"The sentence of a competent court, proceeding in rem, is conclusive with respect to the thing itself, and operates as an absolute change of the property. By such sentence, the right of the former owner is lost, and a complete title given to the person who claims under the decree. No court of co-ordinate jurisdiction can examine the sentence. The question, therefore, respecting its conformity to general or municipal law, can never arise, for no co-ordinate tribunal is capable of making the inquiry. The decision, in the case of Hudson & Smith v. Guestier, reported in 6th Cranch, is considered as fully establishing this principle."

Williams v. Armroyd (1813), 7 Cranch, 423, 432.

"A judgment against one defendant for the want of a plea, or a decree against one defendant for want of an answer, does not prevent any other defendant from contesting, so far as respects himself, the very fact which is admitted by the absent party.

"No reason is perceived why a different rule should prevail in a court of admiralty, nor is the court informed of any case in which a different rule has been established.

"If the district court was not precluded by the non-claim of the owner of the vessel from examining the fact of ownership, so far as that fact could affect the cargo, it will not be contended that an appellate court may not likewise examine it.

"This case is to be distinguished from those which have been decided on policies of insurance, not only by the circumstance that the cause respecting the vessel and the cargo came on at the same time before the same court, but by other differences in reason and in law, which appear to be essential.

"The decisions of a court of exclusive jurisdiction are necessarily conclusive on all other courts, because the subject matter is not examinable in them. With respect to itself no reason is perceived for yielding to them a further conclusiveness than is allowed to the judgments and decrees of courts of common law and equity. They bind the subject matter as between parties and privies.

"The whole world, it is said, are parties in an admiralty cause; and, therefore, the whole world is bound by the decision. The reason on which this dictum stands will determine its extent. Every person may make himself a party, and appeal from the sentence; but notice of the controversy is necessary in order to become a party, and it is a principle of natural justice, of universal obligation, that before the rights of an individual be bound by a judicial sentence, he shall have notice, either actual or implied, of the proceedings against him. Where these proceedings are against the person, notice is served personally, or by publication; where they are in rem, notice is served upon the thing itself. This is necessarily notice to all those who have any in

terest in the thing, and is reasonable because it is necessary, and because it is the part of common prudence for all those who have any interest in it, to guard that interest by persons who are in a situation to protect it. Every person, therefore, who could assert any title to the Mary, has constructive notice of her seizure, and may fairly be considered as a party to the libel. But those who have no interest in the vessel which could be asserted in the court of admiralty, have no notice of her seizure, and can, on no principle of justice or reason, be considered as parties in the cause so far as respects the vessel. When such person is brought before a court in which the fact is examinable, no sufficient reason is perceived for precluding him from reexamining it. The judgment of a court of common law, or the decree of a court of equity, would, under such circumstances, be re-examinable in a court of common law, or a court of equity; and no reason is discerned why the sentence of a court of admiralty, under the same circumstances, should not be re-examinable in a court of admiralty.

"This reasoning is not at variance with the decision that the sentence of a foreign court of admiralty, condemning a vessel or cargo as enemy property, is conclusive in an action against the underwriters on a policy in which the property is warranted to be neutral.

"It is not at variance with that decision, because the question of prize is one of which courts of law have no direct cognizance, and because the owners of the vessel and cargo were parties to the libel against them.

"In the case of Croudson and al. v. Leonard, two judges expressed their opinions. Those who were silent, but who concurred in the opinion of the court, undoubtedly acquiesced in the reasons assigned by those judges. On the conclusiveness of a foreign sentence, Judge Johnson said, 'The doctrine appears to me to rest on three very obvious considerations: The propriety of leaving the cognizance of prize questions exclusively to courts of prize jurisdiction; the very great inconvenience, amounting nearly to an impossibility, of fully investigating such cases in a court of common law; and the impropriety of revising the decisions of the maritime courts of other nations, whose jurisdiction is co-ordinate throughout the world.'

"These reasons undoubtedly support the opinion founded on them, but it will be readily perceived that they would not apply to the case before the court.

"After stating the conclusiveness of the sentence of courts of exclusive jurisdiction, Judge Washington said, 'This rule, when applied to the sentences of courts of admiralty, whether foreign or domestic, produces the doctrine which I am now considering, upon the ground that all the world are parties in an admiralty cause. The proceedings are in rem; but any person having an interest in the property may interpose a claim, or may prosecute an appeal from the

sentence. The insured is emphatically a party, and in every instance has an opportunity to controvert the alleged grounds of condemnation, by proving, if he can, the neutrality of the property. The master is his immediate agent, and he is also bound to act for the benefit of all concerned; so that in this respect he also represents the insurer.'

"The very foundation of this opinion that the insured is bound by the sentence of condemnation is, that he was in law a party to the suit, and had a full opportunity to assert his rights. This decision can not be applicable to one in which the person to be affected by the sentence of condemnation was not, and could not be a party to it."

The Mary (1815), 9 Cranch, 126, 143.

Of the shipments constituting a cargo, captured on a voyage from London to Lisbon, some were accompanied with bills of lading, directing a delivery to shipper or order; a few of these bills were specially indorsed, but most of them had no indorsements, or blank indorsements only. Other shipments were accompanied with bills of lading deliverable to persons specifically named in them. Very few of either kind of bills were accompanied with letters of advice or invoices. The district court condemned "all that part of the cargo which was shipped, as evidenced by bills of lading, either without endorsement or with blank endorsements, and not accompanied by letter or invoice, viz. . . and that part," etc. An appeal having been taken to the circuit court, the decree was, for the most part, affirmed; but, when the decree was returned, the district court admitted further proof as to parts of the cargo comprehended in the bills which, though not indorsed, were expressly deliverable to Lisbon merchants therein named, and, deeming the proof sufficient, ordered restitution. On an appeal by the captors, the circuit court, holding that the former sentence of the district court, as affirmed by the circuit court, was left imperfect by omitting to recite the particular parts of the cargo intended to be condemned, and that the words above quoted could have been intended only for the bills addressed to shipper or order, and not to those addressed to consignees named in the bills themselves, affirmed the sentence of restitution. On a further appeal by the captors, Marshall, Ch. J., delivering the opinion of the court, said "that justice ought not to be diverted from its plain course, by circumstances so susceptible of explanation, that error is possible; and that when the decree was returned to the district court , with the blank unfilled, that court did right in considering the specification intended to have been inserted, and for which the blank was left, as a substantiative and essential part of the decree, still capable of being supplied, and in acting upon and explaining the decree, as if that specification had been originally inserted."

The Friendschaft (1818), 3 Wheaton, 14.

Soon after the beginning of the war of 1812 the American ship Star was captured by the British and condemned as prize by the viceadmiralty court at Halifax, Nova Scotia, British subjects becoming her owners. More than two years afterwards she was captured by an American privateer and brought into New York, where a claim was put in by her original owner. This claim was based on the prize act of June 26, 1812. In the general salvage act of March 3, 1800, there was a special provision excepting from the operation of the act recaptured vessels which had been condemned by competent authorities. It was argued, however, that this rule was changed by section 5 of the prize act of June 26, 1812, which provided for the restoration of recaptured property to "the lawful owners,"" agreeably to the provisions heretofore established by law." Held, Story J., delivering the opinion of the court, that the "lawful owner" of recaptured property which had been law fully condemned was not the original proprietor, but the person who had acquired title under the decree of condemnation.

The Star (1818), 3 Wheat. 78.

"The sentence of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, condemning a neutral vessel taken in war, as prize, is binding and conclusive on all the world."

Dobree v. Napier (1836), 2 Bingham's New Cases, 781, 795, citing Hughes v. Cornelius, Sir T. Raymond, 473.

This was an action against a person for seizing a steam vessel of the plaintiff and converting it to his own use. It appeared that the defendant, a British subject, made the seizure as an officer in the service of the Queen of Portugal, and that the vessel was condemned by a Portuguese tribunal as lawful prize. It was contended, however, that he might be held answerable for the seizure on the ground that his entrance into the service of the Queen of Portugal constituted a violation of the British foreign enlistment act, so that his Portuguese commission would not justify him. The court rejecte-l this contention, saying that no one could dispute "the right of the Queen of Portugal, to appoint in her own dominions, the defendant or any other person she may think proper to select, as her officer or servant, to seize a vessel which is afterwards condemned as a prize.” See, in connection with this case, Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250.

2. JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS OR DEFECTS.

$ 1243.

A sentence of condemnation as prize does not establish any particular fact without which the sentence may have been rightfully pronounced.

Maley v. Shattuck (1806), 3 Cranch, 458.

Where a policy of insurance contained a warranty that the vessel was "American property," followed by the words "proof of which to be required in the United States only," it was held that, although a foreign sentence of prize generally was conclusive, it was not so in this case, and that, in an action upon the policy, evidence was properly admitted to show, in opposition to a foreign sentence of condemnation for breach of blockade, that the vessel was not guilty of that offense. Maryland Ins. Co. v. Woods (1810), 6 Cranch, 29.

A vessel and cargo having been captured and libeled as enemy property, no claim was put in for the vessel, and she was condemned; but a claim was made for the cargo. The vessel and the cargo belonged to different persons, but it was contended by the captor that the condemnation of the vessel conclusively established her enemy character, so that the goods must be treated as having been imported in a hostile bottom. Held, that the owners of the cargo were not precluded from showing the true character of the vessel, so far as this circumstance could affect their claim.

The Mary (1815), 9 Cranch, 126.

Whoever sets up a title under a condemnation is bound to show that the court had jurisdiction of the cause, and that the sentence has been rightly pronounced upon the application of parties competent to ask it. For this purpose it is necessary to show who are the captors, and how the court has acquired authority to decide the cause.

In the ordinary cases no difficulty arises on this subject, for the courts of the captors have general jurisdiction of prize, and their adjudication is conclusive upon the proprietary interest. But where the capture is made by captors acting under the commission of a foreign country, such capture gives them a right which no other nation, neutral to them, has authority to impugn, unless for the purpose of vindicating its own violated neutrality. The courts of another nation, whether an ally or a co-belligerent only, can acquire no general right to entertain cognizance of the cause, unless by the consent or upon the voluntary submission of the captors.

La Nereyda, S Wheat. 108.

A final decree of acquittal and restitution to the only claimant in a prize court determines nothing as to the title in the property, save whether it is prize or not.

Cushing v. Laird, 107 U. S. 69.

Proceedings in the vice-admiralty court at San Domingo are nullities, for the reason that the court is not legally constituted.

Lee, At. Gen., 1798, 5 Op. 689, App.