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restitution of the property condemned, on its appearing that the act had expired since the proceedings in question.
Rachel v. United States (1810), 6 Cranch, 329.
A vessel, libeled for a violation of the nonintercourse act of March 1, 1809, contended that she came into the waters of the United States merely for the purpose of ascertaining whether she might land her cargo. It appearing, however, that she had neglected prior opportunities to inform herself, her condemnation was affirmed.
Brig Penobscot v. United States (1813), 7 Cranch, 356.
It was a cause of forfeiture of the vessel under the act of March 1, 1809, to take articles on board at a forbidden port, with the owners' or master's knowledge, with intent to import them into the United States.
The New York (1818), 3 Wheat., 59.
By section 4 of the act of March 1, 1809, it was made unlawful to import into the United States any goods the "produce" of France. Held, that this prohibition applied to wines which, though imported into the United States prior to the act, were exported to the Dutch island of St. Bartholomew's, where they were purchased by the consignee and reshipped to the United States.
Schooner Hoppet v. United States (1813), 7 Cranch, 389.
Under the same statute, an American vessel from Great Britain had a right to lay off the coast of the United States to receive instructions from her owners in New York, and, if necessary, to drop anchor and in case of a storm to make a harbor; and if prevented by a mutiny of her crew from putting out to sea again, might wait in the waters of the United States for orders.
United States v. The Cargo of the Fanny, 9 Cranch, 181.
The forfeiture of goods for violation of the nonintercourse act of March 1, 1809, took effect upon the commission of the offense, and avoid a subsequent bona fide sale to an innocent purchaser.
United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee (1814), 8 Cranch, 398.
The same rule applied in the case of forfeiture under section 3 of the
act of June 28, 1809. (United States v. Brigantine Mars (1814), 8 Cranch, 417.)
See the Octavia (1816), 1 Wheat., 20, under the act of June 28, 1809.
The nonintercourse act of March 1, 1809, was, by force of the act of May 1, 1810, and the President's proclamation of November 2, 1810, revived on February 2, 1811.
Brig Aurora v. United States (1813), 7 Cranch, 382.
The United States interposed a claim, under the nonintercourse act of March 1, 1809, to a vessel and cargo which had been captured by a privateer and libeled for condemnation for trading with the enemy. Held, that "the municipal forfeiture under the nonintercourse act was absorbed in the more general operation of the law of war;" and that, even were the doctrine otherwise, the prize act of June 26, 1812, sections 4, 6, and 14, granted to the captors all property rightfully captured by commissioned privateers.
The Sally (1814), 8 Cranch, 382.
Prosecutions under the act of March 1, 1809, are causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and the proceedings may be by libel in the admiralty.
The Samuel (1816), 1 Wheaton, 9.
In a prosecution for condemnation of a vessel for violating the nonintercourse act of June 28, 1809, 2 Stat. 550, the claimants alleged that the vessel was driven out of her course by stress of weather and thus compelled to enter a foreign port. Held, that a person who had violated the statute must, in order to clear his vessel, make out the vis major so clearly "as to leave no reasonable doubt of his innocence."
Brig Struggle v. United States (1815), 9 Cranch, 71.
The act of June 28, 1809, requiring a vessel sailing for a permitted port to give bond in "double the value of the vessel and cargo" not to go to a prohibited port, applied to a vessel sailing in ballast.
Ship Richmond v. United States (1815), 9 Cranch, 102.
A vessel coming from Great Britain on July 4, 1812, after the repeal of the British orders in council, but before the declaration of war was known, and lying off the coast of the United States to ascertain whether she would be allowed to enter, was not subject to condemnation under the nonintercourse act of June 28, 1809, though she had been forced by stress of weather and a mutiny of her crew to come into territorial waters and wait there.
United States v. Cargo of the Fanny (1815), 9 Cranch, 181.
An information was filed against certain merchandise under section 5 of the nonimportation act of March 1, 1809. It appeared that after the merchandise was seized it was released by order of the Secretary of the Treasury, and that later in the day the present information was filed. The district court condemned the property, but the circuit court reversed the decree, holding that the jurisdiction acquired by the original seizure was ousted by the subsequent abandonHeld, that, by the laws of the United States, the jurisdiction
in revenue proceedings in rem depended upon the place of seizure and not of the offense; that before judicial cognizance can attach upon a forfeiture in rem there must be a seizure; that this seizure must subsist when the libel or information is filed and allowed; and that "if a seizure be completely and explicitly abandoned, and the property restored by the voluntary act of the party who has made the seizure, all rights under it are gone. . It is, in this respect, like a case of capture, which, although well made, gives no authority to the prize court to proceed to adjudication, if it be voluntarily abandoned before judicial proceedings are instituted."
Story, J., delivering the opinion of the court, The Brig Ann (March 10, 1815), 9 Cranch, 289.
"The English ministry, accordingly, refused to ratify this arrangeinent [for the suspension of the nonintercourse act]; a resolution which, although fully justified in point of right by Napoleon's violence, and by Mr. Erskine's deviation from his instructions, may now well be characterized as one of the most unfortunate, in point of expediency, ever adopted by the British government: for it at once led to the renewal of the nonintercourse act of the United States; put an entire stop, for the next two years, to all commerce with that country; reduced the exports of Great Britain fully a third, during the most critical and important years of the war; and, in its ultimate results, contributed to produce that unhappy irritation between the two countries, which has never yet, notwithstanding the strong bonds of inutual interest by which they are connected, been allayed.”
10 Alison, Hist. of Europe, 650.
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1. Permissible violence. § 1111.
2. Sieges and bombardments. § 1112.
3. Devastation. § 1113.
4. Retaliation. § 1114.
5. Deceit. § 1115.
6. Treatment of resident alien enemies. § 1116.
7. Prohibition of exports. § 1117.
8. Protection of neutral persons and property. § 1118.
9. Prohibited measures.
(1) Particular acts. § 1119.
(2) Bombardment of undefended towns. § 1120.
(3) Pillage. § 1121.
(4) Denial of quarter. § 1122.
Case of Arbuthnot and Ambrister.
1. Who are and who are not. § 1127.
2. Treatment. § 1128.
3. Exchange. § 1129.
4. Parole. § 1130.
VIII. TREATMENT OF THE WOUNDED.
5. Repatriation. § 1131.
6. Spies, war traitors, war rebels. § 1132.
Geneva (Red Cross) convention, 1864.
IX. INTERRUPTION OF COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.
1. Suspension of intercourse. § 1135.
3. Judicial remedies.
(1) Limitations on power to contract.
X. MILITARY OCCUPATION.
(1) Suspension and revival. § 1139.
(2) Suspension of statute of limitations. § 1140.
4. Licenses. § 1141.
5. Interference with means of communication. § 1142.
1. Occupied territory and its administration.
2. Civil War cases. § 1144.
3. Regulation of commerce.
4. Treatment of the inhabitants. § 1146.
5. Martial law. § 1147.
6. Law as to public property. § 1148.
7. Law as to private property.
XI. CONQUEST. § 1156.
1. Flags of truce. § 1157.
2. Passports and safe conducts.
3. Safeguards. § 1159.
4. Capitulations. § 1160.
5. Suspensions of arms. § 1161.
(1) Taxes; contributions; requisitions. § 1149.
(3) Confiscation acts, 1861, 1862. § 1151.
(4) Abandoned and captured property act. § 1152.
Public debts; private debts.
XIII. END OF WAR. § 1163.
XIV. CODIFICATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR. § 1164.
Much confusion may be avoided by bearing in mind the fact that by the term war is meant not the mere employment of force, but the existence of the legal condition of things in which rights are or may be prosecuted by force. Thus, if two nations declare war one against the other, war exists, though no force whatever may as yet have been employed. On the other hand, force may be employed by one nation against another, as in the case of reprisals, and yet no state of war may arise. In such a case there may be said to be an act of war, but no state of war. The distinction is of the first impor