I have a short statement which I could either read or submit for the record, whichever you prefer.

The CHAIRMAN. You are the best judge of what is in it. You may summarize it if you would like to or you may read it.

Mr. BROWN. I will read it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. BROWN. I would like to say it is classified secret due to the inclusion of the current program level for military assistance, but except for that it could be very easily declassified.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

THAILAND IS KEY SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRY

Mr. BROWN. I do not think I need to describe or emphasize to this committee the important position which Thailand occupies in Southeast Asia. In terms of size, history, and geography, Thailand is a key country in the area both in war and peace. Thailand is now cooperat ing fully with us in Vietnam. It has sent a division of troops there and has provided bases from which we conduct important air operations in Vietnam. Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman has been one of the most outspoken Asian champions of resistance to Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Thailand has been in the forefront of efforts to increase regional cooperation in the field of economics and security. It is certain to play an important role in the postwar period.

In addition to longstanding concern about possible threats from the north, Thailand is currently fighting an active insurgency, one that is Communist directed and externally supported. Insurgency came into the open only in 1965. But it is known that since 1959 schools in Communist China and North Vietnam trained some 1,500 Thai and tribal insurgents.

INSURGENTS IN NORTHERN THAILAND

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you there, Mr. Brown, on that subject, what is your estimate now of how many North Vietnamese or Laotian or Vietminh, whatever you wish to call them, are now in northern Thailand?

Mr. BROWN. We do not have any very specific figure on that, but we would say probably 40 to 50 thousand.

The CHAIRMAN. Forty to fifty thousand.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. They are an ethnic group which lives there. The CHAIRMAN. No, I mean troops which were sent in by North Vietnam. I do not mean the people who live there normally. You mean these are people like we have so many Irishmen or so many Czechs in this country?

Mr. BROWN. I do not think there are any regular North Vietnamese troops.

The CHAIRMAN. None.

Mr. BROWN. In fact, there are guerrillas that go in and conduct raids and assassinations and indoctrination and that kind of thing.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by the 1,500 Thai who have been trained as insurgents and go back?

Mr. BROWN. And go back in as agents; yes, sir, as they do in Korea. The CHAIRMAN. I see. I had heard various figures, and I had heard the figure of 20,000 Vietminh troops.

Mr. BROWN. No, sir. I do not think that is so.
The CHAIRMAN. That is not true.

All right. Go ahead; proceed, please.

INSURGENCY IN NORTHEAST THAILAND

Mr. BROWN. During 1966 and 1967 the insurgency in northeast Thailand was at a peak; the monthly average was 10 assassinations of village leaders and 20 forced propaganda meetings. Thai counterinsurgency efforts, both increased security forces and accelerated rural development, apparently succeeded during 1968 in stalemating the attempt by the insurgents in the northeast to conduct small-unit guerrilla warfare. The insurgents have been forced to revert to less visible forms of organizational activities.

But, in 1967 Communist terrorism broke out among Meo tribesmen in mountainous north Thailand, mostly along the border of Laos. Suppression operations have been difficult, and security forces have suffered disproportionate losses (several hundred killed and wounded). Thai security, development, and other efforts in north Thailand are just getting underway.

Small Communist insurgent bands have also appeared in other parts of Thailand, and a "Malaysian People's Liberation Army" of 800 to 1,000 is scattered along the southern border. Although these groups have not been nearly as active as insurgents in the northeast and north, the organization of the Communist terrorist group in southern Thailand and the inaccessability of its area of operations do pose a threat to Thai security in the border area.

Because of these facts, our economic aid, as well as much of our military assistance, will be focused on the accelerated rural development which is fundamental to effective counter-insurgency.

OBJECTIVES OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE

As explained in Mr. Macomber's letter to Mr. Marcy of June 27, 1969, our military assistance to Thailand has been designed to help that country to develop forces capable of affording a significant degree of protection against outside attack and also, particularly in recent years, to help the Royal Thai Government cope with externally supported insurgency. The program is designed to provide the Thai forces with improved firepower, mobility, and communications capability. We have delivered such items as M-16's, M-60 machineguns, communications equipment, and UH-1-"Huey"-helicopters. As certain other items of equipment for their regular forces have become outdated and economically unsupportable-for example, trucks, tanks, artillery, and certain aircraft-we have replaced them with newer equipment, such as M-41 tanks and F-5 aircraft.

In addition to helping train Thai forces for Vietnam, U.S. Army Special Forces personnel are assisting the Thai Army and police in training in the tactics and techniques of counterinsurgency. U.S. military advisers are not assigned below the regimental level, and it is both Thai and U.S. policy that there be no U.S. direct participation in counterinsurgency operations. During his visit in May, 1968, to Washington, Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn noted that, while welcoming foreign assistance in the form of training, equipment, and

advice, the Royal Thai Government regarded defeating the insurgency as a Thai responsibility to be carried out by its own forces.

With respect to defense against Communist aggression through subversion or in any way other than armed attack, Thailand and the United States agree that our assistance should take the form of economic and military assistance programs. Such programs will enhance Thailand's ability to prevent and counter externally supported subversion and at the same time to continue economic development. We are examining ways in which the Thai Government can take on a larger share of the burden of security costs as the Thai economy continues to develop and it can be done without detriment to other necessary Thai Government programs.

FUNDING OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Military assistance to Thailand since 1967 has been funded from the Defense Department's budget rather than from the foreign assistance appropriation. This was done because the maintenance of parallel but separate financial and logistic systems for U.S. forces and for forces supported by military assistance that are engaged in interrelated activities is cumbersome, time consuming, and inefficient. More important than cost, however, is the need for greater flexibility, simplicity, and coordination. Many facilities and activities in Thailand are jointly used and operated by, or provide support jointly to, U.S. and Thai forces. The requirement to make a division of funding under these conditions created cumbersome rigidities and inefficiencies in a situation that should be as flexible and streamlined as possible. Since all these separate accounts and functions serve a common purpose, common funding and management is both logical and feasible. This was approved by the Congress, when a change took place; I believe a letter came to this committee and was approved in Public Law 89-367, section 401.

However, even though the source of funding was changed, we have continued the same procedures for developing and monitoring military assistance to Thai forces in Thailand as had prevailed when it was funded from the military assistance budget. Requirements for military assistance are developed in the field by the MAAG in consultation with the Embassy and the Ambassador. In Washington, they are jointly reviewed by the Departments of Defense and State before programs are finally approved. So the change in funding has not made. any change in the close interdepartmental scrutiny of the program.

FISCAL YEAR 1970 AMOUNTS INCLUDED IN DOD BUDGET

The amount included in the budget for fiscal year 1970 for these purposes is about [deleted]. The Defense Department can give you the details. This compares with approximately $75 million in fiscal years 1968 and 1969, $60 million for 1967, $44 million in 1966. The type of equipment currently being provided is roughly comparable to that furnished in earlier years, though with greater emphasis on material useful to deal with the insurgency I have mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Brown.

On that last item is the [deleted] you say for these purposes, it is about [deleted]? Is that meant to confine the [deleted] just to the counterinsurgency activity?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is [deleted] for all purposes, aid to Thailand? Mr. BROWN. All purposes for their troops in Thailand; yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. For their troops.

Mr. BROWN. Their troops in Thailand; yes, sir. Both the regular army and the forces which are being used for counterinsurgency. The CHAIRMAN. Is there economic aid for Thailand?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it include the item we call supporting assistance in foreign assistance?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir; it would not.

TOTAL ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO THAILAND

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a reasonably accurate estimate of the total assistance given to Thailand in fiscal 1969 and estimated for fiscal 1970, for all purposes?

Mr. BROWN. The current plan for economic assistance, most of which is directed toward rural development and improving the conditions which, if left unsolved, are fostering this kind of insurgency, is $45 million.

The CHAIRMAN. $45 million?

Mr. BROWN. And the military assistance for the Thai forces in Thailand is about [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. BROWN. [Deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. How much is that?

Mr. BROWN. I would say

Mr. DOOLIN. It is not possible because of service funding procedures to place an exact cost on U.S. support of Thai military deployments to South Vietnam. However, a reasonably accurate estimate of this cost would be on the order of [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

MAINTENANCE OF AIR BASES

The CHAIRMAN. That would not include our expenses in the maintenance of the airbases, would it?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any estimate of what that could run into?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir; I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any estimate of what we spend for the airbases in Thailand? We have about 50,000 personnel in Thailand. Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; just under that.

The CHAIRMAN. We spend a very substantial amount in addition. Mr. BROWN. We did in developing the airfields.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, and maintaining them.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

SECRECY OF THE BROWN LETTER

The CHAIRMAN. This is not exactly on the same subject, but while you are here, I want to ask if you remember the so-called Brown letter that you originated. [Note: The Brown letter set forth the U.S. offset agreement with South Korea for ROK forces in Vietnam.]

Mr. BROWN. I do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it now possible for you to make that available to the committee or is the Department still determined not to give it to us? Mr. BROWN. I have not thought about that letter specifically, sir. The CHAIRMAN. It always irritated me that they never would give it to us. I do not mean this against you. The Department's policy was to refuse to give the committee your letter which, as I recall, was intended to set out what we agreed [deleted], is that right?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That was its purpose.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not understand yet while you feel that this committee is not entitled to that information. I am not speaking personally to you.

Mr. BROWN. I know that.

The CHAIRMAN. I am speaking about it as a matter of policy.

Mr. MARCY. I think I should remind you that Mr. Macomber is here. The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MARCY. Prior to May 1968, the Department of State gave this committee a summary of what was in the so-called Brown letter. The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I understand.

Mr. MARCY. Subsequently, Mr. Macomber brought that letter and showed it to me unofficially and privately, and I compared the letter with the summary, and noted several points where there were slight differences of opinion, but the letter itself was never made available officially to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. I remember that.

POLICY MATTER INVOLVING EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS

I am leading up to another matter which is, that it strikes me that these matters are not just the private property of the Department of State. These involve a great deal of money and the possibility of involvement in wars similar to Vietnam. I really think, as a matter of policy, that this committee ought to have had officially and on the record this letter so there would be no whispering about it. I really do not see why it should be classified.

These are very expensive undertakings with almost incalculable amounts of money involved, aside from the risk of war, and I am coming to another agreement which I am going to ask you about. Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But the Brown letter is a sort of precedent. We had an awful time even getting the summary. At first we were told, as I recall that it was classified and it was not available, wasn't that about it? Then gradually after much pressure and waste of time and effort we did get the summary Mr. Marcy told you about.