Chapter V The interval of thirty days peace. spirited belligerent, the uselessness of a protraction of the war beyond the first really decisive battle. There would be, in such a show of friendliness, an element of spontaneous pity or compassion which would surely be resented, and which is wholly absent from the accepted duty of a second. On behalf of the military experts of several of the an agency for Great Powers it was stated that the Article has one feature which would prove an agency for peace perhaps more effective than any other, and which was the least objectionable of all, from the military and naval point of view. This is the interval of thirty days which is provided for in the absence of a different stipulation, and which affords sufficient time to bring home directly to the peoples concerned the stupendous consequences of the impending conflict while it is yet time to retire with honor. Upon the motion of M. d' Ornellas Vasconcellos of Portugal it was expressly recognized by the Conference that the provisions of Article 7 were applicable to the institution of special mediation. While it is not supposed that the appointment of seconds would necessarily be followed immediately by the mobilization of all the national forces, it would nevertheless bring such a mobilization within the limits of probability. The political, financial, and economic effect of a war could well be discussed without the strain which the existence of an actual state of war must necessarily exercise. The result would naturally be a searching of hearts which ought, but seldom does, precede a momentous national deci sion. If this decision should finally be for war, the Chapter V element of deliberation would do no harm, for any loss by delay would be more than made up by the moral strength which any people must gain in their own eyes, as well as in those of the world, by the consciousness of acting, not from a sudden impulse, but from what would be equivalent to a deliberate sense of duty. procedure. The diplomatic modus operandi under this Article Method of will probably vary according to the circumstances of each particular case. Very often the mediating Powers may find it possible to act through their respective representatives accredited to one of the litigating States; in serious cases, however, it may be assumed that special representatives will be appointed, and that they will meet in a neutral place. Scarcely any duty can devolve upon the Chief Executive or any Minister of Foreign Affairs more delicate or more momentous than that of acting, under this Article, on behalf of a friendly State, in what must necessarily be a critical and perilous situation. Special plenipotentiaries, of recognized standing and experience, would seem to be the natural agents for such a purpose, at least where the direct action of the Chief Executives or Foreign Ministers is for any reason impracticable. The results of the negotiations between the mediating Powers should be embodied in a protocol or an identical note addressed to both litigants, and, in a proper case, communicated to other Powers. It is to be hoped that, as a general rule, all diplomatic Chapter V The practical article. correspondence or action under this Article will be communicated by the interested parties to the International Bureau at The Hague, in the manner provided by Article 22, for the case of special Arbitration Tribunals, to become part of the general archives of International Law which should eventually be gathered there. Attention was called by Chevalier Descamps to the fact that existing treaties might have effects, which it was not possible accurately to forecast, upon the choice of seconds by some of the European States. He instanced the case of Belgium in its relations with the Powers guaranteeing its neutrality, under the provisions of the treaty of April 15, 1839. Upon the practical value of Article 8, experience value of the alone can give a truly satisfactory judgment. The introduction or recognition of something akin to the duelling code has been criticised as an unnecessary concession to the so-called "military spirit." It must however be remembered that this very concession operates as a restraint. Appealing, as it perhaps does, to prejudices and habits of thought of the military class, this Article reaches the very persons who are apt to be impervious to other restraining influences, and who have hitherto not infrequently turned the scale in favor of war. The best guarantee of future usefulness, however modest in its scope, is to be found in the fact that it was unanimously adopted by so careful, conservative. able, and eminent a body of men as the Peace Con ference. With this initiatory endorsement the Article Chapter V may confidently await the judgment of the future. TITLE III. ON INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS OF ARTICLE 9. In differences of an international nature involving neither honor nor vital interests, and arising from a difference of opinion on matters of fact, the Signatory Powers recommend that parties who have not been able to come to an agreement by diplomatic methods, should, as far as circumstances allow, institute an International Commission of Inquiry to facilitate a solution of the differences by elucidating the facts, by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation. vation. The institution of International Commissions of Not an innoInquiry is, strictly speaking, by no means an innovation. Numerous instances of more or less importance, especially on questions of fact regarding occurrences upon or near boundary lines, have frequently been investigated by a commission composed wholly or partly of neutrals. The true line of a boundary has often been fixed by neutral surveyors, and in one recent case, beyond no doubt the most notable of all, a commission was appointed by a Power nominally neutral, viz., the United States of America, to report upon the true boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana, preparatory to a declaration guaranteeing the boundary so found to Venezuela. Experience has no doubt shown that an international commission, Chapter V Difficulties selected by the parties to a controversy, is the most efficacious method which has thus far been found, to settle a question of fact, which otherwise might, by uncertainty or misconstruction, easily become the germ of a dangerous conflict. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the dangers to peace arising in many cases merely from uncertainty or positive misinformation regarding questions of actual fact. The halfforgotten Schnäbele affair, regarding an alleged occurrence upon the Franco-German frontier, will serve as a special example. The growing recklessness of the sensational press in every civilized country, and the paralysis which seems to have overcome their Governments, so far as attempts to effectively check this evil are concerned, make the necessity for an impartial and efficient method of inquiry more urgent than ever. At the same time, no subject before the Conference was involved in greater difficulties, or bore within it greater dangers. It will readily be seen that it would be comparain the way. tively easy in any case to consider the proposition for the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry as an implied reflection upon the character or sufficiency of some national institution or governmental agency, with the result of creating as much or more imbitterment of national feeling than the very errors of fact which it was sought to correct. Moreover, this danger would very likely be greatest where the necessity for the commission might be most urgent, especially in States having a comparatively brief legal and administrative experience, or such as |