General WARD. We have, of course, effected some changes in fiscal year 1991. They are already in effect. We had a 9,500 cut. All but two of those units have already been cut, one of them from your State, Senator. It is the 660th Heavy Truck Company, which is in the desert and working hard. As we speak, we are reworking the list of units affected in the out years. The force will be tailored to a series of criteria: What does the Army need to fulfill its operation plans? What does it need to fulfill the strategy that goes behind those operation plans? What units are we unable to fix because of demographic changes?

We selected most of those units for inactivation early in 1992, and this is really not as much as occurred several years ago.

Senator GLENN. Do you have a tentative list of those things already selected?

General WARD. We have a tentative list that has been circulated in the field and is being staffed today.

Senator GLENN. When will that be available?

General WARD. It's not "blessed" yet and probably won't be for another 2 or 3 weeks, at least.

Senator GLENN. Then we could expect that when, in another couple of weeks?

General WARD. That is up to the Army leadership. But I would expect that it would be finished somewhere between 2 and 6 weeks. Many of these cuts are going to become effective October 1.

Senator GLENN. Well, I would hope we could get it within 2 weeks and not 6 weeks, because we have to complete our work on the subcommittee and make our recommendations to the full committee. So we need that information and we need it sooner than in that 6-week period.

General Ŵard. A great deal of it is being bumped against the lessons learned and is going back to the CINCS to make sure that our requirements, gross numbers, and various kinds of units will fully meet any revision in war plans based on our experiences in Southwest Asia.

It's not an uncomplicated problem. I do not expect that we will have major changes, but two dozen units or more may move on and off the entire list.

Senator GLENN. Okay.

As soon as we can get any information or even a partial list on that, we would like to have it so that we know what we are doing when we make our recommendations to the full committee.

I will ask staff to keep on top of that one.

Are there any missions that the Army Reserve now performs that are being transferred back into the Active Army, such as certain combat support or combat service support functions, or infantry combat units as such? Is that being contemplated?

General WARD. The Army's Active component is buying back certain combat service and combat service support missions and units, and functions. Of course, that is one of the aspects that causes our inability to firm up the list. We want to see what they are buying back and what substitute Reserve units will go out.

Many of those units may be put notionally, into the contingency corps. The concept of that corps at one time envisioned that there would be no Reserve units ever required for it. That has been modi

fied by the cold breath of reality, which indicates that there are substantial shortfalls in the contingent corps that may not be overcome without filling it with highly Ready Reserve units, as we did in the Gulf. We had many units that were called to the Gulf and arrived there in 8 to 10 days. Those are the kinds of units that will probably be restored to us so we can meet our requirement to support the Active force.

Senator GLENN. Well, we will be getting into some of these roles, missions and assignments, though we do not plan to get into all of it this morning. We will get into it a little bit later in our testimony today, such as some of the concepts of what is available in 30 days, in 60 days and 90 days and so on. So maybe I will just save my questions until we get to that.

General Closner and General Killey, the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard essentially maintain the current manpower strength level through 1995. In terms of the Active-Reserve mix, the Air Force is the only service in which the Reserve components increase in relation to the Active component.

What major force structure changes are being made in your respective components and what new missions do you pick up as the Active component is reduced?

General KILLEY. As the Air Force draws down in size, one of the main changes is they go from 36 TAC Fighter Wing equivalents today, down to 26.5 TAC Fighter Wing equivalents by the end of 1995. There is going to be some shifting of missions. The Air National Guard is not losing any of our flying flags. We are retaining every one of them. But we are converting some of our fighter units into tanker aircraft. As you are very much aware, your unit at Rickenbacker is one of those units. The unit at Pittsburgh and also the unit at McGuire, New Jersey, is also converting from fighters to tankers.

The reason for that conversion is, as we draw down Active component general purpose TAC Fighter Wings, the balance becomes too heavy on the Reserve component side, and to keep a balanced force, we need to shift some of the fighter assets that are in the Reserve components back toward the Active component.

That is based principally on a CONUS/OCONUS overseas ratio. For every TAC Fighter Wing equivalent that is based overseas, it takes approximately one TAC Fighter Wing equivalent in the United States to support that overseas location with rotation, et cetera. If the ratio is lower than that, then it becomes too turbulent in the Active component to be able to sustain their strength, and they'll start losing their people.

So that is the principle reason for that shift of those approximately one wing's worth of fighter units in the Guard into the tanker mission, which is, as proven in Operation Desert Storm, a superb mission, a vital mission that we need in the Air National Guard. Of our 13 units in the Air National Guard with KC-135E aircraft, 12 were mobilized. Before they were mobilized, they were used fully in a volunteer status from the very beginning. This shows that we need the requirement for the tanker force structure. It is very valid and it is an absolutely superb mission for us, as well as all the other missions.

But that is the principal shift in force structure.

We are gaining a new mission area that was recently announced in the latest public announcements. We are picking up the F-4G Wild Weasel Mission in the Air National Guard, which was originally programmed to phase out. There was going to be a gap of no capability in that mission, before the F-16 replacement aircraft came on line that would replace the F-4G. It was determined by Operation Desert Storm that that was a vital weapon system that we could not let phase out, and it was determined to put that weapons area in the Air National Guard. So two of our units in the Air National Guard, Boise and Reno, are converting from reconnaissance to the Wild Weasel Mission very shortly.

Senator GLENN. You point out and I think most people are probably not aware that the Reserves and Guard have had about 80 percent of the tanker missions, through the years. Isn't that so?

General KILLEY. No, sir. If you consider the Air Guard and Reserve together, in air refueling capability, I think we are approximately 33 percent of the KC-135s.

I think our numbers were about 26 percent, in the Air National Guard, of the KC-135 mission. General Closner I believe is about another 7 percent KC-135s.

Senator GLENN. General Closner, do you have comments?

General CLOSNER. Mr. Chairman, the Air Force Reserve is taking a cut from 1991 to 1992 of about 5 percent of our end-strength, approximately 4,400 people. This has been a conscious decision.

We worked with the administration on that. We certainly think that it would be nice if we could capture the great talent that will be leaving the Active force as a result of its drawdown. But we understand the fiscal realities of life. We have a bill to be paid, too. We have initiated some cost saving measures of our own. We are taking down our numbered Air Force structure, which is a layer of management that we think we can do without in this time of change and the push toward quality. In this new quality revolution, we think that we can do our mission with less overhead.

As far as your specific question on changes, we are picking up the weather mission in total this year. We have C-130 units that are going to C-141s. As you know, in your State, at Rickenbacker, we will be putting in C-141s there. And we have some improvements of equipment, mainly in the Special Operations area.

We are fortunate, I guess you would say, in that the primary emphasis of the Air Force Reserve as far as total mission percentages, is in the airlift business, particularly strategic and tactical airlift. That is a fairly stable area, where we are making some improvements. Eventually, there will be an associate squadron of C-17 at Charleston AFB, SC.

Senator GLENN. About 5 weeks ago this past weekend, I was over in the Gulf. A small group of Senators met with General Schwarzkopf for about a 2 hour meeting. My question to him was this. I said we've seen all the things that worked well in Desert Storm. I have been through a couple of wars in the past myself and I know that everything does not work quite as advertised, like it comes out in the magazines and the news reports. I want to know what did not work well.

He laughed and said, "How many hours do you have to spend?" He then went ahead and outlined some of the things. But the appli

cability of that to this morning is not to tell war stories. When he talked about how the Reserves and the Guard and everybody had worked out coming over there, he particularly pointed out that where there is a civilian counterpart job, such as airline pilots who are in the Reserve and fly tankers and things like that, these worked with no problem whatsoever. In the combat functions, the infantry combat function, obviously we had some problems. We will get into that a little bit later here.

Just as a guide to all of you, I think some of those functions that can be put over into the Guard and Reserve, I fully support those. Those people went over there and, as you already pointed out, they fit right in and did the job that had to be done. There wasn't any problem about it, all the combat support/combat service support roles.

So I think in those areas I want to investigate as much as we can with the committee and the staff, when we examine the Total Force Policy, whether there are more things we sort of want to push in that direction where there is a civilian counterpart, where it can be done just as well for combat purposes and can be done at a cheaper cost. We want to keep our eye out to do exactly those things. That is how we get the best bang for the buck and will still have just as good bottom line combat capability, which is what we are striving for here.

Go ahead, Mr. Duncan.

Mr. DUNCAN. I have just one comment in reaction to that, Mr. Chairman. I certainly subscribe to the notion that to the extent we can assign missions to Reserve forces, where civilian skills come into play in the performance of military missions, that is very useful and desirable. I would not want then to leap to the next step of logic and suggest that that is a limiting factor, that because a person is not engaged currently in a skill that is required militarily in their civilian occupation, that should be a limiting factor.

Obviously, we have experience levels for some fighter pilots that fly F-16s that relate not at all to their civilian skills. I could go on with different kinds of forces. But, as a starting point, I agree with that, Senator.

Senator GLENN. Please don't anybody read into my statement of 2 minutes ago that I mean this should be the sole criteria by which we judge what gets assigned. I don't mean to suggest that at all. But it is one of the major things to be considered, of course.

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Senator GLENN. You have another factor, too. You mentioned F16s and things like that. You still have pilots in some of the Reserve units who are people from the Vietnam era. Those people obviously had more combat experience. They know what it's like to get shot at, which concentrates your mind wonderfully and has an impact on your background and training, and on how you are able to perform in the future. People like that will be phasing out. They are probably beginning to get a little old for some of that. So we'll go to a new type of person perhaps in some of those units in the future, with different kinds of training.

That will mean some different training levels that are needed. There are a lot of things to be considered in this area.

General Closner, you mentioned the Reserve Numbered Air Forces. We have had some complaints regarding that kind of reorganization from a number of people. I understand the functions performed at these Numbered Air Forces would be absorbed at Headquarters Air Force level.

I guess one question would be are you going to need more people to do that at Headquarters or can that be absorbed with your current manpower level?

Let me just list a number of things here. How do you respond to the concerns that former Chief of the Air Force Reserve, Maj. Gen. Sloane Gill has raised about the elimination of the Reserve Numbered Air Forces, the downgrade of Chief of Air Force Reserve to Director of Air Force Reserve, the downgrade of Deputy Chief of Air Force Reserve to Director of Operations on the staff, the downgrade of the status of the Headquarters Air Reserve from a separate operating agency to field operating agency, actions he indicates are a giant step backward that would result in a weakened, less ready Air Force Reserve? What is the status of this organization? Have you consulted with the other former Air Force Reserve Chiefs, such as General Sheer and General Gill, on the reorganization?

General CLOSNER. Yes, sir.

To answer your last question, I have consulted with them. We have talked about this.

Going back to the first part, about taking away the title of the Chief and the Commander of the Air Force Reserve. That was in a brief memo that went through the Pentagon on the staff reorganization of the Pentagon, where I was listed as the Director of Air Force Reserve. I think it was a pure typographical problem. As you know, there is a Director of the Air National Guard, and I think this caused some confusion. This was cleared up within about 3 days.

I will still be the Chief of Air Force Reserve. I am presently the Commander of the Air Force Reserve. That also will not be changing.

It is a mere nuance, I think, as far as a separate operating agency versus a field operating agency. A lot of the units, previous SOA's and major commands are going to be called field operating agencies. It is purely grammatical and has nothing to do with their stature going up or down in the pecking order of priority.

More importantly, when I look at the value added of the Numbered Air Force and the fact that we are leading the way, very aggressively, in our attempts to get on-board with a more streamlined way of management, I reflect about what the Numbered Air Forces do. Having been a Numbered Air Force Commander myself, I found that our biggest value added primarily had to do with assisting our units in the field with readiness-as well as helping in their conversion to other weapon systems.

The vast majority of paperwork functions if you will, had to do with military construction or changes to regulations with other major commands. These had to be worked through Headquarters Air Force Reserve. It was not something that could be closed out at the numbered Air Force level.