A REDEFINITION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA GIVING A BASIS FOR COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY JOHN F. MARKEY ABSTRACT Social phenomena are considered as including all behavior which influences or is influenced by organisms sufficiently alive to respond to one another. This includes influences from past generations. Developments in social study which furnish a basis for this concept are the behavioristic trend and the emphasis upon the objective nature of social life, study of groups, and group life, environmental, and ecological study. The validity of the concept which limits social phenomena to the interaction of human beings is questioned. The outstanding basis for this distinction is the psychological one of the so-called "conscious" or "consciousness." Conscious activity, or consciousness used as a general term, is not limited to human organisms, and does not furnish a basis. Conscious interaction, in the sense of "thinking" or conceptual activity, is questioned as a scientific basis for such limitation of the social. First, we are unable to determine with sufficient scientific accuracy how much and what part of collective behavior is of this reflective type. Second, human beings exert between themselves a large number of influences of which they are unaware. Further, psychological evidence indicates more and more that these differences between man and the other animals are of degree, rather than of kind. At best, with our present knowledge, they are rather vague, indefinite, and insecure differences. Admitting the validity of these distinctions, the validity of marking off the social at this point is questioned. Man has apparently become human, i.e., developed self-consciousness, meaning, ideas, society as a consensus, etc., on account of the fact that he has been a social animal. The problem is one involving the material to be studied by sociology and social psychology. It not only indicates ecological and environmental study, but primarily the study of the processes and organization of collective behavior among organisms. It probably means a much larger development of comparative sociology and social psychology. At present this development is very meager. The purpose of this article is to consider some of the facts which are becoming increasingly evident in regard to the meaning of social phenomena. Evidences from many sources indicate that the limitation of this term to so-called "conscious" behavior and "consciousness" is unsatisfactory and confusing. Its scientific value is questionable when so defined. This evidence also indicates that the restriction of the term social to the behavior of human animals is open to similar objections. A more articulate statement of the problem and some of the facts involved appears timely and useful. Do social phenomena include more than the interstimulation of persons? As a matter of fact, there never has been a unanimity of opinion that they are so limited. Do other animals have a social life or only a biological existence? Is man the only social animal? It has often been assumed that man is the social animal and some (Ward, for example) have even argued against the concept that man himself is naturally a social animal. Is the social limited to "conscious" behavior? The proposal here advanced is consideration of social phenomena as the interaction of organisms which are sufficiently alive to respond to each other, including all behavior which influences or is the result of other behavior. This includes the influences from the behavior of past generations. The point of interest is not terminological but factual; although, of course, it has implications for terminology. Terms are not so important as long as the facts are understood. The purpose is to present a viewpoint with facts, to be tentative where it is easy to be dogmatic, to raise questions rather than settle them. First, it might be well to indicate some phases in the development of sociology which have a bearing on the concept just mentioned, and which will help to define and explain the nature of it. Probably one of the most significant recent trends in sociology is the behavioristic tendency. Recent books indicate this-for example, Park and Burgess, Blackmar and Gillin, Giddings, and others. In spite of some of the absurdities of the behavioristic movement, so cleverly indicated by Faris at the recent meeting of the American Sociological Society, this movement must be recognized as an important one, particularly for its emphasis upon objective and scientific procedure. It has caused us to reinspect our accepted categories. Such reinspection is usually beneficial. Closely allied with this movement is the emphasis now placed upon the objective nature of social life and upon attempts to get a quantitative statement of social phenomena. By the objective nature of social life is meant the fact that social behavior is outwardly observable to a large degree, and not so completely contained within the individual as was formerly supposed. The viewpoint of these two movements certainly would demand consideration of the in teraction of all organisms to determine the possibility of social phenomena existing therein, unless some were excluded a priori, which, in this case, appears to be a rather questionable scientific procedure. The third development is one showing the importance of the group and group group life. Evidences of this are seen in a large number of current articles and books. Some examples are the writings of Cooley; Ellwood; Bogardus' recent edition of Introduction to Sociology, which takes as its center the group concept; Park and Burgess; Bodenhafer; etc. If the group is a center of study, then clearly we have a large number of groupings among plants, animals, and other organisms which might well be studied under this group concept; unless, of course, we arbitrarily limit the study to human groups or contend that man's group relations are unique, of a different kind from those of other organisms; that human groups represent fundamental qualitative distinctions; that "nothing like us ever was." Possibly this is true, but it seems that it is to be proved and not assumed. One of the main developments of science has been the process of turning such differences of kind into varieties of degree. Fourth, environmental study in sociology would apparently give a basis for an extension of the term social to include more than it formerly has. For example, Bernard, who has been particularly prominent in emphasizing the environment, in a recent classification of the social environment includes under it the "bio-social" or the other organisms which have interacted with and been transformed by man. Fifth, a trend which is closely related to the fourth, or might be a part of it, is shown in ecological study which has been developing in sociology. This indicates clearly the tendency toward the extension of sociological study to much more than human organisms. Park and Burgess have particularly emphasized the importance of ecological study. Consideration of this type of investigation is appearing in sociological writings. There is already 'I do not know how many sociologists read that "blasphemer," Carl Sandburg, but it is refreshing material. considerable literature on plant communities and animal societies, and the sociology of plants and animals. Some of the significance from a sociological standpoint of the comparative study of plants, lower organisms, and higher organisms, including man, has been brought out in Park and Burgess (chap. iii and Bibliography). Apparently we have here the beginning of a comparative sociology. The theoretical possibility of the extension of social psychology to include the responses of other organisms has been indicated by Thomas and Znaniecki in The Polish Peasant (Vol. I, Meth. note). Allport, in his recent text, Social Psychology, rejects the definition of social which limits it to human behavior and "conscious" behavior (p. 12). He extends the field to include all forms of animal life in which we find reactions of individuals to one another. The enhanced scientific worth and enriched study resulting from the treatment of social behavior in the broader sense is clearly evident in his book. Gault also assumes social reactions in animals. The foregoing brief statement should indicate a basis in present social studies for data broader than anthropological processes. The second task is to consider the possible validity of such a conception, and some of the factors involved in such a view. In the past we have been almost hopelessly anthropocentric. Man has considered himself the center of the universe. He has been pleased to think himself unique-a thing apart—a special creation. I suppose this tendency for man to be concerned with himself and his problems is a natural one. Sciences have developed around these problems of human life. Thus sociology has developed. And it has developed primarily as a study of human society. But just as we have discovered that man is not unique and not a special creation, that he is after all an evolutionary creation or product, along with the other animals and organisms, so we are learning that other animals are social and have a social life-it seems almost superfluous to say it-and that we may add much to our knowledge by study of them as such social beings. But the more specific problem is: What is the basis for limiting the notion "social" to the influences of human beings upon each other? Space will not permit a discussion of all the various concep tions about the differences between man and the other animals, or of all the particular theories limiting the social to human interaction. The only conception which I wish to consider here is one which appears to be most valid if we are to make such a distinction. The outstanding basis for limiting the social to human relations is psychological. A considerable number of sociologists limit social data to conscious interaction. Social phenomena are often defined as psychic interstimulation. This leaves us on a similar basis. When pressed for a definition of "psychic" it generally turns out to mean "mind," "mental," "consciousness," etc. Or if, as is more rare, psychical is used in a broad sense, somewhat synonymous with psychological, it extends far into the infra-human field. The problem immediately arises as to what is meant by conscious. Conscious and consciousness may be used in two ways: first, as a general term, including in addition to reflective (thought) responses, unreflective response, tropisms as well as responses of the distance receptors; second, in a restricted sense referring particularly to reflective responses. If we apply the first meaning to conscious activity, it is not limited to human beings. Other organisms respond in this manner. Obviously, if sociology and social psychology study such interstimulation their field extends over a large range of different types of organisms. Used in the second sense, conscious behavior does seemingly furnish a distinction between man and the other animals. Man, so far as we have been able to discover, is the only animal that has been able to develop reflective behavior. He represents in this respect a much more complex psychological integration and co-ordination. By reflective behavior is meant what is ordinarily called "thinking" in the sense of conceptual thought. In general, it is the broad category known as language habits. Human beings have built up in this manner a large significant environment by which they represent to themselves absent objects and indicate to themselves the meaning of their activity. Thus society, while not physically present, is psychologically present in the form of these signs, symbols, words, gestures, etc., which are used as substitutes for the absent parts. Hence society might be said to exist in this common |