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Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I know you have a Governor and a mayorand I was a county executive on this committee right now. The issue of cooperation between Federal, State and local-before I ask the question, I think that, from my experience in government and that we have had probably the best cooperation between Federal, State and local and military not only with respect to the war itself but also with intelligence the cooperation has been unprecedented. I think that is one reason why we haven't had another September 11 incident on our shores.

But that doesn't mean that the interdiction is one of the most important issues. I am still concerned a little bit about the cooperation and the ability between, let's say, NORTHCOM and then a Governor. That is easy for a Governor. You have a big snowstorm, you can bring-the Governor declares an emergency, you can deal with some issues.

But you have more with homeland security than meets the eye, I guess; and the cooperation is what is going to make a difference. A lot of leads-there is a lot of leads that might even be relevant because of an intelligence point of view, with NORTHCOM can come from local government, leads can come from the street. And where do you see the cooperation between those State, Federal and local and then

First, where do you see that cooperation, and then in the event that something happens, how long will it take to implement some action when something occurs?

Mr. MCHALE. That is a very complex question and an important


Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. That is why I asked it.

Mr. MCHALE. Let me just create a brief scenario how we would envision forces and military and civilian responding to a given event.

I, too, come out of local government. First job I ever had was on the planning commission back in my hometown borough before I ever ended up here in the Congress of the United States. If there is a terrorist attack, my expectation is that the very first responders will likely be volunteers out of our hometown communities-the volunteer firemen, the EMTs, the paramedics, perhaps part time police officers in small communities, perhaps professionals in larger communities. But these civilians at the local level will be the ones who provide the immediate response. If it becomes clear that we have, let's say, a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction, I think it is likely at that point that the Governor will ask for the assistance of the National Guard, probably in State status, so you will have guardsmen flowing into that area as well.

If it does involve a chemical, biological or even radiological contaminant, it is likely that the civil support teams, the one in that State would likely be deployed to do an assessment of the nature of the contaminant.

Now I have described civilian capabilities at the local and State level. I will envision that the State emergency management personnel in that jurisdiction would also respond. You are going to go through a lot of layers of civilian and military personnel in State status before you get to the Department of Defense.

At that point, if the civilians are overwhelmed or if in fact the Guard in State status alone cannot handle the mission at hand, it is likely a disaster would be declared by the President and likely that the Secretary of Defense, in that extraordinary circumstance, would order DOD forces to respond.

That means that we would have civilians and military, local, State and Federal operating within the same area of responsibility. Coordination is absolutely essential, and one of our goals within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense is to rigorously exercise, in a scenario-based setting, as we are doing, for instance, in Exercise Determined Promise in Clark County, Las Vegas, Nevada, in August, the colocation, communication and coordination of all of those capabilities.

Right now, for contingency planning, action officers within the Department of Defense communicate routinely, often daily, with civilian counterparts, including those at the Department of Homeland Security, to make sure that all of those pieces of the response, in as realistic peacetime training as we can have, prepare for an actual operational deployment if a terrorist attack would occur.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The concern, though, in the event there is an event-you answered it as far as civilians getting involved, and they need help right away, having to go through the Governor at all times. When a local mayor or local county executive needs that help because they are the first responders, that is what I am really focusing on.

My time is up, so I can't ask any more questions, but you can


Mr. TURNER. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With regard to the new role, being called upon for Reservists or really other bases scattered around the country, I represent an area in the Pittsburgh area where we have an air refueling wing, we have an Army Reserve base, we have an Air Guard area. Looking at some of these groups that will be employed in some homeland defense readiness in any place in the country, what input are you going to be having on some things as the BRAC decisions to close some bases, or are you looking at some input on what is needed around the country so you can put information on that?

Mr. HALL. I can talk on the Guard and Reserve. I went through BRAC 1991, 1993 and 1995 as Chief of Naval Reserve. It is absolutely critical with regard to the Guard and Reserve that they be considered in the BRAC process.

So when this one started out of my office, I asked that representatives be on each and every team, so that when we look at bases, both active and Reserve, around the country we think about the demographics of Guard members and Reservists who live there, and if we close a facility that is an active facility for which you might have Reserve personnel aboard, what is the effect of that.

So what I can tell you is we are members, part and parcel of all of teams looking at that, based on my experience.

Mr. MURPHY. So even going with the NORTHCOM, you will be looking at that and having some input on that as well, of what you need to have in certain regions of the country as well?

Mr. HALL. Yes. And I would turn to my colleagues for that. But within the Guard and Reserve context, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Agreed?

Mr. MCHALE. Yes, sir.


The nature of warfare has changed. I think it is very clear, and certainly the Secretary of Defense has correctly stated on any number of occasions, we have excess infrastructure within the Department of Defense and that the resources we put into the maintenance of that infrastructure has a negative effect on warfighting capabilities and Defense's capabilities, including homeland defense. We now recognize that the nature of warfare has changed. And so the fundamental principle remains true, that is, we have to decrease the amount of infrastructure we currently possess, because it is more than we need.

In light of the global war on terrorism and the homeland defense requirements that have emerged since September 11th, 2001, we have to choose wisely in terms of which portions of that infrastructure should be privatized, which portions we should retain. Clearly, the homeland defense mission is seriously considered when we look at that infrastructure and determine what to let go and what to keep.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me give you a scenario, General. Let's say there is word that a train has been commandeered by unknown elements. We believe it is hijacked by some unfriendlies and they are in a rural area headed toward a city at a high speed, has several cars on that train that may have various gases which can be poisonous if they erupt into a populated area. Walk me through in terms of what happens from the local police up to where you might be involved in this and noting that it might only be about 15 minutes to half an hour to take action.

General ANDERSON. Well, sir, as you correctly point out, the local responders will be the ones who will be first informed of this; and, to be perfectly honest with you, our first information may come to us over CNN or some such means as that. But as soon as we see that happen and happening, the first thing we are going to do is call the TAG in your State and say, what is going on and what is it that support that you may need?

At the same time, we will be alerting our Joint Task Force Civil Support that there is the possibility of this kind of an event that is going to occur, which may require WMD consequence management's assistance and the expertise that we have there, if requested, though.

Mr. MURPHY. Let's go through this request, because there may not be a lot of time. Let's say options are derailing this train, stopping the engine through other manners, which local police and firemen don't have the opportunity to do. Would you see yourself in some situation where you have to start taking some action or be ready-helicopters in the air, I don't know what that might be or will it be set up that you have to follow this chain each time, because you will have only minutes?

Mr. HALL. There is an exception that does not require verbal approval from the Secretary of Defense, and that is an immediate response action by a local commander. So if there is a local base in the area or something such as that, he or she, they do have the

authority to be able to respond. If life or limb is at risk or the safety of DOD or there is a large calamity that is going to occur, they can respond immediately under the conditions that are laid out to provide some level of support now. Whether or not it would be a helicopter to shoot at a train or something like that more than likely would not fall into that category.

Mr. MURPHY. I think that is essential, that, as you know, that part of dealing with hijackers is making sure they may not meet their target and their involvement in secrecy, not letting people know. It is important to know that you have enough options in your tool belt that can you take action to be preemptive when needed to or be prepared to defend at that particular moment.

Mr. MCHALE. Congressman, what you are describing is a domestic counterterrorism responsibility, where the local police are unable to defeat the threat as it is emerging.

This goes back to the comments that I made to Congressman Shays a little bit earlier. Because NORTHCOM's land responsibility is colocated with the civilian government of the United States of America, the policy decision under the Constitution has been made that the responsibility to defeat that threat will rest primarily on the shoulders of a lead Federal law enforcement agency.

If the local police cannot deal with that train, it will become clear pretty quickly; and at that point the FBI, not the Department of Defense, will take on the domestic counterterrorism role of physically interdicting and defeating that threat. Consistent with our Constitutional form of government and the Posse Comitatus Act, we can provide assistance to the FBI.

But, as you speak today, looking for an assurance that an enemy threat will be defeated under that circumstance, the lead in that effort will be taken by the FBI. And I can tell you, just from personal awareness, the FBI's exceptional capabilities-the FBI does train to that mission and does have a rapid response capability that we would support, but they would lead.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. McHale, looking at your written statement, on page 10 you talk about six operational goals that U.S. forces must have in addressing the issue of terrorism; and one of them interests me. It states, "Deny enemies sanctuary by developing capabilities for persistent surveillance, tracking and rapid engagement."

Previous to September 11, if we had looked at our military forces and looked at surveillance, rapid engagement, we might have looked at things that were traditionally military targets and-for example, is there a submarine off the coast of the United States. Now that our potential threats have shifted and the form in which they may come, in reading a statement like that you have the issue of balance both of our Constitutional rights and also making certain that we are not doing the wrong things, such as searching 85year-old grandmothers traveling with their grandchildren about ready to get on a plane.

Can you elaborate some on-I mean, obviously, there has been some analysis as to what the need is for their capabilities-what type of surveillance tracking and engagement is being undertaken in context to what the potential threat is. Can you give us some background on that?

Mr. MCHALE. Yes, sir. Surveillance really falls into two categories, from both a military and a Constitutional perspective. The defining line is whether that surveillance is external to the United States or is internal to the United States.

I don't have a copy of my formal statement in front of me, but just very briefly let me tell you that the Department of Defense would take the lead role in terms of continuing surveillance when that surveillance is external to the United States and designed to identify, deter, and defeat an act of foreign aggression or a national security threat. So we are developing, as rapidly as we can, the capability to establish platforms for surveillance that, with significant loitering time, will enable us to literally see threats that are approaching the United States either on the sea or within the air. With regard to surveillance as it may take place lawfully within the United States, that type of surveillance is subject to both Constitutional and statutory constraints. The Department of Defense is subject to the Posse Comitatus Act. So in terms of surveillance the Department of Defense role, if any, would be to-lawfully to support a lead Federal law enforcement agency. Where, for instance, we might make available to a lead Federal law enforcement agency for the proper and lawful use of that equipment, DOD property that would give to, for instance, the FBI, an air platform that would allow the FBI or perhaps the border patrol to maintain aerial surveillance for civilian law enforcement purposes of a particular piece of terrain.

But the Department of Defense would not be engaged in surveillance of that type in a direct way. We do not have that authority. We are prohibited from domestic law enforcement by the Posse Comitatus Act. So once you come ashore, our only relationship to surveillance is to provide assistance to a lead Federal law enforcement agency in its lawful activities.

Mr. TURNER. General, in your comments on page 6, talking about intelligence with USNORTHCOM's challenges, you state that, "Another shared challenge is to overcome cultural and procedural differences among the DOD and other Departments for information that is collected, categorized, classified, analyzed and disseminated." Could you elaborate because you don't in your comments as to what some of these cultural and procedural differences are?

General ANDERSON. Well, sir, as I mentioned in my opening remarks also, the fact is that we are now faced with a situation where we have to fuse law enforcement information with intelligence. In the past when we have been associated with EUCOM or SOCOM or something such as that, we were not faced with the law enforcement information issue, if you will; and so, to protect the privacy of citizens and all of that kind of thing, we have got to make sure that all of our processes are in place to accommodate that.

What we have done to do that is we do, for example, have a representative from the FBI on our staff who assists us in working with the FBI and with the Joint Terrorism Task Force that they have established there at the FBI. And then we have an intelligence oversight committee that is embedded within our intelligence center who is constantly reviewing the information that we

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