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administrative record-closed because under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), neither party may put any additional evidence before the District Court. The magistrate gives only a recommendation to the judge, and only on the single, narrow issue: is there in the record substantial evidence to support the Secretary's decision?" The magistrate may do no more than propose a recommendation, and neither the statute nor the General Order gives such recommendation presumptive weight. The district judge is free to follow it wholly to ignore it, or, if he is not satisfied, he may conduct the review in whole or in part anew. The authority-and the responsibility-to make an informed, final determination, we emphasize, remains with the judge.

The magistrate's limited role in this type of case nonetheless substantially assists the district judge in the performance of his judicial function, and benefits both him and the parties. A magistrate's review helps focus the Court's attention on the relevant portions of what may be a voluminous record, from a point of view as neutral as that of an Article III judge. Review also helps the Court move directly to those legal arguments made by the parties that find some support in the record. Finally, the magistrate's report puts before the district judge a preliminary evaluation of the cumulative effect of the evidence in the record, to which the parties may address argument, and in this way narrows the dispute. Each step of the process takes place with the full participation of the parties. They know precisely what recommendations the judge is receiving and may frame their arguments accordingly.

We conclude that in the context of this case the preliminary review function assigned to the magistrate, and at issue here, is one of the "additional duties" that the statute contemplates magistrates are to perform."

"Ordinarily, the parties will agree as to the legal standard, leaving as the sole issue whether the Secretary's determination is supported by substantial evidence. In some cases, the magistrate may preliminarily resolve issues of law before making a recommendation; in some few cases, the recommendation may turn wholly upon an issue of law. The parties have not suggested that case in either of these sub-categories raise issues of statutory interpretation that require separate treatment, and we do not reach them on this record. Experience with the magistrate's role under this Act may well lead to the conclusion that sound judicial administration calls for sending directly to the District Judge those cases that turn solely upon issues of law.

'Though we do not rely upon subsequently expressed congressional views, the Congress plainly considers claims such as respondent brought in the District Court as matters that could appropriately be referred for preliminary review to a magistrate. In considering magistrates' salaries in 1972, a Senate subcommittee noted:

"Magistrates are judicial officers of the Federal district courts.... They may also be authorized to screen prisoner petitions, hold pretrial conferences in civil and criminal cases, hear certain preliminary motions, review social security appeals, review Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act matters, and serve as special masters. In short, they render valuable assistance to the judges of the district courts, thereby freeing the time of those judges for the actual trial of cases." S. Rep. No. 1065, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., p.3 (1972) (emphasis added).

The Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, the statutory body that supervises the administrative aspects of the Act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 604(d) (1), reads the Act in the same way. It has distributed a "checklist" of magistrate duties that includes review of Social Security appeals brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial Conference of the United

(4)

The Secretary argues that the magistrate, in taking this reference, functions as a special master. From this premise, the Secretary asks us to hold that a general rule requiring automatic reference in a category of cases does not comply with the mandate of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 53, that "reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule," made in nonjury cases "only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it." He also argues that, for similar reasons, the reference here is not permissible under our decision in LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U. S. 249 (1957)."

Section 636(b) expressly provides that a district court may, in an appropriate case and in accordance with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 53, call upon a magistrate to act as a special master. But the statute also is clear that not every reference, for whatever purpose, is to be characterized as a reference to a special master. It treats references to the magistrate acting as master quite separately in subsection (1), indicating by its structure that other references are of a different sort. Moreover, Rule 53(e) provides that, in nonjury cases referred to a master, the court shall accept any finding of fact that is not clearly erroneous. Under the reference in this case, however, the judge remains free to give the magistrate's recommendation whatever weight the judge decides it merits. It cannot be said, therefore, that the magistrate acts as a special master in the sense that either Rule 53 or the Federal Magistrates Act uses that term. The order of reference at issue does not constitute the magistrate a special master.

The Secretary argues that the magistrate will be a master-in-fact because the judge will accept automatically the recommendation made in every case. Nothing in the record or within the scope of permissible judicial notice supports this argument; nor does common observation of the performance of United States judges remotely lend the slightest credence to such an extravagant assertion. We express no opinion with respect to either the wisdom of the validity of automatic referral in other types of cases; only the narrow portion of General Order No. 104D that led to reference of this particular case is before us today. In this narrow range of cases, reference promotes more focused, and so more careful, decisionmaking by the district judge. We categorically reject

(Cont.)

States, Committee on the Administration of the Federal Magistrate System, Duties Which Might Be Assigned to U.S. Magistrates (March 14, 1975). The Administrative Office first noted in its 1972 report that district courts were assigning Social Security Appeals to magistrates under the 1968 Act. Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director (1972) 250.

'These arguments persuaded the Court of Appeals in Ingram v. Richardson, 471 F. 2d 1268 (CA6 1972). Other federal courts to consider the issue reached a contrary result. Yascavage v. Weinberger, 379 F. Supp. 1297 (MD Pa. 1974); Bell v. Weinberger, 378 F. Supp. 198 (ND Ga. 1974); Murphy v. Weinberger, Unempl. Ins. Rep. ¶ 17,608 (Conn. 1974).

Several courts have relied upon these arguments to one extent or another in disapprov ing references that involved a broader grant of authority to the magistrate. See, e. g. Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 507 F. 2d 1378 (CA7 1974); T. P. O., Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (CA7 1972); Reed v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 459 F. 2d 124 (CA1 1972).

the suggestion that judges will accept, uncritically, recommendations of magistrates.

Our decision in LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U. S. 249 (1957), does not call for a different result. In LaBuy, the district judge on his own motion referred to a special master two complex, protracted antitrust cases on the eve of trial. The cases had been pending before him for several years, he had heard pretrial motions, and he was familiar with the issues involved. The master, a member of the bar, was to hear and decide the entire case, subject to review by the district judge under the "clearly erroneous" test. The judge cited the problems attendant to docket congestion to satisfy Rule 53's requirement that a reference to a special master be justified by "exceptional circumstances." The Court held that on these facts reference was not permissible and affirmed the Court of Appeals' supervisory prohibition.

LaBuy, although nearly two decades past, is the most recent of our cases dealing with special masters, and our decision today does not erode it. The magistrate here acted in his capacity as magistrate, not as a special master, under a reference authorized by an Act passed 10 years after LaBuy was decided. Other factors distinguish this case from LaBuy as well. The issues here are as simple as they were complex in LaBuy, and the District Judge had not yet invested any time in familiarizing himself with the case. The reference in this case will result in a recommendation that carries only such weight as its merit commands and the sound discretion of the judge warrants. We are persuaded that the important premises from which the LaBuy decision proceeded are not threatened here.

Finally, our decision in Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U. S. 461 (1974), does not bear on this case. The Secretary has abandoned any claim that the statute giving the District Court jurisdiction of the case in the first instance, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), precludes reference to a magistrate. It was the Court's reading of the habeas corpus statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2243, that formed that basis for the holding in Wingo v. Wedding.

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

'See generally Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 Col. L. Rev. 452 (1958); C. A. B. v. Carefree Travel, Inc., 513 F. 2d 375 (CA2 1975).

SECTION 205(g) (42 U.S.C. 405(g) JUDICIAL REVIEW-APPEAL FROM REFUSAL TO REOPEN PRIOR FINAL DECISION

20 CFR 404.940 and 404.951

CALIFANO v. SANDERS, 97 S.Ct. 980 (1977)

SSR 77-28c

Where claimant sought judicial review of an administrative refusal to reopen a claim for disability insurance benefits previously denied, basing jurisdiction on §10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§701-706, and, in the alternative, on §205(g) of the Social Security Act, held, the APA does not provide an independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to review final agency action. Further held, absent a constitutional challenge, section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, which provides that an individual may seek judicial review of any final decision made after a hearing, does not authorize judicial review of a decision denying a petition to reopen a prior final decision of the agency, as the petition may be denied without providing a section 205(b) hearing.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JUSTICES WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL and REHNQUIST joined. MR. JUSTICE STEWART filed a concurring opinion in which MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER joined. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

The questions for decision are (1) whether § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §§ 701-706' is an independent grant to district courts of subject-matter jurisdiction to review a decision of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare not to reopen a previously ad

'The pertinent provisions of § 10 are the following:

"§ 701. Application; definitions

"(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that

"(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or

"(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.

"§ 702. Right of review.

"A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or ag grieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. Pub. L. 89-554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 392.

"§ 703. Form and venue of proceeding

"The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action, including actions for declaratory judg ments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction. Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law, agency action is subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement. Pub. L. 89-554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 392.

"§ 704. Actions reviewable

"Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, proce dural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of

judicated claim for Social Security benefits and (2) if not, whether § 205(g) of the Social Security Act' authorizes judicial review of the Secretary's decision.

Title II of the Social Security Act provides disability benefits for a claimant who demonstrates that he suffers a physical or mental disability within the meaning of the Act and that the disability arose prior to the expiration of his insured status. 42 U. S. C. §§ 416(i), 423. The administrative process is begun when he files a claim with the Social Security Administration. 20 CFR §§ 404.905-404.907. If the claim is administratively denied, regulations permit administrative reconsideration within a six-month period. Id., at 404.909-404.915. Should a request for reconsideration prove unsuccessful, the claimant may, within 60 days, ask for an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge, 42 U. S. C. § 405(b) (Supp. V), and a discretionary appeal from an adverse determination of the law judge lies to the Administration Appeals Council. 20 CFR §§ 404.945-404.947. Finally § 205(g) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 405(g), authorizes federal judicial review of "any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which [the claimant] was a party...."

The Act and regulations thus create an orderly administrative mechanism, with district court review of the final decision of the Secretary, to assist in the original processing of the more than 7,600,000 claims filed annually with the Administration. See The Year in Review - The Administration of Social Security Programs 1975, at 54 (Feb. 1976). By regulation, however, the administrative scheme provides for additional consideration of the claim. This is in the form of regulations for reopening of the agency determination within specified time limits: 12 months as a matter of right and three years "upon a finding of good cause," which exists if new material evidence is provided or specific errors discovered. 20 CFR §§ 404.957(a), (b), 404.958. Moreover, the regulations permit reopening "[a]t any time" for the purpose of correcting clerical errors or errors on the face of relevant evidence. Id., at § 404.957(c).

On January 30, 1964, respondent filed his initial claim with the agency for disability payments and disability insurance benefits, alleging inability to work because of epilepsy and blackout spells. The claim proceeded through the several steps of the administrative procedures. An administrative law judge found that respondent was ineligible for benefits on the ground that he had not demonstrated a relevant disability of sufficient severity. The Appeals Council sustained this decision,

(Cont.)

reconsideration, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority. Pub. L. 89-554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 392."

*Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. 405(g), provides in part: "Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow ...

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