GAO Highlights Highlights of GAO-03-677T, a testimony Why GAO Did This Study The way in which the federal government views the defense of the United States has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. Consequently, the Department of Defense (DOD) is adjusting its Cold War strategic focus (of defending against massed combat forces) to better encompass defense against the asymmetric threats that small terrorist cells represent to U.S. territory. GAO was asked to review DOD's participation in domestic missions. This testimony represents our preliminary work in response to the request. It addresses (1) the primary differences in military and nonmilitary missions; (2) how DOD evaluates nonmilitary mission requests; (3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act impacts on DOD's nonmilitary missions; (4) whether current management organizations, plans, and forces are adequate to support DOD's domestic missions; and (6) the impact of overseas and domestic missions on military personnel tempo. GAO is making no recommendations in this testimony. April 29, 2003 HOMELAND DEFENSE Preliminary Observations on How What GAO Found DOD's military and nonmilitary missions differ in terms of roles, duration, discretion to accept or reject, and capabilities normally employed. DOD evaluates nonmilitary mission requests on the basis of legality, lethality, risk to DOD forces, the cost, the appropriateness of the mission, and the impact on military readiness. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct use of federal military troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by the Constitution or Acts of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military in certain situations such as to assist with drug interdiction or assist with terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. It is too early to assess the adequacy of DOD's new management organizations or plans but some forces may not be tailored for their domestic missions. DOD established an Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and U.S. Northern Command to plan and execute domestic missions. U.S. Northern Command's plan for domestic military missions was developed before DOD officials had agreed on the nature of the threat. Forces are not adequately tailored for some domestic missions and readiness could erode because of it. For example, Air Force fighter units deployed since September 11, 2001 to perform combat air patrols are unable to also perform required combat training. Overseas and domestic missions are stressing U.S. forces as measured in personnel tempo data. In September 2001, about 1,600 Air Force personnel had I spent 220 to 365 days away from their homes over the previous year, but by December 2002 almost 22,100 Air Force personnel had been away that long. The Army reported similar increases. To prevent erosion in combat capabilities, DOD issued orders, known as stop loss, to involuntarily retain critical personnel. F16 Fighter Aircraft Conduct a Combat Air Patrol Over Washington, D.C. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the demands being placed on the Department of Defense (DOD) in the post September 11, 2001, environment. DOD's primary mission is to deter aggression abroad and fight to win if deterrence fails. It does this by undertaking major combat operations on a global basis. However, the federal government view of the defense of U.S. territory has dramatically changed since September 11, 2001. In this regard, DOD is adjusting its Cold War strategic focus of defending against massed combat forces attacking allied nations or U.S. territory to encompass the asymmetric threats that small terrorist cells represent. You asked us to review DOD's participation in domestic military missions. We will issue a final report on this issue later this spring. My testimony today is based on the preliminary work that we have completed to date on your request. I will address (1) the primary differences in military and nonmilitary missions; (2) how DOD evaluates requests for nonmilitary missions; (3) how the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act impacts DOD's nonmilitary missions; (4) whether current management organizations, plans, and forces are adequate to support DOD's domestic missions; and (5) the impact of overseas and domestic missions on military personnel tempo.' To determine the differences in DOD's missions and how DOD evaluates mission requests, we reviewed appropriate guidance and directives specifying mission types, and discussed these issues with knowledgeable officials. To identify legal constraints on DOD's nonmilitary missions, we reviewed the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act and related laws. To determine the adequacy of organizations, plans, and forces, we reviewed DOD reorganizations, visited the new U.S. Northern Command, reviewed campaign plans and related documents, and compared the types of missions performed by forces with their primary missions. Finally, to determine the impact of domestic or overseas missions on personnel tempo, we obtained personnel tempo databases from DOD for the period October 2000 through December 2002 (the most recent data available) and analyzed the data. We conducted this work from July 2002 through April 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Summary Military missions differ from nonmilitary missions in terms of roles, DOD evaluates all requests by U.S. civil authorities for military assistance against six established criteria, including legality, safety, funding, and impact on readiness. DOD has provided a variety of requested nonmilitary assistance, including over 230 missions in fiscal years 2001 and 2002, such as assisting in fighting wildfires; recovering from tropical storms; providing post-September 11, 2001, assistance to New York City and Virginia; and providing support for the presidential inauguration. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the direct use of federal military troops in domestic civilian law enforcement, except where authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress. Congress has expressly authorized the use of the military in certain situations. For example, DOD can use its personnel and equipment in response to requests from civilian law enforcement to assist with drug interdiction efforts and terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.' The Commander of U.S. Northern Command has stated "We believe the (Posse Comitatus] Act, as amended, provides the authority we need to do our job, and no modification is needed at this time.” It is too early to assess the adequacy of DOD's new management organizations or their plans for their domestic missions, since the organizations only recently began operations and the campaign plan was 18 U.S.C. 1385 (2002). The Act expressly prohibits the use of the Army or the Air Force to 3 '10 U.S.C. §§371-378 (excluding §375) (2002), and 10 U.S.C. §382 (2002). *Statement of General Ralph E. Eberhart, U.S. Air Force, Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, before the House Committee on Armed Services, March 13, 2003. only recently written, although some forces may not be fully tailored to the missions. First, DOD has established (1) the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and (2) U.S. Northern Command to provide long-term planning and execution capability for domestic missions. The new Assistant Secretary is to provide overall supervision of DOD's domestic missions. U.S. Northern Command is to provide unity of command for U.S. military actions to counter threats to U.S. territory and is to provide military assistance to U.S. civil authorities when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Neither organization was fully functional at the time of our review, so we could not yet evaluate the adequacy of these organizations for their new missions. Second, U.S. Northern Command recently completed its campaign plan for domestic military missions, making it unlikely that the services have yet trained or equipped their forces for these missions. In addition, the plan was developed prior to issuance of a Federal Bureau of Investigation counterterrorism threat assessment and before DOD officials had agreed amongst themselves on the nature of the threat and thus may not take into account the current range of identified threats. Finally, forces are not adequately structured for some current domestic missions, and military readiness may erode. For example, following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the President deployed fighter aircraft to protect U.S. cities under Operation Noble Eagle. In addition, DOD needed to enhance installation security and deployed military police units. While the missions are legitimate, these forces' military readiness may erode because they get limited training benefit from the missions and do not have the opportunity to conduct required combat training while performing the missions. Current overseas and domestic missions are impacting U.S. forces as measured by personnel tempo. DOD measures personnel tempo based on three thresholds: 182 days, 220 days, and 401 days deployed' away from home. DOD believes that if servicemembers spend too much time away from home, a risk exists that they will eventually leave the service and military readiness may suffer. From September 2001 through December 2002, the number of Air Force personnel exceeding the personnel tempo threshold of 182 days away from home rose from about 2,100 to about 8,300, the number exceeding the personnel tempo threshold of 220 days away from home rose even higher, from about 1,600 to about 22,100. Army We used the thresholds to measure days away from home, which includes deployments and activities such as individual training data also revealed that personnel tempo had increased during the period. To prevent significant near-term attrition from the force, DOD has used its stop loss authority to prohibit servicemembers affected by the order from leaving the service. DOD has acknowledged that stop loss should only be used for a short period of time and is not to be used as a long-term force management practice. Military missions involve coordinated military actions, such as campaigns, engagements, or strikes, by one or more of the services' combat forces. Operations Desert Storm in 1991 and Iraqi Freedom in 2003 are examples of overseas military missions, and Operation Noble Eagle is a domestic military mission started on September 11, 2001, and continuing today. In Stop Loss authority is provided by 10 U.S.C. §12305 (2002). It authorizes the President to suspend any provision of law relating to the promotion, retirement, or separation of any member of the armed forces when members of a reserve component are called to active duty and the President determines the forces are essential to the national security of the United States. |