The

Fourth, that no authority exists for antedating the bonds. ordinance passed by the board of trustees, pursuant to the authority given, provided that the bonds should be dated as of February 1, 1912, and bear interest at the rate of five per cent per annum. Fifth, under the terms of the ordinance the bonds are to extend over a period of more than forty years from their date.

[1] The existence of irregularities in the proceedings inaugurated for conferring authority upon the board to issue the bonds, may be conceded. Whether of sufficient import to render the proceedings invalid by reason of non-compliance with the statutory provisions under and pursuant to which they were conducted, is immaterial, for the reason that, in our opinion, such defects, in so far as material, were cured by an act of the legislature entitled, "An act to validate municipal bonds, and to provide for the levy and collection of taxes to pay the principal and interest on such bonds," approved April 4, 1913 (Stats. 1913, p. 14). Section 1 of this act provides: "Where in any municipal corporation, proceedings have been taken for the purpose of issuing and selling bonds of such municipal corporation, . . all such acts and proceedings leading up to and including the issuance of such bonds, if they have heretofore been sold, and all such acts and proceedings heretofore had, although the bonds are not yet sold, are hereby legalized, ratified, confirmed and declared validated to all intents and purposes, and the power of said municipal corporation and of the legislative body thereof, to issue such bonds, is hereby ratified, confirmed and declared, and the bonds hereafter sold shall be the legal and binding obligation of and against the municipal corporation, . . ." Section 3 of the act provides: “This act shall not operate to legalize any bonds which have been sold for less than par, nor to legalize any bonds the issuance of which has not received the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors of such municipal corporation, voting at an election held for the purpose of determining whether such indebtedness should be incurred, nor to legalize any bonds which mature at a date more than forty years from the time of their issuance." [2] It has been repeatedly held that the legislature may validate past transactions when it could in advance, without contravening constitutional provisions, have authorized the proceedings taken as a precedent condition to the exercise of municipal power in issuing bonds. In other words, as to all steps which the legislature could, in the first instance, have dispensed with, it may by retroactive statute declare the taking thereof unnecessary. (See Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., vol. 2, sec. 948; City of Redlands v. Brook, 151 Cal. 474.) [3] Indeed, counsel for respondent, notwithstanding the irregularity in the proceedings, concedes the act quoted as sufficient to validate the bonds, except that he contends the notice of the election failed to state the amount of the proposed indebtedness, by reason whereof there was a failure to comply with section 18 of article XI of the constitution, which prohibits the incurring of "any indebtedness or liability in any manner or for

any purpose, without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof, voting at an election to be held for that purpose". And while he concedes that the purpose, as specified in the notice of election, was to vote bonds in the sum of twenty thousand dollars of the denomination of five hundred dollars each for the purpose of constructing an outfall sewer, he insists that the notice did not state in express terms that it was proposed to incur an indebtedness of said sum for such purpose. There is no merit in the contention. The notice recited that the estimated cost of the improvement was the sum of twenty thousand dollars and the election was called, as stated in the proceedings, for the purpose of submitting "to the qualified electors of said city the propositions of incurring the said several indebtednesses (that of $23,000 for a garbage plant, and $20,000 for the sewer) for the said several purposes set forth in this resolution". Moreover, as was said in City of Oxnard v. Bellah, 21 Cal. App. 33, where a similar point was urged: "It is clear that the authority to issue bonds evidencing a debt was submitted and that the voters directed the issuance thereof, the effect of which would be to create and establish an indebtedness; and it should follow that a proposition to issue bonds evidencing a new and independent indebtedness is a proposition to incur an indebtedness, and comes within the purview of the statute which provides that the proposition of incurring a debt for the purposes set forth in said resolution, and no question other than the incurring of an indebtedness for the purpose, shall be submitted."

[4] Pursuant to the power conferred, the board of trustees adopted an ordinance authorizing the issuance of the bonds, and whereby it was provided that they should be dated February 1, 1912. Respondent insists that thus dating the bonds rendered them illegal for the reason that they would bear interest from a date prior to that upon which the election was held whereby authority to issue them was conferred upon the board. The date of the bond is immaterial, the only restriction being that it shall not extend over a period of forty years. Like a note, the bond would only take effect upon delivery and bear interest from such date. (Collins v. Driscoll, 69 Cal. 550; Bither v. Christensen, 1 Cal. App. 90.) Moreover, it appears that the bond in question is sold at par and accrued interest. However this may be, the city treasurer cannot justify his refusal to sign the bond upon the ground that the board of trustees may violate their duty by selling the bond for less than par.

We are of the opinion that the defects and irregularities in the procedure, to which respondent has directed our attention and by reason of which he has refused to sign the bond here involved, are cured by the validating act above referred to.

The alternative writ of mandate should, therefore, be made neremptory, and it is so ordered.

We concur:

CONREY, P. J.

JAMES, J.

SHAW, J.

Civil No. 1435. Second Appellate District. April 20, 1914. W. T. WHEATLEY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SAN PEDRO, LOS ANGELES & SALT LAKE RAILROAD COMPANY (a Corporation), Defendant and Appellant.

[1] ACTION TO QUIET TITLE SAN PEDRO BAY LANDS-SOUTHERLY BOUNDARY LINE-HIGH Water Mark—DeeDS AND PARTITION DECREES -CERTAINTY OF DESCRIPTIONS.-It is held in this action to quiet title to certain lands lying along the northerly shore of the Bay of San Pedro in Los Angeles county that the terms of description used in the deeds to the predecessors in title of the plaintiff and in the partition decrees referred to in the opinion, clearly and sufficiently describe the boundary line between the points "B" and "C" on the diagram set out in the opinion, as being located at the line of high water.

[2] ID.-DEED DESCRIPTION-QUANTITY OF LAND-WHEN A FACTOR. Where in an instrument of conveyance or other description of real property the quantity of land to be conveyed is stated, that term is not to be viewed as a factor in establishing boundaries, unless the more particular description as expressed is indefinite and uncertain.

[3] ID.-CASE AT BAR-DISPUTED LINE-LOCATION BY ACQUIESCENCE CONTENTION NOT MAINTAINABLE.-It is also held that as to the line in dispute having become fixed by agreement or acquiescence at the location claimed by appellant, the facts do not bear out that contention, as there was no active possession on the part of claimants adverse to the record title, nor any dispute or question cxpressed as to the true location of the line.

ID.-BOUNDARY-FIXING

[4] OF DIVISION LINE-ESSENTIALS.There must be an agreement in order that a division line shall become fixed; this agreement must be express or implied from the acts of the parties and acquiesced in for the period fixed by the statute of limitations.

[5] ID. CASE AT BAR-PRESCRIPTIVE TITLE NOT OBTAINED.-It is also held that the appellant had failed to obtain a prescriptive title to all of the ground in dispute, as the proof of possession was insufficient to sustain the claim.

POSSESSION-CON

[6] ID.-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-ADVERSE STRUCTIVE POSSESSION-COLOR OF TITLE.-An adverse claimant cannot under a deed which conveys a good title to a portion of a tract and a colorable one only to another portion thereof, take possession of the portion to which he has received good title and by so doing maintain the claim that constructively he is in possession of the whole tract.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County-Frank G. Finlayson, Judge.

For Appellant-A. S. Halsted, W. F. Palmer, F. A. Waters and Wilfred M. Peck.

For Respondent-Frank D. McClure and Woodruff & McClure. Action to quiet title to certain lands. From the judgment in favor of plaintiff, and an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial, appeals were taken.

The lands as to the title to which controversy is made are lands lying along the northerly shore of the Bay of San Pedro in Los Angeles county. These lands, together with those com. posing the entire townsite of the city of Wilmington and lands east and south thereof, were originally owned, under the name of Rancho San Pedro, by one Christopher Dominguez, whose title

rested on a grant from the Spanish government. The heirs of Dominguez, in the year 1855, conveyed to B. D. Wilson, John G. Downey and four others the tract of land upon which the town of Wilmington was afterwards platted. The conveyance was to the grantees as tenants in common. In general the southerly boundary of the tract so conveyed was fixed at the line of high-water mark on the bay. The description given in the deed traced a course from the intersection of the westerly boundary of the tract with the line of the bay, easterly until a point on the short line designated as "B" was reached. The point where the casterly boundary intersected the shore line of the same bay was designated as "C." The high-water mark between points "B" and "C" made a meandering line and mainly followed a course southerly of a straight line drawn between points "B" and "C." The diagram accompanying this opinion is referred to as illustrating roughly the conditions just described.

Wilmington

B

Bay of San Pedro

It then appears that a straight line drawn between "B" and "C" would leave between such line and high-water mark an irregular-shaped plat of ground. A portion of this ground is the

land about the title to which this litigation revolves. The deed cf conveyance by the Dominguez heirs to the grantees hereinbefore mentioned described the southerly line of the tract, after the point "B" was reached, as follows: "From the said point 'B' unto a stake marked 'C," following the ordinary high-water mark, and distant in a straight line sixteen hundred and nineteen yards and three inches, with the course by compass east 47° north," etc. In the year 1855 a decree of partition entered in the district court of the county of Los Angeles partitioned the land of the Rancho San Pedro among the Dominguez heirs and their grantees, and the description quoted from, which refers to the southerly boundary of the tract deeded to Wilson et al., was incorporated into the decree. In 1862, in the same district court and in case No. 877, a partition by decree was made of the tract purchased by Wilson and others. In this suit of partition the referees appointed one Frank Lecouvreur, a surveyor, to assist them, and he prepared a map of the tract showing the boundaries thereof. The tract as delineated upon this map was also subdivided into blocks with streets between them, which blocks composed the townsite of the city of Wilmington thereafter incorporated. The subdivision was at that time designated by the name of "New San Pedro." The interlocutory decree entered in action No. 877 described the boundary line between the points "B" and "C" in substantially the same terms as were used in the deed from the Dominguez heirs to Wilson et al., and in the decree in the first partition suit. In the final decree in this second suit (No. 877) were these clauses: "Having reference, in the descriptions in this decree, for fuller explanation, to the map made by Frank Lecouvreur, the surveyor appointed by said referees to assist them in said partition, which map was submitted by the referees with their said report and filed herein with said report. And it is further ordered . that the entire tract of land included within the exterior boundaries of said map be and shall be partitioned between the parties in this suit, the said tract being . . . described as follows: Commencing at the point known as 'Los Barriles,' marked 'Station A' on said map; thence following the line of ordinary high water mark, easterly as far as the point marked 'C' on said map, or where the eastern Exterior boundary of said tract of land will intersect said ordinary high water mark, the courses and distances from said point 'A' to station 'C,' according to said map, being as follows: links to station 'B; thence north 43° east seventy-three (73) chains, sixty (60) links to station 'C' . . the same being the resurvey of the lands first described in the complaint in this case, and in said former decree of date September 6, 1862, i. e.. the interlocutory decree, excepting from said lands the stip of one mile in length by one hundred yards in width within said estuary whereon the said lands are situated, commencing from station 'B'." On the map filed with the referees' report in case No. 877 the side lines of the blocks were not shown extended through to high-water mark, but all such lines intersected a straight line drawn from "B" to "C." The decree of partition adopted the