clerk of the board of supervisors a notice of their appeal, in which their objections were stated in writing; and the board of supervisors fixed Monday evening, June 6th, as the time for hearing the appeal, at which time they passed a resolution setting aside the assessment, and directing the superintendent of streets to make and issue a new assessment in accordance with the claim of the contractors. The present action is brought upon the assessment made under this direction of the board of supervisors. Section 11 of the street-improvement act (St. 1885, p. 156), after providing for an appeal from any act of the superintendent, declares: "Notice of the time and place of the hearing, briefly referring to the work contracted to be done, or other subject of appeal, and to the acts, determinations or proceedings objected to or complained of, shall be published for five days." In the present case the board of supervisors fixed the time and place for hearing the appeal by the following resolution: "Resolved, that Monday evening, June 6, 1892, at 8 o'clock p. m., be fixed as the time for hearing said appeal by this board, in their chamber at the new city hall, at which time and place all appellants are required to appear, when they will be heard in relation to said appeals. And the clerk is hereby directed to publish this resolution in the San Francisco Daily Report newspaper for five days, as and for the notice required by law." resolution was published as therein directed, and was the only notice of the hearing of the appeal authorized or given by the board of supervisors. The act of the superintendent in making the assessment is in the nature of a judgment by a tribunal of special and limited jurisdiction. After its judgment has once been exercised, its power is exhausted, and, in the absence of statutory authority for its revision, cannot be changed. By the original assessment the land of the owner is charged with a lien of a specified amount, and, if the amount of this lien is to be increased, it is essential that the owner shall have notice thereof, and have an opportunity to be heard there on. This This notice is in the nature of process by which the board of supervisors may acquire jurisdiction to act upon the appeal and change the assessment. It is the only means which the law has provided to warn the owner of the intended increase of the lien upon his property, and must be followed in order to effect such increase. Cruger v. Railroad Co., 12 N. Y. 201; Scammon v. Chicago, 40 Ill. 146. The mode which the statute prescribes for a revision of the assessment is the measure of the power, and, unless that mode is followed, any attempted revision will be nugatory. Where a statute prescribes the mode of acquiring jurisdiction, the mode must be complied with, or the proceedings will be a nullity. In Durant v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. Law, 309, under a provision in the charter of Jersey City requiring notice to be given, in terms similar to those of the statute under consideration, the notice specified that the council would hear any objections that might be presented "in writing." It was held that by reason of this departure from the direction of the charter the council did not acquire jurisdiction to pass the ordinance, saying: "It may be that this departure from the direction of the charter was not calculated seriously to interfere with the rights of the property holders whose lands were to be taken; yet, în point of fact, the power delegated to the common council was not strictly pursued in this particular, and their jurisdiction to pass the ordinance therefore fails." In City of Lowell v. Wentworth, 6 Cush, 222, the officer was required, before making an assessment, to give to each person liable to be assessed a notice in writing, appointing in the notice a time and place in which all persons interested might appear and be heard in relation to the assessment. Instead of so doing, he notified some of the persons interested to appear at one time and place, and others at a different time. This was held to be such an omission to comply with the ordinance as to render the assessment void. Notice, when required by a statute, is not the equivalent of knowledge, and the supervisors gain jurisdiction to act upon the appeal only by giving the notice that the statute requires, and in the manner that is required, and not by the fact that the parties interested may have knowledge of their intended action. The term "notice" of itself imports that the information given thereby comes from an authentic source, and is to be directed to some one who is to act or refrain from acting in consequence of the information contained in the notice. See Fry v. Bennett, 7 Abb. Prac. 355; Minard v. Douglas Co., 9 Or. 210. A notice which, by its terms, is directed to A., is ineffectual as a notice to B., even though it is delivered to B., and he is thereby informed of its contents. In the absence of any provision in the statute for the mode of giving the notice, it would be necessary that every person who might be affected by the appeal should receive personal notice of the matter appealed from, as well as of the time and place fixed for hearing the same. The provision that the notice shall be given by publication for five days merely changes the mode of giving the notice, but does not change the character of the notice to be given. The publication of the notice takes the place of personal notice, but can have no greater effect as a notice than would a similar one if personally delivered to him who is to receive it. In either case it must indicate the person who is to be notified, as well as the matter of which notice is given; the object of giving the notice being to enable those to whom it is to be given to be heard upon the appeal. "It must be very plain language which will justify the court in holding that the legislature meant to substitute, by way of a published advertisement, anything less explicit than would be required in a written no. tice, actually delivered to the person whose property was meant to be affected." Peters v. City of Newark, 31 N. J. Law, 364. The only "notice" that was given in the present case is that contained in the resolution aforesaid, and the only portion of this resolution that has any of the qualities of a notice is contained in the clause, "all appellants are required to appear, when they will be heard in relation to said appeals." All else is only the fixing the time and place for hearing the appeal, and directing the clerk to publish the resolution. Although the statute merely declares the manner in which the notice shall be given, and does not indicate the persons who are to be notified, yet it is a rule of universal application, in all proceedings by which a person's property is to be taken or to be charged with a burden, that he shall have notice of the proceedings; and the notice which is here required to be given necessarily includes every one who is to be affected by the appeal. A notice which by its terms is limited to a portion of those who may be so affected cannot be held to extend to others who may be also interested in the appeal, and is not a compliance with the statute. The direction to the clerk to publish the resolution "as and for the notice required by law" can have no effect to enlarge the notice which was actually published, or to change its character from the terms in which it is expressed. The direction in this clause limited the notice to the appellants, and cannot be construed as a notice to all persons interested in the subject-matter of the appeal. It was an express notice to the appellants alone, and by its terms implied that they only would be heard; and it must be construed as a notice only to them. By reason of its limitation to the "appellants," it failed to be a notice to the defendant, and the supervisors acquired no jurisdiction to act upon the appeal. The effect of the appeal was to suspend all action for the collection of the assessment until after its determination (People v. O'Neil, 51 Cal. 91; Mahoney v. Braverman, 54 Cal. 570); and until the confirmation of the assessment by the board of supervisors, or the making of a new one under its direction, the contractors had no right of action against the owner. It follows that the assessment sued upon was made without authority. The judgment and order are reversed. We concur: VAN FLEET, J.; GAROUTTE, J. (108 Cal. 179) FREEMAN et al. v. BELLEGARDE et al. (No. 15,606.) (Supreme Court of California. July 18, 1895.) BOUNDARIES-THREAD OF STREAM-SHORE LINE. 1. A description in a mortgage extending the boundary line of the mortgaged land from a given point, by certain courses and distances, "to the mouth" of a certain creek, and "thence ascending said creek" by certain courses and distances, made the thread of the creek the bounv.41P.no.3-19 dary line, regardless of the last-named courses and distances, even though the creek was a tidal stream, the grantor having title to its bed. 2. A deed conveying land bordering on a stream, and defining its boundaries as "commencing at the intersection" of a certain ditch "with the shore line," and extending by courses and distances named to the "S. shore" of the same stream, "thence along said shore as it winds and turns, to commencement," made the shore line the boundary, and did not convey the land lying between the low-water mark and the thread of the stream. In bank. Appeal from superior court, city and county of San Francisco; J. C. B. Hebbard, Judge. Action by Freeman and others against Bellegarde and others to quiet title to lands lying between the shore line and thread of a stream. From a judgment for plaintiffs, and an order denying a new trial, defendants appeal. Reversed as to part of the defendants, and affirmed as to others. Freeman & Bates, for appellants. Warren Olney, Harding & Forbes, Grant & Cushing, and Charles F. Hanlon, for respondents. HARRISON, J. Action to quiet title to certain lands in San Francisco. The lands described in the complaint are a portion of the Bernal Rancho, and the controverted question in the action is the title of the plaintiffs to that portion of the lands described in the complaint which lies between the south shore of Islais creek and the thread of the stream. Islais creek empties into the Bay of San Francisco, and the tidal waters of the bay ebb and flow in the creek for some distance above its mouth. At the line of the land claimed by the plaintiff nearest the bay the creek is at ordinary high tides 300 feet wide, and the ground at that point that is covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tides has a width of 150 feet between the bank of the stream and the line of ordinary low-water mark. At high tide the water nearest the bay is about 3 feet deep, and at a point below the lands in controversy there is at low tide no water in the creek, thus rendering the creek a mere basin which is filled and emptied by the ebb and flow of the tide. The patent for the Bernal Rancho covers the bed of Islais creek and the land on both banks thereof, and includes all the lands described in the complaint. The title of the plaintiff's to the land in controversy is derived through the foreclosure of a mortgage given by the Bernals to J. Mora Moss, and a subsequent conveyance from the grantees of Moss to John Hewston, and depends upon the construction to be given to the description in the mortgage and sheriff's deed thereunder, and to the description in the conveyance from Moss' grantees to Hewston. The plaintiffs had judgment in the court below, and defendants have appealed therefrom, and from an order denying a new trial. 1. The description of the property in the mortgage to Moss, so far as the same af fects the present action, is as follows: |isting, inasmuch as the mortgage to Moss, * * Thence along margin of the bay (giving four courses and distances) * * con 11 chains to mouth of creek; thence ascending said creek (giving thirteen courses, with their distances) * * * N. 45°, W. 9 chains, 50 links, crossing the creek to the end of the old wall on N. side of marsh, * taining area of 1,958 acres, more or less, according to a survey by N. Scholfield, deputy U. S. surveyor general." This description in the mortgage was carried into the sheriff's deed issued upon the sale under the foreclosure, and the title to the land thus conveyed afterwards became vested in Pioche and Robinson. In Spring v. Hewston, 52 Cal. 442, the description in this mortgage was before the court, and it was held that the creek, rather than the line determined by the courses and distances, was the true boundary of the land embraced in the mortgage. The call in the mortgage "to mouth of creek" rendered the thread of the creek the boundary of the land mortgaged. In the absence of any qualifying term, the designation in a conveyance of any physical object or monument as a boundary implies the middle or central point of such boundary, as, for example, if the boundary be a road or highway or a stream, the thread of the road or stream will be intended; if a rock, a heap of stones, or a tree be the boundary, the central point of such tree or rock or heap of stones will be intended. A private grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantee, and, if the grantor is the owner of the monument or boundary designated in his grant, his conveyance will be held to extend to the middle line or central point of such monument or boundary. This rule is not changed by reason of the fact that a stream which is designated as the boundary is a tidal stream, if the grantor of the land is the owner of the bed of such stream. "When riparian estates are conveyed, the owner may reserve the land under water, but the general presumption is that the purchaser's title extends as far as the grantor owns, in both tidal and fresh waters." Gould, Waters, § 195. The title to the beds of tidal streams is ordinarily vested in the sovereign, and in such case 2 grant from the sovereign which is bounded by tidal waters will be construed to extend only to high-water mark. Water Co. v. Richardson, 70 Cal. 206, 11 Pac. 695. A grant from the sovereign is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor, contrary to the rule for interpreting grants between private individuals; but if, as in the present case, the sovereign has parted with the title to the land beneath the stream, a grant of the riparian tidal lands by the owner must receive the same construction as a grant by him of any other riparian lands. It is unnecessary to determine whether the provisions of section 880, Civ. Code, and of section 2077, Code Civ. Proc., were intended to change the rules of construction then ex and the conveyances by which the lands in question became vested in Pioche and Robinson, were executed prior to the enactment of the Codes. The further call in the mortgage and subsequent conveyances, "thence ascending said creek," must prevail over the courses and distances. The creek is the boundary of the land conveyed, and the courses and distances, being only approximate estimates of the direction and length of the boundary, must yield to the actual line of the creek. When a meandering stream is a boundary, it is impracticable for a surveyor to fix monuments in the channel of the water, or to define the actual line of its windings and courses; and in attempting to define its banks it would be impossible for two surveyors to give the courses and lengths of its several meanders alike. Yates v. Van De Bogert, 36 N. Y. 526; Ang. Water Courses, §§ 29, 30; Middleton v. Pritchard, 3 Scam. 510; Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272. This construction is not overcome by the fact that, after "ascending the creek" for several courses, the next course is given as "crossing the creek to the end of the old wall." This call is not inconsistent with holding that the previous call, "ascending the creek," follows the thread of the stream, but merely shows that in going from that point the next course is in a direction which crosses the creek from the thread of the stream towards the end of the wall. Nor is the construction to be given to these calls in the mortgage qualified by the subsequent reference therein to a survey by Scholfield. The defendants offered in evidence a plat of a survey made by Scholfield and approved by the United States surveyor general September 23, 1853, and it was testified that this was a preliminary survey of the Bernal Rancho, made under instructions from the land commission. A comparison of this plat with the description in the mortgage shows, however, that this cannot have been the survey referred to in the mortgage. The plat is of the entire rancho, containing 4,341 acres, and has upon its face several subdivisions, no one of which corresponds with the tract of 1,958 acres which is described in the mortgage. The plat, however, contains upwards of 100 courses, more than double the number in the mortgage,-and only 11 of these courses are the same as those in the mortgage. 2. Pioche and Robinson conveyed December 6, 1866, to John Hewston, a tract of land "commencing at the intersection of a ditch (dividing land of Haley and O'Neill) with the shore line, and running thence along said ditch * * * to E. line of 15th avenue; thence along the easterly line of said 15th avenue, N. 45° 15', W. 2 chains 60 links, to S. shore of Islais creek; thence along said shore, as it winds and turns, to commencement." Whatever title passed by this deed was vested in the plaintiffs at the commencement of the action. By virtue of conveyances subsequently executed by Pioche and Robinson, the defendants Luty and Thomas claimed title to the land, "commencing at a point where the northwesterly line of Fourth avenue intersects the southerly shore of Islais creek, and running thence in a northwesterly direction along the northeasterly line of said Fourth avenue, extended to the center of Islais creek; and thence ascending said Islais creek along the center line thereof to the northeasterly line of Fifteenth avenue, if extended in a northwesterly direction, as said avenue is delineated on said map; and thence in a southeasterly direction, and along the northeasterly line of Fifteenth avenue, if extended as aforesaid to the southerly shore of Islais creek; and thence in a northeasterly direction along said southerly shore, as it winds and turns, to the point of commencement." With reference to their title to this land the court finds "that the lands described in the conveyance to Hewston include all the property described in plaintiffs' complaint, unless such deed is to be construed as including no part of the lands covered by the waters of Islais creek, in which event the said deed includes all the lands described in plaintiffs' complaint, except that lying in Islais creek"; and "if Pioche and Robinson retained any title to any part of the lands described in plaintiffs' complaint, after the making of the conveyances hereinbefore set out, then such title thereafter, and prior to the commencement of this action, became vested in the defendants Thomas and Luty as to the lands described in their answer." The conclusion of law that "the plaintiffs are the owners of all the real property described in their complaint" must be regarded as a finding that Pioche and Robinson did not retain any title to any portion of the lands described in the complaint. The term "shore," in its ordinary use, signifies the land that is periodically covered and uncovered by the tide, but it is sometimes applied to a river or pond, as synonymous with bank. In the absence of any qualification, a grant bounded by the "shore" of a river, when the grantor is the owner of the river, conveys the land up to the lowest point of the shore at any time, in order that the grantee may at all times have access to the stream by which the land is bounded. It is competent, however, for the grantor to so designate the line on the shore which shall constitute the boundary that there shall be no uncertainty in its location, and in such case the line of high or low water mark would be immaterial in determining the extent of the grant. In the present case the starting point of the description in the grant to Hewston is "the intersection of the ditch with the shore line." This starting point may be susceptible of exact location, and from some of the evidence offered at the trial it would appear capable of ascertainment, although the court does not find its location. The only land of which plaintiffs have title is that embraced within a line drawn from this starting point, around the various courses, to the "south shore of Islais creek," and "thence along said shore, as it winds and turns, to commencement." The point in the "south shore," from which the last course is to be drawn, must be the same point in the shore as is the starting point; that is, at whatever point between high and low water mark was the intersection of the ditch with the shore line, there must be the point in the "shore line" to which the course along the easterly line of Fifteenth avenue is to be extended. The term "shore" must be construed with the same meaning wherever it is used in the same conveyance, and its definite location in the first course requires the same location in the last. This is a fixed boundary or monument to which the distance "two chains, sixty links," must yield. Whatever land lies between this boundary and the center of the creek is vested in the defendants Thomas and Luty, and the finding of the court that the plaintiffs were the owners of this portion of the demanded premises was erroneous. 3. The defendants other than Thomas and Luty claim title under Harvey S. Brown to certain lots in gift map No. 4, upon the theory that the Moss mortgage did not include any part of the bed of Islais creek. As Brown had conveyed to Moss all the lands described in the mortgage before he made the conveyance under which these defendants claim, it is evident that the plaintiffs' title, derived from Moss, is superior to theirs. The judgment and order denying a new trial are reversed as to the appellants Thomas and Luty. As to the other appellants they are affirmed. We concur: GAROUTTE, J.; VAN FLEET, J.; MCFARLAND, J.; HENSHAW, J. (108 Cal. 189) CITY OF SAN DIEGO v. LINDA VISTA An assessment, for purposes of irrigation, against the pueblo lands of a city, which are vacant, unoccupied, and, when irrigated, susceptible of cultivation, by an irrigation district, under Act March 7, 1887, an act providing for the organization and government of irrigation districts, is not a tax, within Const. art. 13, § 1. which exempts property belonging to municipal corporations from taxation, and such an assess ment is valid. Commissioners' decision. Department 1. Appeal from superior court, San Diego coun ty; E. S. Torrance, Judge. Action by the city of San Diego against the Linda Vista Irrigation District and othto quiet title. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed. ers Gibson & Titus, for appellants. William H. Fuller and Clarence L. Barber, for respondent. HAYNES, C. The city of San Diego brought this action against said irrigation district, and its directors and officers, to quiet its title to several parcels of land, containing in all nearly 3,000 acres. The defendants answered the complaint, alleging its organization under the act of March 7, 1887, "to provide for the organization and government of irrigation districts," etc. (St. 1887, p. 29), and the acts amendatory thereof. The district was organized August 24, 1891, and in 1892 it made an assessment upon all the lands in said district, including those of the plaintiff, described in the complaint, and, plaintiff having failed to pay the assessment so made upon its said lands, the same were sold, on February 23, 1893, to the said irrigation district. These lands were described in the complaint as pueblo lands of the said city; and the answer alleged "that said real property, consisting of lands owned by said plaintiff, was acquired by it as pueblo lands, and held as such until the sale thereof, as hereinafter stated, and that said lands now are, and at all the times herein referred to were, dry, vacant, unoccupied. and uncultivated agricultural lands, susceptible to cultivation by irrigation, and would be largely benefited by irrigation; that they could not and cannot pe profitably cultivated without irrigation, and are practically valueless for any other uses than agricultural and horticultural." Plaintiff demurred to defendants' answer. The demurrer was sustained, and, defendants declining to amend, judgment went against them, and they appeal therefrom. The question to be determined is whether such lands as are described above, situated within an irrigation district, are exempt from assessment by such district, because they are owned and held by a municipal corporation. Respondent contends that said assessment is a tax, and that these lands are exempt from taxation, under section 1 of article 13 of the constitution, which reads as follows: "All property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United States, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. The word 'property,' as used in this article and section, is hereby declared to include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, dues, franchises, and all other matters and things, real, personal and mixed, capable of private ownership; provided, that growing crops, property used exclusively for public schools, and such as may belong to the United States, this state, or to any county or municipal corporation within this state, shall be exempt from taxation. * *" Section 3607 of the Political Code repeats the above exemption; but we are not referred to any other statutory provision exempting property from taxation. But the assessment to satisfy which the lands in question were sold is not a tax, within the meaning of said provision of the constitution. The act un der which the Linda Vista District was or ganized authorizes the formation of districts where the lands of the different owners are "susceptible of one mode of irrigation from a common source, and by the same system of works." The district, when formed, is a local organization, to secure a local benefit, to be derived from the irrigation of lands from the same source of water supply, and by the same system of works. It is, therefore, a charge upon lands benefited, or capable of being benefited, by a single local work or improvement, and from which the state, or the public at largé, derives no direct benefit, but only that reflex benefit which all local improvements confer. In Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 241, 255, the court defined the term "assessment," as distinguished from "taxation," thus: "It is not a power to tax all the property within the corporation for general purposes, but the power to tax specific property for a specific purpose. It is not a power to tax property generally, founded upon the benefits supposed to be derived from the organization of a government for the protection of life, liberty, and property, but a power to tax specific property founded upon the benefits supposed to be derived by the property itself from the expenditure of the tax in its immediate vicinity." In Emery v. Gas Co., 28 Cal. 346, 357, the court spoke of "the long and well established meaning of the words 'taxes' and 'assessments,' as used in the statutes and in the ordinary language of the several states, to indicate different classes of public burdens,-the one imposed for general revenue for the purposes of the ordinary expenses of the state, county, and town governments, and the other to raise a special fund to defray the expenses of public improvements, mainly locally beneficial." See, also, Doyle v. Austin, 47 Cal. 353, 358. It cannot be doubted, in view of the wellrecognized distinction between a tax and an assessment, not only in common parlance, but in repeated decisions of this court prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1879, that if it had been intended to restrict the power of the legislature in regard to assessments for local purposes, or that the proviso contained in section 1 of article 13 should extend to assessments as well as taxation, apt words to express such intention would have been used. If this be true, it follows that there is at least no express exemption of any property from local assessments, while the act under which said irrigation district was organized provides for an annual assessment upon the real property of the district; "and all the real property in the district shall be and remain liable to be assessed for such payments, as hereinafter provided." St. 1887, p. 37, § 17. In Cooley, Tax'n (2d Ed.) p. 650, in speaking of property subject to assessment, the learned author says: "It has been shown in another place that, while these local as |