assistance to Pakistan. I suppose Pakistan has requested the tanks. If we are going to allow our policy to be determined simply by a request or because Pakistan wants them, I would think our experience there would be enough to know that it would be a very unwise investment. In any case, did you happen to see this article by Mr. Bowles? Mr. JOHNSON.I have not seen this article but I am familiar with it. The CHAIRMAN. I recommend it because experience has shown that once any military assistance program, however wrongly conceived, is established, it is difficult to stop. Mr. Bowles goes on to give the history of this program which, as I say, was not started in this Administration, Mr. Packard. It was started before. I have been hopeful for a year and a half that this Administration would not take up all the errors of its predecessor and feel it is committed to them. I thought we were going to have a new deal with the new Republican Administration. I have been hopefully watching for signs that say, "Well, that was a stupid policy. We are going to do better." This is one of them. I recommend this article to you. Mr. Reporter, I will put it in the record. (The information referred to follows.) [The New York Times, Mar. 21, 1970] TOPICS: WILL WE EVER LEARN IN ASIA? (By Chester Bowles) Some months ago it was rumored that pressures were developing within the Nixon Administration to approve the sale to Pakistan of 100 American tanks which we had previously given to Turkey under NATO agreements. Now, according to several authoritative sources, this proposal has actually "reached the President's desk" for his final approval. This news is all the more disquieting because it coincides with the recent recommendations of the House Armed Services Committee that the "loan" of an American submarine to Pakistan, which was authorized ten or twelve years ago, should be renewed. Has the United States Government lost all sense of direction in Asia? Can it learn nothing from past mistakes? American military assistance to Pakistan in the last fifteen years will, I believe, be listed by historians as among our most costly blunders. In a period in which costly mistakes came thick and fast, this program was launched in February 1954, when John Foster Dulles somehow succeeded in persuading President Eischnower and Congress that a U.S.-equipped Pakistan Army could be counted on to challenge any Soviet or Chinese military threat toward the Arabian Sea or the Bay of Bengal. When the bizarre nature of this assumption became evident, new justifications for the military aid program to Pakistan were quickly produced. In the late 1950's, for instance, these military assistance grants were said to be necessary to assure continued use of the U.S. Peshawar Air Base in Pakistan from which the U-2 planes took off on their flights across the Soviet Union. After these flights had been abandoned, Congress and the public were told that the base was "essential to our national security" as an observation post. MILITARY AID UNSTOPPABLE When President Johnson cut off our military aid to Pakistan following the outbreak of the "Three Weeks' War" between Pakistan and India in September 1965, Pakistan promptly reacted by announcing that our lease on the Peshawar base would not be renewed. But experience has shown that, once established, any military assistance program, however wrongly conceived, is difficult to stop. A few months after announcing this cutoff the Johnson Administration agreed to the sale of spare parts for Pakistani tanks, which had been procured under the American Military Assistance program. They had been damaged in the war with India and an effort was begun to seek means of replacing some of the tanks demolished or captured. What followed has been fully reported by the press. Since these tanks had been given to Pakistan on the solemn assurance, underwritten by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson and five successive American Ambassadors to India (including myself), that they would never be used against India, it was proposed that the replacements should be procured through a third government, to appear less conspicuous. First an effort was made to persuade the West Germans, then the Belgians, then the Italians, and finally the Turks to "sell" 100 semi-obsolescent U.S. tanks to Pakistan for a nominal price with the assurance that the United States Government would "approve" the sale (necessary under Military Assistance requirements). Then the Pakistan tanks would be replaced with modern ones "to strengthen our NATO forces." Predictably these "third governments" (all of which were reluctant to become a party to this gambit) leaked the story to the press. After a period of uncertainty the Johnson Administration, already caught in a "credibility gap" in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, decided not to widen the gap further. This brings us to a disturbing question. Why should the Nixon Administration in the year 1970, with a relatively clean slate, seriously consider a proposal that would simply repeat the blunders and shabby diplomatic gambits of its predecessors? And why should the Congress renew the loan of a submarine to Pakistan, whose only possible function would be to sink Indian ships? NIXON DOCTRINE? Are the Administration's new "Nixon Doctrine" and Congress's expressed determination to limit our military commitments simply fresh examples of the usual empty rhetoric by our leaders in dealing with Asia? Whose interests would be served by such decisions? Certainly not the interests of the American people in Asia. Or the cause of world peace. Or the welfare of the people of Pakistan, who need tractors, not tanks. A few military leaders in Pakistan would be helped and, perhaps, the American firms that manufacture the tanks. (Chester Bowles served as Ambassador to India for six years.) The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken, do you want to ask some questions now? I will question further later. Senator AIKEN. You have incited a few questions on my part. PAKISTANI REQUEST FOR TANKS AND PLANES How long ago was it that we outfitted Pakistan with tanks and planes? Mr. JOHNSON. That was prior to 1967. I think it is since 1967 we have made no sales or grant of lethal military equipment to either Pakistan or India. Senator AIKEN. Has there been some loss in depreciation and outmoding of the equipment which was supplied to Pakistan prior to 1967? Mr. JOHNSON. Oh, certainly, of course. It is wearing out and, as you know, they have now received some equipment from Communist China and from other countries. Senator AIKEN. Pakistan has? Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Senator AIKEN. Is their current request of us for tanks and planes for the purpose of replacing losses and depreciation on the equipment they had before or is it in addition to what they had as an overall line of equipment? Mr. JOHNSON. To what amount this request is for replacement and to what amount is addition I just am not able to answer offhand. Obviously Senator AIKEN. What was the request, 200 tanks? Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, may I correct myself? It has been pointed out that we cut off sales in 1965. I had mistakenly said 1967. Senator AIKEN. That is right. The request was 200 tanks and 25 planes. Am I correct in believing that is the number? Mr. JOHNSON. There have been various requests at various times and in various amounts. I find it difficult to identify offhand exactly what the amounts are. But one of the requests or one of the suggestions has been this request for the sale of some tanks by Turkey to Pakistan. Senator AIKEN. Was this request made to offset supplies which have been given to or contributed, or sold rather, to India by Russia during the last, say, 4 years? Mr. JOHNSON. I presume that they are probably basing it upon that. Their tanks are certainly old, and certainly they are seeking replacements for them. Senator AIKEN. That is as I understand it. Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. PETERSON REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS Senator AIKEN. You mentioned the Peterson report. Senator AIKEN. Do you agree with the recommendation that the economic aid and the military aid should be completely separated, sir? Mr. JOHNSON. As far as the recommendations, organizational recommendations, of the report, the Administration is still studying this and, as you know, the Administration is committed to making recommendations to the Congress, and the Peterson report is one of those, one of the items that is being studied in that connection. We have not yet taken any position on the exact organizational framework which the President will recommend. This will obviously have to be a decision that the President would want to make. Senator AIKEN. The Peterson report I notice in recommendation No. 5 says: All types of security assistance-military assistance grants, use of surplus military stocks, military credits, economic assistance in support of military and public safety programs, budget support for political purposes, and the Contingency Fund-should be covered in one legislative act. The State Department should exercise firm policy guidance over these programs. Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, yes. Senator AIKEN. Do you agree with that? Mr. JOHNSON. I agree with the firm policy guidance. As far as to whether or not we separate out the development aid, you know, this has been a subject, Senator, which has been discussed for a long time, whether you separate the development aid, so-called, from the other aspects of our program, and the Peterson report is recommending that we do do so. And as I say, we still have not formulated our position on this, and obviously this is a decision the President will want to make. Senator AIKEN. You mean the State Department has not formulated its position? Mr. JOHNSON. No, we have not; no, sir. Senator AIKEN. Has the Defense Department formulated its position on this recommendation? Mr. PACKARD. No, Senator Aiken. We are still studying the report. We will be in consultation with State and, hopefully, have some mutually agreeable recommendations in due course. Mr. JOHNSON. I am sure we will. Senator AIKEN. I just want to know what the Under Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense agreed on this recommendation. You both agree you are still studying it. Mr. PACKARD. We have not had time to analyze it. SOURCE OF MINERALS FORMERLY PURCHASED FROM RHODESIA This discussion was all about sales of military supplies and materiel necessary for defense purposes in different countries. Could you tell us anything about some of these scarce minerals that we used to buy from Rhodesia? Do you know where we are now buying platinum, chromium, titanium, and a couple of others in that class that sell for so much an ounce instead of so much a ton? Mr. PACKARD. I do not have detailed information on that, Senator, but I think we can provide it for you, if you would like to have it for the record. I do not have it with me. Senator AIKEN. I think it would be well to have it. (The information referred to follows.) U.S. IMPORTS OF SELECTED MINERALS/METALS BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN Average chromium oxide content of Soviet ore, 54 percent; that from other sources 45-46 percent. Senator AIKEN. I believe about 2 years ago we purchased nearly $50 million worth from Russia at an increase of something over 50 percent in price after suspending the purchases from Rhodesia. Mr. PACKARD. We are still buying some material from Russia, but I would prefer to provide you with the details; and I will be glad to do so. Mr. JOHNSON. You are referring specifically to chrome, are you, Senator? Senator AIKEN. Yes, that is one of them. There are about five or six precious minerals that we stopped purchasing from Rhodesia, forcing Rhodesia to put them on the world market, and then brought from Russia, paying something over 50 percent more for them than we paid Rhodesia. CONDITIONS OF RUSSIAN SALE OF MINERALS The question I really wanted to ask is this. Perhaps you will look up and submit for the record whether Russia requires us to buy any other commodity from them in order to get these semiprecious minerals? Mr. JOHNSON. We will supply that for the record. Not that I am aware of. (The information referred to follows.) U.S. PURCHASES OF SCARCE MINERALS FORMERLY PURCHASED FROM RHODESIA 1. Relationship of Southern Rhodesia and Soviet Union Markets for Scarce Minerals and Metals.-The U.N. Security Council Resolutions of December 1966 and May 1968, which the United States supported, required of UN members observance of specified economic sanctions against the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia. As a result of these sanctions, to which all UN members except Portugal and South Africa have subscribed, Southern Rhodesia has been denied access to legitimate markets for its minerals and metals. Of importance to the United States are metallurgical grade chromite and ferrochrome and a lithium ore, petalite. The value of Southern Rhodesia's exports are now below that of 1965, as a result of these sanctions. American customers formerly dependent upon Southern Rhodesia for chromite, the only significant commodity exported also by the Soviet Union, have had to increase supplies from other sources, among which is the Soviet Union. American consumers are free to determine from whom they purchase although the superior grade of Soviet chromite as well as its greater availability are factors which no doubt have contributed to increased American purchases of the Soviet chromite. 2. Scarce Minerals Now Not Available from Southern Rhodesia Due to Security Council Sanctions.-Metallurgical grade chromite and a lithium ore, petalite, are the two minerals which the United States obtained from Southern Rhodesia prior to sanctions and which, because of sanctions, are now in tight supply. Petalite is obtained in significant commercial quantities from South and South West Africa. Users of petalite (glass and ceramics industry) are supplementing their stocks of petalite from these sources and meeting the balance of their need by substitution of other minerals (lithium carbonate and hydroxide). Our imports of chromite for metallurgical use in 1969 are reflected in the table provided. 3. Sources of Platinum Group Metals and Titanium.-The United States has not, either prior or after sanctions, imported these metals from Southern Rhodesia. The table provided demonstrates the source of these metals which were imported in 1969. 4. Chromite Imports from the Soviet Union.-The table reflects 1969 imports from the USSR. These exports earned the Soviet Union $7.8 million according to our trade data. Prices of Soviet chromite, as quoted by the American trader having the exclusive contract, have risen about 80 percent in the last four years. Prices of chromite of lesser quality from other sources have increased more or less proportionately. The price increase could reflect factors in addition to sanctions, such |