I think we must look at this as to the overall problem. I am not saying-I mean, your statement has been very good, and I want to commend you for it. But yet we do have a problem.

And I am very anxious to see just how it is worked out.

I believe it was a year ago last May or June when you went into Lebanon. I wanted to see how quickly those planes responded. I have heard no criticism of it, but to me this is very important, to see just what happened. And that was a very small emergency. I hope it is the largest we ever have, but it is something that I would like to see all of you think about.

Secretary ALLEN. On the general question, as I see it, it should be divided into two subsidiary questions:

The first would be how do you have a facility available that is sufficient, and, second, how do you use it when the resources must be mobilized?

Now, as to the first one, it is my opinion that the Nation is best prepared for both military and civilian requirements if the common carriers and the civilian industries and the other resources of the Nation are used and developed to the full during peacetime and thereby are available at their greatest capacity in an emergency.

Now, the question of mobilization is somewhat different. And that, I presume, I should leave to the Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization, because I believe the general problem and the transportation problem are particularly problems of theirs, on which a lot of work is being done.

Mr. BRAY. If I am not incorrect, that is what this hearing is for, to try and determine.

Now, your statement is very good and does look at it as it should— from the civilian airlines business.

Now, we have heard also the story from MATS, being purely the military side. And I would say there is a great deal of difference between their thinking. And it is only natural that it should be. And I expect somewhere in between both of those views is probably where we should find ourselves.

Secretary ALLEN. General Ireland had a comment on one phase of your question, if you would like to have it.

Mr. IRELAND, On the question with respect to the need for civil air transportation in time of war.

In the first place, the utilization of equipment on the airlines would go up substantially in time of war because then they would not have to pay too much attention, or in fact any attention, to desirable schedules which could be sold to the public.

So your utilization would go up very substantially. It did in the last war, and there is certainly every reason to believe that it would in any other war.

However, I should add that the Civil Aeronautics Board has made a study to determine the wartime requirements for civil air transportation and has come up with figures which indicate that there is ample passenger capacity both for wartime civil air transportation and for CRAF

As Mr. Allen pointed out in his statement, there is a deficit in cargo capacity, but that is something which is being remedied as

rapidly as possible. And I know that a number of plans have been discussed here for that.

But the study which Mr. Gurney will undoubtedly refer to indicates that there is ample passenger capacity both for civil and military, as far as CRAF is concerned, in time of war.

Mr. RIVERS. Of course, CRAF has no military cargo capacity. Mr. IRELAND. Well, I won't say it has none, sir. It has some, but it doesn't have enough.

Mr. SMART. 15 percent.

Mr. RIVERS. What?

Mr. SMART. 15 percent of the total requirements.

Mr. RIVERS. Well, I am talking about the real capacity. You know that, and I know that.

Mr. IRELAND. I understand that.

Mr. RIVERS. The stuff that the military hauls for the hard core, that heavy stuff that industry just doesn't handle.

Mr. IRELAND. That is correct.

Mr. RIVERS. I mean there are not any inventories.
Are you finished?

Mr. BRAY. Yes.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Becker.

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman.

The chairman of the committee, Mr. Secretary, just brought up one factor that has developed before all these hearings, not only this year but developed last year before Mr. Kilday's Special Investigating Committee on Transportation for National Defense, in respect to CRAF.

That is the question of the availability of civilian personnel to operate the CRAF.

And why, from outside sources, the question of patriotism and loyalty creeps in, I don't know, because it sort of gets us off to discussing some phase which has no part in this.

The question that we are concerned with is: Are we going to have an available airlift if and when necessary? That is one.

No. 2, I might say, Mr. Secretary, your statement is a very excellent one, But the one word that creeps into this statement, as it has crept into many others, is the word "planned"—"we are planning" or "is being planned." The use of that word, to me, has become so nebulous that it hasn't any more meaning, for the simple reason that we are confronted with a fact. What kind of an airlift are we going to have today if we need it, or tomorrow, and when is the planning ever going to get to a point of being able to inform this committee or the Congress, or the departments necessary, as to what we have now? We do know that we do not have very much of a cargo fleet in the civilian airlines to do very much of a job in the event of a national airlift requirement. I am talking about a properly equipped cargo fleet.

Is that correct?

Secretary ALLEN. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. BECKER. We try to find out in these hearings when we are going to have one. Well, it all seems to be somewhere in the future— 1962, 1963, or 1964. But what have we now and how soon could we get these things, rather than 3 and 4 years away?

Now, you deal with these airlines. What is your opinion of that? Secretary ALLEN. I think that the usual competitive situation has developed to a point where there is a demand for cargo space, demand on common carriers, and that as soon as the demand has stabilizednot much more but just a little more than it is now-that the supply of those planes will begin to come in.

Now, we already have the orders for 17 of these Canadair that I mentioned.

The major aircraft producers are well along in their plans to go into production if the orders are available. The carriers are ready to go as soon as they can be relatively sure that the income from the service will pay the cost of these planes.

One phase of it has been an endeavor to get some permanent arrangement or definite arrangement as to who is going to carry military

cargo.

Obviously there is so much of it and no more and if the military are going to carry it themselves the private carriers aren't going to invest. On the other hand if the private carriers are assured of that portion of cargo I think they will then obtain the planes with which to carry it.

That is one of the phases that is undetermined at the minute.

Mr. BECKER. Well, did you read General Quesada's testimony? Have you had the time to read his testimony of the other day?

Secretary ALLEN. I know General Quesada. I haven't read his testimony.

Mr. BECKER. Of course, his testimony would reflect in the direction of the expression that he made, in that he disagreed with the type of operation of MATS' airlift today as consuming more time in covering routes that are not necessary and that it could be reduced to a different type of operation, that is, different type of training program which would require le time in the air.

And this, of course, would come on along the line of what you are just saving; is that right?

Secretary ALLEN. That is right. And I have very little doubt of it in my own mind. It doesn't go back as much to experience in air as it goes in the handling of seaborne cargoes by the Navy.

Mr. BECKER. Don't you think, Mr. Secretary, that with the taxpayers and the Federal Government paving a great deal, as far as the part of the money for research and development, that the civilian airlines have been able to utilize in both the construction of passenger planes and cargo, that they could make a little more effort in producing these planes and taking their chance of getting this business? I mean, after all, hundreds of millions of taxpayers money has been spent in research and development for which the civilian airlines have received the benefit.

Secretary ALLEN. I don't go at it quite that way.

Mr. RIVERS. The 707's.

Secretary ALLEN. I will always expect a civilian organization to go into business if there is a profit in sight and to go broke if it doesn't make the profit. That is a pretty easy rule.

But one the other side, as between using a civilian service as against a Government-operated service, particularly a military service, I

think that the use that is made for commercial purposes pays off a certain amount of the investment and to that extent the taxpayers are saved.

Once more, going back to the merchant fleet, where there is a subsidy to construct ships and there is a subsidy to keep American seamen on the sea, if it weren't for the use that is made on at least partial return that comes back to the Treasury because there is a civilian use of the asset during peacetime, there is that much less expense to the taxpayer in the long run.

I think the same thing is true of air transport. The more that the military can use the civilian service, while it is being used also for civilian purposes, the less it costs the taxpayers.

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Secretary, knowing you so well, as having been a colleague of mine in the House for so many years, I just can't accept the philosophy in our free enterprise system, because I am distinctly one who believes in free enterprise and giving it every leeway. But if we were to subsidize or partially subdize our many industries in this country on the theory that we will get back in taxes to the Federal Government, there will be no end to it. And why it should apply to the airlines more than to the automobile industry or some other industry, I can't conceive.

Secretary ALLEN. I don't think you quite get my meaning.
Mr. BECKER. Maybe I missed it.

Secretary ALLEN. I don't think that it is necessary to subsidize industries to get back a return.

What I am saying is that if we do use the private industry in peacetime for military purposes while it is being used for commercial purposes, then when an emergency comes, we have a bigger facility that meanwhile has cost the taxpayers less to keep in a standby status. Mr. BECKER. All right.

To finish up, now, let us simply get this.

At the present time, we do not have a sufficient cargo fleet in the civilian service to take care of more than--what is it, 15 percent, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. SMART. Correct.

Mr. RIVERS. About.

Mr. SMART. 15 percent of requirements.

Mr. BECKER. So, one, it means we have to have a larger civilian cargo airlift that is properly configurated to fit the needs of the military.

Secretary ALLEN. Right.

Mr. BECKER. If they are to do a reasonably good job. Even this 15 percent isn't properly configurated today. That is not even properly configurated. They are making use of something which isn't properly configurated for its need today.

So that something has to be done about that. When and how, I don't know.

Secondly, the question of having fuel, airfields, parts and all the other things in the necessary places. This is in planning. I mean, this is your understanding. I take this from your statement?

Secretary ALLEN. I don't pretend to be at all expert on the planning of airfields.

Mr. BECKER. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. But where you have the Department of Commerce dealing with the airlines in this GRAF situation, it must come up in the discussion that this is something that has to be worked out.

Secretary ALLEN. You must have the whole system in being. A plane with no place to land is obviously no good in the airlift.

Mr. BECKER. That is correct. And finally, we come to the pilots and the crews. As I always get on an airplane, I have one thought in mind-and I have traveled vast numbers of miles on them--I always get on with the idea that the pilot thinks as much of his life as I think of mine. I always ride on that basis. I have complete confidence in them.

But in the use of CRAF, regardless of its efficiency—I am talking as to numbers and configurations-we have to work into the scheme finally how we can bring in at a moment's notice pilots, copilots and crews, into the operations of the CRAF program, on the demands, the immediate demands of the Military Establishment.

Can this be done by just agreements with the civilians involved? Can this be done just by agreements, and you feel that these agreements will be satisfactory to take care of the needs?

Secretary ALLEN. I think so. In fact, I think it can be done better that way than by having some standby military organization. Mr. BECKER. Rather than to have some standby?

Secretary ALLEN. I think you need some, but the big bulk of it, I think, will be more available if the civilian organizations that are operating are used than if the military tries to beef up an operation. For example, if I may go back to the merchant marine?

This question was a matter of testimony in the committee. The President Wilson, which operates on the Pacific, is a P-2 type ship. The transports that the Navy uses are P-2 types. The question was asked as to the availability. One of the I have forgotten which admiral was testifying, but the answer was that by the arrangements in existence, that is, the agreements and the ability to, by wire and radio, make arrangements for the use of that ship by the military-it could be diverted from civilian to military use at sea in a matter of 90 minutes.

With regard to the P-2 that was in standby condition, it would require that it be broken out and put in operating condition and put to sea to train a crew and would be available in 90 days.

Now, that is the difference in the availability of a ship that is operating at the time under arrangements where it is available to the military, and one which is in standby, waiting for an emergency.

The timing may be different and the conditions somewhat different, but I see no difference in principle from the availability of an aircraft and the availability of a ship.

Mr. BECKER. Well, except for one difference. I make the analogy that if these merchant marine did not make themselves available in this manner, there will be nothing for it to do. There will be nothing for the ships to do. However, with your airlines, if none of these were brought into CRAF at the time of an emergency, they would have plenty to do on the domestic scene because of the terrific increase in the use of the civilian airlines in time of war. Because in the last