Our best estimate for calendar year 1968 of the number of persons possibly connected with or known to be connected with the Communist movement, who have been arrested is about [deleted], the number who have surrendered is about [deleted] and the number killed by Thai security forces is [deleted].

Typical of those surrendering is the large number of low level supporters, not hard core terrorists, who "defect" after assisting Communist terrorists in limited manner (such as one-time food supplying), and who are soon released after cursory interrogations. Conversely, bonafide Communist Party Thailand (CPT) members and cadre-level arrests/surrenders have been few-estimated at less than [deleted] per cent of the total number.

The bulk of arrests (about 500 percent) and surrenders (about 75 per cent) have occurred in limited areas of five northeastern provinces (Sakon Nakhon, Nakhon Phanom, Udorn, Nong Kuai) where RTG has concentrated more of its counterinsurgency effort for longer period than in other areas. This preponderance is an encouraging sign that RTG's mix of suppression, development, intelligence operations, and psychological/information programs may be beginning to take effect at the level of village supporters in an area where the CPT has been at work for more than 20 years and where the CPT has made more headway among indigenous Thai population than in other areas. On other hand, the terrorist hard core in these provinces largely intact despite losses. 2. Do U.S. military personnel ever accompany Thai military units on patrols in guerrilla-infested areas?

Have any ever been killed or wounded on such missions? Would you provide the Committee with a precise statement of the regulations concerning U.S. participation in Thai military operations?

Answer. U.S. military personnel do not accompany Thai military units on patrols in Guerrilla-infested areas, nor have there been any U.S. casualties in Thailand resulting from participation by U.S. personnel in combat operations against the insurgents. [Deleted.]

The basic guidelines of the Vance Memorandum of 30 June 1967 have subsequently been implemented and amplified by the American Embassy, Bangkok. The most recent iteration (4/13/69) of the "Counterinsurgency Police Guidelines" defines the goal of U.S. programs as one of "helping the Thai develop the capability to handle the counterinsurgency problem completely on their own.' This document articulates precise guidelines which preclude U.S. involvement in Thai counterinsurgency efforts beyond a training or advisory capacity. The relevant section (pp. 5-6) reads: [Deleted.]

3. Does the Thai Government operate a program comparable to the Vietnamese pacification program? If so, would you provide the details, particularly as to U.S. participation, by men or money, in the program?

Answer. The Thai Government, with U.S. support, engages in a number of counterinsurgency projects for rural economic and social development, village security, information and intelligence activities comparable to the Vietnamese "pacification program", although it does not formally designate them by this title. A recent study conducted in the field concluded that the Thai Government spends about two dollars for each dollar that is provided under AID. The Thai Government is also spending on defense 22 to 3 times as much as is provided under military assistance.

The major rural development effort is the Accelerated Rural Development program for road building and other public works. In FY-69 the USAID provided approximately 40 advisors and $8.74 million to this program. USAID is also providing assistance in agricultural extension, communist development, public health and education. Several thousand villagers have been trained and armed to defend their villages. In the last fiscal year AID and MAP provided $617,000 to these programs. In addition, USAID has supported expansion of Thai police forces into security sensitive villages; for FY-69 this program involved approximately 50 advisors and $7.4 million.

The United States Information Service has been advising and training Thai officials in information activities and psychological operations. There are approximately 16 USIS officials engaged in these activities; U.S. support in FY-69 amounted to $1.8 million.

In addition U.S. intelligence advisors are engaged in advising Thai security officials on countersubversion matters.

COMMITMENT UNDERSTOOD IN CONTINGENCY PLAN

Senator CHURCH. Now, going back to that quotation, it is this kind of assessment of the contingency plan which makes me feel that I cannot vote to support military assistance for Thailand, whether or not it is a part of aid, until I know better what this plan is all about, and I want to see the plan. It is characterized one way by you gentlemen, and it seems to me to be characterized in a different way by the Defense Department.

Mr. BROWN. Could I comment on that, sir?

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Mr. BROWN. Our commitment to Thailand is understood by them. and by us to be that in the SEATO Treaty. That was done in 1954, and from time to time during the intervening years the Thai have become very nervous about whether we were really prepared to live up to that agreement, and there have been assurances given them in different forms that the SEATO Treaty was something that we still regarded as a commitment and that we were going to live up to.

So when the Thai are talking about commitment, they are talking about the basic commitment of the SEATO Treaty. It is unreasonable sometimes but the Thai get nervous, get worried, and get the feeling that our interest is diminishing and our sense of obligation under the treaty is weakening.

The kind of thing that was intended by this military planning exercise was to give further evidence we were going to honor our basic commitment and not thought of as extending the commitment

Senator CHURCH. Well, I think that if your interpretation of the commitment is concurred in by the military and conforms to the actual plan that has been drawn up, much of the concern and anxiety of this committee would be allayed.

COMMITTEE REQUEST FOR TEXT OF CONTINGENCY PLAN

Our difficulty is that we have not seen the plan, and we have asked for it, and we have been told that the plan cannot be submitted to us, that we will have to accept a briefing instead. I think it is for this committee to decide whether that is adequate under the circumstances. Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, assistance to Thailand is in the bill we are considering, is it not?

Senator CHURCH. Military assistance for Thailand comes under the military budget.

Senator PELL. But in the bill

Senator CHURCH. Rather than under the foreign aid bill.

Senator PELL. Wouldn't it be proper just not to report out the provisions of the bill concerning Thailand until we see the agreement? Senator CHURCH. This committee could simply postpone further consideration of the foreign aid bill.

Senator PELL. On that particular item.

Senator CHURCH. I think that is a decision the whole committee has to reach. It is certainly within our power to do that under the circumstances. It is a question, I think, that will have to be taken up with all of the committee members present and a decision made then.

Mr. BROWN. May I add one thing to my summary statement?
Senator CHURCH. Yes.

THAI GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT AS TO COMMITMENT INVOLVED

Mr. BROWN. And that is that the Thai Government is in complete agreement with the statement that I made to you, and so advised us on numerous occasions, both privately and to some extent publicly.

Senator CHURCH. I am pleased to hear that, and I think your testimony this morning is very welcome testimony.

Senator JAVITS. The Thai Government is in agreement with—I did not quite get that.

Mr. BROWN. With the fact that our commitment, our basic commitment is that in the SEATO Treaty.

Senator CHURCH. Well, if there are no further questions

Mr. DOOLIN. If I may add one thing

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Mr. DOOLIN. [Deleted.]

The plan itself explicitly states that it would be "implemented only on mutual agreement and consent of both the U.S. Government and the Royal Thai Government," and the Joint Chiefs are prepared to brief the committee fully on the plan at any time it is convenient.

COMMITTEE'S DOUBTS INCREASING

Senator CHURCH. If all this is so, and the questions that we raised concerning the plan are not well founded, then why not simply show the committee the plan. That would allay all doubts.

Mr. DOOLIN. I think, Mr. Chairman, it is simply because it is nothing more than a contingency plan.

Senator CHURCH. Well, so what? I mean

Mr. DOOLIN. For that reason

Senator CHURCH. So what? I mean just because it is a contingency plan does this mean we cannot see it?

Senator PELL. It must be one of two things: They either do not trust our keeping our mouths shut, for which there may be some justification, or it says more than you all have said it says. It is one of the two reasons. There is no other alternative.

Senator CHURCH. You see, this only creates added doubts, this kind of a posture, and it is going to lead to increased pressures, charges, countercharges. It just throws fuel on the fire. Let it burn. If that is the way we have to operate, but I do not see why we must operate that way, and it is only at the insistence of the Executive that this thing is becoming such a big issue.

Mr. BROWN. I think the views of the committee are very clear, sir, and we will communicate them.

Senator CHURCH. Fine, Mr. Ambassador, I hope you will. I guess that is all.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN GREECE

We do have representatives here to discuss the military assistance program for Greece.

Senator PELL. I would like to hear them.

Senator CHURCH. I know you have questions, so let us ask Mr. Rockwell and Mr. Dunlap to come in.

Senator PELL. I wonder if it would not be a good idea if we asked Mr. Dunlap and Mr. Pranger to come to answer questions on general military assistance. I think Mr. Dunlap ought to be around.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

We have asked you gentlemen to come here this morning to discuss the proposed military program for the Greek Government in the coming year.

This is a subject that Senator Pell has been particularly concerned about. For that reason, I am going to invite him to ask such questions as he might like to ask and to take the chair, if he will, for that purpose.

Senator PELL. I will start out by expressing my admiration and regard for Mr. Rockwell, whom I have known well.

My high regard for him personally is quite in contrast to my feelings about our policy toward Greece.

EFFECT OF CEASING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE

What would be the effect if we stopped military assistance to Greece until further decision by the Congress?

STATEMENT OF STUART W. ROCKWELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT J. PRANGER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS; JAMES DUNLAP, DEPUTY TO THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE; AND MILNER DUNN, ECONOMIC-POLITICAL OFFICER, GREEK COUNTRY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. ROCKWELL. How long would that be, Senator?

Senator PELL. It would be until the decision was made by Congress to resume it. In other words, my thought is to prohibit the administration from extending further military assistance until Congress takes positive action to resume it.

My reason for saying this is, as you know, and this is why I wanted Mr. Dunlap to be here, too, is that the amount of military assistance in the pipeline is substantial. I think we have enough already authorized, yet not delivered, to last quite sometime at the present program rate. Would Mr. Dunlap answer that?

Mr. DUNLAP. I will have to refer to my book, Senator.

Senator PELL. Thank you. I think this would be a good point to nail down.

Mr. DUNLAP. At the present program rate, approximately 3 years. Senator PELL. So in other words, if an inhibition like this were placed on the administration, there would be no adverse effect certainly for a year or more and it would be a very tangible action to nudge them along a little bit.

Am I not correct in saying that the leadtime for most of your items is in the neighborhood of 2 years?

Mr. DUNLAP. That is close enough, sir; yes.

Senator PELL. What would be the adverse effect of simply not having any authorization for Greece in this year's aid bill?

Mr. ROCKWELL. Senator, first allow me to express my gratitude for your kind remarks with regard to myself personally.

GREECE AS A NATO ALLY

Second, I think your question goes to the very heart of the dilemma that we face in trying to devise our policy toward Greece, and that is that we are dealing with a country which has an internal order of which we heartily disapprove, yet which is a loyal and enthusiastic NATO ally, which has lived up to all the obligations of the NATO Treaty, and has extended full cooperation to us for the purpose of strengthening the obligations and intentions of that treaty.

There are not many nations in the eastern Mediterranean these days which extend to us the same kind of facilities of full cooperation which Greece does, and we, in essence, are faced with the dilemma of weighing the implications and importance of, and the interrelationship of, our extreme disapproval of Greece's internal national policy against the value of Greece's cooperation with NATO and with us.

Now, if one accepts the NATO treaty and the purposes of NATO as being still valid, and as being a primary objective for the United States in its relationships with Western Europe, then I think it flows from that the assumption that the subsidiary arrangements deriving from the NATO Treaty are also valid.

One of these is an ongoing military program for the modernization and bringing up to date and strengthening of the forces of the socalled forward defense countries among which are Greece and Turkey. If we were to accept the proposal which you have outlined, it would mean, in essence, that we would be further slowing down the progress of modernization of the Greek forces and, in my opinion, endangering a substantial investment, which we have already put into the building of a relatively effective military establishment in Greece.

EFFECT OF LACK OF FUNDS ON GREECE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

I think you should keep in mind, that the sum of money which you mentioned as being in the pipeline includes [deleted] of suspended items. So assuming that those suspensions are not lifted, that amount cannot be taken into account as being available for the ongoing Greek program. This leaves about [deleted]. I think the total value of suspended items are [deleted] or something, and a part of that, Senator, is money destined for ongoing services such as training, spare parts, and the kind of thing that is used primarily for the protection of the investment that we already have in Greece.

So I would think if you were to put forward this proposition and it were to become policy, it would involve, and one would have to accept that it would involve, the deterioration of the military estab lishment in Greece, the lessening of Greece's ability even further to fulfill the obligation of the NATO Treaty and an undermining of a substantial military investment which we already have in Greece.

Now, that might be something that you would be prepared to accept. It would have to be something, I think, that would have to be weighed very carefully. But these military programs, as you know, are designed over a lengthy period. If you stop the process of injection of new funds into them, it means that long-lead items cannot be procured or