tual elements. Elsewhere in the volume are found the following pertinent comments upon the psychic factors: In the language of physical science, a "cause" has come to mean the invariable, necessary, and equivalent antecedent of a consequent which we call the "effect." Now, the "stimulus" in psychology is not the equivalent of the "cause," but rather the opportunity for the discharge of energy; and the "response" is not the mechanical effect of the stimulus, but is always teleological, that is, directed to some end. Hence, it is incorrect, from the standpoint of a physical science, to speak of the stimulus as the cause of a response, or of a bodily state as the cause of a mental state. Now the connections of individuals in society are almost entirely those of mental interaction, or stimulus and response. Men influence each other, act upon each other, through acting as stimuli to each other. Hence the word "cause" must be used in the social sciences in a sense different from its use in physical science; for, from the standpoint of physical science, there are no causal connections between the minds of individuals.30 The desires are complexes of feeling and impulse with the knowledge of the object which will satisfy the impulse.31 They are most manifest in connection with the instinctive impulses; hence the close connection of desire with instinct. An impulse which springs from an acquired habit may, however, express itself in desire, though usually not of the strong, passionate sort. That the desires are expressions of habits as well as of instincts is shown by the fact that the desires of men differ greatly, but the instincts of all are practically the same. Although the desires are extremely complex mental states, they occupy a position of fundamental importance in the social life. The relations of individuals may be regarded as more or less direct expressions of their desires. For this reason, Professor Ward and other sociologists have claimed that the desires are the true social forces.32 By the time he published his Introduction to Social Psychology, five years later, Ellwood had changed his opinion considerably, to the extent that he was prepared to present a more definite classification of the "active factors in association," under which subtitle he submits the following remarks and outline: It has been a tendency, among social psychologists, to recognize only the psychic factors as truly social, and even among these only the acquired psychic 30 Ellwood, Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects (1912), pp. 76–77. "Professor Ellsworth Faris, elaborating upon suggestions made by W. I. Thomas, has defined "wish" in practically these same terms. 32 Ellwood, Op. cit., p. 117. traits which are the result of cultural evolution, since these alone can be considered as having originated within human society. But the scientific question which concerns us now is not how forces originate, but what factors do we have to take into account in explaining psychologically the social life of mankind? As soon as we put the question in this form and take the evolutionary point of view, we see that the physical factors, such as climate and race, loom large. Indeed, over long stretches of time, the geographical factors of climate, food, soil, and the biological factors of variation, heredity, and selection, seem the significant factors. At any given moment, however, the influence of these physical factors expresses itself in the social life through the impulses, feelings, and ideas of individuals; for it is only through these psychological elements that any kind of social life is maintained, as we have already said. Hence the social psychologist may emphasize the psychic factors, provided that he keeps in the background environmental and biological factors as the basis upon which the psychic processes take place and which originally conditions and modifies them. As original active factors in human association, we must, then, recognize the following: I. The physical factors: a) Geographic environment, including climate, food, soil, natural resources, topography, etc. b) Biological forces, heredity, variation, selection, etc. II. The psychical factors: a) Impulses, both hereditary and acquired (instinctive and habitual) b) Feelings, both hereditary (emotions) and acquired, and both pleasant and unpleasant c) Intellectual elements, including sensation, perception, and ideation (conception, imagination, reasoning, etc.) Derived, complex factors, compounded out of the simple, original factors, are very numerous, and have never been classified satisfactorily from a psychological point of view. Thus we have, as a result chiefly of the operation of man's intellect upon physical nature, the whole technology of civilization, such as roads, houses, tools, and machinery. This results in a new artificial physical environment for man, even more important for his social life than the geographic environment. Compounded mainly out of feeling and intellectual elements are beliefs; out of feeling and impulses are desires; out of feeling, impulses, and intellectual elements are interests. [Quotes Small's classification of interests, on the whole with approval.]33 The more recent sociological treatise which accepts, on the whole, Ward's notion of the desires as social forces is Professor Ellwood, Introduction to Social Psychology (1917), pp. 75–77. 25 Bushee's Principles of Sociology. In that book, after reviewing with approval Ward's statement of his doctrine, and adding some comments of his own, the author presents the following section: Classification of the desires.-Progress therefore originates in the satisfaction of desire; but continued progress is not a matter of one desire nor of a few desires, but of a multitude of desires succeeding one another. If the satisfaction of a few inherited instincts were the only motives for activity, progress would soon cease, for actions would become habitual and unvarying. The situation would be the same as that of adaptation to a single environment. Continued progress requires a changing environment and successive adaptations; and the chief method of producing the change is through the multiplication of desires. Although specific desires among progressive peoples come to be indefinite in number, they may all be reduced to a few fundamental types. And an analysis of the primary desires will be of assistance in making a systematic arrangement of complicated social processes and institutions. I have made the following classification, not so much with the intention of analyzing all the instincts and desires which may be considered fundamental, as to get at those basic desires out of which great social institutions and activities arise. I. Physical a) Desire for self-preservation II. Mental a) Desire for approbation Art . Science Religion The desires may be classified conveniently according to man's twofold nature. Man is first an animal, and in common with other animals possesses certain inherited instincts essential to the well-being of the species. But man is also a thinking and reasoning animal, and he possesses other desires specially characteristic of his superior intellectual faculties, which are either lacking or rudimentary in animals of inferior intelligence. The former may be classed as the physical and the latter as the mental desires.34 We cannot close this discussion of the social-forces doctrine as it was originally laid down by Ward, and perpetuated by others along lines more or less consistent with those he first mapped out, Op. cit., pp. 58-59. Cf. the selection from L. L. Bernard's review, in Sec. VII, to appear in the American Journal of Sociology for March, 1926. in any better way than by quoting at some length from Small's General Sociology the passage in which is embodied the author's most important critical estimate of that doctrine: Social forces.-No treatment of this subject is so full and clear as that of Ward. . . . . We must guard at the outset against an illusion that has exerted a confusing influence at this point. There are no social forces which are not at the same time forces lodged in individuals, deriving their energy from individuals, and operating in and through individuals. There are no social forces that lurk in the containing ether, and affect persons without the agency of other persons. There are to be sure, all the physical conditions . . . . that affect persons just as they affect other forms of matter. So far these are not social forces at all. They do not get to be social forces till they get into persons, and in persons take the form of feelings which impel them to act upon other persons, and exert themselves as external stimuli upon otherwise inert persons.35 In either case social forces are personal influences passing from person to person, and producing activities that give content to the association. The concept of social forces was never challenged so long as it was merely an everyday commonplace. When it passed into technical forms of expression, doubts began to be urged. If anyone in the United States had questioned the existence of Mrs. Grundy fifty years ago, he would have been pitied and ignored as a harmless "natural." Social forces in the form of gossip, and personified as Mrs. Grundy, were real to everybody. But the particular species of social forces which Mrs. Grundy represented were neither more nor less real than the other social forces which had no names in folklore. Persons incessantly influence persons. The modes of this influence are indescribably varied. . . The simple fact which the concept "social forces" stands for is that every person acts upon and is acted upon in countless ways by other persons with whom he associates. These modes of action and reaction between persons may be classified, and the more obvious and recurrent among them may be enumerated. More than this, the action of these social forces may be observed, and the results of observation may be organized into social laws. .. [In re Ward's identification of desires as the social forces:] But we have gone a step beyond the desires, and have found it necessary to assume the existence of underlying interests.36 These have to desires very nearly the relation of substance to attribute, or, in a different figure, of genus to species. Our interests .... 35 The allusion to "inert persons" in this passage, and what it implies, would be vigorously combatted by many contemporary social psychologists, particularly by Dewey, who holds that action is primary, and that all that external pressure can give is change of direction. The point is, however, not an important one for the argument of the passage in which we are here chiefly interested. 36 Cf. Section V of this paper, to appear in the American Journal of Sociology for January, 1926. may be beyond or beneath our ken; our desires are very strong and clear. . . . . The implicit interests, of which we may well be very imperfectly aware, move us to desires which correspond well or ill with the content of the interests from which they sprung. The desires that the persons associating actually feel are practically the elementary forces with which we have to deal. They are just as real as the properties of matter. They have their ratios of energy, just as though they were physical forces. . . . . The one consideration to be urged at this point is that the concept "social forces" has a real content. It represents reality. There are social forces. They are the desires of persons.37 "Small, General Sociology, pp. 532 ff. The greater part of this passage is quoted in Park and Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology, pp. 452-53. [To be continued] |