attacks on the United States. Both hard-liners and reformers denounced the attacks, and at that pivotal moment, Iran's reformist government would probably have been politically free to extend its reach to America even further. The combination of sensible steps by Washington on the Arab-Israeli front and improved U.S.-Iranian relations would have further isolated Iraq politically within the region and, hence, appealed to all sides. But the administration's failure to respond and its harsh reaction, notably the President's axis of evil remark, damaged prospects for beginning to repair a bilateral relationship with Iran of surpassing strategic importance.

Pakistan, a nominal ally, is the country that most nearly fits the President's profile of evil. Two of its provinces are controlled by Taliban and al Qaeda sympathizers. Although the issues that divide Iran and Pakistan have never reached the level of crisis, relations have worsened in recent years. Pakistan's heavy involvement with the Taliban is partly responsible. It is a bone-the Taliban is a bone in Iran's throat. Pakistan's Islamic schools, the madrassas, have become training grounds for terrorists and other radical groups in much of the Muslim world.

For now there may be little that the Musharraf government can do about the chaos and anarchy in parts of the country, but it can and should be held to account for its remarkable decision to make possible North Korea's highly enriched uranium program. Pakistan is known to have provided much or most of the program, weapons design, gas centrifuges, materials to make centrifuges, data of the sort that would enable the customer to avoid having to test its devices. The two-way traffic between Pakistan and North Korea involving ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons technology could have a dangerous ripple effect.

The campaign against terrorism generated a sense of common purpose, but at another level also became divisive. Most of Mr. Bush's advisors regard the first and best answer to threats to security as lying in preponderant military force. European governments along with most others see military force as a complementary tool in the campaign against terrorism, less essential than a soft-power mix of intelligence, law enforcement, border, and financial controls. Terrorism is generally seen as part of a larger problem, not a single problem. Thus far, however, the administration's concern with the causes of terrorism has been minimal, in my view. Its focus instead has been on identifying and destroying the terrorist threat, "before it reaches our borders," if necessary, acting alone and using preemptive force. This thinking is contained in the novel doctrine laid down by the administration last September.

Other governments assume, doubtless correctly, that in its reliance on massive military power, the new doctrine downgrades alliances. They also worry that the administration may not feel bound by the body of international rules and restraints that developed after World War II. Taken at face value, the new doctrine justifies preventive war waged without allies and without U.N. Sanction.

A doctrine of preemption that relied on very high-quality intelligence to identify an impending attack well in advance and then head it off would not raise eyebrows, but the Bush doctrine is based instead on prevention and preeminence; that is, taking military power to a level never before seen, one that would so intimi

date all parties that no one would even consider an attack of any kind against the United States. Threats to American interests would be not just discouraged, but precluded. "Full spectrum dominance," was a term for it in defense circles. Anticipatory self-defense is a phrase that Secretary Rumsfeld has used.

In practice, such a doctrine harbors many risks. If I am banging on too long, please cut me off, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Keep going.

Mr. NEWHOUSE. It exaggerates the role and utility of raw military power. The government could find itself unable to carry out programs in other realms, unable, for example, to cooperative effectively with other governments to combat terrorism. Special Forces and smart weapons can help in that battle, but other tools starting with good intelligence and good police work are more important.

No matter how good the performance of the Intelligence Community, surprises are probably unavoidable. Thus, measuring performance by the standard of prediction is unrealistic and can damage the standing, morale, and performance of intelligence agencies. They are engaged in not winning a war against terrorism, but in managing it, restricting the activities and options of hostile forces. The Bush doctrine, if taken seriously, would mean that prediction would become the measure of performance, because a preventionbased strategy would require sustained and timely collection of the kind of intelligence that is rarely available, least of all in a form that connects all the dots.

Effective intelligence collection must be conducted bilaterally, but with a wide array of countries. After September 11th, offers of help, large and small, poured into Washington from around the world. They were rejected. Another opportunity lost. Accepting these offers would have harmed nothing, generated enormous goodwill, and, most important, helped at another more important level. What the United States has needed from other countries, then as now, is information, a process through which intelligence may be shared with countries best equipped to penetrate terrorist organizations and cells. Many of these countries took part in the sanctions against Iraq, and most of them have experienced serious difficulties of one kind or another with the terrorist groups located in the extensive region they share.

Terrorism may be contained if intelligence services and police agencies acquire the habit of cooperating closely with each other and suppressing their competitive instincts and preference for acting alone. The United States would be the chief beneficiary of such activity, first because it appears to be the primary target of al Qaeda and sibling terrorist groups; second, because it lacks adequate human resources for gathering the intelligence it needs; and third, because its ability to eavesdrop on global communications is declining. The rapid growth of commercially available technology is reported as allowing for the creation of all but unbreakable computer codes. Fiber-optic lines give off no electronic signals that can be monitored.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Newhouse follows:]

Statement of John Newhouse

Senior Fellow

Center for Defense Information

House Committee on Government Reform,

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Affairs

March 3, 2003

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Huge opportunities were left in the grim wake of September 11. Stated simply, most of the world was ready and willing to accept American leadership "We are all Americans," proclaimed the page one headline in Le Monde on Sept. 12, a declaration of solidarity from an unlikely source.

In seizing the moment, the administration could and should have set about stabilizing the most serious sources of instability—the Middle East, Southwest Asia and Northeast Asia. In the Middle East, they could have deployed their new leverage to push Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) into serious negotiations. Quite clearly, Israel's Likkud government expected exactly that, especially when on October 2, Mr. Bush endorsed the idea of a Palestinian state. Two days later, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon warned Washington not to "try to appease the Arabs at our expense...Israel will not be Czechoslovkia." The administration listened. Regime change on the West Bank became more attractive than taking on Israel's Likkud government and its allies in Washington.

Since World War II, the Arab world has been largely shaped by transient passions, notably anti-colonialism, nationalism, socialism, and Islamism. The single constant, apart from corrupt and/or incompetent regimes, has been the Arab-Israeli conflict and a perception throughout the region (and most of the world) that Washington shares responsibility with Israel for the plight of the Palestinian people.

In his speech last week, Mr. Bush offered some hope, saying that if "the terror threat is removed and security improves," Israel "will be expected to support the creation of a viable Palestinian state.. As progress is made toward peace, settlement activity in the occupied territories must end."

However, Mr. Bush provided no specifics. Who will judge whether the terror threat

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has been removed or sufficient progress toward peace has been made? A skeptic would say that if the recent past is any guide, Israel's Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, will make those calls. On April 4 last year Mr. Bush said, "enough is enough." And he added, "I ask Israel to halt its incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas, and begin the withdrawal from those cities it has recently occupied. Israeli settlement activity in occupied territories must stop. And the occupation must end through withdrawal to secure and recognizable boundaries." Mr. Bush also announced that he was sending Secretary Powell to the Middle East to push for a political settlement.

Two days later, Mr. Bush called Sharon and said Israel must pull its forces out of the West Bank "without delay." And the White House appeared to support Secretary Powell's idea of bringing the parties together in a peace conference. Then, Powell left on a six-day trip to the region, and General Anthony Zinni, Bush's special envoy for the Middle East, conveyed to Sharon Bush's call for Israel to withdraw at once from Palestinian cities.

On April 9, three days after the call from The President, Mr. Sharon said that Israeli

would press on with its offensive in the West Bank.

On April 17, Powell returned without the cease-fire he had been seeking and unable to secure a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank. Meanwhile, An Fleischer, the White House press spokesman, was stressing that Sharon was "a man of peace.

The tilt toward Sharon reached a peak of sorts on June 24, 2002, when Bush told the Palestinian people that they would have to replace Yasir Arafat as their leader before Washington would support an independent Palestinian state. Without mentioning Arafat by name, the President made his meaning clear: "Peace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership so that a Palestinian state can be born," he said. Until then, Mr. Bush had resisted the