THE CONCEPT "SOCIAL FORCES" IN AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY SECTION VII. THEORIES OF SOCIAL CAUSATION MORE OR LESS INCONSISTENT WITH THE "SOCIAL FORCES" CONCEPT AS DEVELOPED BY WARD AND HIS FOLLOWERS FLOYD N. HOUSE ABSTRACT Three classes of sociological systems having little or no place for the social forces concept.-There are three types of sociological theory which are either logically incompatible with the use of the social forces concept as developed by Ward and his followers, or do not find such a concept useful: (1) monistic theories, illustrated in part by the work of Giddings, Cooley, and perhaps by Hayes's attack upon the social forces concept; (2) theories which conceive the social process as so indefinitely variable that no universal categories of forces can be identified; and (3) theories emphasizing the immediate, concrete factors of particular situations so strongly that no place is left for the use of general categories of motives or social forces. Giddings' sociological theory has been considerably modified by his latest writings, and he would perhaps now be placed in the second class rather than the first. Ellwood appeared to be moving in the direction of the third class in his first publication, but has changed in the direction of the social forces doctrine in more recent writings. Ross's "theory of the worries" and passages from Dealey and Todd are notable as variants on the types of classifications and treatments previously noted. Bernard's treatment of Bushee's classification of social forces can be taken as an exhibit of the latest type of criticism. It is no more than would naturally be expected that in a moderately complete survey of the literature of sociological theory in the United States since the time of Ward and Spencer we should discover formulated theories of social causation which could not be entirely reconciled with the "social forces" concept as Ward and his successors in this regard have developed it, and that there should be some direct attack upon the concept and whatever doctrine it is held to imply. In fact, we do find just such divergencies. These conflicting, antagonistic, and divergent doctrines can be classified roughly under three headings: (1) strongly monistic theories, inconsistent with the conception of a plurality of social forces because of this very fact of their monism; (2) theories which con ceive of the social process as so completely and indefinitely variable in its ongoing and in response to indefinitely variable environmental conditions that any general classification of social forces or of human motives which shall be universally valid is held to be impossible, and the attempt to establish such classifications is deprecated; (3) theories, not in principle inconistent with the last-mentioned type, nor, perhaps, with the "social forces" concept, but given to such emphasis upon the immediate, concrete factors in a particular local and temporal situation that no attention is left over for an analysis with reference to postulated universal forces or motives. This third classification is intended to apply especially to the social theory of the "institutional economics," and to the theory of social forces which seems to underlie much of the literature of social work and social reform; this material we have set aside for separate examination in the following section of this paper. Under the first two categories suggested above might be grouped most of the material which we propose to deal with in the present section. When criticism of the social forces concept is in order, it is appropriate to begin with Professor Hayes's article on "The Social Forces Error," which was one of the earliest of such criticisms and attracted considerable notice from sociologists when it appeared.' The essence of his criticism is contained in the following passages: I wish to protest against the idea that we can explain social phenomena by referring them to various "social forces." The habit, almost universal among sociologists, of referring frequently to "social forces" I believe is a bad one that ought to be broken. The temptation to use it lies in its metaphysical quality of drugging the mind's hunger for explanation with a false satisfaction by yielding the complaisance of understanding without the labor of obstinate analysis. . . . . Explanation of the phenomenon X (in the case of sociology oftenest a prevalent mode of activity) consists in showing the phenomenon X in its relations to the conditioning phenomena a, b, c, etc., in the presence of which X emerges, by the increase of which X increases, and by the diminution of which X diminishes. . . . . Sociological explanation can relate prevalent modes of activity to the conditions by virtue of which they become prevalent at one place and time and not at another, with the increase 1 We have presented in Section III of this paper a statement of Hayes's treatment of "conditioning factors" in his Introduction to the Study of Sociology, published four years later than the article cited above. of which, in passing to another place or time, they increase in prevalence, and with the diminution of which they decrease in prevalence.2 Now as often as we come across a kind of phenomena the conditioning of which we do not understand, we are tempted to say it is caused by a force. It is indeed caused by the force [allusion to preceding paragraphs, in which is developed a brief account of the metaphysical concept of "force" underlying physical science; "energy" would be nearer the correct term-F. N. H.], as all phenomena are, if we accept the metaphysics just outlined; but what we are tempted to say is that any particular phenomena the conditioning of which we cannot unravel are caused by a force. And if there are many kinds of phenomena which we cannot explain, we suppose a large number of forces, one for each great unsolved problem in causation. This is the second meaning of the word "force," and the one to which I object. Every time that we solve one of the problems we get rid of a supposed force and replace it with a statement of the recognized combination of conditions under which the one force operates in the causation of the phenomena thus explained. It is in this way that we pass from what Comte called the metaphysical to what he called the positive stage of explanation. We are in the metaphysical stage as long as we imagine a number of forces about which we know nothing save that each is the supposed cause of a kind of phenomena, the real causation of which we do not understand. We are in the scientific stage when we have replaced these "forces" with explanations stated in terms of antecedent phenomena, or when we have at least gone far enough to become convinced that such explanation is possible, so that we give up talking about the supposed force which we had used as a false denial of our ignorance and offered as a stone to the hunger of the mind. . . . . Thus sociology will pass from the metaphysical to the scientific stage when it ceases to talk about social forces and becomes convinced that social phenomena can be explained in terms of logically antecedent phenomena.3 .... The present writer is forced to admit that he has never been able to ascertain definitely to what or whom Hayes was referring in this article. When one examines his argument carefully and considers its possible relevancy to the use of the term "social forces" by Lester F. Ward and some of the other writers whom we have quoted in the present study, one is tempted to accuse Hayes of setting up a straw man in order that he may knock it down. Certainly it does not seem that Ward was guilty of multiplying "forces" simply in order to account for all the divergencies and complexities of E. C. Hayes, "The Social Forces Error," American Journal of Sociology (1911), XVI, 616 (quoting author's previous article, A. J. S., XII, 652). 'Loc. cit., A. J. S., XVI, 613–14. social phenomena which he could not otherwise explain; although it is true that Ward wrote in such a style that he gave a false appearance of finality and completeness to his works. That which, in the first passage we have just quoted, Hayes states as the ideal of sociological explanation, seems to the present writer to be almost exactly what could be given as a generalized statement of the ideal of the writers who have striven to formulate lists of universal "social forces." Indeed, it will be noted that we have stated the general nature of the social forces concept in Section I of this paper in terms which correspond very closely to those used by Hayes in his criticism, and we may volunteer the information that the passage in the present paper was written without the writer's having Hayes's comment in mind at all. It has been true, however, that sociology has, through the years of its early development, been much handicapped by the tendency of its proponents to resort to "metaphysical" explanations, i. e., as we understood the Comtean sense of the term, and as Hayes seems to have intended it, the metaphysical tendency consists in identifying certain phenomena as representatives of a class, and postulating some force or principle with a long name as the cause of the class of phenomena. Ward was the chiefest of sinners in this direction, though the tendency is not so strikingly manifested in his theory of the social forces as in some other features of his sociology. Mention might be made in this connection of the tendency, which is mainly of recent manifestation, to postulate a specific "instinct” as the motive of every common feature of human behavior. In so far as Hayes's criticism probably has aided to correct a real fault of early sociology, we must give him credit for making a contribution to the science with this article, even though we cannot concede that it was altogether valid as an attack upon the social forces concept in the sense in which we are concerned with it in this paper. It will be interesting to examine, in connection with Hayes's criticism, a passage in which Ellwood has commented upon Hayes's article: The present writer's inspiration for the passage in Section I, above, can be found in Small, General Sociology, pp. 217-18. The only sense in which the term "force" can be used in the social sciences is in the sense of an active element or factor in social situations. There are grave objections to the use of the term "force" at all in the physical sciences, and these objections are intensified when there is any assumption of a peculiar social force or forces. As Professor Hayes has insisted, the assumption of peculiar social forces is as metaphysical as the assumption of a peculiar vital force in biology. However, just as in biology there is no objection to speaking of the special forces or factors which have shaped a given situation, so in sociology there is no objection to speaking of the concrete factors which are at work in a given situation as social forces, provided we simply mean by such an expression that they are the active elements or factors in the situation." Reading this passage from Ellwood carefully, and re-examining the quotations from Hayes in the light of Ellwood's comment, we can find some ground for the belief that the criticism was directed more particularly against the use of the term "social forces" or often simply "forces"-by the social workers and reformers in the manner which we shall note in the following section of this paper. There has been some disposition, on the part of persons having practical interests in social and economic problems, to apply the term "forces" to existing institutions and features of the social process in such a way as to imply that these factors of concrete situations were metaphysically absolute, not subject to voluntary human influence or direction. The "supply and demand" of the earlier economists and contemporary popular writers of a certain bias would be perhaps an illustration of the sort of thing to which Hayes objected. In part, of course, Hayes may have been influenced by the point of view which assumes that valid science must remain purely descriptive-that there are no valid generalizations which hold universally. To this attitude there is no effective counter; adherence to it is a matter of temperament and of personal judgment concerning the pragmatic value of generalizations in a science, and in social science in particular. If it is believed that there are generalizations which have such value to sociological research and to the cause of social reform, then Hayes's attack is unconvincing as against any and all uses of the social-forces concept, 'C. A. Ellwood, Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects (1912), p. 278. |