Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman. Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I don't want to get into in any great depth; I just want to have a sense of it. A chemical or biological attack-excuse me, a chemical or a nuclear attack, do the personnel that know how to neutralize these weapons of mass destruction, do they come out of-General, out of your operation? Is this a USNORTHCOM operation, or is this something totally separate that you kind of hire? General ANDERSON. Sir, Render Safe is a very, very classified subject that I would rather talk to you off line on, if I may, please. Mr. SHAYS. Fair enough. Mr. MCHALE. Mr. Chairman, I would simply note very quickly for the record that there are exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act with regard to weapons of mass destruction. Mr. SHAYS. Fair enough. OK. Thanks. Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We want to thank the panelists, and ask if there are any of them that have any additional statements or any additional response to a question that you would like to add to the record at this time. If not, we thank you very much. And we will turn to our second panel, which includes General Reimer, the director, Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism; Mr. Raymond Decker, Director, Defense Capabilities Management Team, U.S. General Accounting Office; and Dr. James Jay Carafano, senior fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Mr. Michael Wermuth, senior policy analyst, RAND Corp. If you would all come forward. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. TURNER. Let the record reflect that you all responded in the affirmative. We are going to begin by asking each of you to make a 5-minute statement. And we will begin with Mr. Decker. STATEMENTS OF RAYMOND DECKER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES MANAGING TEAM, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; GENERAL DENNIS J. REIMER, DIRECTOR, OKLAHOMA CITY NATIONAL MEMORIAL INSTITUTE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM; DR. JAMES JAY CARAFANO, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS; AND MICHAEL WERMUTH, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST, RAND CORP. Mr. DECKER. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the demands being placed on the Department of Defense in a post-September 11, 2001 environment. The Department's primary mission is to deter or prevent aggression abroad and fight to win if these measures fail. This has been accomplished through military presence and power projection overseas, and, as we have witnessed recently in Iraq and Afghanistan, our military forces have conducted major sustained and successful combat operation. However, since the events of September 11, 2001, our Federal Government's view of the defense of the U.S. territory has dramatically changed. This special emphasis has required the Department of Defense to adjust its strategic and oper ational focus to encompass not only the traditional military concerns posed by hostile states overseas, but also the asymmetric threats directed at our homeland by terrorist groups. Last year at the request of this subcommittee we initiated a review of the domestic military missions performed by the Department and their impact on the Department's ability to meet all of its mission requirements. We will issue our report to you later this spring. However, my testimony today is based on our preliminary observations from this review. I will briefly comment on three key areas: The primary differences between military and nonmilitary, or civil, support missions conducted by the Department; whether current defense organizational structure, plans, and forces are adequate to support DOD's domestic missions; and the impact of domestic missions on military personnel tempo. First, I will cover the military and nonmilitary missions. In general terms-and I think this was elaborated by Congressman McHale and General Anderson-the military missions are those primary warfighting functions DOD performs in defense of the Nation and at the direction of the Commander in Chief, the President. Recent combat operations in Iraq are a good example of the military's primary purpose. Conversely, in nonmilitary missions or support missions to civil authorities, DOD provides military forces or capabilities in support of another agency. For instance, the recovery assistance provided by the Pentagon at the request of FEMA after a natural crisis such as a hurricane or flood is a support mission to civil authorities. DOD evaluates all requests by U.S. civil authorities for military assistance against six established criteria, including legality, lethality, cost, and impact on readiness to base its decision. During fiscal years 2001 and 2002, the Department supported over 230 missions requested by civil authorities such as fighting wildfires in the West, providing post-September 11 recovery assistance to New York and Virginia, and supporting the last Presidential inauguration. Although established DOD guidance with a formal decisionmaking process exists for military support to civil authorities, the use of military combat forces such as U.S. fighter aircraft patrolling the skies of America after the attacks of September 11 leads into my comments on whether DOD has the organizational structure, plans, and forces to support the heightened domestic military missions. As you are aware, DOD has taken two positive steps to organize its efforts in the homeland defense role within the larger domain of homeland security. First, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Mr. McHale's office, was recently created to provide leadership and supervision of all DOD's domestic missions. Second, the U.S. Northern Command located in Colorado Springs was recently established to provide long-term planning and execution for domestic air, sea, and land missions. It will be fully operational the first of October this year. During our official visit to U.S. Northern Command last week, it was clear that General Eberhart and his battle staff are dedicated and committed as they tackle their new duties in homeland defense. Although these two organizational initiatives are important, it is premature to evaluate the effectiveness of these organizations to address their new missions at this time. We have noted that the U.S. Northern Command completed its campaign plan in October 2002 for domestic military missions that will guide the forces performing these missions. However, the plan was developed prior to the January 2003 issuance of a Federal Bureau of Investigation national terrorism threat assessment and may need to be reviewed to ensure all threat aspects are appropriately considered. Additionally, there are indications that the U.S. military forces may not be adequately structured for some current domestic missions and military readiness may become eroded as a result. For example, following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the President deployed fighter aircraft to protect U.S. cities as well as military police units to enhance installation security across the Nation under Operation Noble Eagle. While all units and personnel have performed their homeland defense duties superbly, in some cases the assigned tasks were not the primary mission of these affected units or personnel; therefore, this condition highlights a potential imbalance between current force structure mix and future requirements. Although these specifically focused missions were deemed necessary, the military readiness of the assigned forces over time may decline due to the limited training value derived from these missions and the reduced opportunities to conduct other required combat-oriented training during the period. My final comments are directed at personnel tempo or the amount of time a service member spends away from home while deployed. Clearly, the current overseas and domestic missions are stressing U.S. military personnel in this area. For example, from September 2001 through December 2002, the number of Air Force personnel exceeding the personnel tempo threshold of 182 dayswhich is approximately one half a year-away from home rose from 2,100 to about 8,300. The number of personnel exceeding the personnel tempo threshold of 220 days away-which is 60 percent of a year-rose from 1,600 to 22,000. Army data also revealed a similar serious trend during the same period. Exceeding the threshold on a sustained basis may indicate inadequacy in the force structure or mix of forces for the current level of operations and could lead to retention problems later if military members leave the service because personnel tempo was too high. To prevent significant nearterm attrition from the military force DOD has used stop loss authority to prohibit service members affected by the order from leaving the service. All four services have stop loss orders that are currently being used. Officials from the four services who manage the implementation of these orders caution that these are for short-term use and designed to maintain unit level military readiness for overseas combat and domestic missions. Moreover, the officials added that the orders are not intended as a long-term solution to address mismatches or shortfalls in capabilities or requirements or as a substitute for the routine recruiting, induction, and training of new members. In closing, Department of Defense has initiated several important measures to accomplish its homeland defense mission, but needs to address concerns over the impact of this emerging issue on force structure and personnel tempo. Like a baseball team that is used to playing games at home and then away, the Pentagon must now balance its ability to play both at home and away simultaneously, and review its approach to continue fielding the best team for years to come. Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement. GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:00 p.m.. EDT United States General Accounting Office Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, HOMELAND DEFENSE Preliminary Observations. Statement of Raymond J. Decker, Director GAO-03-677T GAO Accountability * Integrity * Reliability |