1972 NASA AUTHORIZATION FRIDAY, MARCH 19, 1971 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m., in Room 2325, Rayburn Office Building, the Honorable Joseph E. Karth (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. KARTH. Yesterday, Doctor Naugle, after you had finished the physics and astronomy programs part of your presentation, I made an observation designed to get your attention more than anything else. I do have a few questions on physics and astronomy that I would like to explore with you before we go into the next phase of your testimony. On page 7 of your statement you talked about the several reasons why the decision had been made not to refly OAO-B. And my remarks were in regard to those reasons. Immediately below those reasons in your testimony in the middle of page 7 you went on to say: Instead we instructed Goddard Space Flight Center to proceed with the preparation of OAO-C for a launch in 1972; to preserve the prototype payload package for possible future use; and to accomplish where possible the OAO-B objectives with OAO-C. I assume when you said "to preserve the prototype for possible future use" you are talking about the OAO-B parts. Is that correct? FURTHER STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN E. NAUGLE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS, NASA Dr. NAUGLE. That is correct. Mr. KARTH. As one of your four reasons for not flying OAO-B you cite the age of components that would be flying. If we are going to preserve the prototype for possible future use, those components will be older still. I just can't help wondering about that reasoning. Can you explain precisely why you use two seemingly inconsistent and diametrically opposed reasons? Dr. NAUGLE. Yes. I would like to extend my comments on that decision and on your observations. First, let me say that the loss of OAO-B was the most heartbreaking loss we have suffered in the space science and applications program. A very dedicated, highly competent group of astronomers at GAFC, together with a highly competent project organization at GSFC and Grumman, had worked for nearly a decade preparing the experimental hardware and spacecraft for OAO-B. A decade is a major fraction of a professional scientist's career. That was why we had asked the GSFC to develop a recovery plan literally almost before the OAO-B had impacted. It was my hope that we could recover from the loss of OAO-B as we had in the case of Nimbus, where we were able to replace Nimbus-B for about one-fourth of the original cost. The eventual decision not to attempt the backup mission OAO-B2 was the most difficult of my tenure at NASA. As you indicated, the scientific objectives of each of the OAO's had been carefully selected so that each one made a unique contribution to measurements of the universe in the ultraviolet portion of the spectrum. OAO-2 is making broad surveys of ultraviolet light from the stars and some relatively crude analysis of that light by wavelength (spectral resolution 10A) for the brighest and, thus, generally the nearest stars and galaxies. OAO-B (the mission that failed) objectives were to investigate, in more detail, the ultraviolet emission of stars and galaxies with increased spectral resolution (2, 8, and 64A) and to dimmer stars (roughly 100 times) or stars further out (roughtly 10 times). The OAO-C objectives are to investigate the nature of interstellar atter from which stars are formed, and measure the detailed charcteristics of the ultraviolet light from bright stars with very high resolution (0.1 and 0.40). Thus we see that each OAO mission was designed with unique objectives, but with some planned overlap on the brightest and thus nearest stars. If OAO-2 continues to operate satisfactorily, and if OAO-C is successful and has a long lifetime, I estimate that we could carry out the ultraviolet observations of the atmospheres of the brightest stars. These observations, together with low resolution ultraviolet photographic measurements on skylab and selected sounding rocket observations, might accomplish perhaps 10- to 15-percent of the OAO-B objectives. Because all of the OAO-B objectives are still valid we still intend to accomplish them in the future. Some of the remaining important objectives of OAO-B, including the exploitation of the discoveries of OAO-2 and the extension of observations to 100 times fainter and to 10 times further distant objects might be accomplished as part of the small astronomy satellite-D Project. We are presently studying this mission with the United Kingdom and ESRO as a possible cooperative project. My comments regarding considerations of age of components-and I meant design age as well as age of hardware-and the present OAO organization were meant to reflect the fact that these factors were considered in the estimated cost of a backup mission. Hardware available for the backup was essentially a prototype spacecraft structure and the telescope. Most of the black boxes would have had to be purchased. Because of this we found that the total cost of the backup mission would not be one-fourth of the original cost of OAO-B but rather would be one-half. The consideration of the organization at Grumman, and also at GSFC was a factor in the phasing of people on OAO-C and the OAOB-2, and because we were aware that we would have to reduce the GSFC work force by some 200 positions. Finally, as Dr. Low has indicated in his statement before the Commitee on Science and Astronautics: "The budget is a fiscally constrained one, and as such has forced us to make reductions and compromises to bring our request well below what would be desired from a purely scientific and technical standpoint." These were the facts that we faced when we came to make the OAO-B-2 decision. In considering OAO-B-2 we had to weigh the delay in accomplishing the objectives of OAO-B-2 against either the delay in accomplishing other objectives in the NASA program or perhaps against giving up some other objectives entirely. For instance, we might have delayed the start of HEAO by a year to gain roughly half the funds needed for OAO-B-2. We might have delayed or eliminated OSO I, J, K, to gain the rest of the money. In our judgment, we felt that the early accomplishment of the OAO-B objectives at the expense of these missions was not the thing to do. When we weighed the things we would have to give up against the delay in accomplishing the OAO-B objectives, we decided that we should not try to proceed with OAO-B-2. In summary, the OAO-B objectives were and are still valid. At this time, we are delaying these important astronomy objectives so that we might implement the major new projects in applications and the exploration of Mars authorized in prior years; and proceed with major new initiatives including the unique opportunity for exploration of the outer planets, the grand tour, and the potential for major new discoveries relevant to our understanding of the production of energy, HEAO. Mr. KARTH. Dr. Naugle, I appreciate very much that explanation, but I still feel quite strongly that one of our problems is that we are hurrying on so rapidly to produce new hardware that we really don't have much time to give attention to that which has already been cut. I think it is very unfortunate because the OAO-B was sold to us on the basis that it was designed to fill the large void between the low resolution sky survey in the ultraviolet and the high resolution that we expect to get from OAO-C. NASA had originally planned a very orderly and logical OAO program. Now, it appears to me we don't have an orderly and logical program in astronomy, in spite of the fact that HEAO has come along as a new multihundred million dollar experiment. You mention that you weren't talking about the physical age of the available OAO-B parts, but rather about the design age. I respect that as a valid argument. The point I would like to make, as I understand it, HEAO has been under design and development, at least the experiments, for some 5 or 6 years. Therefore, HEAO, too, for all practical purposes, might fit into the same category. I am not so sure that if the design age argument applies to OAO-B that maybe it doesn't just as persuasively apply to the HEAO now. Dr. NAUGLE. Let me speak to that. The type of work we are doing right at the present time in the case of HEAO, that in which we are laying out the preliminary de signs of the spacecraft, that type of work in the case of OAO was done early in the decade of the 1960's. I think Mr. Mitchell may want to comment in more detail on that. Mr. KARTH. Irrespective whenever it was done, I would assume it was done not too much in advance of OAO-C. I suppose OAO-C, to some degree, using the same reasoning, might also be obsolescent before its launch. I think this is true with every satellite, really, isn't it? Dr. NAUGLE. Yes. Mr. KARTH. You can't design it and develop it one day and fly it the next. They all pretty much fit into the same category. The point I want to make again is that there will exist a data gap, until it is filled perhaps by the large space telescope, brought about by the failure of OAO-B. It was of such importance to begin with that the taxpayers were asked to spend a hundred million dollars on OAOB. It seems to me that it may be important enough now to consider launching another for $50 million, half the cost, even though it may fly a year or two later than originally intended. I am not so sure I understand what the rush is all about when it comes to other programs. I am not too sure that the Cosmos is going to go away and we are not going to be able to study it if we delay OAO-C, for example, for a year, to accommodate a second OAO-B, or if we delay the HEAO experiment for a year to accommodate a second OAO-B. I am just not sure I understand what the rush is all about, and why we ought not to certify a program that originally was logical and orderly. Mr. DOWNING. Would the chairman yield? Mr. KARTH. I will in just a minute. You did say in your statement here this morning that sounding rockets and other spacecraft will give us some 15 percent of what we expected to get from OAO-B, but I note, and the gentleman from Virginia knows better than I, that the sounding rockets portion of your budget is down in fiscal year 1972 from fiscal year 1971, and OAO-2 is going to be turned off in the latter part of June of this year. It seems to me those two arguments quite frankly can be scrubbed. The 200 positions NASA will lose at Goddard that you referred to probably was one of the major reasons for the decision, but I doubt seriously this committee wants to accept that as a valid reason. Mr. Downing? Mr. DOWNING. I have been listening to this discussion with a great deal of interest. The key words in Dr. Naugle's testimony was considering the potential value of the scientific results, the whole purpose is lost if there are not going to be any beneficial results. It would be useless, in my opinion, to go ahead with the thing. Mr. KARTH. The point the Chair raised was that the potential value of the scientific results was one of the reasons used for not flying the OAO-B prototype equipment. That should have been a good reason for turning down a hundred million dollar program to begin with, because the scientific results, I assume, would be the same. Dr. NAUGLE. Could I speak to that? As I stated earlier this morning, the objectives that we had hoped to accomplish with OAO-B, and with OÃO-B2, are valid and they were and still are worth the amount of money that we had planned, that we had allocated in the case of OAO-B. And, as I indicated, we intend to ultimately accomplish those objectives. The decision that the agency had to make here was whether we should use resources to accomplish those objectives of OAO-B at this time, at the expense of the objectives of other programs. We made the determination that we should continue with certain other programs and start certain new intiatives that the objectives of those when considered at this time against the objectives of what we could accomplish by repeating OAO-B2 were such that we should not proceed with OAO-В2. Now, in a situation in which we had not been living under such an austere budget so we would have had more backup equipment available, or if the overall NASA budget were not so austere, it is conceivable we would have made a decision to proceed with OAO-B2 to maintain an orderly program. But we simply could not make that decision faced with the alternatives that we had at that time. Mr. KARTH. Well, Dr. Naugle, I don't want to be argumentative about it. I just fail to understand why we would proceed with HEAO before we have filled the gap left by OAO-B. We felt that data was absolutely necessary and embarked upon a hundred million dollar program to acquire it originally. There is really no rush about this new program. I have the instinctive feeling, unfortunately, that we are trying to take care of people rather than take care of a program designed to do a complete job, and decisions like this one may well be one of the reasons why the American public really doesn't understand this program. The scientists who has been associated with it for 10 years perhaps is beginning not to understand it as well. This committee is going to have to be a little more conscious of its oversight responsibilities. Hopefully, in the future, when programs are begun for the purpose of obtaining certain important scientific information, in an orderly fashion, we would stick to that program, so that we are not confused and so that that the American people don't become more confused. Now, I guess what we are talking about, really, is the importance of the Goddard experiment flying before the HEAO experiment, if you have to make a decision and budgetary constraints force you to make that decision. You said in your testimony yesterday, that accidental discoveries are responsible in large part for major scientific advances. I think that is true. A good deal of our scientific discovery has come from those accidental ones. Again I say, it really doesn't make sense to me not to fly the spare parts of OAO-B for half the price that we originally felt that it is extremely important we fly the program to begin with. I am not sure I understand that. Let me ask you whether or not what you said in your testimony of yesterday is true. You said NASA will "preserve the prototype for possible future use." I merely pointed out, if the design is somewhat aged now, the design will be even more out of date as time goes on. 59-311 0-71-No. 2, pt. 3- -13 |