and respondent did not pursue judicial review of the Secretary's final decision under § 205(g). Almost seven years later, on March 5, 1973, respondent filed a second claim alleging the same bases for eligibility. His claim was again processed through administrative channels under the Secretary's regulations. The administrative law judge viewed the new application as barrel by res judicata, see 20 CFR § 404.937, but also treated the application as requiring the determination "whether the claimant is entitled to have his prior application reopened...." App. 33-34. Concluding that respondent's evidence was "merely repititions [sic] and cumulative," id., at 35, and finding no errors on the face of the evidence, ibid, the administrative law judge denied reopening and dismissed the claim. Respondent thereupon filed this action in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, challenging the Secretary's decision not to reopen, and resting jurisdiction on § 205(g), 42 U. S. C. § 405(g). The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground stated in its unpublished memorandum that "this court is without jurisdiction to consider the subject matter of this suit." App. to Cert. Petition 13a-14a. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, 552 F. 2d 1167 (1975). The Court of Appeals agreed that jurisdiction to review a refusal to reopen a claim proceeding on the ground of abuse of discretion was not authorized by the Social Security Act. Id., at 1169. The Court held, however, that § 205(h)3 did not limit judicial review to those methods "expressly authorized" by the Social Security Act itself. Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which contains an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy," afforded the District Court jurisdiction of respondent's complaint. Ibid. We granted certiorari, U.S. (1976). We reverse. A The Court of Appeals acknowledged that its construction of § 10 of the APA as an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction is contrary to the conclusion reached by several other Courts of Appeals. 522 F. 2d. at 1169. This conflict is understandable. None of the statutory sections that comprise § 10 is phrased like the usual grant of jurisdiction to 'Section 205(h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(h), provides: "The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secre tary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 41 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter." This section has been held to require the exhaustion of available administrative proce dures, to foreclose jurisdiction under the general grant of federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1331, and to route review through § 205(g). See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749,757, 761 (1975). proceed in the federal courts. On the other hand, the statute undoubtedly evinces Congress' intention and understanding that judicial review should be widely available to challenge the actions of federal administrative officials. Consequently, courts and commentators' have sharply divided over whether the statute should be read to provide a distinct basis of jurisdiction for the review of agency actions. Three decisions of this Court arguably have assumed, with little discussion, that the APA is an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 410 (1971); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967); Rusk v. Cort, 369 U. S. 367, 372 (1962). However, an Act of Congress enacted since our grant of certiorari in this case now persuades us that the better view is that the APA is not to be interpreted as an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to review agency actions. On October 21, 1976, Congress enacted Pub. L. 94-574, Stat. 2721, which amends 28 U. S. C. § 1331(a) to eliminate the requirement of a specified amount-in-controversy as a prerequisite to the maintenance of "any [1331] action brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity." The obvious effect of this modification, subject only to preclusion-of-review statutes created or retained by Congress, is to confer jurisdiction on federal courts to review agency action, regardless of whether the APA of its own force may serve as a jurisdictional predicate. We conclude that this amendment now largely undercuts the rationale for interpreting the APA as an independent jurisdictional provision. As noted previously, the actual text of § 10 of the APA nowhere contains an explicit grant of jurisdiction to challenge agency action in the federal courts. Furthermore, even the advocates of jurisdiction under "The Courts of Appeals of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Nine, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have held that §10 of the APA is an independent grant of jurisdiction. See Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F. 2d 410 (CA1 1973); Deering Milliken Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F. 2d 856 (CA4 1961); Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F. 2d 1005 (CA5 1975); Sanders v. Weinberger, 522 F. 2d 1167 (CA7 1975); Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F. 2d 53 (CA9 1970); Brennan v. Udall, 379 F. 2d 803 (CA10 1967); Pickus v. United States Board of Parole, 165 U. S. App. D. C. 284, 507 F. 2d 1107 (1974). The Courts of Appeals of the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits disagree. Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F. 2d 326 (CA3 1970); Bramblett v. Desobry, 490 F. 2d 405 (CA6 1974); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F. 2d 529 (CA8 1967). The Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit views the question as unsettled. See South Windsor Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 541 F.2d 910 (CA2 1976). 'Compare, e. g., Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 308 (1967), Davis Administrative Law Treatise § 23.02 (Supp. 1976), and Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 165 (1965) (all advocating APA jurisdiction), with Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Soverign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 389 (1970) and Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3568 (1975) (rejecting APA jurisdiction). 'Section 702 makes clear that a person wronged by agency action “’is entitled to judicial review thereof." But § 703 suggests that this language was not intended as an independent jurisdictional foundation, since such judicial review is to proceed "in a court specified by statute" or "in a court of competent jurisdiction." Both of these clauses seem to look to outside sources of jurisdictional authority. Thus, at best, the text of § 10 is ambiguous in providing a separate grant of subject-matter jurisdiction. the APA acknowledge that there is no basis for concluding that Congress, in enacting § 10 of the APA, actually conceived of the Act in jurisdictional terms. See, e.g., Byse & Fiocca, supra, at 328. Thus, the argument in favor of APA jurisdiction rests exclusively on the broad policy consideration that given the shortcomings of federal mandamus jurisdiction, such a construction is warranted by the rational policy of affording federal judicial review of actions by federal officials acting pursuant to federal law, notwithstanding the absence of the requisite jurisdictional amount. See id., at 330-331; Jaffe, supra, at 165. We do not find this argument to be compelling in light of Congress' apparent intention by the 1976 amendment to restructure afresh the scope of federal-question jurisdiction. In amending § 1331, Congress obviously has expressly acted to fill the jurisdictional void created by the pre-existing amount-in-controversy requirement. This new jurisdictional grant was qualified, however, by the retention of § 205(h) as preclusive of actions such as this that arise under the Social Security Act. Read together, the expansion of § 1331, coupled with the retention of § 205(h), apparently expresses Congress' view of the desired contours of federal-question jurisdiction over agency action. A broad reading of the APA in this instance would serve no purpose other than to modify Congress' new jurisdictional enactment by overriding its decision to limit § 1331 through the preservation of § 205(h). Squarely faced with the question of APA jurisdiction for the first time, Congress' explicit entry into the jurisdictional area counsels against our reading the APA as an implied jurisdictional grant designed solely to fill such an interstitial gap in § 1331 jurisdiction. This is particularly so since neither the text nor the history of the APA speak in favor of such a reading, and the 1976 Congress, in redefining § 1331, appears not to have envisioned the APA as playing any such stopgap role.' We thus conclude that the APA does not afford an implied grant of subject-matter jurisdiction permitting federal judicial review of agency action. B Respondent contends that notwithstanding the above, the Social Security Act itself, specifically § 205(g), should be construed to authorize 'Respondent argues that Congress intended its modification of § 1331 to be supplementary to the APA, and, therefore, contemplated that the APA would remain as a distinct jurisdictional provision. But the contrary seems true, for the legislative history suggests that Congress believed that the APA does not confer jurisdiction over administrative action, and, therefore, deletion of the jurisdictional amount from § 1331 was warranted. This understanding was made explicit by the Senate Judiciary Committee: "An anomaly in Federal jurisdiction prevents an otherwise competent United States district court from hearing certain cases seeking 'non-statutory review of Federal administrative action, absent the jurisdictional amount in controversy required by 28 U. S. C. section 1331, the general 'Federal question' provision. These cases 'arise under' the Federal Constitution or Federal statutes, and the committee believes they are appropriate matters for the exercise of Federal judicial power regardless of the monetary amount involved." S. Rep. No. 94-996, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 12 (1976) (emphasis supplied); see H. R. Rep. No. 94-1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 13 (1976). judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary not to reopen a claim of benefits. All Courts of Appeals that have considered this contention have rejected it. We also agree that § 205(g) cannot be read to authorize judicial review of alleged abuses of agency discretion in refusing to reopen claims for social security benefits. The pertinent part of § 205(g) provides that: "Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by civil action commenced within sixty days...." (Emphasis supplied.) This provision clearly limits judicial review to a particular type of agency action, a "final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing." But a petition to reopen a prior final decision may be denied without a hearing as provided in § 205(b), 42 U. S. C. § 405(b); see Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F. 2d 1, 4 (CA2 1966); Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F. 2d 1005, 1007 (CA5 1975). Indeed, the opportunity to reopen final decisions and any hearing convened to determine the propriety of such action are afforded by the Secretary's regulations and not by the Social Security Act. Moreover, an interpretation that would allow a claimant judicial review simply by filing-and being denied a petition to reopen his claim would frustrate the congressional purpose, plainly evidenced in § 205(g), to impose a 60-day limitation upon judicial review of the Secretary's final decision on the initial claim for benefits. 20 CFR § 404.951. Congress' determination so to limit judicial review to the original decision denying benefits is a policy choice obviously designed to forestall repetitive or belated litigation of stale eligibility claims. Our duty, of course, is to respect that choice. Respondent argues, however, that Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976), have rejected this interpretation of § 205(g). We do not agree. It is true that both cases authorized judicial review under § 205(g) of the Secretary's decision to deny or discontinue social security benefits notwithstanding the absence of a prior § 205(b) hearing. In both instances, however, the claimants challenged the Secretary's decision on constitutional grounds. Constitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and, therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions. Furthermore, since federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 is precluded by § 205(h), Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 761, a decision denying § 205(g) jurisdiction in Salfi or Eldridge would effectively have closed the federal forum to the adjudication of colorable constitutional claims. Thus those cases merely adhered to the well-established principle that when constitutional 'See Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F. 2d 1, 4-5 (CA2 1966); Davis v. Richardson, 460 F. 2d 772, 775 (CA3 1972); Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F. 2d 1005, 1007-1008 (CA5 1975); Maddox v. Richardson, 464 F. 2d 617, 621 (CA6 1972); Stuckey v. Weinberger, 488 F. 2d 904, 909 (CA9 1973); Neighbors v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 511 F. 2d 80, 81 (CA10 1974). questions are in issue, the availability of judicial review is presumed, and we will not read a statutory scheme to take the "extraordinary" step of foreclosing jurisdiction unless Congress' intent to do so is manifested by "clear and convincing" evidence. Id., at 762; Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 366-67 (1974). This is not one of those rare instances where the Secretary's denial of a petition to reopen is challenged on constitutional grounds. Respondent seeks only an additional opportunity to establish that he satisfies the Social Security Act's eligibility standards for disability benefits. Therefore, § 205(g) does not afford subject-matter jurisdiction in this case. (PPD-8) Presidential Pardon Reversed. SSR 78-7 EFFECT OF PRESIDENTIAL PARDON OR CLEMENCY PURPOSE: To provide information which will be needed to respond to inquiries concerning the Presidential pardon or a Clemency Discharge for Vietnam-era draft evaders and military deserters. CITATIONS: A proclamation issued by President Gerald R. Ford on September 16, 1974, announcing a "Program for the Return of Vietnam Era Draft Evaders and Military Deserters." PERTINENT HISTORY: This Program Policy Directive reflects a Presidential order estabishing a Clemency Program to enable citizens who were convicted of violations of the Military Selective Service Act or the Uniform Code of Military Justice in the Vietnam era to resume a normal life within their community and country. The Clemency Discharge which is issued under the Clemency Program is a neutral discharge, issued neither under "honorable conditions" nor under "other than honorable conditions." Such a discharge does not entitle an individual recipient to veterans' benefits although application therefor is not precluded. A Presidential pardon indicates to all government offices and officials the President's intent that they not consider pardoned offenses in deciding questions involving rights of the pardon recipient, thus removing most legal disabilities of an offense. It also restores Federal civil rights which have been lost because of a conviction, for example, the right to vote and hold Federal office. POLICY DIRECTIVE STATEMENT: Since the above provisions relate only to Vietnam-era offenses, they have no bearing on World War II |