attempt to apply such limitation to work in lodging houses and boarding houses. Notwithstanding this difference, the validity of the act was sustained. After stating the general rules defining uniformity of laws, as those rules are established by the decisions, the court pointed out the differences which exist, or reasonably may exist, between the burdens and conditions of employment of women in hotels as contrasted with boarding houses and lodging houses. The court then said: "It is not unreasonable to suppose that those in the other places will be subject to less strain and tension than those who serve the more transient, varied, and indiscriminate guests of hotels, to whom they are generally entire strangers. The legislature, in view of all the above facts, may reasonably have so determined. In support of the law, as already stated, the courts are bound to presume that it did make this decision, and as there are sound reasons upon which it may rest, the decision must be accepted as correct. The conditions stated appear to be a sufficient basis for the classification made. In such matters the legislature cannot deal with individual cases. It can provide only for classes, and its decision as to the line of cleavage between classes in some particulars the same and in other particulars different must be upheld where it is based on any reasonable grounds. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the law cannot be declared invalid because of this discrimination."

[1] In like manner we reach the conclusion that the objections made by respondent to the present statute respecting personal property brokers are without merit. [2] Since the legislature has not included in the prohibitions of this act those persons who make loans without security, we may reasonably assume that the legislature has not found any abuse in that business requiring public correction, if indeed it could find such business in existence at all. And since the lending of money upon the security of real estate, or of bank deposits, or of interests in estates, or of contracts, has not been included within the prohibitions of this statute, we may reasonably assume that the legislature has not found that the businesses pertaining to such loans are usually accompanied by the abuses which the legislature was seeking to remedy. The exclusion from this act, of the business of taking pledges as security for loans, is accounted for by the terms of the laws already in existence, controlling the business of pawnbrokers. (Pen. Code, secs. 338, et seq.; Levinson v. Boas, 150 Cal. 185.)

[3] Laws enacted to guard against unreasonable rates of interest are laws against oppression, and should be favorably regarded, as they always have been favored by the common law of England. When there comes into existence in a state a class of business (even though it be within a more general class) wherein it is customary and habitual for those conducting that business to charge excessive rates of interest and take mortgages upon the personal goods, or assignments of the wages of the borrower as security therefor, the legislature may take cognizance of the fact that such business is in existence as a distinct occupation, and may set it apart as a business subject to regulation peculiar to

itself, in order to avoid the wrongs incidental to such business when unregulated. Such legislation, as instanced in the present case, is not arbitrary. It is based upon differences which in some reasonable degree, as said in the Miller case, "will account for or justify the peculiar legislation".

The contract in this case being within the description of business defined in the statute, and providing for a rate of interest in excess of two per cent per month, is not "of any force, virtue or effect, either at law or in equity", and the plaintiff has no cause of action thereon.

The judgment is reversed.

We concur:

JAMES, J.

SHAW, J.

CONREY, P. J.

Civil No. 1345. First Appellate District. February 26, 1914. V. B. SCANLON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES JACOBS, Defendant and Appellant.

[1] JUDGMENT-FINDINGS-AMENDMENT-POWER OF TRIAL COURT. -A trial court has power to amend its findings and judgment by consent of parties before a motion for a new trial has been made cr an appeal taken.

[2] ID.-SALE-ACTION FOR PURCHASE PRICE OF HOGS-ANSWERALLEGED FALSE REPRESENTATION AS TO CONDITION-SUFFICIENCY OF FINDINGS. A finding in an action to recover the balance of the purchase price of a number of hogs, wherein the answer set up as a defense an alleged false representation as to the physical condition of the hogs, that all of the allegations of the complaint were true and that there was no express warranty as to such condition, fairly and fully covers all the issues in the case.

Appeal from the Superior Court of San Mateo County-Geo. H. Buck, Judge.

For Appellant-J. G. Reisner.

For Respondent-Harry E. Styles.

This action was brought to recover a balance alleged to be due upon the purchase price of a number of hogs. The plaintiff recovered judgment on December 14, 1912, for the sum of $363.43 and costs. On January 31, 1913, the court, "upon ex parte motion of counsel for plaintiff, but with the consent of the defendant" (so reads the statement in the case), filed amended findings, and caused an amended judgment to be entered, reducing the amount of the plaintiff's recovery $20. This reduction in the amount of the judgment seems to have been caused by the discovery that. a miscalculation had been made in the amount of interest due, to that extent. Later the defendant moved for a new trial, which being denied, he appealed from the judgment of December 14, 1912; and also from the amended judgment of January 31, 1913, and from the order denying the motion for a new trial.

[1] The appellants first contention is that the court had no power to amend its judgment of December 14, 1912, or to make the amended findings and enter the amended judgment of January 31,

1913. It is a complete answer to this contention that the record shows, and the defendant admits, that he consented to the making and entry of the amended findings and judgment reducing the amount of his liability, and that the same was accomplished before the motion for a new trial was noticed or an appeal taken. How this consent was manifested does not appear; but in support of the action of the court reducing the judgment against the defendant by his consent and for his benefit, it must be assumed, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, that his consent thereto was given in whatever formal and persuasive way was requisite to induce the court's action. No case has been called to our attention holding that the parties to an action may not alter the findings and judgment by consent before a motion for a new trial has been made or an appeal taken, and while the court still has jurisdiction of the case. We think the appellant's contention in this respect is without merit.

The amended findings and judgment having thus supplanted the original findings and judgment in the case, are the only proper subjects of appeal.

[2] The only other point urged by appellant is that the court failed to find upon certain material issues in the case. The complaint was in the form of a common count for merchandise sold and delivered. The answer set forth the transaction, and alleged that the plaintiff sold his hogs to the defendant under an express agreement and understanding that said hogs were in a good, sound and healthy physical condition and free from disease, and that the plaintiff, to induce their said purchase, falsely and fraudulently represented and stated to said defendant that said hogs were in such good, sound and healthy physical condition and free from disease, and that said defendant was induced to purchase them relying upon said representation, which proved to be false.

The court found that all of the allegations of the complaint were true; and further found "that there was no express warranty given or made on the part of said plaintiff to said defendant at the time of sale or delivery with regard to the condition of said hogs, as alleged in said answer herein, or in said cross-complaint; nor was there any agreement or understanding at any time in regard to said matter; nor were said hogs sold upon any agreement as to their condition or freedom from disease". We think this finding fairly and fully responds to the issues presented by defendant's answer and cross-complaint, and negatives his averment therein as to the agreement and conditions under which he purchased the hogs. The appellant does not contend that this finding is not fully sustained by the evidence in the case. The judgment and order are affirmed.

We concur:

LENNON, P. J.

KERRIGAN, J.

RICHARDS, J.

Civil No. 1475. Second Appellate District. February 26, 1914. WILBERT MORGRAGE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE NATIONAL BANK OF CALIFORNIA (a Corporation), Defendant and Respondent.

[1] BANKING LAW-CREDIT ON DEPOSITOR'S DRAFT-CERTIFICATES OF STOCK AS SECURITY-DISHONOR OF DRAFT-REIMBURSEMENT BY BANK-KNOWLEDGE OF OWNERSHIP OF STOCK.-Where a bank gives credit to a depositor engaged in the stock brokerage business on his draft drawn upon a third party accompanied by certain certificates of stock endorsed in blank by the persons to whom the stock had been issued for sale in the course of the depositors business, the bank has the right upon the dishonor of the draft to reimburse itself by a sale of the stock, where it had no notice of any other ownership than that presumed from the blank endorsement.

[2] ID.-ID.-ID.-ID.-ID.-ACTION FOR CONVERSION OF STOCK— KNOWLEDGE OF OWNERSHIP-PLEADING-EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENT ALLEGATION AND PROOF.-In an action against the bank for the alleged conversion of such stock, want of notice of any claim of interest possessed by any other person is sufficiently alleged and proven by an allegation, substantiated by the evidence, in the answer setting out the agreement and transaction which included the giving of the redit, followed by the allegation that in the transaction the defendant understood and believed that said depositor was the absolute owner of the stock.

[3] ID.-ID.-ID.-ID.-REIMBURSEMENT FROM OTHER SOURCESEFFECT OF. The fact that on the day following the date upon which the draft and the oil stock were deposited and credit given, an additional sum of money was deposited, which would have been sufficient, if so applied, to discharge the amount of the draft credit, did not operate to extinguish the obligation of the depositor thereon, as the bank had the right at any time to offset any matured indebtedness owing by the depositor to it against his credit.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County-J. O. Moncur, Judge presiding.

For Appellant-W. N. Goodwin, Hunsaker & Britt.

For Respondent-Oscar A. Trippet; Trippet, Chapman & Biby. This action was brought to recover damages for the alleged conversion of 15,000 shares of the capital stock of a certain oil company. The appeal is from a judgment entered in favor of the defendant, and is presented on the judgment-roll and a bill of exceptions.

In August, 1910, one C. B. Miner was engaged in business as a stock broker in the city of Los Angeles and a banking account was carried with him on the books of defendant. Miner had, during the time that he carried the account with defendant, been a depositor of a large amount of money. Between the 1st and the 11th days of August he had deposited with defendant bank the sum of $156,919.02. On the morning of August 12, 1910, his cash credit balance was $5,651.84. At noon on the same day checks had been received by the bank, drawn against the account, aggregating the sum of $21,241, which checks were held to await a deposit to cover. At about 2 o'clock on that day Miner offered for credit drafts drawn by him, accompanied by certificates of stocks, and some checks drawn to his order. There were four of these items, aggregating $15,739.05, which amount was passed to

his credit. At the end of that day the credit had been exhausted by the payment of checks issued by the depositor. As a matter of fact, of the $15,739.05 credit on August 12th the amount of $12,420 was made up of items which were not bona fide, but fraudulent, which fact was not discovered until later. On August 13th, in the forenoon, a new deposit credit was given Miner for items presented on that day, amounting to $20,651.25. That was the last transaction had with the bank by Miner, who immediately absconded and was not thereafter heard from. Among the items included in the credit of $15,739.05 given on August 12th was one for the sum of $4,837.50, which was represented by draft drawn by Miner on one Gartland at San Francisco. Attached to this draft were the certificates representing the stock which it is alleged by appellant was improperly converted to the use of defendant. In receiving the draft for collection, according to the customary mode of doing business with Miner, the bank did so with the agreement that if the draft was not paid when presented, the amount thereof should be charged back to Miner in his account, and if he failed or refused to reimburse the bank the stock of the oil company should then be resorted to by the bank to secure such reimbursement. A transfer of the certificates of stock had been endorsed in blank by the persons to whom the stock had been issued, and they were presented in that form by Miner to the bank when he deposited the draft. [1] It is admitted that the bank, if it had no notice of any other ownership than that presumed from the blank endorsement, could rightfully assume that Miner was the owner thereof, and if it parted with value relying upon that presumption, the title that it might secure in a proceeding taken for the purpose of subjecting the stock to the satisfaction of the debt arising upon the non-payment of the draft, would be a good title, even though Miner was not the real owner, but, as the fact was, had received the stock for the purpose of making a sale of it in the course of his brokerage business. The owners of the stock had in fact endorsed the transfer thereof in blank and had given Miner authority to sell and deliver the shares represented by the certificates. As a matter of fact, however, Miner had made no sale of the stock to Gartland, the person upon whom he drew his draft, and in view of subsequent events, it appeared clear that his intention when he presented the draft and stock was to improperly secure a credit to be made in his favor and upon which he might obtain money. As soon as the bank secured an intimation that Miner had absconded, which was on August 13th, it proceeded to apply the credit balance of Miner's account to cover items owing to it, arising in part upon credits given which were fraudulently obtained on drafts accompanying purported certificates of stock which were found to be forgeries, and including one check drawn in Miner's favor for the sum of $5,000, the signature of the drawer of which was found to be a forgery. The amount of $5,800 was credited upon an indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note drawn in favor of the bank by Miner, upon which there was then due the sum of $12,800; and when these amounts were charged against