ments and capabilities in detail. Army and Air Force are to be complimented in presenting a better understanding of Army requirements and Air Force capabilities than has been available in the past., Present effort on the part of both services will greatly improve our basis for planning, and the mobility of our forces. Also, you will be given details of major airlift, exercises myolving Army, MATS, and the Tactical Air Force. And I was pleased to hear the chairman state that the committee expects to see the Puerto Pine exercise, toward the close of this month, idegeb The Department of Defense report on "The Role of Military, Air Transport Service in Peace and War, which is available to you and may be referred to frequently during our presentations, states that the airlift capability now assigned to MATS is adequate to meet the hard-core requirements of general war and the hypothetical hard-core requirements for limited war. This phrase "hard-core requirements" refers to personnel and cargo which must move in, military aircraft because of special military considerations, security, or physical characteristics of the cargo items. Including the civil reserve air, fleet as almost immediately effective, our available lift is marginally capable of meeting, wartime requirements under present plans. But little has been done to modernize our airlift fleet.. Now, let me briefly discuss equipment. For strategic cargo lift we depend largely on the C-124, This airplane has both long-range, and troop-carrier capabilities. It is approaching obsolescence but can carry a very big load relatively short distances and substantial loads more than 3,000 miles. The big modern cargo transport of the fleet is the C-133, turboprop powered and the largest of cargo aircraft. Its size is realized when I say it carries the Atlas and Titan missiles. There are also DC-6, and Constellation cargo types in the fleet. For tactical airlift we still depend on the C-124, which I have referred to, a heavy cargo transport; on the C-130, a medium cargo transport which is a good, modern troop-carrier airplane capable of fairly long-range operations; on the C-123, an assault transport; and on the old C-119 of which there are now several hundred in the Air Reserve troop carrier squadrons. - I bave referred to our cargo and troop carrier aircraft to emphasize the need for a modern cargo aircraft. This reed is even more urgent in the civil airlines if they are to play the part they should in meeting military requirements in wartime. The civil cargo fleet consists of cargó configurations of passenger-type aircraft with high floors and side-door loading. These types are of relatively little use for large items of military equipment! My prime concern for the future, to assure the airlift essential to support our military strength, is that we take steps promptly toward are modernization of our long-range cargo fleet. And in moving forward to procure modern cargo aircraft for MATS, we must seek to develop or adapt a cargo aircraft that can meet civil needs as well as our military needs. As you will hear in the presentation, the Air Force has established performance and design specifications for a modern cargo aircraft that combines characteristics of a strategie and a tactical transport. The characteristics of this aircraft appear to meet Army requirements, and advice from the Federal, Aviation Agency indicates that with adjustments of certain criteria it would be compatible with requirements for civil operators. Production of such a cargo aircraft, however, is dependent upon substantial development expenditure, and will take more time than required for production of modified versions of present jet tankers or transports, or the cargo transport already purchased by three airlines. My experience in the Air Transport Command in World War II has given me special interest in MATS, in long-range air transport, and the problems of meeting our airlift requirements. Let me recall a few significant nontechnical problems in MATS history. After World War II, in the days of demobilization and retrenchment, MATS was, of course, reduced in size, but, more important, its aircraft utilization rate was reduced to 2 hours per day. This was the MATS utilization rate at the beginning of the Korean war, and it quickly became apparent that an operation at a rate of 2 hours per day cannot be stepped up to the efficient full-time utilization required in an emergency. After the Korean war, Air Force officers familiar with the disappointments flowing from the 2-hour utilization insisted on a 6-hour peacetime utilization rate as a desirable goal. This was later reduced to a maximum of 5 hours, which we believe assures readiness to meet wartime needs. Several years, ago when I was Under Secretary of the Air Force, MATS was subject to criticism on the ground that a considerable part of its traffic did not deserve air movement, and that only by charging for peacetime services could effective use of available lift be attained. To correct this situation and encourage efficient operation, MATS was organized on a single-manager industrial fund basis in which the user pays for transportation furnished, whether in MATS military aircraft or in civil aircraft under contract to MATS. I believe the desired result has been achieved, and I no longer hear of traffic moving on MATS which should not move by air. The industrial fund has also resulted in better operating practices, but at the same time it has emphasized the airline characteristics of part of MATS peacetime operations and so given credence to criticism of MATS as a Government activity performing services that could be provided by civil carriers. Concern that MATS was performing transport services not reasonably related to its wartime mission resulted in the President's directing the Secretary of Defense to study the military role of MATS in peace and war. Based on this study the President approved certain courses of action which have been referred to as "new policy guidelines" for MATS. They state in paragraph 1 that MATS should be equipped and operated in peacetime to insure its capability to meet approved military hard-core requirements in a general war and in situations short of general war, and such other military requirements as cannot be met. adequately by commercial carriers on an effective and timely basis. Paragraph 2 recognizes the need for modernization of MATS hardcore airlift capability. Paragraph 3 puts new emphasis on the intention that MATS routine channel traffic operations be reduced on an orderly basis consistent with assured commercial airlift capability and with economical and efficient use of MATS capacity resulting from MATS operations in accordance with the first paragraph I quoted above. The fourth paragraph encourages the acquisition of modern cargo aircraft by commercial carriers. And the fifth paragraph provides for exploration of airlift procurement policies and practices with a view to better adapating them to long-range defense needs and to encouraging the sound growth and development of an increased civil cargo capability. Secretary Sharp will refer to steps he is taking to implement the purposes of this paragraph, and other constructive courses of action suggested will be covered by General Wheless. The basic matters of policy guidance that I have briefly outlined should give assurance that the Defense Department will work with the commercial carriers to encourage the development of modern cargo airlift and, as such lift increases, will seek to move more military traffic by commercial carrier. It is estimated that this year some 50 percent of MATS passenger traffic and nearly 20 percent of MATS cargo traffic will be moved by commercial carrier. This increased proportion of traffic moved by commercial carrier is in part due to reduction in the number of MATS aircraft, accomplished by transfer of C-97 aircraft to Air National Guard squadrons. In the light of present requirements further reduction in MATS aircraft does not appear likely in the near-term future. With regard to MATS it is a pleasure for me to call attention to the fact that its commander, Lt. Gen. William H. Tunner, has the most distinguished record of directing military air transport operations. His experience is unique. In World War II, among other operations, he organized an express transport service from our eastern seaboard to Calcutta. He commended the India-China "Hump" operation. Later he commanded the Berlin airlift and much of the theater transport activity of the Korean war. The safety record of MATS operations under General Tunner is one of which we can all be proud. MATS has had no fatality in its scheduled airlift force; that is, in its regular transport operations, since an accident in October 1958 during the "Deep Freeze" Antarctica operations. No fatal accident has occurred in its domestic aeromedical evacuation operations since April 1952. As the presentation proceeds, you will have many questions concerning the various transport activities which together aim to provide ready airlift to meet our wartime needs. We look to you to join us in seeking solutions to some of the problems that remain unsolved, but you will find those making the presentation ready and well qualified to answer most of your questions. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. RIVERS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. That is a very fine statement. We will no doubt want to ask you some questions later on, but I think as we pinpoint these things it would be better-I have a number I want to ask, and I am sure other members do too, and, Mr. Smart, don't you think the best thing to do now is proceed with the next witness? Mr. SMART. I do, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. We are going to ask you to be available. Secretary DOUGLAS. It will be a pleasure for me to be available for questions of the committee, Mr. Chairman. Mr. RIVERS. We will no doubt have a lot of questions we will want to ask. Secretary DOUGLAS. Right. Mr. RIVERS. Thank you very much. CMr. SMART. Secretary Brucker woe sigamoons of ins ebeant Mr RIVERS. The committee will now be pleased to hear the distinguished Secretary of the Army, Hon Wilber M. Bruckers: ai sul Le Secretary BRUCKER. Thank you re motos to acerboo evitounamos Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Secretary, you may proceed at your convenience, in any way yous desire. Staubit Voto to enutrans nieud s Secretary BRUCKER. Mr. Chairman and members of theb.committee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you to introduce the Army's presentation on strategic and tactical airlift. It is, I believe, a most satisfactory arrangement to have this important subject covered in a coordinated and integrated series of presentations, with all of the interested services/represented at the same time. As you know, although all the services have requirements for airlift, the Army is the only service that does not have its own airlift of the type that will be discussed and, consequently, is entirely dependent on the lift provided to the common pool by the other services. In previous years, the various facets of the airlift situation have been covered perhaps too much in isolation from each other. Actually, they are inseparable and should only be considered with due regard to their interrelationship. The committee has obviously recognized these facts in calling for these hearings to be joint in nature, and the presentations which will follow should do much to clarify the understanding of the problems involved. - At the outset, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I would like to emphasize that the Army airlift is not an end in itself. Rather, it is simply a means to an end, the end being the projection of our national military power promptly at the proper time and place anywhere in the world. It has not been many years ago that our chief reliance for strategic mobility for the projection of our military might overseas-was on oceangoing transportation. We depended on our allies to hold the lime while our forces were deployed. The tempo of our time has changed this. No longer can we place reliance on having this much time available, and, today, the deployment of our initial forces from the United States must rely almost entirely on airlift to provide the requisite mobility. All of the services have, with the expenditure of considerable resources and effort, built powerful strike forces to counter aggression wherever it may occur. In the Army, in addition to our forward deployed forees, we have created, organized, trained, and equipped the Strategic Army Corps, or, as it is known, STRAC. The Strategic Army Corps was given its name symbolized by "strong, tough, ready, round-the-clock" to highlight its top priority mission, those being the initials of STRAC, the mobility and readiness which it must maintain at all times as an element of our forward strategy. It fulfills an essential and unique need in our national defense posture. The sustaining power of the Army's combat and supporting forces distinguishes STRAC as the force that can fight under sustained and protracted operational conditions.stol mind STRAC stands ready at all times to reinforce promptly our forces overseas or to be deployed independently to other areas where no U.S. troops are now deployed. It is a well-balanced combined arms force built around one infantry and two airborne divisions which can be employed either as a whole or in part to meet the precise demands of any situation to which it is committed. In the event of an emergency, the entire corps is prepared to move out to any part of the world. Advanced combat elements of the STRAC are prepared to load aireraft within an hour after receipt of the initial alert. As a matter of fact, gentlemen, we have a company on constant alert day and night, 24 hours, and a battle group that sustains the same status of which of course the company is a part, and they rotate. And that goes on right at the present moment. v As you are aware, the national policy for the deterrence of war has been fundamental in shaping the philosophy and actions of the Army, It is the Army's view that deterrence must take place at two integrated and concurrent levels of effort. These are the deterrence of general atomic war and the deterrence of limited war, the piecemeal aggression which, if not successfully curtailed, could lead to ultimate defeat just as surely as could an all-out nuclear war. A Our deterrent must, therefore, be made complete. To be truly effective it must deter all types of aggression:" - Within this broad concept, the Army's mission is to provide ade quate forces for prompt, sustained combat on land. From this we have derived the task to maintain mobile, combat-ready strategic forces in the United States. This is our STRAC. It stands as a major contribution to deterrence deterrence against, initiation of aggression and deterrence against expansion of those aggressions that are initiated. - In addition to the STRAC here in the continental United States, we have a strategic reserve force of a four-battle-group division stationed in Hawaii. The readiness of this division to move rapidly within the Far Eastern area if trouble should arise gives material substance to our national intent to preserve the peace. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I have personally visited the divisions of STRAC, each one of them, and many parts of them and several times, as well as the division in Hawaii; and I can assure you that these fine Army forces are ready and available immediately at any time in defense of their country. Their morale is superb and I have the greatest pride and confidence in these American soldiers; But I must emphasize that the tremendous striking and staying power of those units can be applied in a timely and effective manner only if adequate means exist and are made available for their immediate and rapid movement to any trouble area in the world. Once there, our initial forces must be resupplied and reinforced as necessary in order to achieve our objectives.gay ng semi The necessity to provide the means required to move these Army striking forces is not based on unfounded situations which have little probability of occurrence. It is based on our globe-girdling national commitments, which provide reasonable guarantees that we stand ready to support our friends and allies throughout the free world in the event of aggression, as well as in the implementation of our national policy of collective security.Recent history stands as a firm reminder of the wisdom of this policy. Airlift requirements also find their basis in the stark realization that the United States is confronted with a potential enemy who can do battle on a scale ranging from cold war to a general war. We must be able to counter aggression wherever and in whatever form it occurs. The long-range security of our Nation is just as dependent upon our 49066-60-No. 54- -2 |