To meet the demands of a new, more dangerous world, the executive branch has promulgated strategy statements articulating national goals for various aspects of the war on terrorism. Subordinate to the overarching national security and military strategies, other plans guide efforts to secure the homeland, combat terrorism abroad, integrate military response capabilities, combat weapons of mass destruction, stanch terrorist funding, secure cyberspace and protect critical national infrastructure.

A strategy famine has given way to a variable feast of high-level statements of national objectives and tactics to defeat the multifaceted foe that is global terrorism. Today we ask how these strategies link to form the national comprehensive policy recommended by the Gilmore Commission. Are they dynamic to meet changing adaptable threats? Do they guide the application of finite resources to achieve critical objectives? And how do we know if they are working?

Just as reorganizing the Federal Government to counterterrorism will take time, reorienting the U.S. long-term strategic mindset will require sustained effort and hard choices. Some fundamental elements of a fully integrated preparedness and response strategy are not yet evident. State officials and local first responders are still waiting to know how much will be expected of them in the event of a major incident. What capabilities in terms of training and equipment should be resident at the local level? When and how should Federal capabilities be brought to bear?

To help us begin our consideration of these important questions today, we welcome two panels of distinguished witnesses, including former Governor James Gilmore, chairman of the advisory commission that has been and remains on the forefront of the national debate on combating terrorism. In future hearings, we will hear from administration representatives and others to address specific elements of the strategic bulwark against terrorism.

We welcome all our witnesses and look forward to their testimony. At this point, the Chair would recognize the distinguished gentleman, our ranking member, Mr. Kucinich.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

Almost two years before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction - far more widely and succinctly known as the Gilmore Commission - concluded the United States lacked a coherent, functional national strategy to guide disparate counterterrorism efforts. In testimony before this Subcommittee on March 26, 2001, the Commission's Vice Chairman said, "a truly comprehensive national strategy will contain a high-level statement of national objectives coupled logically to a statement of the means used to achieve these objectives."

The Bush Administration inherited a loose collection of presidential directives and law enforcement planning documents used as a strategic framework. But that fragile construct collapsed with the World Trade Center on September 11th. The brutal nature of the terrorist threat shattered naïve assumptions terrorists would be deterred by geographic, political or moral borders.

A new strategic paradigm was needed. Containment, deterrence reaction and mutually assured destruction no longer served to protect the fundamental security interests of the American people. The threat demands detection, prevention and a more proactive, preemptive approach to selfdefense.

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Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays

March 3, 2003

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To meet the demands of a new, more dangerous world, the executive branch has promulgated strategy statements articulating national goals for various aspects of the war on terrorism. Subordinate to the overarching national security and military strategies, other plans guide efforts to secure the homeland, combat terrorism abroad, integrate military response capabilities, combat weapons of mass destruction, staunch terrorist funding, secure cyberspace and protect critical national infrastructure.

A strategy famine has given way to a veritable feast of high-level statements of national objectives and tactics to defeat the multifaceted foe that is global terrorism. Today we ask how these strategies link to form the comprehensive national policy recommended by the Gilmore Commission. Are they dynamic enough to meet changing, adaptable threats? Do they guide the application of finite resources to achieve critical objectives? And, how will we know if they are working?

Just as reorganizing the federal government to counter terrorism will take time, reorienting the U.S. long-term strategic mindset will require sustained effort and hard choices. Some fundamental elements of a fully integrated preparedness and response strategy are not yet evident. State officials and local first responders are still waiting to know how much will be expected of them in the event of a major incident. What capabilities - in terms of training and equipment - should be resident at the local level? What and how should federal capabilities be brought to bear?

To help us begin our consideration of these important questions today, we welcome two panels of distinguished witnesses, including former Governor James Gilmore, chairman of the advisory commission that has been, and remains, on the forefront of the national debate on combating terrorism. In future hearings, we will hear from Administration representatives and others to address specific elements of the strategic bulwark against terrorism.

We welcome all our witnesses and look forward to their testimony.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to extend a warm welcome to you and everyone connected with the work of our committee and to let you know that I look forward to working with you in this session.

Mr. SHAYS. Likewise.

Mr. KUCINICH. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we worked together in the last Congress to conduct oversight over the administration's efforts to secure our country against terrorist attacks. After the awful events of September 11th, it became more evident than ever that we needed a rational approach to protecting the American people.

Officials from the U.S. General Accounting Office, who are appearing before us again today, testified that the No. 1 step in crafting a national strategy was a comprehensive threat and risk assessment. Before we reorganized ourselves or allocated additional funding, we needed to understand and to prioritize the true threats to our Nation.

Mr. Chairman, on October 15, 2001, you and I joined together and we were accompanied by our counterparts on the full committee, Chairman Burton and Ranking Member Waxman, and the four of us signed a letter to President Bush. We urged the President to conduct exactly this type of assessment. In the spirit of bipartisanship, we moved forward and asked the President to use the opportunity of Governor Ridge's appointment to carefully examine all the threats we face.

Unfortunately, President Bush was not responsive in regard to our request. He did not respond to the committee. The administration moved ahead with the new Department of Homeland Security and produced a new budget, all without taking the initial step of completing a comprehensive threat, risk, and vulnerability assessment.

What is the result of this? Today's hearing is aptly entitled, "A Proliferation of Strategies." The administration has been proliferating national security strategies, nearly a dozen by my count, without any logical or demonstrable sense of priorities.

This lack of logic and the lack of priorities is exemplified by the administration's push for a preemptive attack on Iraq. The administration has not been able to make any kind of a credible connection between Iraq and al Qaeda with regard to September 11th, nor has the administration produced credible evidence connecting Iraq and September 11th. Yet the administration is moving ahead with the preemptive war despite the fact that Iraq poses no imminent threat to the United States.

This rush to war, in the face of international opposition, threatens to alienate the United States from the international community at the very moment we need international cooperation to root out terror. By pushing our Nation and the world to the verge of a historic preemptive attack, we are making America far more dangerous as a place to live.

I would suggest that whatever strategies we are discussing here must take into account the impact of any preemptive action by the United States against Iraq, because it's quite likely that such action, according to reports I've heard, Mr. Chairman, from the FBI that were published in the New York Times, it's quite likely such

action could result in more terrorist attacks being directed against this country. So that's why it's important we have this hearing.

This weekend's capture of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the suspected mastermind behind numerous al Qaeda attacks by Pakistan, the capture that was effected with the help of Pakistan, once again demonstrates the great importance of international coalitions and cooperation in our ongoing efforts to root out the terrorists. The administration's rush to a historic preemptive war against Iraq, I believe, threatens to isolate our country and alienate allies that we need in our efforts to disrupt, capture, and dismantle the al Qaeda network.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:]