sonable reading of the Act is consistent with both the language of the statute and congressional pronouncements. We are thus most reluctant to disregard the Secretary's interpretation. We conclude, as did the Appeals Council, that subsection (b) does not authorize the disbursement of Mrs. Guidet's aid to a "representative payee." [5] Though apparently acknowledging that on its face subsection (b) does not authorize such payment, Ms. Smith argues that when that sub (Cont.) derpaid recipient when he died or was not separated from him for 6 months at the time of death. No underpayment may be paid to the estate of any underpaid recipient, the estate of the surviving spouse, or to any survivor other than the living-with eligible spouse. If the Secretary's regulations conflicted with the proper meaning of the statute they were intended to implement, they would of course be invalid. See Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286, 92 S.Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed.2d 448 (1971); Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1976). But where the regulations are reasonable and reflect the language and policy underlying the statute, the courts should carefully consider the regulations in determining the proper interpretation of the statute. See Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of America, Inc., 423 U.S. 12, 15, 96 S.Ct. 172, 46 L.Ed.2d 156 (1975); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105, 91 S.Ct. 1319, 28 L.Ed.2d 625 (1971); Bone v. Hibernia Bank, 493 F.2d 135, 139 (9th Cir. 1974). Ms. Smith refers to § 416.601, which reads in part: (a)... When it appears to the Administration that the interest of a recipient of payments under title XVI... would be served thereby, certification of payment may be made by the Administration... either for direct payment to such recipient, or for his use and benefit to a relative or some other person (including an appropriate public or private agency) selected by the Administration as the "representative payee" of the recipient.... (b)... Payments made in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section to a representative payee of an eligible individual or eligible spouse shall constitute payments to such eligible individual or eligible spouse. Ms. Smith contends that § 416.601 applies to § 1631(b) and therefore payment to either her or the health facility as a "representative payee" would constitute payment to "such individual" within the meaning of § 1631(b). The Secretary responds that § 416.601 cannot be applied to § 1631(b). We think the Secretary is correct. To invoke the § 416.601(b) equivalency rule in the context of § 1631(b) would mean that the Secretary could pay any "appropriate person." This would in effect abrogate the limits of § 1631(b) that Congress intended to apply to underpayments. Instead, underpayments would essentially be subject to the same rule as are regular payments under § 1631(a) (2). That is, payment could be made to such individual or eligible spouse-the scheme common to subsections (a) (2) and (b)—or to an appropriate other person-a method statutorily limited to subsection (a) (2). We cannot disregard congressional intent to limit underpayments under subsection (b) more than regular payments under subsection (a) (2). This conclusion is reinforced by the language of § 416.601. That language parallels the language Congress employed in § 1631(a) (2), suggesting that the Secretary intended the regulation to apply in that context and not in the different § 1631(b) payment scheme. Finally, we note that the Secretary's reasonable interpretation of his own regulation should be accorded great respect by a court interpreting the regulation. See Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co., 423 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 172; Ehlert, 402 U.S. at 105, 91 S.Ct. 1319; Bone, 493 F.2d at 139. This is particularly so here because Congress gave to the Secretary the task of implementing congressional intent. § 1631(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a) (1). In sum, we conclud ed that the Secretary's reading of his regulations is consistent with and supports the proper reading of § 1631. section is read in conjunction with other parts of the Social Security Act a statutory basis for such payment emerges. First, she notes that the ALJ found that because Title II of the Social Security Act provides for making underpayments to individuals other than the eligible person's surviving spouse, "[t]he parts of the statute must be read reasonably together to accomplish their purpose. The authorization in the one subsection [of Title II] is meant to be understood in all the other sections [of the Act, including Title XVI]." Section 204(a) (2) and (d) of Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 404(a) (2) & (d), includes very detailed provision for making underpayments to persons other than a deceased individual's spouse, including to "the legal representative of the estate of the deceased." § 204(d) (7). But when Congress wished to incorporate parts of Title II into the newer Title XVI, it did so explicitly. For example, subsection (d) (1) of § 1631, the very section with which we are concerned, selectively incorporates into Title XVI procedures specified in parts of Title II. Moreover, we cannot infer such incorporation here because the Title II provision for paying "the legal representatve of the estate" conflicts directly with the language of § 1631(b) and the House Report's statement that "[u]nderpayments ... would not be paid to the estate of a deceased since that would not further the objective of meeting the current needs of individuals." Ms. Smith responds next that § 1631(a) (2) indicates the propriety of payment to a payee other than the eligible individual or his spouse. That provision reads in part: Payments of the benefit of any individual may be made to any Regardless of the proper interpretation of this provision vis-a-vis regular SSI payments, Congress has provided that underpayments should be distributed in accordance with subsection (b), specifically dealing with underpayments. And "[f]undamental maxims of statutory construction require that a specific section be found to qualify a general section. A specific statutory provision will govern even though general provisions, if standing alone, would include the same subject." Monte Vista Lodge, 384 F.2d at 129; see Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin Tompkins Co., 322 U.S. 102, 107, 64 S.Ct. 890, 88 L.Ed. 1163 (1944). Ms. Smith argues finally, and most powerfully, that her construction better satisfies the general congressional policy underlying Title XVI of helping the elderly and disabled. She notes that families will be less willing to assist their aged and disabled relatives if they fear that they will not obtain reimbursement should their relative pass away before payment. She also notes that the Secretary's interpretation in essence "rewards" the Secretary for failing to process claims quickly and accurately because the Government may avoid paying monies otherwise due should an eligible individual without an eligible spouse die before payment (as in this case). Finally, she contends that the Secretary's interpretation creates an incongruous scheme wherein the Secretary can pay regular SSI benefits under subsection (a) (2) but not underpayments under subsection (b) to individals other than an eligible spouse. We have a good deal of sympathy for Ms. Smith's policy claims. We are afraid, however, that in light of the legislative history and language of § 1631(b), we must reject her effort to redesign the statute. For as the Supreme Court has recently written: [A]s the second Mr. Justice Harlan said, when speaking for the National Broiler Marketing Association v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, MERRILL, Circuit Judge, dissenting 'In the interpretation of his regulations the Secretary has recognized the same limitation. In January of 1974 the Secretary first proposed regulations dealing with underpayments, writing: "If there is no surviving eligible spouse, no one can receive the underpayment." 39 Fed. Reg. 2012 (1974). After receiving comments about the proposed regulations, the Secretary noted: With respect to the limitation... on payment of an underpayment due a deceased individual, the comments said the prohibition against paying underpayments to the estate of the recipient seemed to violate the spirit of the Social Security Act and might deprive an individual responsible for the medical or burial costs of funds to pay them. However, section 1631(b) of the Social Security Act authorized the payment of an underpayment only to a surviving spouse eligible for supplemental security income and living with the individual when he died. 40 Fed. Reg. 47762 (1975). SECTION 1631(b) (42 U.S.C. 1383(b))— SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INECOME DISPOSITION OF UNDERPAYMENT 20 CFR 416.542(b) SSR 76-10 The supplemental security income recipient lived in a nursing home more than three years prior to her death. Her husband filed as her representative payee and also received a supplemental security income payment as an eligible individual. The claimant died before receiving any payments. Her huband claimed that all due monies should be paid to him Held, the law is quite definite in listing when and to whom an underpayment may be made. Although the husband is an eligible individual, he was not living with the claimant at the time of her death and does not meet the requirements of Regulations No. 16, §416.542(b). The general issue to be determined is whether the husband is an eligible recipient of supplemental security income underpayments due his deceased wife. The specific issue on which findings will be made and conclusions will be reached, is whether the surviving husband is an eligible member of a couple to receive the benefits due his deceased wife who, at the time of her death, was a resident of a nursing home in which he did not reside. On November 26, 1974, the husband filed an application for himself and as a representative for his aged and disabled wife. She had been confined to a nursing home since June 2, 1971. According to the husband's testimony, his and his wife's savings were used to maintain her in the nursing home, and there was no assistance from Federal or State funds. He and his wife, prior to her need for care in the nursing home, had maintained a home together since their marriage on December 18, 1910. His claim for benefits was processed expeditiously, and he commenced receiving payments with a monthly check about January 1, 1975, and a retroactive benefit check thereafter on January 6, 1975. On January 7, 1975, he inquired regarding his wife's supplemental security benefits which had not yet been received. On January 19, 1975, she passed away. On January 21, 1975, the surviving spouse filed a claim for the amounts due in the case of his deceased wife. On January 22, 1975, he was advised by letter from the Social Security Administration that: Section 1631(b) of the Social Security Act provides that money On January 28, 1975, he was sent a further letter from the Social Security Office, stating that his wife was eligible to receive the supplemental security income payment. On his request for reconsideration, the reason for reconsideration was: "According to your notice of January 22, 1975, this indicates I'm to receive my wife's "SSI checks for November '74 through January '75. Yet when I went to Soc. Sec. office they told me I couldn't get her back pay." A Notice of Decision letter was sent advising him that: "As you requested, your claim for the supplemental security income underpayment has been thoroughly examined. A supplemental security income underpayment due on behalf of a deceased individual by law is generally payable only to the surviving eligible spouse. To receive a supplemental security income payment due a deceased member of a couple, the surviving member must meet requirements for eligibility as a member of a couple for the month of death. For the month of death, you met requirements for eligibility as an individual but did not meet the requirements for eligibility as a member of a couple. Therefore, the payment due your wife cannot be made to anyone." The first letter to the husband, dated January 22, 1975, was incomplete in that it did not specify that the surviving spouse had to be living in the same household with the deceased spouse at the time of death in order to qualify for the unpaid benefits. This omission was covered in the Notice of Decision letter of February 24, 1975. On February 25, 1975, the spouse signed a request for hearing which stated: I don't feel that this is an underpayment, I feel it was a back payment. Her application and my application were filed on the same day in 11/74. I rec'd my initial payment 1/1/75 and on 1/6/75, I received my back payment for 11/74 and 12/74. The deceased wife was not receiving Title XIX Medicaid and was not in a public institution. She was entitled to supplemental security income benefits to supplement her Title II social security payments. After careful consideration of the evidence in this case, it is clear that because of the care she required, the deceased wife was in a private nursing home from June 2, 1971, until the date of her death on January 19, 1975. Although their separation was not due to marital difficulties, they were, in fact, living in separate households from each other at the time of her death. The social security office correctly took two applications from the husband when he filed applications on November 26, 1974. The benefits payable to each eligible individual living in a separate household is greater than the benefits paid to the two as a couple. Had the wife lived, she and her husband would have received more |