Mr. SCHOENBRUN. That is correct. Senator Knowland attacked Foster Dulles and Foster Dulles realized that he might be in very serious trouble if he signed such a document. That is why they adopted the very curious, interesting procedure of having the chairman read the political accords and having the head of each delegation stand up and speak to them in the name of his country. General Smith spoke to them.

Senator GORE. Are you telling this committee that no one signed the Geneva Accords?

Mr. SCHOENBRUN. That is correct and I am also angered when I hear State Department spokesmen and others say America did not sign it, as though others did and we did not. Nobody signed the Geneva Accords, but each country got up and spoke to them, accepted them. Our country accepted them with some minor qualifications. General Smith preferred the United Nations to supervise elections in Vietnam rather than an International Control Commission, a very minor qualification. He also was full of warnings, dire warnings, of what we should do should this be violated or force be used.

He also separated himself from the others and said, "We do not join in with the others. We make a statement on our own," all of this for American internal political reasons.

Nonetheless, as most experts on international law would argue, such as Professor Falk at Princeton University, and I recommend to you gentlemen the "Lawyers Brief" on international law as it concerns Vietnam, which is very important on this and other such points. The record is very clear and can be read and is available, of course, to you gentlemen. General Smith at the end of his testimony said, "And I wish to thank the cochairmen, Anthony Eden and Vyacheslav Molotov, for what they have done to make these agreements possible," and that to me, means that the United States was a party to and accepted the Geneva Accords.

ACCEPTANCE AND VIOLATION OF GENEVA ACCORDS

So, our Government variously tells us, one, that we did not sign it; two, that the Communists violated it. The fact is we did accept it verbally.

Furthermore, in my view, if I may say, sir, even if we had not accepted it this does not give us automatically the right to oppose arrangements entered into by the other great powers of the world. China was present; Russia was present; France was present; Great Britain was present. They all accepted it without conditions. I believe the United States did too, with minor conditions, and I believe the accords were principally violated by the western side, and there were then later also some violations by the Communist side, but principally by the western side.

Furthermore, it seems to me

The CHAIRMAN. Could I interrupt to make a background statement? Mr. SCHOENBRUN. Yes, sir.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON SECRETARIES DULLES AND ACHESON

The CHAIRMAN. It was not only Senator Knowland's action. This was also at the height of the influence of Senator Joseph McCarthy; was it not?

Mr. SCHOENBRUN. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The domestic political implications had something to do with the attitude of the Secretary of State; did they not?

Mr. SCHOENBRUN. Yes, sir. I believe it also influenced the attitude of the previous Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson, who had been under very serious attack by Senator McCarthy, which is why Mr. Acheson, I believe, in January of 1950 denounced Ho Chi Minh and took a very strong anti-Communist stance under domestic political fire.

U.S. COMMITMENT NOT TO USE FORCE TO UPSET GENEVA ACCORDS

The CHAIRMAN. I vaguely remember a slight addition which said we would not use force.

Mr. SCHOENBRUN. The U.S. undertook a commitment that we would not use force to upset those Geneva agreements.

The CHAIRMAN. That was part of that qualification that he gave. Mr. SCHOENBRUN. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. It is all part of a very short document almost totally unknown by the American public and, if I may say without offense, even to some Members of the Congress of the United States, to say nothing about the Administration itself.

POLICIES OF PRESIDENTS EISENHOWER AND KENNEDY

This is the situation that confronted us at a moment of maximum opportunity not to get engaged in Vietnam. And I think we might say in memory of President Eisenhower and the view that he took at the time that he was most careful to stay within the military clauses of the Geneva Accords and refused to send troops in the 8 years he was President of the United States.

Therefore, sir, when it is said that Mr. Johnson, as he said, and Mr. Nixon, as he has said, is only carrying out the policies of his predecessor, I would submit to this committee that that is inaccurate. The policy of President Eisenhower was not to become militarily engaged. He did send a letter, which I have submitted in my written testimony, to President Diem offering his limited economic assistance with very serious qualifications, including the phrase "provided that you give assurances of your performance and provided that reforms are carried out," none of which, of course, took place. So, President Eisenhower did not institute any American commitment to defend Vietnam. This ought to be on the record and known to the American people.

As for President Kennedy, at that time, I left my assignment in CBS, Paris as French Empire affairs correspondent and became the CBS bureau chief and chief correspondent here in Washington, D.C., during the Kennedy years and discussed this issue with President Kennedy at great length.

It is true Mr. Kennedy went beyond the caution of President Eisenhower, but he, too, remained a prudent man. He did permit the sending of some 12,000 men who were armed but he called them "advisers." And the President once explained to me why he called them advisers. He did not want them to be troops because he said he was not committing the United States to fight in Vietnam and this to me was a very important qualification. An armed adviser is a dangerous sort of a fellow who can get you into fighting and indeed Mr. Eisenhower used

to complain to me in private when I saw him that President Kennedy had made a mistake in bringing on advisers. But, nevertheless, Mr. Kennedy never believed it was a true commitment and the last thing Mr. Kennedy said publicly on the record in September 1963, shortly before his death, on a CBS program was very ambivalent. He said: "We cannot abandon these people to Communists", but then he went on to say, "We can advise them; we can aid them, but we cannot fight for them." So, where Kennedy stood we really do not know.

I think it is very unfair, indeed very sad, to see anybody use his name today to say that he is carrying out Kennedy's policy for that was not on the record Mr. Kennedy's policy.

BASIC U.S. COMMITMENT TO FIGHT IN VIETNAM

It seems to me that our basic commitment to fight in Vietnam was taken by President Johnson and it was taken after the campaign of 1964 and it was not taken under the SEATO Treaty. It was taken under the Tonkin Gulf resolution and it was a unilateral action and decision by the President and he was not carrying out the policy of Eisenhower and Kennedy. He was carrying out the policy of Lyndon B. Johnson.

That policy is now being furthered by Mr. Nixon and extended by Mr. Nixon into Cambodia itself. To be sure, we are told, temporarily, but time will tell how temporary it is and the nature of it.

VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM DOUBTED

We have had commitments in Laos; we have had commitments in Cambodia. We are now told about Vietnamization. I have no confidence in the program of Vietnamization. I do not think it can work and I do not think it is desirable even if it can work. It is, at best, the hiring of South Vietnamese mercenaries who will fight as foot soldiers under American military cover, that is an air and Navy cover.

I have heard no assurances. Have you heard any assurances, Senators, that all of our forces, all of them, will be withdrawn? The best I have heard is that by the summer of 1971 most of our ground troops will be withdrawn except for those that will have to defend our bases, except for the Air Force, except for the Navy, in other words, 150,000, at least, of our forces will be committed.

The President has told us that he will not lose a war and the Vice President on CBS 2 weeks ago on Face the Nation said everybody knows that a ground war in Asia cannot be won.

METHODS OF U.S. DISENGAGEMENT FROM VIETNAM

Well, gentlemen, just where does this leave us with an Administration that says the war cannot be won, but will not be lost? We are trapped in the middle. It seems to me it leaves us with an absolute demand on the part of the American people to the Administration to get us out of such an entrapment.

I think it can be done. And it can be done with honor in one or two ways. The best possible way, of course, would be negotiations and I think negotiation is what we all desire. But the other side has made

it quite clear they will not negotiate with Generals Thieu and Ky, whom they consider to be traitors to their country. Whether they are right or wrong is not really important. The question is will they negotiate with Thieu and Ky. I believe they will not.

Should the United States place all of its strength and commitment and honor on the shoulders of Thieu and Ky or should we make it clear that we favor any kind of a coalition? There are men who are ready; there are men like General "Big" Minh, anti-Communist all his life, and Buddhist leaders ready to step in. The Communists said they would negotiate with these people. If we remain on a policy of solid support for Thieu and Ky by this Administration, there will be no success in the Paris negotiations and, if they do not succeed, then it leaves us no choice but to disengage totally, completely by ourselves.

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR U.S. DISENGAGEMENT FROM VIETNAM

I think this, too, can be done honorably. I think indeed, gentlemen, the American people want it to be done, but it depends upon an initiative by the President of the United States.

I am convinced from my travels across this country, from lectures at universities, at clubs, at chambers of commerce, that the overwhelming majority of the American people want out. The public opinion polls are falsified and I think we should make a distinction about this falsification. They do not support the President's policy in Vietnam. They support the President. Half this country does not wish to, and it is an honorable thing, does not wish to oppose the President of the United States. So they are not supporting what he did in Cambodia; they are loyally standing behind him and his office.

If the President said, "I want to get out," 90 percent of this country would say, "We are with you, Mr. President." I believe he can do it.

I think he can do it in 60 seconds. I say that because, in all the years that I was on CBS, I learned to analyze world affairs in depth in the 60 seconds that were accorded to me. [Laughter.]

Senator CASE. You have slowed up a good deal.

Mr. SCHOENBRUN. That is right. The opportunity to speak to your committee at length is one that a frustrated correspondent cannot resist, Senator Case. But I can speed up now, Senator.

Senator CASE. We are grateful.

Mr. SCHOENBRUN. A 60-second speech I have written that I think President Nixon can make that this entire country, I believe, would cheer and it is this:

My fellow Americans, in the winter of 1965 our Government took a commitment to help the people of South Vietnam organize themselves to resist a Communist takeover. It is important to understand the nature of that commitment. It was not to defend them permanently by our forces, but to help them get into a position to defend themselves.

In fulfillment of that commitment, we have expended almost 50,000 of our men dead, some 275,000 wounded and perhaps as much as $150 billion of our treasure so badly needed at home.

At the same time we have raised, trained and equipped for 5 years an army of 1 million South Vietnamese. My fellow Americans, our commitment has now been fulfilled. We hope that they can negotiate peace. Whatever it is, it is now up to them. We wish them good luck and we say farewell. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. I announced yesterday that demonstrations on the part of our guests at these hearings are against the rules of the committee. I suspect some of you are here today who were here yesterday and I hope you will respect this rule. It is very disruptive of our proceedings to have demonstrations. Sometimes you know we might have them on the other side. Remember that.

But I will have to confess that was a very eloquent speech, with which I agree. [Laughter.]

Mr. SCHOENBRUN. I would only hope that President Nixon would make it and I am convinced that if he were to make it he would enthusiastically receive the support of the Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. He would certainly receive the support of the junior Senator from Arkansas.

PATRIOTISM AND THE DUTY OF A PATRIOT

Mr. SCHOENBRUN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude now really very briefly with one word about something that has been on my mind and on the minds of our fellow citizens for a long time which confuses this whole war discussion. And that is patriotism and the duty of a patriot.

Most of us have been raised and brought up on the doctrine of Stephen Decatur, "My country, right or wrong."

I used to believe that until I came across, in historical research, a statement from a Senator, a very great man, a credo of patriotism by which I have lived ever since and would like to get into the record. And that was the Senator from Missouri, Carl Schurz, who, in 1899, led the anti-imperial convention to Chicago in protest against the annexation of the Philippine Islands, saying that ours was the land of the free and we had no business annexing other peoples and somebody in the audience shouted him down and said, "Senator, you are not a good American. Remember Stephen Decatur, who said 'My country right or wrong," and Carl Schurz's reply, with which I would like to conclude this testimony, with my great thanks to you, was the following: "My country right or wrong. But when right to be kept right and when wrong to be put right." That is what free men and women can do.

I thank you gentlemen for the privilege of being in a country where we can, even in time of war, express such sentiments. Thank you very much.

(Mr. Schoenbrun's full statement follows.)

STATEMENT BY MR. DAVID SCHOENBRUN ON THE HISTORY OF U.S.-INDOCHINA RELATIONS

Where and what is Indochina? When, how and why did the United States first get involved and then committed to fighting a major war in that area? These are questions being asked with acute anguish by the entire nation. They are questions that were raised many times in the past by distinguished members of this Committee. Excellent reports have been made by such investigating groups as those led by Senator Mansfield and others over the course of more than two decades. Yet the general public remains largely uninformed and confused by the history of the tragic affair. In lectures and question-and-answer sessions on radio and TV across the country, I have become convinced that less than one percent of Americans are familiar with the basic facts, documents and arguments involved in the longest foreign war we have ever fought. They have not read the text of the Geneva Accords of 1954 or 1962, or the SEATO Treaty, documents frequently referred to by Administration spokesmen in justification of charges