it does not mean, and I am sure it was not contemplated, that we would be promising armed forces, because that is not our agreement with the Thai.

Senator JAVITS. So that you would see no necessity for coming to any other agreement in view of the fact that we have no existing agreement which commits armed forces on the ground? Mr. BROWN. No, sir.

LUMPING TOGETHER ALL VIETNAM WAR EXPENDITURES

Senator JAVITS. I think that Senator Case is right, and Senator Church is right, in finding it very difficult to accept the bookkeeping problems as adequate reason for lumping this appropriation in the Defense Department's appropriations.

The question I would like to raise is whether or not, perhaps, your other reason for it is that it is truly because of what you have just testified to, a part of the cost of the Vietnam war and, therefore, should be lumped with what we are spending on the Vietnam war in view of the fact that when we stop the Vietnam war their expenditure will go out just like other Vietnam war expenditures.

Mr. BROWN. That is right, sir.

Senator JAVITS. Is that correct? That is your really substantive reason, is it not?

Mr. BROWN. I think basically that is the reasoning.

Senator JAVITS. Whereas if it were military aid under the foreign aid act it is the kind of expenditure that would be expected to survive an end of the Vietnam war; correct?

Mr. BROWN. That is why the continued same process of processing these operations with the [deleted] which was in military assistance. Senator JAVITS. Do we have any contemplation of what military assistance will cost to Thailand once the Vietnam war is over? What is really Thai military assistance?

Mr. BROWN. I do not see how anyone can predict that.

Senator JAVITS. You have given us two figures. One is [deleted]; one is [deleted]. Isn't the [deleted] really Thai military assistance? Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator JAVITS. So if anything is to go in the foreign aid provision for military purposes it should be the [deleted].

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

Senator JAVITS. If we put the [deleted] in then we would be putting in a Vietnam war expenditure.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator JAVITS. And we might just as well put in all the Vietnam war expenditures, shouldn't we, for Korea and anybody else; isn't that correct?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator JAVITS. That is the real rationale.

Now, question, would the Department have any objection to including Thailand for its true military aid as an element of foreign aid, to wit, the [deleted] order of magnitude into the foreign aid bill? Senator CHURCH. Separating the two.

Senator JAVITS. There I can see the point, and that answers all your bookkeeping problems.

Mr. BROWN. I do not think it really does.

Senator JAVITS. You don't?

Mr. DOOLIN. I do not think so, Senator, because the cut is not that clean.

Senator JAVITS. Well, no cut is that clean. The question is is it approximately clean enough to be done.

Senator CASE. In other words, [deleted].

Senator JAVITS. It is an order of magnitude.

FUNDING OF SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator CHURCH. How is the South Korean matter handled now so far as military assistance [deleted] is concerned?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir; I think the regular Korean assistance is in the foreign aid bill.

Senator CHURCH. The regular form of military assistance is in the foreign aid bill, but the part relating to the Defense budget, what they are doing in Vietnam, is under Defense.

Senator CASE. In other words, the counterinsurgency, et cetera, would be military aid.

Senator JAVITS. It is military aid.

Senator CASE. This, of course, is the point, and for the rest it is a a matter of designating it, isolating it.

Senator CHURCH. I think Senator Javits has delineated the issue very well.

Senator JAVITS. Just boiling the issue down.

Senator CASE. We are doing the same thing with Korea.

Senator JAVITS. In essence, if they are right about it.

I understand our reasons, Mr. Chairman, for wishing to recapture the legitimate expenditure of military aid.

Senator CHURCH. For foreign aid.

Senator JAVITS. That is a matter we ought to seek to recapture, we have a right to. As to the other, if it is part of the Vietnam war we have to accept the fact that that is a unit proposition which is the Defense Department appropriations.

Senator ČASE. I would think the Senator from Alabama would probably agree with it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I have urged such as that for a long time. I think that we ought not to be charged in the foreign aid program with those expenses that are primarily defense expenditures, that they ought to be in the Defense budget. But I have never had much luck in separating them.

Senator CASE. And carrying that point through, those matters that are military assistance ought to be so charged even though that country is involved with us in another war.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, that is right. Yes, even more so.

I notice in reading Mr. Brown's statement. I am sorry I was late but I had to be at another committee-that he refers specifically to the [deleted] that you made mention of. In other words, it is clear cut so far as this statement is concerned. I do not know how intertwined it may be with reference to the other expenditure.

Senator CHURCH. If we can do it for Korea I do not see why we cannot do it for Thailand.

Senator SPARKMAN. I do not either.

Senator CHURCH. Ambassador Brown, I have two or three questions.

EXAMINATION OF U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH THAILAND URGED

Senator JAVITS. May I finish? I believe this is critically important. I do not believe we can allow the Thai situation to remain where it is in terms of respective obligations. I think that we have to interest. ourselves in what should be the American relation to a situation like that in Thailand.

Senator CHURCH. I agree wholeheartedly because I believe this is filled with all of the problems that developed in Vietnam, and we must be very careful. Now is the time to be careful, and this committee should make a thorough investigation of the state of our relationship with Thailand.

Senator JAVITS. In full fairness to the Thai, with their courage, their self-reliance and self-help, I would not wish for a moment, Mr. Chairman, to imply derogation of the extraordinary vitality and determination and fidelity of the Thais to their own security, et cetera, or to what they can accomplish for freedom as a nation.

Mr. BROWN. I think, Mr. Chairman, the President has recently made it very clear that he does not want to get in this, what somebody has called, a creeping Vietnam situation. He is most anxious to avoid it. Senator CHURCH. I am sure he does have that feeling.

When you look back on the Vietnamese experience though no one really wanted what happened, and I think, with that in mind. we ought to be very careful as to how we proceed finally. Mr. BROWN. That certainly is his intention.

REASON FOR U.S. BASES IN THAILAND

Senator CHURCH. In that connection, Ambassador Brown, when we built the bases which we presently occupy in Thailand, the mission for which we used the airbases was connected with the bombing of North Vietnam, was it not?

Mr. BROWN. I do not know that it was limited to that, sir. It was South Vietnam as well.

Senator CHURCH. I know that during that period those bases were used for bombing operations against the north.

Mr. BROWN. That is right.

Senator CHURCH. [Deleted.] What is the present use of the bases now that the bombing of the north is stopped?

Mr. BROWN. They are mainly used for air operations in South Vietnam [deleted].

REDUCING U.S. FORCES IN THAILAND

Senator CHURCH. Is there any intention, now that we have commenced to reduce the force levels of American troops in South Vietnam, to begin with a reduction of the force levels of American troops in Thailand?

Mr. BROWN. I would have to check into that because they are basically in a support position. Very large numbers of them are engaged in the maintenance of the fields and the communication facilities.

32-308-69-21

Senator CHURCH. Would you check into that and let the committeeknow if there is any plan now or intention now to commence reduction in force in Thailand?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; I would be glad to.

(The following information was later supplied by the State Department :)

REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES IN THAILAND

We are continually examining our overseas military posture in order to find ways consistent with our security needs to reduce the number of American military personnel stationed overseas.

Following a satisfactory solution to the current hostilities in Southeast Asia, both we and the Thai Government are agreed that there would have to be compelling reasons for American forces to remain in Thailand and that this is a matter for agreement between the two governments. We are also studying ways to reduce the number of combat forces in Thailand as the tempo of fighting in Southeast Asia phases down. As these studies have not been completed, I would not wish to venture any predictions of their conclusions at this time.

Senator CHURCH. Well, I do not believe I have any further questions. Senator, do you have any?

Senator SPARKMAN. Not right now.

Senator PELL. No.

Senator CHURCH. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions.

SENATOR CASE'S QUESTIONS

There are several questions that the staff prepared which Mr. Javits has which I would be glad to have answered for the record, not necessarily orally.

Senator JAVITS. I will, Mr. Chairman, submit for the record questions for Senator Case. I will hand them to the witness and ask that they be answered, and ask unanimous consent that they may be made part of the record.

Senator CHURCH. Very well.

Before this questioning ends, also for the record, I want to quotefrom [deleted] a passage that-this has been submitted to the committee by the Defense Department-a passage that relates to the contingency planning which has been the subject of this hearing with the Thais. It reads as follows:

[Deleted].

(The questions of Senator Case previously referred to and their answers follow :)

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENAtor Case

In a draft report on aid to Thailand, the General Accounting Office said the following:

"In the situation such as existed in Thailand. where the enemy was small in strength and was not conducting military operations of appreciable size nor concentrating on building a logistics base, jet fighters, for instance, would not appear to have an efficient application. We were informed by MACTHAI/JUSMAG officials that the F-5 jet fighters furnished Thailand currently have no application in Thailand. According to MACTHAI/JUSMAG, (The U.S. military aid group) the insurgents were equipped only with small arms and until such time as they acquire antiaircraft weapons, the most effective air support would be slower propeller driven aircraft, such as the T-28, which has the ability to stay over target areas for longer periods."

(a) How many jets and tanks have been given to Thailand to date? Answer.

(b) The military authorization bill pending in the Senate would authorize procurement of four F-5 jet fighters for Thailand. What is the justification for providing an aircraft which is not as suitable for use in the insurgency areas as propeller planes would be?

Answer. Although we emphasize in our service-funded military assistance (MASF) program to Thailand the development of the counterinsurgency capability of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF), our MASF program is also designed to upgrade the capability of the RTARF to defend against conventional attacks by Communist China and North Viet-Nam and to continue to participate in the conventional operations of free world forces in such areas as South Viet-Nam and Korea. It is in this context of defense against conventional attack and participation in regional security operations that we are providing F-5 jet fighters to Thailand-an action which will significantly augment their conventional air capability.

1. How large are the Thai military forces? Why are they unable to put down 2,800 insurgents? How many guerrillas were killed or captured last year?

Answer. As of 31 March 1969, the assigned strength of the Thai armed forces was [deleted] men. Of these, over 11,200 are serving with other free world forces in South Viet-Nam, and a company is assigned to the UN Command in South Korea.

Insurgency is a phenomenon which grows out of political, social, economic, geographic, as well as military, conditions, and requires a response on as many fronts. Success against insurgents cannot be measured satisfactorily by any single yardstick-be it military, economic or political. The persistence in Thailand of an undetermined number of Communist insurgents (which the Mission currently estimates [deleted] rather than 2,800) is not an indication of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) lack of success in combatting the externally-supported Communist insurgency in its country. In fact, the RTG's response has been a comprehensive and reasonably effective one. The insurgency has been geographically contained through military suppression operations; village-level security forces have been developed in many sensitive areas to provide protection for the loyal populace. At the same time, the RTG, with the aid and advice of US AID and USIA, has undertaken a comprehensive set of development, welfare, and informational programs. In the Northeast, the long-standing insurgency has been stalemated, though by no means eliminated. In the North and North Central areas, the insurgency is somewhat newer and limited geographically and by its tribal character. In these regions the RTG's military and developmental responses have not yet been entirely adequate, but there are recent indications that they are becoming more effective. In the final area of major insurgent activity, the Far South, about 1,000 Chinese terrorists, remnants of the Malayan Emergency, operate in Thai territory. The RTG has made only limited efforts to remove these insurgents because their activities have thus far been targeted against Malaysia and because other priorities in the North and Northeast have required more attention. In other words, since the inception of overt insurgent activity in Thailand in 1965, the RTG has contained the insurgency and developed relatively effective longrange programs to deal with the political, economic, social and military roots of the insurgency. There are no indications that the Communist Party of Thailand has changed its policy of overthrowing the RTG by armed revolution.