speeding up of the whole MATS the surging of the whole MATS operation to its wartime rate of utilization, to see if we can run the overall MATS worldwide force at the rate of production that we think it should be. Actually, something in the neighborhood of half of MATS' capability is involved in the Puerto Pine operation, whereas, the other half in involved in the surging of MATS to its full capability. And some idea of what 12,000 tons of materiel involves: it is interesting to note that this is the equivalent of 96,000 more people being transported. So it is a very sizable operation.

Now, Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. I shall certainly be glad to return at a later date when this committee or the chairman so desires.

Thank you very much.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Secretary, you have made a very fine statement, and I was glad to see you go into what the President's directive you touched on that, and how you plan to implement it.

We will have a lot of questions to ask of you as we get into these other witnesses who are busy now implementing existing regulations. We will call you back.

Mr. Smart, have you anything?

Mr. SMART. Nothing at this point.

The next presentation is top secret, and all persons who are not cleared for top secret will be required to leave the room at this time. And I would ask the chief liaison of each department to approve those who may remain in the room.

Mr. PRICE. Mr. Secretary, I was deeply interested in your statement. I think it is a frank statement of your policy, and so forth, but there is one disappointing note to me, and that is getting back to this old habit of appointing a committee to determine what you are going to do. I would like for you to elaborate as to why you believe it is essential to resolve some of your problems here

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, are we going to question these witnesses or not?

Mr. RIVERS. Well, we will just go ahead with the witnesses. We will call you back later on.

(Whereupon, the committee proceeded in top-secret executive session, the reporter being excused. (11:17 a.m.) The remainder of the morning session was not recorded.)

EXECUTIVE SESSION

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL MILITARY AIRLIFT, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, March 9, 1960. The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., Hon. L. Mendel Rivers, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Mr. RIVERS. I am going to ask the committee to come to order. Now, this morning we are going to start with General Lemnitzer, the distinguished Chief of Staff of the Army, after which we are going to ask General Wheless to come back to the table, and I will

ask the committee to propound any questions which may-and I know we will have plenty of them, of the two distinguished officers.

But before that, we will ask Mr. Smart to set the pace on the questions so that we will know just exactly where our thinking is on the testimony which is so vital, which both of these gentlemen will have given...

Now, General Lemnitzer, I notice that you have a little badge there that indicates that you know a little something about airborne operations. I don't know of anybody I would rather see wearing it than you, knowing of your wonderful background. A lot of people in our town know of your service and are about as proud of you as

we are.

Now, I don't know that you covered it in your statement; I haven't seen your statement. But I wish you would put in the record when it is convenient-I think now would be a good time your experience on airborne and planning airborne operations. Because I think we ought to know that.

General LEMNITZER. I will be very glad to, Mr. Chairman.

In the early days of World War II, I was assigned to General Eisenhower's staff in London to prepare the plans for the invasion of north Africa. As a part of those plans we had what I believe was the first U.S. airborne operation. It was an opération designed to seize the airfields in the vicinity of Oran.

Subsequently in that campaign we planned a considerable number of airborne operations in connection with the drive across north Africa. Not all of them executed but many of them were planned and some were executed..

Then, in the later phases of World War I operations in the Mediterranean, I was Deputy Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Alexander, commander in chief of the 15th Army Group and later Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean: Throughout the Italian campaign we planned a great many airborne operations-and executed many of them.

- One of the largest was the one planned to seize Rome, but due to the quick reaction of the German forces, this operation was called off. I happened to have been designated to fly to Gela, Sicily, to call it off, since we couldn't very well depend upon the communications existing right in the heat of combat at that time. YEN

I arrived on the Gela airfield when General Ridgway and General "Joe" Cannon of the US. Air Force were about to get into the aircraft in which they were going into the Rome area: There were a good many aircraft already airborne. But the German reaction as indicated by the information obtained by General Taylor in his well-known and historic mission into Rome convinced us that this would be a very hazardous operation and one not likely to succeed. The 83d Airborne Division, then a part of the U.S. 5th Army, was then used to reinforce our operations at Salerno.

Subsequently, following the war, I commanded the 11th Airborne Division, and during that period of command I planned a winter airborne operation at Fort Drum in northern New York.

As commander in chief of the Far East and United Nations Commands, I was also involved in the preparation of contingency plans that included many possible airborne operations if hostilities were resumed in Korea, and if war broke out in the Far East theater 2

. That, I think, suimmarized my association with airborne operations and the planning therefor.

Mr. RIVERS. Well, it follows, then, that you would want the Army, which you now command, to be current in that area as well as have available the weapons to carry out your plans, namely, the aircraft? General: LEMNITZER. I think I should add to this, now that you mention it, Mr. Chairman, that while I was Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations from 1952 to 1955, we had a rather large number of airborne operations planned and we reviewed the airborne operations prepared by all of our unified commanders, These plans were reviewed by General Ridgway and General Taylor when they were Chiefs of Staff. Also, of course, the plans for the operation which took place yesterday, Banyan Tree, and the large Puerto Pine-Big Slam airlift operation, that this committee is going to inspect, have all been thoroughly reviewed by me, and I have approved the final details.

Y BAR Mr. RIVERS. Now, you go ahead. I touched on that yesterday. I think the timing of this hearing is very fortunate for us, in keeping with those developments, and all this airborne maneuver exercise coming up. Now, you go ahead and we will not interrupt you and let you continue, General.

-General LEMNITZER. Right. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I welcome this opportunity to discuss the Army's concept of airborne operations and strategie and tactical airlift requirements for emergency situations which may confront this country. You probably wonder why an Army briefing on our airlift requirements follows immediately after a presentation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff airlift requirements, which you would expect to have included the requirements of all the services.

The explanation of the apparent duplication is the first essential step in my presentation in order that you may understand our problems..

The agreed Joint Chiefs of Staff requirements and capabilities for a limited war, which were presented yesterday by General Wheless, are taken from a single so-called hypothetical limited war situation-[deleted]. The airlift requirements, generated in this particular situation are in support of a Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved contingency plan. They represent a very special case, in that we already have U.S. forces deployed alongside existing Republic of Korea forces, and in an area where we have a logistic system that is, lines of communication, dépots, and supplies already established and operating. Furthermore, fdeleted] division would be airlifted in this plan. As you have been told, the requirements-even in this special situation, exceed our airlift capabilities during certain periods. Even so, these requirements are far less than those for other possible emergencies which might occur in other areas of the world. For example, such emergencies could occur in the Middle East or southeast Asia. In such areas, we do not now have U.S. ground combat forces already deployed with their established command structure and logistics base as we do in Korea. Further, in such cases as southeast Asia, a much longer line of communications would be involved. [Deleted.

I believe it is obvious to everyone that our planning should encompass the entire scope of the military actions which we may be called upon to perform. Although I agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff requirements study which has been briefed to you by General Wheless, the requirements developed in this study would, as I have indicated, apply to only one of many possible limited war situations. Also, they do not take into account the possibility of other emergencies occurring in any area other than Korea, or of two or more emergencies occurring simultaneously. Thus, this study is not by itself sufficiently comprehensive to determine the total magnitude of our airlift requirements. requ

I should like to make one additional point in regard to the Joint Chiefs of Staff study. It assumes that the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) will be activated during a condition of the emergency. Under existing legislation, we believe it is extremely problematical that CRAF would be available to meet such an emergency, particularly during the early and most critical days. Thus, the deficit in airlift capability would be much greater than that reflected in the study [deleted] to meet such emergencies. Also, it is not clear to us how crews and maintenance augmentation required by CRAF could be assembled and positioned promptly.

In order to understand why the Army-and indeed, all the services— have important airlift requirements, we need only to review the events since World War II which have had a profound impact on our National policy and our military strategy.

Following the fall of Czechoslovakia in 1948, the United States and the nations of the free world, in recognition of the menace of the Communist military threat and its massive, versatile, and global scope, decided that this threat could most effectively be countered in cooperation and in coordination with each other. Recognizing their interest in a common defense against a common threat, the free nations have joined together in political and military fields to develop a solid front against Communist aggression.

The United States, recognizing that strong measures were required to deal with the situation, found itself in a role of leadership. It took a number of steps of great importance. These steps marked a departure from our traditional policy and were dictated by commonsense, deep interest in our friends, and by our own national interest.

In 1947, there was a Truman Doctrine, which provided military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey.

In 1949, the Vandenberg resolution was passed by the Senate. It laid the groundwork for the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Since that time, we have joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Australian-New Zealand-United States Pact (ANZUS Pact). We have also entered into a number of bilateral security treaties with other important allies such as the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, Japan, and others, for mutual defense. These, with our membership in the Organization of American States, provide a network of mutual security arrangements reaching to the farthest corners of the globe, wherever our national interests are concerned. Truly, among free nations, the United States has become the common denominator in collective security arrangements which have

been made to provide for the common defense of the free world. It might well be said that, through these agreements and through our association under the mutual security program with 45 other nations, the United States is the keystone of an interlocked free world security system. Our national policy, therefore, recognizes the extent to which our security is bound up with the security of free peoples the world over.

[Display slide 1.]

In some cases we have deployed our own forces in direct support of these treaty arrangements. In other cases, we have given aid to allied forces only though our military assistance programs. In all cases, however, the U.S. policy of mutual security is based on the concept that no single ally can be expected to have all the means necessary to meet every aggression that might be made against it. It is not possible for the United States to deploy forces to all potential danger spots throughout the world. For this reason, the United States must maintain forces in a central reserve here in the United States, ready and capable of prompt and effective response and resistance to Communist attack. Such deployments may be required to reinforce U.S. forces already deployed overseas, or to enter areas where there are no U.S. forces presently deployed, in order to come to the aid of an ally under attack. The requirement could involve counteraction varying from a simple show of force to very sizable military operations.

The effectiveness of our military power as an instrument of national policy depends greatly on our ability to project this power promptly to any area in the world where it may be needed. With the rapid advances of modern technology, the movement of military forces has taken on a new meaning in terms of speed and distances. No longer can we rely on our allies to hold off the enemy while we mobilze our forces and move them into the battle area solely by surface transportation. The events that take place within the first few days of an attack may well influence the outcome of a war, its duration, and whether it remains a limited conflict or expands into a general or world war.

In a limited war, for example, the enemy may well have the objective of gaining control over a comparatively small land area and the people who inhabit it. If this can be done quickly, before our forces can arrive, the objective of the aggression will be achieved before any decisive U.S. counteraction can be taken. Such failure to stem immediately the enemy advance could well lead to a long and costly war. Such a war might not only fail to resolve the basic issues at stake but could also lead to an expansion of the conflict into a general war.

There is a tendency to consider that only the Army requires airlift. The fact is that all our services need it. It is important, also, to realize that the same emergency which requires the prompt movement of Army forces by air also simultaneously requires the movement of elements of the tactical air forces that are required to support them in the battle area. In addition, the emergency might be serious enough to demand simultaneous preparation for the possibility of a general war. In such a case, there would also be simultaneous, heavy demands for airlift to position properly the Strategic Air Command and other U.S. forces.