Mr. BECKER. That isn't what General Wheless said.

General WHELESS. There is no deficit in passengers, only in cargo. Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, he said [deleted] percent of the passengers is to be carried by CRAF, which is an operation by civilian crews, and so forth. You can't be certain of the fact that they are going to fulfill the military obligation.

How are you going to force these civilian crews into a military combat area?

Mr. BECKER. That is the question I asked earlier.

General WHELESS. Sir, in the strategic lift which CRAF provides in this first 5 days-now, I am talking about general war, where the emergency powers exist and CRAF is called in fully.

Mr. RIVERS. Talk a little louder.

General WHELESS. I am talking about general war in this particular case. CRAF operates the strategic lift to about the same place as the civilian aircraft are operating today.

Now, when CRAF is called up-we are talking not just about its aircraft, of course but its crews, its maintenance and its entire capability, to support itself in this type of operation.

Mr. PRICE. CRAF has civilian employees. How do you handle them?

Mr. BECKER. I wanted to get into that, because many of the pilots are Reserve officers.

Mr. PRICE. Yes.

Mr. BECKER. Many of them are, and I intended to develop that as fas as possible. I can take it up with General Wheless, either Friday morning or sometime.

Mr. RIVERS. He will be here Friday morning..
General WHELESS. Yes, sir.

Mr. BECKER. As to whether or not that is true.

Mr. RIVERS. Of course, he won't be representing MATS. He represents the Joint Chiefs now. You don't represent MATS now? General LEMNITZER. No; General Wheless is on the Air Staff, Mr. Chairman, and he was selected to present this Joint Chiefs of Staff paper.

Mr. RIVERS. So he won't talk for MATS whenever MATS gets on. I can tell you that. General Tunner will be talking for MATS. [Laughter.]

Now, Mr.

Mr. BECKER. I will be all finished with this

Mr. RIVERS. Excuse me.

Mr. BECKER. Then, as I understand it, Mr. Counsel, you would like the discussion, so far as the facilities of CRAF and its utilization, in this area to be deferred until we get the briefing on MATS and the operation of CRAF on Friday?

Mr. RIVERS. It will develop itself.

Mr. BECKER. It will develop itself at that time.

Mr. SMART. The point is, it will be so much more meaningful to the members if they will get those briefings, rather than to pick it out the hard way now.

Mr. RIVERS. I think so.

Mr. SMART. It is hard going now. It will be easy going once you get the presentation.

Mr. BECKER. I see. I will certainly defer to your intelligence in this matter, Mr. Counsel, because there is no better.

Mr. SMART. That is very flattering.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Fisher.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I am sure a lot of these questions will be more appropriately addressed to others as this comprehensive hearing unfolds.

Here is one quesion that occurs to me, that it may be timely to inject at this point:

You stated, General, in your prepared statement:

"We cannot afford the delay which this would involve. Consequently, as an immediate measure, [deleted] and so forth."

Just what is the status of the procurement? You say you want it [deleted]. If so, is there any procurement, and if so, what is it? General LEMNITZER. I would have to defer that question to the Air Force, because they have the responsibility for procuring aircraft. General WHELESS. We are

Mr. RIVERS. That doesn't come under General Wheless. He can't answer that question.

General LEMNITZER. Yes; he can.

Mr. SMART. He can put on his Air Force hat and answer it.

Mr. RIVERS. Put on your Air Force hat and answer it.

Mr. FISHER. Now, am I getting premature in my question?

Mr. SMART. That very point will all be covered.

Mr. FISHER. Well

Mr. RIVERS. Wait. Let me interject.

Really, the people who procure aircraft is the Air Materiel Command. They are the people who buy.

General WHELESS. The Air Force procures them; yes, sir-I mean provides the money.

Mr. RIVERS. Can you speak for the Air Materiel Command?
General WHELESS. I can speak for the Air Force, I mean.
Mr. FISHER. You know the answer to the question, General?
General WHELESS. Yes, sir.

We presently have under procurement C-130's, still under procurement. And our plans call for continuous procurement in 1961 for C-130's and into the 1962 time area at the present time with the C-130B, and possible procurement of the C-130C following.

Now-

Mr. FISHER. Is that in substantial numbers or
Mr. RIVERS. Go ahead and ask him.

General WHELESS. Exactly. We are procuring 25 in 1961 in our budget that we have submitted. And we will continue the procurement in 1962 [deleted] these on our program projected, or a combination of C-130B and C's.

The C-130 is a boundary layer control aircraft. That is the difference between the two, giving it a shorter field capability and other characteristics that are better.

Mr. RIVERS. That is like the 123?
General WHELESS. Sir?

Mr. RIVERS. That is like the 123?

General WHELESS. It reaches that-it gives them a shorter field capability and more speed, and a few things like that.

Mr. RIVERS. Now, in answer to Mr. Fisher's question, you get 25 in 1961?

General WHELESS. Twenty-five in 1961 is presently in our budget.

49066-60--No. 54

Mr. RIVERS. [Deleted.]
General WHELESS. [Deleted.]
Mr. RIVERS. [Deleted.]
General WHELESS. Right.

Mr. RIVERS. How many in 1960?

General WHELESS. In 1960, it was a procurement of 18B's-18. Mr. RIVERS. You would have a lot of trouble beating the world with that number of aircraft.

General WHELESS. We had procured up until that time 184 C-130's, by the way, of the A's.

Mr. SMART. I think at that point-if I may, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Fisher-go ahead.

Mr. SMART. I think at that point we should understand that only a limited number of this type of aircraft are in the so-called strategic aircraft category, and that most of these, are they not assigned to the Tactical Air Forces?

Mr. RIVERS. That is right.

General WHELESS. They are all assigned to the tactical missions. The C-130's are tactical aircraft.

Mr. SMART. So you have to be very careful here when we are talking about strategic airlift on the one hand and the aircraft assigned to the Tactical Air Force, on the other.

Incidentally, we will have a presentation on that, too.

Mr. RIVERS. Excuse me.

Mr. Fisher, it should be noted that not one of these aircraft apply to that operation in Korea, because they can't fly from here to Koreathe 130's.

General WHELESS. They

Mr. RIVERS. You got 118's, you got 124's, you may have some 54's, and you got 133's, 121's, and that is all.

General WHELESS. That is our strategic airlift, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. Yes.

General WHELESS. We are still procuring in the strategic area, airlift area, C-133's, up to a total of 50 in our present program. Mr. RIVERS. Tell Mr. Fisher how many 133's you are buying. General WHELESS. We are buying

Mr. RIVERS. Yes.

General WHELESS. Fifty.

Mr. RIVERS. When did you start buying them?

Mr. SMART. They have 29.

General WHELESS. We have procured 35 in 1958, and prior years. In 1959 we procured the other 15, which are still in the delivery stage. Mr. RIVERS. They quit making them yet?

General WHELESS. No, sir; they are still on production line. We are still receiving them.

Mr. FISHER. Well, you do, General, specifically advocate in your statement, what General Wheless has been talking about, that the procurement be expedited?

General LEMNITZER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FISHER. You are not satisfied

General LEMNITZER. No. Since there is a deficit in this area, we would like to see [deleted].

Mr. FISHER. You stated that your goal is to be able to deliver [deleted] anywhere in the world in [deleted].

General LEMNITZER. That is the outside time limit. Anything that can be done to beat that time makes us more effective, as I pointed out in my statement.

Mr. FISHER. DO I understand, then, correctly, that you could not deliver them with the capabilities you have now within the [deleted]? General LEMNITZER. That is correct.

Mr. BECKER. Would not?

Mr. FISHER. Would it take twice that long or since you mentioned the time, I am wondering just what the relative situation is. General LEMNITZER (confers with General Wheless).

Mr. SMART (aside to Mr. Fisher).

General LEMNITZER. Well, I am told that in the planning that we have already done with the Air Force staff it would take [deleted]. But all of the aircraft we are talking about would be used for the lifting of Army forces. It doesn't take into account the requirement to lift the Tactical Air Force strike force which must accompany us. We can't go into an area like southeast Asia by ourselves. We have to have tactical supporting air forces going in concurrently. And these are the problems. I am sure we wouldn't want, nor could we get, all of the available aircraft just for the movement of Army forces. Mr. FISHER. Of course, if you had all the aircraft for airlift that you wanted, you could reduce that [deleted] couldn't you?

General LEMNITZER. The more we can reduce it, the more effective we shall be.

Mr. FISHER. In other words, your limitation is largely due to the lack of

Mr. RIVERS. Airlift.

Mr. FISHER. Airlift capabilities?

Mr. RIVERS. That is right.

Mr. FISHER. And your whole movement is tied in with the availability of airlift planes?

General LEMNITZER. The time that will be required is completely dependent upon airlift, I will put it that way. Our STRAC can move as fast as it can be transported.

Mr. FISHER. I think that is all.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I got a flock of notes down here some of which I can't read. [Laughter.]

General LEMNITZER. Could I correct that?

General Wheless shows me the planning figure here: It would take [deleted] as you have indicated, Mr. Fisher.

Mr. HARDY. And that would be [deleted].

General LEMNITZER. That is right, moving Army forces only.

Mr. HARDY. Everybody else [deleted] while you are doing that? Mr. SMART. [Deleted.]

Mr. RIVERS. Do you recall-I won't interrupt you again.

You recall awhile ago I asked you if you were concerned-a short while or a few minutes ago

General WHELESS. Yes, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. If you aren't concerned-I sure am-[Laughter.]
Go ahead, Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY. Now, General, on page 12 of your statement you listed the requirements in terms of trips to meet certain specified deliveries there into [deleted].

General LEMNITZER. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. How does that requirement with respect to trips tie in-I am talking now about other than the [deleted] propositionswith the availability of total aircraft?

In other words, you don't say how many planes it would take to accomplish this in the period of time that is assigned.

General LEMNITZER. Well, this is what will be covered later, Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY. All right.

General LEMNITZER. We know that we need so many packages or so many aircraft delivering X people into this area.

Now, how many it takes to do that within a given time will be presented in the later analysis of these requirements which I have given.

Mr. HARDY. All right.

Has anybody-have you made a comparable study showing what your requirements would be if you had to send some people over to the Middle East and at the same time had to take care of a situation in southeast Asia?

General LEMNITZER. No; we haven't. We haven't gotten that far yet. But we ultimately will have to do it, of course, if we are going to have our planning completed.

Mr. HARDY. In the meantime, we just hope to the good Lord that a fire doesn't break out somewhere.

General LEMNITZER. Well, it is first things first, Mr. Hardy. I am sure we have to do the planning on one emergency at a time.

Mr. HARDY. Well

General LEMNITZER. Because, as I pointed out in my statement, I don't believe that the enemy is going to be so obliging as to present us with only one emergency at a time.

Mr. HARDY. That is just exactly the thing that bothered me about taking this Korean assumption, which you said was agreed on.

You indicated that there had been progress because the JCS had agreed on a problem for study.

Now, does that assume that the JCS is convinced we haven't got to be concerned anywhere else?

How long is it going to be before we take a realistic study and see what our shortage really is?

General LEMNITZER. I don't know

Mr. HARDY. Are we kidding ourselves, in other words?

General LEMNITZER. I don't know how long it is going to take [deleted] on this. This is going to take some time. So what we have done, deleted] on this, is to do our planning [deleted].

Mr. HARDY. You mean [deleted] that the Army is likely to have this trouble?

General LEMNITZER. Well, we have had difficulties up until recently when General White and I have agreed on certain requirements. I think this is yet another major step forward.

Mr. HARDY. So the other members of the JCS have to agree on what your requirements are going to be?

Mr. RIVERS. That is right.

General LEMNITZER. This is the point. For getting a JCS-agreed requirement, this is correct.

Mr. HARDY. And in the meantime [deleted].