only 25 percent of the revenue. However, a comparison of Model VI-B with Model VII-B shows that if a state provides only 25 percent of school revenue from state sources, an equalization model will provide much more financial equalization than a flat grant model. Complete Local Support Model Under this model, the same total revenue is provided as under Model I-A but all of it is provided from a local levy in each district of 32.6024. This model provides for no financial equalization whatsoever. The average deviation from full equalization is 30.98 percent and the NEFP score is 1, the lowest possible score on that scale. Tables 10-22 shows that the wealthiest district would have 248 percent of the revenue required for full equalization and the district of least wealth only 39 percent. It can be computed from data in Tables 10-4 and 10-10 that if there were no limits on the mills of local taxes District 1 could obtain the equalized foundation program shown in Table 10-10 with a levy of only 13 mills whereas it would require a levy of 83 mills in District 32, the district of least wealth. This condition shown in the prototype state is typical of the conditions found in most states. Comparison of Progressivity of Tax Structure Under Alternative Models Table 10-23 shows the tax progressivity score for each model computed in accordance with the methods described in Chapter 9 of this volume. It is observed from this table that the tax progressivity score is 18.10 for all models from Model I-A through Model III. This is due to the fact that the proportion from state and local sources is the same for these models. In making the computations of the progressivity scores for the prototype state the assumption was made that its state tax progressivity score was the same as the average state and the local score was also the same as the average state. Table 9-4 shows that the state tax progressivity score for the average state in 1969 was 20.49 and the local tax score 14.00. However, if the assumption had been made that the state tax progressivity score of the prototype had been as high as Oregon, 26.7 percent (see Table 9-5) the progressivity score for all of these models would have been higher. The data presented in Chapter 9 of this volume show the following: 1. The higher the percent of state revenue derived from relatively progressive taxes, the higher the progressivity score of a state's tax structure. 2. The higher the percent of state revenue in relation to local tax revenue, the higher the progressivity score of the state's school finance plan. 3. The higher the percent of school revenue provided from federal sources in relation to state and local sources, the higher the progressivity score of a state's school finance plan. The progressivity score for federal revenue for 1969 was 39.90 (see Table 9-4). For example, the tax progressivity score would be 25.65 under a revenue model with 30 percent of the school revenue provided by the federal government, 60 percent by the state and 10 percent by local school districts. Table 10-23 shows that the progressivity scores for flat grant Models IV-A through IV-C increase as the percent of state revenue increases. The same trend is observed in equalization Models V-A through V-C. However, when the percent of state funds is reduced, the tax progressivity score decreases as shown in flat grant Models V-A and VI-B and equalization Models VIIA and VII-B. Model VIII, the complete local support model, has a tax progressivity score of 14.00, the lowest possible score. SOME OTHER ALTERNATIVES There are numerous other possible variations in school finance models. Some of those possible variations are discussed below. Other Variations in Models Examined Following is a list of some of the possible variations: 1. Various program elements, such as pre-school programs and special programs might be added or subtracted. 2. Cost differentials could be varied. 3. Special supporting services and facilities such as school food service, transportation, summer programs and capital outlay could be added or subtracted. TABLE 10-4 AVERAGE DAILY MEMBERSHIP, WEIGHTED AVERAGE DAILY MEMBERSHIP AND EQUALIZED VALUATION OF THE PROTOTYPE STATE 4. Other modifying factors such as training and experience of teachers could be included or excluded. 5. Sources of state revenue could be varied. 6. Sources of local revenue could be varied. 7. Measures of local ability in equalization models could include factors other than equalized valuation. The National Educational Finance Project has developed a computerized model which can incorporate all of these variations. The details of this model are too extensive to be included in this volume but are available in a technical monograph published by the Project. District of Dollars TABLE 10-5-MODEL I-A FLAT GRANT OF $500 PER PUPIL IN ADM NO ALLOCATION FOR TRANSPORTATION LOCAL TAX RATE OF 12 MILLS In Dollars Revenue in % Equalized 61.27 5,241 6,725 11,965 1,142 155.36 55.36 16,266 15,439 31,705 975 132.15 32.15 61,659 55,492 117,151 950 126.79 26.79 2,599 2,173 4,771 918 106.20 6.20 5,090 3,520 8,609 846 112.07 12.07 7,610 5,157 12,767 839 108.58 8.58 906 624 1,529 844 107.52 7.52 3,529 2,721 6,250 886 97.11 -2.89 68,664 43,042 111,707 813 109.29 9.29 11 1,616 938 2,554 790 107.00 7.00 12 2,365 1,420 3,785 800 105.61 5.61 13 2,033 1,290 3,323 817 93.98 -6.02 14 82,662 44,581 127,243 770 105.67 5.67 15 2,381 1,464 3,845 808 88.00 -12.00 16 8,325 4,184 12,508 751 95.01 4.99 17 36,972 18,156 55,128 746 97.74 2.26 18 10,620 5,498 16,118 759 92.47 7.53 19 15,009 6,665 21,674 722 94.57 - 5.43 20 7,431 3,505 10,935 736 88.75 -11.25 21 12,506 5,947 18,453 738 89.15 -10.85 22 9,484 4,102 13,586 716 85.31 -14.69 23 3,062 1,324 4,386 716 79,45 -20.55 24 3,623 1,558 5,180 715 75.71 -24.29 25 104,007 42,964 146,971 707 80.06 -19.94 26 6,959 2,518 9,477 681 84.58 -15.42 27 6,789 2,406 9,195 677 79.21 -20.79 28 1,252 387 1,638 655 85.81 -14.19 29 5,642 1,695 7,337 650 73.43 -26.58 30 2,766 721 3,487 630 72.07 -27.93 31 3,032 795 3,827 631 70.00 -30.00 32 2,493 607 3,100 622 73.63 -26.37 |