responsible for basic preventive maintenance on his vehicle, such as changing a tire or checking the oil. Troubleshooting major equipment failures and determining where to fix them is a job performed by the Army's civilian specialists.

Civilian members of the Army throughout the world provided substantial support to our soldiers. Without the expertise and dedication of thousands of Army civilians, we would not have been able to pull off the largest logistical support operation since World War II. Their performance should have removed any doubt about why we need the best and the brightest in public service-whether they are loading, moving, shipping or purchasing supplies, combat material or spare parts, installing and maintaining communications systems, constructing facilities, providing expert technical assistance on weapons and equipment operation or processing and preparing troops for deployment from the United States.

Recruiting and Retention

MILITARY PERSONNEL PROGRAMS

Success on the battlefield is predicated on the quality of the soldiers we recruit and retain. Desert Storm has again proven the value of quality soldiers and leaders. The international environment with its continuing threats to peace in the Middle East and elsewhere requires nothing less than an Army filled with quality soldiers to accomplish its mission. As the Army is reduced in size, the focus on quality is more compelling. The technology of today's and tomorrow's weapon systems, the sophisticated tactics required to fight and succeed, and the soldier flexibility necessary to accomplish the mission contribute to the strong need for continued support of recruiting and retention programs.

Competition for these quality youth and for scarce resources is increasing. To sustain the quality gains of the recent past, adequate recruiting and retention reSources must be provided. We must have proper incentives to recruit and retain these quality soldiers in both the Active and Reserve component.

The Montgomery GI Bill, with the Army College Fund, has been instrumental to the success of achieving quality for your Army and, through these great young people, the success in Operation Desert Storm.

The Army College Fund Plus (ACF Plus) has been highly successful in attracting and enlisting quality men and women in specific difficult to fill specialties. This program which ties a Reserve component commitment of 2 years to active duty for 2 years has expanded the recruiting market for quality youth and attracted quality men and women who might not otherwise enlist. Since July 1, 1989, 6,576 youth have enlisted for this program to include 1,680 women.

In the first two quarters of fiscal year 1991, the Army accessed 45,490 soldiers which was 3,352 or 8 percent above the goal of 42,138. For fiscal year 1991, 85 percent of the annual goal of 85,000 accessions was accessed or contracted during the first 6 months of the year.

The quality of these new soldiers is exceptional. Through March, the non-prior service quality achievements are 96.6 percent high school graduates, 78 percent scored in the top half of the entrance test-the Armed Services Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and only 1.5 percent of the accessions scored in the lowest allowable range. For the whole year, the accessions plus those in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) continue to reflect strong quality achievement with 97.2 percent high school graduates, 75.9 percent in the top half and only 1 percent in the lowest range of the