to say, that they are the conduct of personality with its characteristic mental conditions and functions, the more mutually interdependent and reciprocating they must be. For without socially acquired, vigorous imaginations, the appropriation of a group's cumulatively built-up fund of ideas and ideals, without the common moral sustenances and encouragements in social group life," without the mutual disciplining and co-operative reinforcements in a common life, men can have no personalities" nor any conduct.

TC. H. Cooley, op. cit., p. 389.

19 Cf. Park and Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology, esp. p. 70. [To be continued]

WHAT ARE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY?

I. W. HOWERTH

Colorado State Teachers' College

ABSTRACT

It seems that a satisfactory answer to the question, "What is a sociological principle?" should be found in the dictionary or in sociological treatises. But it is not. Most sociologists have overlooked the question. We need an answer, clear and definite. It is here suggested that sociological principles, in the most fundamental sense, are exactly similar in character to mechanical principles; they explain natural processes. Such principles must be carefully distinguished from social laws, which describe but do not explain. Lester F. Ward appears to be the only sociologist who has thus conceived principles of sociology. There are, however, two kinds of principles that may be called sociological. They are, first, general truths about society that enable the sociologist to discover other and more recondite social truths; they are, in a sense, methodological. Secondly, they are fundamental truths that definitely explain how nature produces social changes. They are the modi operandi of the social forces in the field of natural social phenomena. The latter are the more important, since they give the clue to social control and a basis of hope for future social self-direction.

A principle, in one way of looking at it, is anything which, according to accepted usage, we have agreed to call by that name. From this point of view it should be easy to ascertain just what a principle is; we have only to consult the dictionary.

Turning, then, to the Century Dictionary, I find seven distinct and more or less independent definitions of the word "principle." It is (1) a beginning or commencement; (2) a cause, in the widest sense; (3) an original faculty or endowment; (4) a truth which is evident and general; (5) that which is professed or accepted as a law of conduct or a rule of action; (6) a component part; and (7) a law of nature, or a general property of matter.

Now which, if any, of these definitions is, or are, or should be, applicable in the field of sociology? Hardly the first, second, third, fifth, or sixth. These may define certain things properly regarded as principles, but a principle of sociology, in any significant sense, could hardly be regarded as adequately described by any of them. According to the fourth definition, a principle is a general truth,

and the word is often so used, but a law is also a general truth. Is there, then, no difference between a principle and a law? It would appear that the dictionary does not recognize any difference, for in the seventh definition, "principle" is defined as a law of nature. But surely in sociology the terms are not synonymous, and if they were so in common usage, it would be desirable to create a distinction for sociological and for general scientific purposes. In our quest, then, for the essential nature of a sociological principle we do not get much help from the dictionary.

Perhaps we shall have better luck if we lay aside the dictionary and examine the use of the word "principle" among sociologists themselves. What, then, is a sociological principle according to the present usage of the expression in the science of sociology? Naturally, our first resort for an answer is to the books on sociology carrying the word "principles" in their titles.

On casually glancing over my library I observe four treatises entitled Principles of Sociology. They are those of Spencer, Ross, Giddings, and Bushee. There may be others. I note one bearing the title Principles of Educational Sociology, and another entitled An Introduction to the Principles of Sociology. Here, then, it would seem, we should be able to find just what we are after. Let us glance at some of these works to see if we can ascertain from them what a principle is.

Well, I turn first to Spencer's three volumes on the Principles of Sociology. Somewhat to my surprise, the word "principle" is not in the index. In Giddings' and Bushee's texts, ditto. Giddings, however, says in his Preface, "There are principles of sociology, and they admit of logical organization," and describes his own book as "an attempt to combine the principles of sociology in a coherent theory." But he nowhere tells us what a sociological principle is. Ross, I observe, has not included the word "principle" in his index either, but this is evidently in the nature of an oversight, for, as most of my readers will know, Ross devotes sixtythree of his seven hundred pages, less than one-tenth, to a presentation and discussion of sociological principles. Sociological Principles is, indeed, the title of the fifth division of his book. He

names four such principles-the principles of anticipation, simulation, individualization, and balance; but he nowhere defines a principle. We are assumed to know, or we are left to infer, what principles are from the samples he lays before us. Fishing in these waters turns out to be almost as discouraging, so far as our purpose is concerned, as was our angling in the dictionary. In both cases we get practically "a dry haul."

My own view is that the concept "principle," and the principles of sociology are altogether too important to be thus neglected or taken for granted in sociological exposition. From the viewpoint of the possible modification of human behavior and the consequent future direction of social evolution social or sociological principles are, I think, just the most important things with which sociology may be and should be concerned. I propose, therefore, to present another conception of a principle in the sociological sense. Whether it is the correct conception, or the most helpful, the reader himself may determine.

I begin by asking the reader, What would you understand by "principle" if I should address you in regard to the principle of a given mechanism, say, a steam engine? Would you not think at once of the expansion of steam in the cylinder, that is to say, of the particular mode or manner in which a steam engine operates? You would understand, I think, that I was talking about how it

moves.

Again, if I should declare that I had succeeded in moving a heavy weight, heavier than a man could lift, would you not ask, if you were curious about the matter, What principle did you employ in moving the weight? And you would expect to hear that I had employed the principle of the lever or the pulley, or the inclined plane, or some other well-known "mechanical principle." A mechanical principle is generally understood, I think, as the modus operandi of a mechanical operation. It is an explanation of how the movement takes place.

Now, I believe that biological, psychological, and sociological principles are exactly of the same nature-they explain the movements and operations of nature in the realms of the corresponding

natural phenomena. In biology, for instance, natural selection is a true principle; it explains, in part, the process of organic evolution. When we discover, if we ever do, the "principle" of variation, that is, when we find out how natural variations in living things are produced, the explanation of the whole process of organic evolution will practically be complete.

Now, as I see it, the prime objective of the science of sociology is the discovery of the principles operative in the social mechanism. It is to find out just how social movements are initiated and carried on by nature. That is really the great sociological question, for if we can ascertain just how nature produces, or induces, social change, we shall then have the secret of producing desirable changes in social phenomena through artificial effort. That is to say, we shall be able to control and direct social evolution.

If I have correctly suggested the nature of a principle, we should now be able to see clearly that it is not the same as a law, and to perceive the respect in which a law and a principle differ from each other. A law is a mere formula expressing the observed constancy or uniformity in action in a special field of phenomena, the mere sequence or coexistence of certain events as observed by man. It is supposed to express a general truth, as it does if it is a correct formula; but it explains nothing. When we have discovered a social law, for instance, expressing a uniformity of coexistences or sequences in a given area of social phenomena, we have achieved an important object, but our task is not yet complete. We must go a step farther; we must endeavor to find out how the change takes place. That is, we must find out the operating principle. We are then, and not until then, ready to exert the most effective artificial control over the given change. In efforts to control we must observe the law, if we would be effective; that is, we must act within the limitations imposed by it, but the secret of control in a given case is not a knowledge of the law, but a knowledge of the corresponding natural principle.

To be specific, then, a scientific principle is a modus operandi of nature in the production of phenomenal change, and a sociological principle is the modus operandi of nature in the produc