negotiate or coexist with communists without us. It points to the most malignant outcome of "Vietnamization": endless war and endless U.S. participation in it to support an unpopular and corrupt military dictatorship.

In these circumstances, a U.S. policy to avert a communist dictatorship in Vietnam by support of a military dictatorship will not extricate the U.S. from the conflict; nor will it justify past or further American efforts and costs. Compared to policies that might bring an end to the war, or to U.S. participation in it, it will mean many more American deaths-and Vietnamese deaths inflicted by Americans-in a cause increasingly unworthy of these sacrifices.

MEMO FOR THE RECORD BY DANIEL ELLSBERG

Subject: Colonel Chau and CIA.

1. In half a dozen conversations with Colonel Chau starting 29 January he has expressed great concern about the role of Office of Special Assistant (CIA) in the rural construction program. This memo summarizes the verbal reporting I have made to you after these conversations. Chau's concerns break down into three categories: a) his personal relations with OSA; b) OSA handling of its relations with Thang and the cadre program; c) the impression in Vietnamese minds of the relation of Rural Construction to the Americans, particularly CIA. 2. Frictions and pressures in his relations with CIA have obviously put great emotional strain on Chau because of his past friendship with that agency. In our first conversation and frequently in later ones he would interject with great emotion:

"You know, I have great appreciation and gratitude for help I got in Kien Hoa from CIA: more for the moral support than for material help. They were the only ones who believed in what I was trying to do, and helped me. Believe me, I have nothing against CIA."

"But I think that I was brought to Saigon on a misunderstanding. I thought I would run the program, determine the policies: with consultation with all the agencies involved. But I think that Mr. J and Mr. D only wanted me to do a technical job, administering it but not affecting policy matters. If that is what they want, that is fine, but I do not want that job."

3. Apparently major friction erupted on the issue of the size of the cadre groups. After Thang and Chau had briefed all the province chiefs on a program calling for 80-man groups, J and D visited Thang, and D reported to the Cadre Working Group that they had agreed on a 50-man group: which would mean a 40-man PAT unit and 10 other cadres instead of 40. Each man on the interagency group got the impression and relayed it to his supervisors that the initiative for this major change had come from Thang. (Apparently D did not say this explicitly, but the several members I have talked to all said that they had received this impression, which they didn't question). Chau spoke of resigning; and when Vann, who had been out of town, was called back to dissuade him, Vann questioned the change strongly. Vann and Chau then went to see Thang, who told them that he had not proposed a reduction to 50 men-he was still in favor of an 80-man team-but that J and D had told him that it was necessary because of training and budgetary limitations: "and they are the ones with the money."

After negotiation, a 59-man team was decided upon; Chau described this to the Working Group as "a compromise between the 80-man team that Thang and I wanted and the 50-man team proposed by OSA." [Deleted], who was present, did not comment on this characterization of the positions, though it came as a surprise to the other members present. (A mission Weekly Report to the President had gone out already describing the shift to a smaller team as initiated by Thang.)

This episode inevitably left bitter feelings all around. (I have not heard an account from the OSA side.) Although Chau several times mentioned his respect for [deleted] when I commented at one point that from everything I had heard I was sure that [deleted] and his colleagues were sincere and well-intentioned, he broke in, "But they said that General Thang wanted 50-man teams!" He felt he had been lied to (though others, searching their memories, conclude that this was not strictly the case).

There were several issues here, from Chau's point of view: a) OSA going to see Thang without telling Chau their proposal; and then fostering a misleading impression of Thang's position; b) the limitation on the non-PAT elements of the team still inadequate, in Chau's eyes, at 19 men, let alone the 10 proposed; c)

a GVN change in the overall plan, just after briefing the provinces on the old one. Chau tended to depreciate the importance of the first two points (though they may have affected him more than he said); he emphasized the bad impression given to the province chiefs, who had been told that a new version of the plan would be released that reflected their comments. Now, before they had had time to comment, the national government was changing it without waiting for them, indicating either that province chiefs' opinions didn't really matter, that the government didn't know its own mind, or that the Americans had simply dictated a change.

3. Chau felt that the OSA representatives were insensitive to the political costs of appearing to be in complete charge of the cadre program. He felt that both the province chiefs and General Thang went too far in permitting this impression (he said he had often remonstrated with General Thang over this) because they felt that CIA "had the money." "It would not be so bad if an American in the province seemed to be higher than the province chief: if he were a mature, experienced person; but when a young, obviously inexperienced American seems to be able to tell the province chief what to do, that makes it seem very obvious that we are just working for the Americans."

Chau referred to several incidents on our trip to Dalst to brief II Corps officials; I had noticed all of them myself. At one point, in front of every province chief in II Corps, Thang had pointed at one and said: "Now, you had better be sure that you send only good men to Vung Tau; because if you send poor men, Mr. [deleted] here (sitting next to him) will send them right back, and I will be very unhappy." Also, the OSA representative had ignored the invitation to fly up in the plane with Thang, Chau and all other members of the working group. As usual they took their own plane. The OSA plane was delayed and the OSA members arrived after Vann's briefing on the cadre program to U.S. attendees; the other members of the working group were disappointed by this, because they had found on earlier trips that the OSA field representatives seemed to have heard little or nothing about any changes from the PAT program.

Chau said that he had not been able to get any OSA people to discuss with him their concept of the program; he felt they were totally ignoring him (as yet OSA had not moved into the building with all of the other members of the working group).

At the end of one conversation he said: "I do not feel that CIA should not have a large say in the program. It is right that they should; they are paying for the program, and it is right that their views should have great weight. I don't want everything on my own way (Vann comments: 'Of course, he does want everything his own way. . .') but the question is: Is it to be entirely run by CIA?"

4. Substantively, Chau had come to suspect that OSA did not fully understand or believe in the roles of the non-PAT elements of the team. Their willingness to see these elements cut to 10 men (rather than sacrificing PAT trainees, given limited training capability)-including them, at all, apparently as a sop-or finally to 19 men, seemed evidence for this. In effect, Chau felt, OSA saw the current Rural Construction Cadre program essentially as an expansion of the PAT program (though it had the added effect of giving OSA-in Saigon and in the field-effective control over nearly all cadre in the provinces). Moreover, they either were not aiming at pacifying, as Chau understood it, or they had an exaggerated notion of the role of a PAT team in pacification.

In Chau's view, the PAT team alone was, in practice, only a substitute for PF's: a good substitute, conducting themselves more effectively than most PF platoons both in military and civic action functions: but not a substitute for the Census/Grievance, Civic Action and New Life Development teams on which Chau lays most emphasis for the complex tasks of organizing and motivating the people. At some times, Chau felt, CSA seemed satisfied to see the PAT's quite explicitly performing a PF/RF role only, as in Quang Nam. At other times. ÖSA seemed to believe that the insertion of a PAT team into a VC-dominated hamlet would somehow generate the information flow between villagers and government, the hamlet organization and eventually self-defense that the Cadre Group, with their more specialized training, were designed to produce.

D has commented to me that Chau kept adding so many tasks to his Census/Grievance teams in Kien Hoa-so many "baroque little frills"-that the project could not have been administered by any other province chiefs. "What is needed here is really something very simple, some simple little measures." Vann agrees that Chau's Kien Hoa program could bear simplification before be 44-296-70-pt. 2- -15

ing imitated widely; but not to the point of hamstringing the non-PAT elements, which he along with Chau regards as vital. I am not yet able to say whether Chau and Vann are right in believing that OSA accords little importance-less than they say-to these elements. There is the evidence of the attempt to take the manpower slash wholly out of the training of these elements; and apparent slowness about educating the OSA field representatives-used to dealing only with PATS-about the role of the new elements. (One province representative of OSA told me recently he “didn't see the need for the new parts of the team . . . couldn't see any point”.

While OSA has endorsed the Census/Grievance mechanism introduced by Chau in Kien Hoa by supporting it elsewhere, Chau feels that their practice and interpretation has been to emphasize only the census-making and intelligence-gathering aspects rather than what he regards as most important: the feedback to local government of villagers' aspirations and grievances, and the follow-through on their complaints, informing them of action taken.)

5. Chau says he has lost some of his respect for CIA in the course of working with them in Saigon. "I used to think they had great feel for political and psychological matters." (This was in Kien Hoa, where they backed what he was doing and let him alone!) "Now I think they have little." (Even so, he judged in answer to a question that they had more political sense than any other US field agency.)

Moreover, he felt that top OSA leadership in Saigon was not well informed as to actual PAT/OSA performance in the provinces. "Many of the field representatives are young and inexperienced, and many of them are not good; they don't know what to look for, and they are not sufficiently supervised. OSA has commodities, weapons, money to give; people like province chiefs want these, and they flatter OSA, don't give them a true picture."

6. Even before the episode of the "numbers game," friction had developed between Chau and OSA over the role of Captain Mai, the commandant of the PAT training program. OSA thought very highly of Mai and wanted to keep him in place. Chau expressed, at first, little criticism of Mai as an individual but insisted that he had been known too long as an employee of the Americans, and that if province chiefs were ever to believe that the program was now to be a Vietnamese one, the change must be symbolized by downgrading Mai or letting him go. Chau got a very poor impression on his early visits to Vung Tau of the deference paid by Mai to his American counterparts and the general note there of Mai/Vietnamese subordination to US representatives.

(Vann has described the recent graduation ceremony at Vung Tau in a way that supports this picture of Mai and of OSA insensitivity.)

A planeload of American guests was invited to the ceremony; they were met at the airport by Mai, who took them all to a banquet at Cyrano's in Vung Tau. Because of the banquet (no other Vietnamese were present) the Americans and Mai arrived about 30 minutes late for the ceremony, where 3200 presumably fired-up PATS were waiting. On the stage in front of these new troopers were four easy chairs, with three rows of chairs in back. The four chairs in front were occupied by Mai, J, C and D; the two rows behind them high-heeled secretaries of OSA. Vietnamese were crowded behind. During the ceremony, Mai presented some awards to honor students; about half were handed out by Americans. All in all, a dubious way of arming the PATS psychologically to answer the taunts they would meet in the field of being "an American army."

7. Since arriving at Vung Tau to prepare the courses for the non-PAT elements, Chau has received quite a different type of impression. "Incredible . . . unbelievable . . . a new surprise every day," he kept murmuring to me, shaking his head referring to the apparent lack of OSA supervision of the political/ psychological courses at Vung Tau-lack, it seemed, even of knowledge of their content-and the corresponding freedom accorded to Captain Mai. No American at the base spoke Vietnamese; and Mai informed him that he did not translate or submit his lesson plans to the Americans at all. (I understand that neither of these conditions obtained at the very beginning of the APA program). “I am completely free in running these courses; the Americans do not ask and do not know what I am doing," Mai insisted. Chau, incredulous, forced him to repeat this several times, and asked him: "How can you justify working for these people, who support this whole program, without keeping them informed of what you are doing?" "I am working for the good of the people," Mai answered. "I simply cannot believe it," Chau said. "I am going to go to Mr. J and ask him, I will say, 'I just want to know, for myself,'. I will not tell his answer

to anyone.. not even you, excuse me... is it true that you have not known what is being taught at Vung Tau?"

As for the actual content of the courses-a current set of lesson plans is now being translated-they seem to be in close correspondence to the doctrines and symbolism of a particular Dai Viet splinter sect, the Duy Dan faction. The Fairy and Dragon legend which gets strong emphasis in the course is widely recognizable as a Duy Dan creation, as is the symbolism of the "100 Vietnamese Peoples" (Thai, Malaysian, Lao, Montagnard, etc.). Chau suspects that much of the "misuse" of PAT teams by various province chiefs reflected simply their distrust of what seemed to be a propaganda team for the Duy Dan/Dai Viets. (Major Be in Binh Dinh had explained to Bumgardner almost a year ago that his reason for retraining PAT teams on their return to province was that "I didn't send our people there to become Dai Viets"; Bumgardner had paid little attention at the time).

Moreover-although this is tentative at this point-there are indications that the students are given an orientation that is almost as strongly anti-GVN as it is anti-VC. No relieving features of the GVN are mentioned, nor is the possibility of reforming it from within. In effect, the students seem to be taught to regard themselves as a Third Force, to await directions when the time will come for a new "Special Politics" (the literal translation of Biet Chinh, as the PATS are known), separate from VC or GVN politics.

"All this might be all right," says Chau, "if that is what the governmentand the Americans-want. It might be all right to back the Dai Viets, or to prepare the cadres for a Special Politics; but is that what the government has decided to do? Do they or the Americans know that that is what they are doing?" As for Mai, Chau's already low appreciation has fallen still further. He does not feel Mai has acted honorably with his employers (Chau seems sincere about this, despite the fact that, as I pointed out to him, he "should be glad that it has turned out to be a Vietnamese program after all"). Also, although he concedes that Mai spends a lot of time with the trainees and has by now acquired much training experience, he is very dubious about Mai's qualifications as a political instructor. Mai has virtually no time in the field in any capacity, his military career having been spent almost completely in staff communications work. Chau finds his political sense naive and does not believe he has a major impact on the students (others disagree), (Chau thinks very highly of Major Be, for example, and says there "is not the slightest comparison" between Be and Mai, pointing primarily to Be's command and field experience and maturity in political matters). 8. Even prior to going to Vung Tau, Chau felt he had "lost the confidence of OSA" and could no longer be effective in the program; he had asked Thang to be relieved, and Thang had agreed, though asking him to stay on for a couple of months. However, Chau would not in any case have stayed if it were to be primarily an American program.

With considerable emotion Chau has said to me on two occasions: "It is better for my country to be taken over by the Americans than by the Communists. If that is the only choice, then I think it is better for the Americans to take it over. But I do not want to be part of that. They can do it without me."

More specifically, he says: "I like CIA. I have always been a friend of CIA; that is why I speak so frankly to Mr. J because I do not think a friend should hide his feelings. But I do not want to be an employee of CIA. I would not have come here for that."

On another occasion he mentioned: "The generals are all afraid of CIA. They think it is the most powerful US agency; that it has more money and more influence. And they say that CIA can do things to them that other agencies can't. They say, 'If we disagree with MACV, can MACV have us assassinated? No; but CIA can'." (I was rather startled at this comment, and remarked that after all no major military figure had disappeared lately. Chau said: “Col. Thao." Startled again, I said "Does anyone think CIA killed Thao?" "Many said it," Chau said. "They say that Thao lost his usefulness to CIA." "Do you think that?" I asked him directly. "I don't know, I don't know what to think," he said, flustered.) Short of assassination, he said later the generals feared that CIA would ruin them by spreading stories-true or not-of their corruption or mistresses. All in all, he felt the association with CIA was not helpful to the Rural Construction program. "People can understand CIA doing many things . . . but they cannot understand CIA running pacification."

9. For future policy, the most important issue raised by Chau is this, is the Rural Construction Cadre Program to be a Vietnamese program, with US

support, or primarily a US/CIA program? There are arguments for the latter, in terms of efficiency and control (Chau claims to believe that the US should in any case retain control of financial matters). But if it is to be a US/CIA program, Chau foresees the following problems (aside from his leaving, which is probably too late to change):

(a) GVN officials-the ruling generals, province/district chiefs, division commanders, ministries—will not support it effectively. They will figure that Americans will take the credit if it succeeds; and in any case, they will feel, “If it's an American program, let them run it." (To be sure, one might question how much they would get behind it even if it were 200% Vietnamese; but if it is identified with Americans, because of heavyhanded American control, their noninvolvement is assured). Two years from now, there will be a competent cadre program in operation, but with very little link to any central or provincial authority.

(b) The identification with Americans, as it becomes known to local officials and villagers, will seriously hamper the essentially political work of the cadres. "You could pacify South Vietnam with American Troops alone," Chau says. "But it would take three million troops, and it would last only as long as they stayed."

The crucial target of pacification, in Chau's mind, is to create a spirit in the rural people of willingness to organize in their own self-defense. This spirit cannot be lit by an American occupying army. Nor will it be generated by Vietnamese cadre widely regarded as "American employees"-particularly if CIA influence on the program emphasizes the role of the PAT element alone.

10. If these points are taken seriously, the policy inference would be: either (a) Change CIA's style and direction of influence significantly, persuading them to be less overt in their involvement and control both in Saigon/Vung Tau and in the field and to allow full weight to the role of non-PAT elements; or (b) Move CIA out of this overt program as quickly as possible-say two or three months-meanwhile channeling financial and field support through another agency, either AID or MACV (perhaps shifting some field reps to the other agency; also reducing the total number and increasing the quality of field reps.)