should direct the Chief, Forest Service, to establish a uniform national policy for dealing with outfitter and guide structures and facilities within wilderness areas that minimizes the presence of such structures in keeping with the spirit of the Wilderness Act. To improve administration of the National Wilderness Preservation System and provide Congress with current and accurate budget information, the Secretary of Agriculture should direct the Chief, Forest Service, in conjunction with the development of baseline inventory information on the condition of individual wilderness areas, to compile information on the total funding and staffing needed to manage wilderness areas in a manner that will meet the objectives of the Wilderness Act. 139622 Superfund: Contractors Are Being Too Liberally Indemnified by the Government. RCED-89-160; B231219. September 26, 1989. 57 pp. plus 5 appendices (18 pp.). Report to Congress; by Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General. Refer to RCED-88-2, October 16, 1987, Accession Number 134208; RCED-881, October 26, 1987, Accession Number 134238; RCED-88-39, January 15, 1988, Accession Number 134843; PEMD-89-6, October 28, 1988, Accession Number 137568; HRD-88-64, July 29, 1988, Accession Number 136658; and RCED-89-57, February 17, 1989, Accession Number 138211. Issue Area: Environmental Protection: Contact: Resources, Community, and Organization Concerned: Environmental Protection Agency; Congressional Relevance: Congress. and Administrative Services Act (40 U.S.C. 541 et seq.). F.A.R. 9.5. EPA A.R. 1509.5. EPA A.R. 1509.509(b). Abstract: Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) Section 119 program for indemnifying Superfund program contractors and subcontractors against liabilities caused by negligence, focusing on: (1) the use of and need for indemnification agreements; (2) claims against those agreements; (3) the program's compliance with applicable laws and regulations; and (4) program management. Findings/Conclusions: GAO found that: (1) as of June 1989, EPA had provided over 1,000 indemnification agreements to Superfund prime contractors and subcontractors, most of which worked directly for EPA; (2) EPA did not grant indemnification to any contractor working directly for parties responsible for the contaminated sites; (3) while no claims had been filed against any of the indemnification agreements, many years could pass before pollution was detected and a claim brought against the alleged polluter; (4) most private insurers generally regarded pollution risks as uninsurable, although three insurers provided some limited-coverage pollution insurance for cleanup contractors; (5) although several contractors cited their reluctance to perform Superfund work without indemnification, some of them had performed Superfund work for states and responsible parties without indemnification; (6) EPA provided indemnification free of charge; (7) EPA did not fully comply with requirements to provide indemnification on a discretionary, case-by-case basis, and did not enforce guidance procedures for granting indemnification; (8) EPA did not set limits on the amount of contractor indemnification; and (9) the EPA contractor for providing section 119 policy support was a direct beneficiary through two major indemnified Superfund contracts. Recommendation To Agencies: Because SARA section 119 established specific statutory authority to indemnify Superfund response action contractors, the Administrator, EPA, should advise federal agencies to use section 119 rather than general contracting authorities if they choose to indemnify Superfund contractors. To limit the government's potential exposure to liabilities caused by contractor negligence and keep qualified contractors working in the Superfund program, the Administrator, EPA, should: (1) identify and test, through the procurement system, options for providing section 119 indemnification that will make it competitively unattractive for Superfund contractors and subcontractors to obtain more indemnification than is needed; and (2) incorporate the options that are most cost-beneficial to the government into the regular Superfund procurement process. To encourage the development of pollution liability insurance for response action contractors and limit dependence on federal indemnification, the Administrator, EPA, should implement management controls for the section 119 indemnification program that will ensure that: (1) the insurance requirements in SARA are strictly enforced; and (2) indemnification decisions are made on a discretionary case-by-case basis, as Congress intended. To avoid unnecessary exposure of Superfund while EPA section 119 guidance is being developed, the Administrator, EPA, should attempt to reach an immediate agreement with contractors indemnified under the interim program to place a specific limit on the amount of indemnification they are being provided and specify a limit in indemnification agreements provided under the interim program for new contracts. 139641 Computer Security: Identification of Sensitive Systems Operated on Behalf of Ten Agencies. IMTEC-8970; B-231257. September 27, 1989. 4 pp. plus 2 appendices (11 pp.). Report to Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on Government Operations; Rep. Robert A. Roe, Chairman, House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology; by Ralph V. Carlone, Assistant Comptroller General, Information Management and Technology Division. Issue Area: Information Management and Technology: Other Issue Area Work (Unanticipated Congressional Requests) (7130). Contact: Information Management and Budget Function: Automatic Data Organization Concerned: Department of Department of the Interior; Department of Justice; Department of Labor; Department of the Treasury; Environmental Protection Agency; National Aeronautics and Space Congressional Relevance: House Abstract: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on 10 federal agencies' identification of sensitive computer systems operated by contractors, states, and other organizations. Findings/Conclusions: GAO found that: (1) 9 agencies reported in November 1988 a total of 812 sensitive computer systems operated by contractors or other organizations and none operated by states; (2) the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reported that it operated all of its sensitive computer systems; (3) the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Interior, Justice (DOJ), Labor (DOL), and the Treasury sent their components definitions of sensitive computer systems and then consolidated componentsupplied information to determine their total numbers of sensitive systems; (4) DOJ, DOL, Treasury, and the Department of Defense (DOD) used computer security plans, inventories, or other documentation to ensure that their reported lists were complete; and (5) in response to a March 1989 request that they revise their lists, which did not appear to include all sensitive systems operated by contractors, states, or other organizations, DOD, Interior, DOL, Treasury, and the Department of Health and Human Services reported a total of 220 additional systems, while other agencies reviewed their original responses and verified their accuracy. 139653 Financial Audit: Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund's 1988 Financial Statements. AFMD-89-104; B-208638. September 29, 1989. 13 pp. Report to Congress; by Brian P. Crowley, (for Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General). Issue Area: Financial Statement Audits Contact: Accounting and Financial Budget Function: Financial and Co.; Exxon Corp.: Exxon Shipping Co. Congressional Relevance: Congress. Authority: Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (43 U.S.C. 1653(c)(4)). Abstract: Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed an independent accountant's audit of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund's financial statements as of December 31, 1988. Findings/Conclusions: GAO found that: (1) the audit found that the Fund's financial statements fairly presented its financial position; (2) the audit did not disclose any material weaknesses or noncompliance with laws or regulations; (3) while the Fund has never had to pay a claim since its establishment in 1973, damages related to a March 1989 oil spill are expected to exceed the Fund's maximum liability; and (4) the Fund will contest any claims related to that spill, since it believes that a shipping company's negligence caused the spill. 139664 [Implementation of the Federal Contact: Resources, Community, and Authority: Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Abstract: GAO discussed the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) and the Forest Service's implementation of legislation concerning those agencies' administration of oil and gas leases on public lands. GAO noted that: (1) although both BLM and the Service determined that they needed to study potential environmental impacts and satisfy all environmental requirements before issuing oil and gas leases or approving drilling permits, 75 of 82 landuse plans, which the agencies heavily relied on in making such determinations, did not adequately identify or address essential potential environmental impacts; (2) both agencies have begun work to improve the information they use in making lease decisions, but are also continuing to approve drilling permits before they obtain the necessary information; (3) the Service's January 1989 proposed regulations for implementing its legislatively required responsibilities did not clearly address bonding requirements, introduced lease development uncertainties, and improperly separated oil and gas leasing decisions from the normal land-use plans and environmental studies process; (4) BLM implementation of its responsibilities resulted in a substantial increase in the percentage of competitively leased land and per-acre revenues; and (5) BLM retained a leasesale procedure which could reduce competition and revenues. Recommendation To Agencies: The Forest Service should confer with BLM in order to establish clear responsibilities for bonding to cover subsurface environmental impacts and nonpayment of royalties on Service lands. Given the uncertainty of what adequate bond amounts should be, and the possibility that amounts larger than current BLM requirements may seriously impede oil and gas leasing, the Forest Service should study the need for and availability of larger bond amounts before issuing bonding regulations. The Forest Service should remove bonding from the current rulemaking and propose a new bonding regulation after completing an appropriate study. The Forest Service should improve its information on the environmental impacts of oil and gas leasing and development on its lands so that informed decisions can be made before a lease is issued, thereby negating the need to deny subsequent development. Unless the Forest Service can ensure that its proposed suitability determination process is consistent with its regulations and would be cheaper and faster than using existing land-use planning procedures, the Service should use its existing planning process, rather than establishing a new one, to determine which lands should be available for leasing. 139675 [Shortfalls in BLM's Management Contact: Resources, Community, and Abstract: GAO discussed the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) management of wildlife habitat in the California Desert Conservation Area (CDCA), focusing on its efforts to protect and enhance wildlife under current legislative authority. GAO found that: (1) in 1980, BLM developed a comprehensive land use plan that required it to develop specific plans for and monitor 57 wildlife habitat management areas and 28 wildlife-related areas of critical environmental concern; (2) as of March 1989, 38 of the required habitat management area plans remained undeveloped; (3) of the 349 tasks in the 22 completed plans, BLM completed only 33 percent, partially completed 21 percent, had not started work on 46 percent, and consistently assigned low priority to or indefinitely delayed essential monitoring; (4) BLM did not maintain current wildlife inventory and population trend data for the more than 635 vertebrate species and countless other species living in CDCA; (5) BLM shortfalls resulted from lack of funding and staff, because actual spending totalled only $53 million between 1982 and 1988, which was only 40 percent of the planned $130 million; (6) each of the eight wildlife biologists assigned to CDCA was responsible for an average of 1.5 million acres; (7) BLM generally allowed economic and recreational interests to take precedence over wildlife interests in resolving land use conflicts; and (8) BLM could not make lasting improvements in its wildlife protection and enhancement efforts until it requested and received funding and staffing levels sufficient to carry out the comprehensive CDCA plan. 139679 Federal Research: Information on Issue Area: Energy: Assessing Whether Contact: Resources, Community, and Organization Concerned: Department of Congressional Relevance: Rep. John D. Dingell; Rep. Bob Traxler; Rep. William D. Ford; Rep. Carl D. Pursell; Rep. Bob Carr. Authority: Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (National). 40 C.F.R. 1500. Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (P.L. 91646). Abstract: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) site selection process for the superconducting super collider (SSC), focusing on whether DOE: (1) assigned weights to the technical criteria used to evaluate the sites; (2) complied with timing requirements for the draft and final environmental impact statements; (3) considered all the geological information the states submitted subsequent to the initial site proposals; (4) considered whether transfer of federal properties in four site proposals would conflict with the properties' intended use; and (5) considered the $1-billion financial inducement that Texas offered to defray costs. Findings/Conclusions: GAO found that: (1) although DOE listed the technical evaluation criteria in descending order of importance in the invitation for site proposals, it did not assign weights to the criteria or rank the sites according to their performance on the basis of the technical evaluation; (2) the Secretary of Energy considered not only the technical evaluations, but the environmental impact statements and comments, and state representatives' presentations; (3) DOE complied with the timing requirements for both the draft and final environmental impact statements; (4) DOE incorporated all the supplemental geological information that states submitted into its technical evaluations; (5) the federal agencies that owned land proposed for sites had no insurmountable conflicts in using the lands for SSC; and (6) DOE did not consider inducements that Texas or any other proposers offered to defray costs. 139723 Alaska Wildlife Refuges: Restrictive Issue Area: Natural Resources Contact: Resources, Community, and recommendations for additional wilderness designations in its 16 Alaska wildlife refuges. Findings/Conclusions: GAO found that: (1) FWS recommended designating an additional 3.4 million acres of refuge lands as wilderness areas, although 52.6 million acres qualified as wilderness; (2) refuge managers and planning team members recommended designating 31.9 million and 26.9 million acres, respectively, of additional wilderness areas; (3) FWS based its policy of restricting designations of additional wilderness areas on congressional intent to limit the establishment of additional areas, and focused wilderness area proposals on adjusting the boundaries of existing areas and adding lands with outstanding or unique resource values that Congress may have inadvertently overlooked during other wilderness designations; (4) other FWS criteria for evaluating refuge lands' wilderness quality involved land ownership, the area's natural integrity and state of nature, opportunities for solitude, primitive recreation opportunities, and size; and (5) refuge managers and planning team members cited differences in opinions regarding flexible and effective resource management and perceived threat of overuse or development as the primary reasons for their differing preferences for additional wilderness area designations. GAO believes that: (1) the designation of additional refuge wilderness areas would not conflict with congressional intent, since the areas are already part of national conservation units; and (2) it is important that Congress consider the basis upon which FWS prepared its recommendations for wilderness area designations. 139779 [Perspectives on the Potential of Clean Coal Technologies to Reduce Emissions From Coal-Fired Power Plants]. T-RCED-90-3. October 18, 1989. 16 pp. plus 1 attachment (1 pp.). Testimony before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce: Energy and Power Subcommittee; by Keith O. Fultz, Director, Energy Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division. Refer to T- Contact: Resources, Community, and Organization Concerned: Department of Congressional Relevance: House Abstract: GAO discussed its reviews of 139785 [Status of the Research Fleet of the Contact: Resources, Community, and Congressional Relevance: House Abstract: GAO discussed the status of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) research fleet modernization and use of multiyear chartering to obtain ship support. GAO found that: (1) budget restraints have reduced research fleet support, although research assignments have increased; (2) NOAA users generally find allocated research ship time and ships' capabilities inadequate; (3) most users believe that ship and equipment upgrades and additional ships are necessary for future research; and (4) NOAA has not adopted a strategy to meet future fleet support needs. 139802 Nuclear Waste: DOE's Budgeting Process for Grants to Nevada Needs Revision. RCED-90-20; B-202377. October 20, 1989. 6 pp. plus 2 appendices (10 pp.). Report to James D. Watkins, Secretary, Department of Energy; by J. Dexter Peach, Assistant Comptroller General, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division. Refer to RCED-86-4, April 1, 1986, Accession Number 129698. Issue Area: Energy: Effectiveness and Contact: Resources, Community, and Congressional Relevance: House Abstract: GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) process for budgeting funds for financial assistance to Nevada for independent testing and monitoring activities at the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste disposal site. Findings/Conclusions: GAO found that: (1) DOE did not evaluate Nevada's funding needs in developing its financial assistance budget; (2) DOE could have to fund Nevada's testing activities regardless of whether it adequately budgeted for them, since a court decided that DOE could not decline to fund the activities if they met certain criteria; (3) DOE could not meet its commitment to support an appropriate amount of grant funds to Nevada for independent technical oversight of DOE activities without evaluating Nevada's grant request; and (4) Nevada had difficulty submitting a detailed grant request early enough for DOE to evaluate the request because it needed specific information about DOE activities. Recommendation To Agencies: To ensure that DOE considers Nevada's financial assistance requirements in formulating its nuclear waste program budget, the Secretary of Energy should require Nevada to provide information on its financial assistance needs on a schedule that permits DOE to evaluate the state's funding requests in preparing its budget. 139806 Nuclear Health and Safety: DOE's Released October 25, 1989. 9 pp. plus 5 Issue Area: Energy: Other Issue Area Contact: Resources, Community, and Committee on Appropriations: Energy Subcommittee; House Committee on Government Operations: Environment, Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee; Senate Committee on Appropriations: Energy and Water Development Subcommittee; Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources: Energy Research and Development Subcommittee; Rep. Michael L. Synar. Authority: Clean Water Act of 1977. Abstract: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the extent to which the Department of Energy (DOE) considered environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) matters in its contract award fee determinations for the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons facility. Findings/Conclusions: GAO found that the DOE award fee determinations: (1) downplayed a variety of significant ES&H problems through questionable classifications and omissions; (2) emphasized production over ES&H matters; and (3) did not require DOE headquarters review or approval. Recommendation To Agencies: The Secretary of Energy should require all awards determinations to be approved at the headquarters level. Headquarters program offices should have approval authority over the operations for which they are responsible. Further, advisory roles in the process should be given to those DOE headquarters offices which have important roles in overseeing the operations. The Secretary of Energy should ensure that there is reasonable balance between production and ES&H performance in the award process. Further, if awards are to be given for accomplishing specific objectives, the Secretary should ensure that such objectives do not conflict with ES&H objectives. The Secretary of Energy should restructure the award process to reduce the level of discretion exercised in making a final determination. In this regard, more specific criteria are needed for determining how a deficiency is to be considered in the evaluation process. Further, procedures are needed to ensure that all identified deficiencies are considered in making an award determination. 139809 [DOE's Award Fees at Rocky Flats Do Not Adequately Reflect Environmental, Safety, and Health Problems]. T-RCED-90-7. October 24, 1989. 12 pp. plus 1 attachment (2 pp.). Testimony before the House Committee on Government Operations: Environment, Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee; by Keith O. Fultz, Director, Energy Issues, Resources, Contact: Resources, Community, and Authority: Clean Water Act of 1977. Abstract: GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) management of award fees to the contractor operating its Rocky Flats Plant. GAO found that: (1) despite significant environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) problems at the plant, the contractor scored well in semiannual performance evaluations and received $26.8 million in award fees between fiscal years 1986 and 1988; (2) in its award fee process, DOE downplayed ES&H problems and placed more emphasis on production than on ES&H problems; (3) DOE headquarters did not review or approve the award fee evaluations; and (4) DOE began to implement improvements in its award fee process, including having all awards reviewed by DOE headquarters and requiring that evaluations weight ES&H matters by at least 51 percent. 139842 Nuclear Health and Safety: Policy Released October 27, 1989. 8 pp. plus 5 Issue Area: Energy: Ensuring the Safe and Environmentally Sound Operation of the Nation's Nuclear Facilities (6416). |