INTELLIGENCE AND THE ABM

MONDAY, JUNE 23, 1969

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, the Honorable J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Mansfield, Gore, Church, Symington, Dodd, Aiken, Mundt, Case, Cooper, and Williams.

Also present: Senators McCarthy, Mondale, and Cook.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we ought to start on time, as everybody is busy. The committee will come to order.

Last week, I believe it was Monday or Tuesday, I requested the Secretary of Defense to testify in public session to discuss the information contained in his statement on May 22 to the Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations. The statement was made in classified executive session of the subcommittee but was subsequently, after sanitation, made public. The Secretary of Defense requested that the meeting with this committee be in executive session and that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency accompany him, and I, of course, agreed.

PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING

The purpose of this meeting is to pursue as succinctly and as clearly as possible the various questions that have arisen in connection with estimates of intelligence relating to the need for the United States to deploy an ABM system, and intelligence regarding what other countries, who possess nuclear weapons and who represent potential threats to our security, are doing or are likely to do. This is obviously a crucial factor in the decision the Congress will soon face on voting whether or not to authorize deployment of the so-called Safeguard system.

I do not mean to leave the impression that this is the only factor, but it is a very important factor. The efficiency or workability, if you like, of the system is also a very important factor.

Mr. Secretary, do you wish to open with a statement before we have questions? Do you have a prepared statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary LAIRD. I have a short statement, Mr. Chairman. It was my understanding that this committee wanted to direct questions to me concerning the testimony that I gave before the House Appropria

tions Committee, which has been referred to, not by me but by some members of the press, as the so-called White Paper on the ABM. The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Secretary LAIRD. And I will be most delighted to answer any questions with regard to this document. I am sure you will find that there are no unresolved questions, as far as the intelligence community is concerned, regarding the statements contained in my testimony before the House Appropriations Committee.

I will now proceed with my prepared statement.

Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, from your invitation to appear before the committee, and in more detail from recent articles in the press, I am aware of the general interest which you have, and which this committee has, in this whole question of the antiballistic missile program and my testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on May 22.

I welcome the opportunity to appear jointly with Mr. Helms, and I hope that together we can clear up any confusion which may exist in the minds of members of the committee on the intelligence question.

I am particularly pleased, Mr. Chairman, that you honored my request to appear jointly with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and that we be permitted to testify in closed session so as to discuss with you all the pertinent information on this most important

matter.

COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE

Initially, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make several general comments on intelligence, the procedures for its evaluation and use. and its application to the subject of the Safeguard question as I understand it.

Since your request that I appear before this committee was based on intelligence aspects of my testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on May 22, I want to make one point very clear at the outset. The intelligence aspects of that testimony were based upon the data furnished by the intelligence community. There is not a single statement in that testimony relating to intelligence that is not supported by that data. I might add that this testimony incorporates all of the major points I had previously addressed in my public discussion on this very important issue.

Nevertheless, I have the impression that there may be some confusion about the terminology connected with the intelligence area. If I may, I would like to discuss some of the more important terms used in connection with intelligence in order to clarify for this committee the role of intelligence and its use by the executive branch of our Government.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure you are aware that for 14 years I served on the House committee handling the defense appropriations and dealing directly with this particular program.

As you know, intelligence is not comprised simply of an accumulation of facts. Intelligence is made up partly of facts or information and partly of interpretation or analysis of information. Let me give you an example of what I mean, Mr. Chairman.

Our intelligence community collects an astounding amount of information, much of which falls into the category of technical data. I never cease to be astounded at the almost unbelievable job of information collection that is accomplished by our intelligence com

munity. The data itself would scarcely be very useful, however, were it not evaluated. For instance, from time to time, information is collected about some particular activity in the Soviet Union [deleted].

An analysis is made of this information, applying other known information and a conclusion is reached by the analysts that the Soviets have begun [deleted] to deploy a particular type of [deleted] weapons system.

Thus the intelligence is composed of both information and conclusions about an existing state of affairs.

Not all of the technical data collected lends itself to precise evaluation, of course. Recently, information was collected that the Soviet Union conducted a series of ballistic missile tests with three reentry vehicles into the Pacific where, as you know, we had a destroyer in the vicinity.

[Deleted.] The data we have does not show conclusively that the several reentry vehicles are individually targeted. However, these data are consistent with a MIRV capability, [deleted] and therefore they can mean the Soviets are evolving a capability against Minuteman such that up to three Minuteman can be destroyed by a single SS-9.

I cite these examples to show that intelligence is composed of a variable mixture of information, judgments, and conclusions which lead to a point of view about a given state of affairs.

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

At periodic intervals, such technical scientific intelligence is combined with many other types of intelligence. These other types of intelligence deal with economics, politics, and military and diplomatic considerations. All of them are evaluated against the background of historical conduct in order to arrive at a judgment of what the Soviets are apparently doing now and what they are likely to do in future. years. The result is called an intelligence estimate.

There are two categories of judgment encompassed in the intelligence estimate. The first has to do with the interpretation of the existing and near-term state of affairs, based on the interpretation of the information which is collected. The second has to do with the anticipation of probable and possible future events and circumstances. It should be obvious that although our intelligence community does an unbelievably good job of collecting an astounding amount of information, we do not collect all of the information that exists. Accordingly the conclusions of an intelligence estimate must be stated in terms of what the information we do have in hand proves. In addition, there are usually notations of additional possibilities for which conclusive evidence is not yet available. The information is skillfully collected from many sources, but even so is composed of many bits and pieces, which still require considerable evaluation to arrive at a useful judgment.

INTELLIGENCE ROLES OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Against this background, Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee, I would like to comment briefly on the roles of the officials of government in relation to intelligence.

The intelligence community, under the very able leadership of Mr. Helms, collects the information, evaluates it and prepares estimates of the probability of future developments. The intelligence and the estimates are provided to the official users of the intelligence and the estimates.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I think we know this.

Secretary LAIRD. It is provided to the President.

The CHAIRMAN. This is not the issue. We have gone over this in other hearings. In the interest of time-and you said your time is limited-do you not think we can come to the point? I do not want a long lecture on what the Board does.

Secretary LAIRD. I just have two more pages, and I think it is most important that this question be cleared up very carefully and precisely.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, if you think it is important. We are already familiar with what the Intelligence Board is, but go ahead. Secretary LAIRD. I think this is most important, Mr. Chairman, because I have been reading certain stories that would indicate that there is not a clear understanding of the manner in which these intelligence estimates, upon which my statement on the ABM program is based, are prepared.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, proceed.

Secretary LAIRD. The intelligence and the estimates are provided to the official users of the intelligence and the estimates. It is provided to the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, among others, for use in their policymaking roles. It is provided to committees of Congress to assist them in appreciating the problem as they perform their official roles.

Mr. Helms, as head of the intelligence community, has the responsibility not only of providing this service, but he also is charged by statute with the responsibility for protecting and securing the intelligence and the sources by which it is obtained. This is the reason for the security classifications placed on the information which is given to you by him, or to other officials by him.

The policymaker has a different role, however, from that of Mr. Helms. The President, the Secretary of State, and I, as Secretary of Defense, have the duty to use this intelligence for the conduct of foreign relations of our Nation and for the protection of the Nation's security.

Should those of us responsible for policy conclude, after weighing all factors, that national security interests are best served by making public portions of the intelligence or information collected by the intelligence community, then it is our responsibility to do so, even if in some cases that public release may possibly impair the future collection of information. This is the President's responsibility as the principal policymaker in the fields of foreign relations and national security. With this, I know that Mr. Helms agrees. In arriving at the appropriate and best use for the intelligence, the President, of course, weighs all the pertinent considerations, including the possibility of compromising some source.

SPECIAL ROLE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

As a defense planner, as well as a Cabinet officer and a member of the National Security Council, I have a special role in the use of the